

William Boulton.



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HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A NEW EDITION,

WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

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A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXI.

History of Athens from the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war and the establishment of the supreme Council of Thirty, commonly called the Thirty Tyrants, to the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus.

SECTION I.

Recapitulatory synopsis of the Peloponnesian war. Deficiency of the Greeks in political science. Condition of slaves meliorated by the Peloponnesian war.

IN the long and complicated war, which it has been the business of the preceding chapters to relate, the reader would in vain look for campaigns upon the extensive scale of Hannibal's in Italy, Cæsar's in various parts of the ancient world, or many in modern Europe. It was not a war between two great states, but between two confederacies of small states, with intermingled territories. The objects of attack and defence were thus numerous and scattered. The Lacedæmonian confederacy, strong in disciplined numbers, was deficient in pecuniary resources; while the very purpose of Athens, defensive war, restrained her operations to a correspondence with those of her enemies. Hence,

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in the account of Thucydides, digested scrupulously according to the order of events, the Peloponnesian war may appear, to superficial observation, an unconnected series of action, in which the enterprises had often no very near relation to each other, or to the first and great object of the contending parties. In the foregoing narrative it has always been in view to guard the reader against a mistake into which some writers on the subject have fallen; yet, to enable him to follow, with greater facility, the clue of Grecian politics through succeeding times, it may be advantageous here briefly to retrace the principal features of that multifarious series of events.¹

¹ Barthelemi, in the Grecian history which he has interwoven in his *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis*, after a concise account of the first campaign of the Peloponnesian war, proceeds thus: 'Les campagnes qui la suivirent n'offrent de même qu'une continuité d'actions particulières, de courses rapides, d'entreprises qui semblent étrangères à l'objet qu'on se proposait de part & d'autre. Comment des peuples si guerriers et si voisins, animés par une ancienne jalousie et des haines récentes, ne songeaient-ils qu'à se surprendre, à s'éviter, à partager leurs forces, et, par une foule de diversions sans éclat ou sans danger, à multiplier et prolonger les malheurs de la guerre? C'est parce que cette guerre ne devait pas se conduire sur le même plan que les autres.' P. 2. s. 3. This solution of the difficulty can scarcely but excite a smile; and the more detailed explanation, which the learned author proceeds to attempt, will not be found very satisfactory. But the contemporary historian would have furnished him with a sober and very sufficient answer to his petulant question. It occurs in a speech of Pericles, reported by Thucydides, in his first book; and the part most pointedly to the purpose is in the 141st chapter. Barthelemi's work is a rich mine of information concerning the interesting people he describes; but for its very merit it is important that its deficiencies and errors should be exposed. Barthelemi had imbibed the political principles of the French philosophy, and was warm in the cause of ideal liberty: but, though he passed much of his time in the house of a minister, the Duke of Choiseul, he seems to have been no

The Peloponnesian war was truly a civil war: it was less a contest between Lacedæmon and Athens than between the oligarchal and 'democratical' interests throughout the Grecian commonwealths; in every one of which was a party friendly to the public enemy; with whom it had a community of interest, not, as may happen in modern Europe, accidental, unprincipled, and passing, but fundamental and permanent; so that, with the success of that public enemy, not only the political welfare of the party, but the private welfare of its members was intimately and, for the most part, inseparably implicated. The apprehension excited, among the oligarchal states, by the growing preponderance of the Athenian democracy, rendered terrible by its spirit of conquest, its spirit of tyranny, and its particular disposition to overthrow and oppress the oligarchal interest, was the real source of the war.² The purpose of the Peloponnesians therefore, though in offensive measures, was, not to conquer Athens, but only to reduce her

Ch. 13. s. 5.
of this Hist.

politician; he certainly had no clear insight into the complicated politics of Greece. His fellow-countryman Rollin, though an academician, shows juster views of Grecian history. Had he avoided to interrupt and perplex his narrative with anecdotes, biography, and preaching, which might have been better thrown into an appendix, his book, instead of being esteemed fit only for boys, might have maintained its reputation as the best epitome of Grecian history, for the earlier part, that has yet appeared. After losing the guidance of the contemporary historians indeed he has been bewildered.

² The alarm spread over Europe by a similar spirit, carried indeed to a greater extravagance, in the French democracy, may possibly be supposed to have furnished this idea; but it was derived purely from the Grecian contemporary historians; and indeed the passage was written before the spirit of conquest and tyranny among the French had given the lie direct to their pretension of peaceful and equitable principles.

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to a state of inability to conquer them. For this end it was held sufficient, and it was deemed also indispensably necessary, to deprive her of that dominion over other Grecian states which, by affording a superior revenue, enabled her to maintain the most formidable navy to that time known in the world, and to carry hostilities to distant countries, by land as well as by sea. The invasion of Attica, for two successive years, had this for its principal object; the siege of Plataea, and the unavailing attempt at naval exertion, equally followed with the same view. Meanwhile it was the purpose of Pericles to strengthen Athens, if possible, by alliance, but not by conquest. It sufficed to let her enemies weary and impoverish themselves with fruitless attack, and the consequences would be equal to victory: her power would be at least confirmed, and probably extended. And in these views he was favored by the circumstances of the Athenian dominion, and by the warfare of the age. For the Athenian dominion consisted mostly of islands and transmarine territories, secure through the superiority of the Athenian fleet; and though a country could less easily be defended against a superior invading force with ancient than with modern weapons, yet towns derived a security from fortifications which, against the modern art of attack, no art of defence can give.

But what the Peloponnesian arms alone could not accomplish, the pestilence, co-operating with them, in some degree effected. The severity of the pressure upon Athens at home encouraged the oligarchal and checked the democratical interest in her foreign dependencies. In some of them ensued what, in modern phrase, we should call a change of administration; and, instantly as the oligarchal became the

prevailing party, revolt was ripe: with the first favoring opportunity the Athenian connexion was renounced, and the Lacedæmonian adopted. Thus the operations of the war became distracted and complex, while the principal object remained simple and the same. The command of the sea nevertheless enabled the Athenians to vindicate their transmarine dominion; the extraordinary affair of Pylus put pledges into their hands which ensured Attica against farther invasion; and thus, nearly five years after the death of Pericles, the purpose of that great statesman was accomplished, in the acquisition of means for making an honorable and advantageous peace. But unfortunately, in the want of his superintending wisdom, the popular will, bandied from orator to orator, and often subjected to the unworthiest, owned no principle but of ambition and avarice, inflamed by success; till, Brasidas obtaining the direction of the enemy's arms, and Cleon of their own, defeat restored among the Athenians the moderation which success had banished, and peace was made.

Such was the first series of action of the Peloponnesian war. The ancient enmity of Lacedæmon and Argos, in concurrence with the rising ambition of Alcibiades, produced a second; abundantly complicated, though within a narrow field. But still, reduced to its elements, it was a contest between oligarchy and democracy.

The circumstances of Sicily led to a third series. Here a new principle was the spring, and here first conquest upon a great scale came into view. Democracy here was opposed to democracy. But, unlike those little democratical states, which could only support themselves under the protecting power of Athens, Syracuse was so powerful as to assert its own

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dominion over almost all the other Grecian cities of Sicily. Such a democracy was perhaps even more obnoxious to the domineering temper of the Athenian people than the most absolute oligarchy or monarchy. Thus the jealousy and the ambition of the Athenian people were led readily to second the ambition of Alcibiades. But on the removal of the able projector the magnificence of the project shrunk; and, with the overthrow of the Athenian forces in Sicily, the principle, upon which the Sicilian war was begun, totally lost its energy.

From the Sicilian war then resulted a fourth and concluding series of action; complicated in its circumstances, but in principle brought back to the original spring, the opposition of interest of the democratical and oligarchal parties throughout Greece. The prominent points of that series were, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies; war transferred to the Asiatic coast; the connexion of Lacedæmon with Persia; sedition in Athens itself, with the short triumph of the oligarchal party there, more hostile to their fellow-countrymen of the opposite interest than to the common enemy; and thence that weakness and instability in all the powers of government, which superinduced the defeat of *Ægospotami*, and the capture of the city.

Able in war, skilful, perhaps to the utmost extent of human ability, in political intrigue and political negotiation, in leading fellow-citizens, in bargaining with strangers, the Greeks were unfortunately deficient in the more important science of framing that great machine which we call a Government; harmonizing the various ranks of men of which a nation must consist; providing, at the same time, security for property, and equal justice for those who have no

property; establishing, for the well-disposed of every rank, an interest in the preservation of the constitution, and, for the unprincipled and turbulent, strong coercion to secure it against disturbance; reconciling the protection of private rights with the maintenance of public force, and making a general private interest in the support of the existing order of things the basis of patriotism, and the source of general concord and public spirit. In the preceding chapters we have traced the rise and downfall of the most celebrated democracy that has appeared in the world: we have seen the wonderful force of that form of government as a spring, which enabled so small a community to become such a formidable power, to acquire such extensive dominion, and to exhibit, within so short a period, so many exalted characters. But we have seen too its utter unfitness both to give security under equal law to its own people, and to rest in peace among neighbouring states; its disposition to exercise the most oppressive tyranny against the most illustrious of its own citizens, and the most imperious and cruel despotism over those who were so unfortunate as to fall under its sovereignty in the condition of subjects; and we have seen that, though it might have resisted the combination, which its injurious and alarming conduct excited, of the most powerful military confederacy with the wealthiest empire to that time known, yet the highest spirit in the people, with very uncommon abilities in the leaders, was unable to avert the ruin which such a government hath an eternal tendency to bring upon itself.

The benefit of instruction and the amusement of interesting investigation should reward the painful contemplation of the crimes, follies, and miseries of mankind, which it is the office of history to relate:

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any gratification arising from matter pleasing in itself must be placed to the account of incidental gain. But when occasionally we find, in the course of events, good beaming upon men, or evil alleviated, the satisfaction will be greater in proportion as the surrounding scene is dark, and the relief unexpected. We have had occasion to observe that misfortune could scarcely befall a Grecian state, so imperfectly were the Grecian governments harmonized, but benefit, or at least the prospect of benefit, would result to some considerable portion of its members. We shall be more gratified to find that, with the various miseries which a war of twenty-seven years diffused among those called citizens of the Greek nation, it brought a very general alleviation of evil to that far more numerous portion of mankind, the Grecian slaves. When all neighbouring republics were friendly the slave looked around in vain for refuge from the cruelty of an inhuman master; but if they were hostile, it behoved equally the wealthy despot of many slaves, and the poor tyrant of one, to beware how he set the wretch upon comparing the risk of desertion with the hope of a better service. The Grecian republics indeed were not all entirely without laws for the protection of that unfortunate portion of the human race: at Athens particularly the wise and humane institutions of Solon provided for them a lot that other slaves might envy. Yet even at Athens they might be very harshly treated; and even there the war produced regulations to soften their condition. What the ancient historians have left unnoticed (for slaves came little within their regard) we learn from the celebrated comic poet of the day. In the comedy, yet extant, called *The Clouds*, we find an old country-gentleman of Attica

ludicrously execrating the war because he was no longer permitted to beat his slaves. SECT.
II.

Thus incidentally only we get information of the condition of those who formed far the larger part of the population of the boasted free republics of Greece. Of the lot of their masters, the citizens, or however of those of Athens, in so many respects the first of the republics, our information is large; and coming from contemporary writers, of various situations in life, various views and pursuits, and of various and opposite political interests, it is, in great proportion, amply authenticated. From this it will be advantageous, and even necessary, to endeavour to select and throw together here what may be wanting to elucidate the views, and account for the actions, of those to whom, on the surrender of the city to the Lacedæmonian arms, the supreme power was committed; for, without such preparation, the conduct of men among the first of Greece in birth, talents, and education might appear monstrous and irrational, and the story, however well attested, altogether too strange for belief.

SECTION II.

*Character of the Athenian democracy; judicature; revenue; syco-
phancy; theatrical satire; law of treason.*

We have already had occasion to observe that Solon introduced, or left, in the Athenian constitution, a defect which had the most direct and irresistible tendency to its destruction. Carefully providing for the responsibility of ministers, he committed absolute sovereignty immediately to the multitude, who could be responsible to none. The same power delegated

Ch. 5. s. 4.
of this Hist.

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to representatives, who, at stated periods, should be responsible to the multitude, would not have been so hastily ruinous. He intended indeed that the councils of the Areopagus and of the Fourhundred, afterward Fivehundred, should balance the authority of the popular assembly; and they might have been effectual balances to a body representative of the people; but against sovereign power, committed immediately to the people at large, no balance could avail. Interested demagogues inciting, restraint was soon overborne, and so the Athenian government became, what, in the very age, we find it was called, and the people seem to have been even pleased to hear it called, A TYRANNY IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE.³

We want information how Solon composed his courts of justice; but there seems reason to believe that, among the changes introduced by Clisthenes and Ephialtes, not only his venerable tribunal of the Areopagus, but the whole judicature of Athens suffered. The institution of wages for serving in the ten ordinary courts is attributed to Pericles. It was a mode of bribing the people. Three oboles, about fourpence sterling, were the daily pay of a dicast, whose office resembled that of our jurymen. The rich and the industrious avoided; the poor, the idle, the profligate thenceforward sought the office; it became their resource for a livelihood.⁴ To extend gratification then among that sovereign order, the

Aristot.
Polit.
l. 2. c. 12.

³ Τυραννίδα ἔχερε τὴν ἀρχήν. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 63. & l. 3. c. 37.

⁴ 'I sold sausages,' says Agoracritus, in The Knights of Aristophanes, 'but I got the best part of my livelihood by 'judging causes.' V. 1239. & 1255. 'And if the archon should 'not order the court to sit,' says a boy in the Wasps, 'how are 'we to have victuals?' 'Alas!' answers his father, 'I fear we 'must go supperless.' V. 309.

juries were made immoderately numerous. Five ^{Aristoph. Vesp.} hundred was the ordinary number of each. In the ten courts, unless the demands of military service interfered, no less than six thousand citizens are said to have been employed, except on holidays, daily throughout the year; and, for a cause of extraordinary ^{Andoc. de myst. p. 9.} importance, the whole six thousand were sometimes assembled to compose the single tribunal called Heliaea. But the holidays themselves, which interrupted the business of the courts, afforded also a pretence and a mode for bribing the people. They were truly seasons of festival; in which the numerous carcasses of animals killed in sacrifice were distributed to the multitude. Demagogues therefore would omit no opportunity for ingratiating themselves at so easy a rate as by the proposal of a new festival; and thus ^{Xen. resp. Athen. c. 2. s. 9. & c. 3. s. 2. & 8.} the Athenian holidays were multiplied till they were twice the number of those of any other Grecian city. Still however they were far from equalling those of the Roman church in modern Europe, making, all together, no more than a sixth part of the year.

In the deficiency therefore of subsistence provided under the name of Sacrifice, a lawsuit, or, still more, a criminal prosecution, became the delight of the Athenian people. Beside the certain pay, which was small, there was the hope of bribes, which might be large; while pride was gratified by the importance which accrued to the meanest man who could call himself an Athenian citizen. Fine and confiscation, ordinary punishments of the Athenian law, conveyed the property of the wealthy to the treasury; to be thence distributed in various ways, theatrical exhibitions, processions, and feasts, for the gratification of the people, or wages on pretence of paying their services. Suits and prosecutions therefore, encouraged

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by the interest of the sovereign, became innumerable; and life and property were rendered insecure beyond what anything, seen in the most profligate of modern European governments, at least of times before the French revolution, would give to imagine under any government possible. The glorious security provided by the English law, which requires the solemn sanction of a grand jury to the merit of the accusation, before any man can be subjected even to trial, was unknown at Athens. It appears as if liberty was held there (so was the spirit of Solon's system perverted) to consist, not in the security of every one against injury from others, but in the power of every one to injure others. Any man might constitute himself accuser against any, and the king-archon was bound by his office to bring the accused to trial. When the cause came before the jury, no right of challenge, the second security of Englishmen, gave the accused Athenian means of guarding against partiality in his judges. The effect of partiality in some it was indeed proposed to obviate by multitude, such that the majority should not be likely to concur in it: but the disadvantages of such a resource perhaps exceeded its benefits. In no conference among themselves could the informed and the wary, of so numerous a court, correct the prejudices and misjudgment of the ignorant, careless, or impassioned, or obviate the effects of misused eloquence; nor was it possible to make so large a portion of the sovereign people responsible for the most irregular or flagitious decision. Punishment could not be, and among the multitude shame was lost. Under this constitution of judicature the most victorious and deserving general, the ablest and most upright magistrate, or the most inoffensive private citizen, might be brought to trial for his life

Xen. resp.
Athen.
c. 3. s. 12.

at the pleasure of the most profligate of mankind. Even the allegation of a specific crime, a crime defined by law, was unnecessary. Constructive treason, any imputed disaffection to the sovereignty of the people, sufficed; and, as passion and prejudice, or the powers of oratory, or solicitation and bribery, moved, condemnation or acquittal were pronounced.

SECT.
II.

Lys. or. pro
Polystr.
p. 664.
& or. con.
Ergocl.
p. 320.

We have, from Aristophanes, a ludicrous picture, not perhaps greatly inflated, of the importance which the political and judicial system of Athens gave to every individual citizen; of the court paid in consequence to those, mostly men beyond the age of military service, who gave their time to the tribunals in the office of dicast, and of the usual pride and profligacy of such as could hold any leading influence there. 'We are as great as kings,' an old dicast says: 'The principal men of the commonwealth watch our rising in the morning. Presently one of those who have embezzled public money approaches me, bows humbly, and begs favor. 'If ever you your- self,' he says, 'in any office, or but in the management of a military mess, robbed your comrades, pity me!' He stood trembling before me as if I was a god.' Allowing for something of caricature, still this is a picture from the life, of democratical probity, modesty, and magnanimity.

Vesp. v. 46
—569.

It may be held as an unfailing political maxim, that where the property of individuals is insecure, the PUBLIC REVENUE will be ill-administered. Perhaps Solon, little foreseeing that his commonwealth would want, did not desire that it should have, a great revenue. A sovereign people indeed would not easily be persuaded to pay taxes; but some provision for public expenses would be necessary. Attica fortunately possessed, in the silvermines of Laurium, an

Xen. de
vectig.

CHAP.
XXI.Lys. or. de
oleâ sacrâ.

advantage unknown in any other part of proper Greece. Those mines were public property; and perhaps under such a government as that of Athens the mode of deriving a public revenue from them was altogether the most advantageous for the public that could have been devised. They were let to individuals, to work for their private benefit, paying only into the public treasury a certain proportion; at one time said only to be a twenty-fourth of the ore obtained. Such however as the return was, it is said by Xenophon to have been the most profitable source of the regular public revenue of Athens. The sacred olive-trees, the income from which could be but small, were looked to as a second branch. Scattered among the lands of individuals in various parts of Attica, they were consecrated, together with the ground immediately around them, (perhaps originally by the policy of the government, for their security,) to the goddess protectress of Athens; the fruit was sold by auction, under direction of the court of Areopagus, and the price was paid into the treasury. A third branch of the Athenian revenue consisted in the rents of public lands and houses, mostly acquired from individuals by forfeiture.

But, among the little states of Greece, the first purpose of a public revenue was generally less to supply public than private needs; less to support civil and military establishments, than to provide a maintenance for citizens without property, without industry, and perhaps without objects for industry: it was to answer the purpose of our poor-rate. Solon had been anxious to promote industry among his people. He desired rather that they should earn their livelihood by labor than be maintained in idleness: and, not, with the credulous inexperience

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and deficient foresight of some modern political speculators, supposing democracy naturally economical, he proposed to check its wildness and extravagance by committing to his court of Areopagus a controlling power over all issues from the treasury. But the revolutions under Pisistratus, and still much more that under Clisthenes, deranged his wise institutions: the passions of the multitude and the interest of demagogues met; and, before the Persian invasion, we find the whole revenue from the silvermines distributed among the people. This extravagance was remedied, as we have seen, by the extraordinary address of Themistocles; who, with the advantage of favoring circumstances, persuaded the many to resign that revenue for public purposes, and hence acquired the means to make Athens the greatest maritime power to that time seen in the world.

Ch. 8. s. 2.
of this Hist.

We are uninformed by what able statesman, or in what public exigency, the Athenians were persuaded to submit to a tax, in the manner of the modern customs, of a fiftieth of the value upon all goods imported, and upon some exports. Early in the Peloponnesian war we find it familiar; as also a small toll, or a kind of excise-duty, on goods sold in the markets. The two, forming together a very light burthen, were the only regular and general taxes at any time paid by the Athenian people.⁵

Andoc. de
myst. p. 65.

⁵ The articles of the Athenian revenue are thus enumerated by Aristophanes—*ἐκατοσῆς, Πρυτανεία, μέταλλ', ἀγορὰς, λιμένας, μισθοὺς, καὶ δημόπρωτα*. Vesp. v. 657. The amount he reckons two thousand talents, about five hundred thousand pounds sterling. The *ἑκατοσῆς*, hundredths, appear to have been the same tax which Andocides calls fiftieths. Perhaps it may have been doubled after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, to supply the deficiency of the public revenue arising from loss of dominion. For the other articles, the curious reader may con-

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The deficiency of a public revenue, arising from sources so scanty, was in some degree supplied by an imposition, in the manner of a poll-tax, on the metics, those numerous free residents in Attica who were not Athenian citizens. This however seems to have been not in its amount oppressive, any more than in its principle unreasonable. It was the consideration for the advantages which the residence of Athens and the protection of the Athenian government afforded. Through the superior population of that city, the extent of its dominion, and the protection for maritime communication which naval empire afforded to its subjects, trade could be carried on there upon a greater scale, and with more certain profit, than in any other situation in Greece. The metics were not Greeks only from various cities, but Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and other barbarians, and they seem to have formed the greatest portion of the traders of Athens, and of the manufacturers not slaves; these however remaining the most numerous.

Xen. de
vectigal.
c. 2. s. 3.

The regular taxes, which the Athenian people would consent to pay for the support of that government of which they held in their own hands the immediate sovereignty, were light. But they were irregular and partial, in their principle inimical to equal freedom, every way worthy of the most despotic government, and thus were as the materials of storm in a lowering sky, threatening always all, but falling chiefly on the higher ranks of citizens. It seems likely to have been when the poorer many were persuaded to make the patriotic surrender of their dividends from the silvermines for building a fleet, that the wealthier few undertook, at their own

consult the scholiast on Aristophanes, and Xenophon on the Athenian republic, c. 1. s. 16—19.

charge, to equip the ships when built. There was an apparent fairness and liberality, on both sides, in such a compromise. But, as the balances of Solon's government were successively overthrown, and the popular will became the instrument of arbitrary power in the hands of the demagogue of the day, the practice, grown into law, for individuals to equip the fleet, degenerated into a source of grievous oppression. Regulated by no certain principle, the wealthier, or those reputed the wealthier citizens, were annually appointed by arbitrary nomination (in the Peloponnesian war to the number of four hundred) to be responsible from their private fortunes, some singly, some in partnership with others, for the equipment of a ship of war. Intrigue and popular favor, or popular displeasure, decided on whom the burthen should be light, and whom it should oppress. Yet; whether from a natural sense of justice, or some remaining prejudice in favor of the old Athenian constitution, the person who equipped the trireme was generally allowed to command it, or to name the commander.

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Xen. Ath.
resp. c. 3.
s. 4.

Another irregular tax, not unknown where single despots have ruled, with the improper name of free-gift, was frequently exacted by the despotic democracy of Athens. This, a tax also upon the higher ranks only, and perfectly arbitrary, could not fail to become partial and oppressive in extreme. Among taxes partaking of the nature of free-gifts may also be reckoned the requisition for the rich to exhibit, at their own expense, theatrical entertainments, and other costly shows, for the amusement of the people; taxes severely felt by the higher ranks, though contributing nothing to the public revenue or the public force.

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But Athens, in acquiring extensive dominion, acquired means to make others pay the principal expense of that force which was to maintain her dominion; and a democracy, least of all governments, would scruple any means of profit. The comic poet, one of the most informed and clear-sighted politicians, and, however reprehensible in some points, very far from having been altogether the worst citizen of his age, has painted the popular temper of the day in a speech so breathing the purest spirit of democracy, that, though already noticed, it may not be superfluous to repeat it here. ‘A thousand cities,’ it is observed by one of the characters in his comedy called *The Wasps*, ‘pay tribute to Athens. Now ‘were each ordered to furnish subsistence for only ‘twenty Athenians, twenty thousand of us might ‘live in all ease and luxury, in a manner worthy of ‘the dignity of the commonwealth and of the trophy ‘of Marathon.’ The mixture of aristocracy yet remaining in the Athenian constitution prevented any actual attempt to carry a measure so congenial to what may perhaps not improperly be called the natural politics of the multitude. But in the empire which Athens exercised over so many transmarine cities a vast field for speculation was open. New and greater objects then incited contending factions; and immoderate temptation occurred for those in authority, and those who sought authority, to put forward measures ultimately the most adverse to the public good, if they tended in the moment to gratify the many. The principal powers of the court of Areopagus, and especially its salutary control over the treasury, were thus abolished; and when the commanding abilities of Pericles no longer checked popular extravagance, there followed the grossest

Ch. 16, s. 2.
of this Hist.
Vesp.
v. 705.

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dilapidation of the public money, the most tyrannical oppression of the allies, and the most profligate exercise of the purest despotism over the most respectable citizens. Fine and confiscation were looked to less for the purpose of justice than of revenue. The temptation to peculate, the insecurity of innocence, and the hope for crime to escape punishment, became such, that, amid the general depravity of Grecian governments, Athenian peculation grew proverbial; and it was at the same time made a question, whether it was advantageous for an individual to have property, and whether it was advantageous for the commonwealth to have a revenue. If we might believe Aristophanes, (who almost alone, among the poets of the day, dared direct his satire on the public stage to restrain the folly and correct the profligacy of the tyrant multitude,) of two thousand talents, esteemed the annual amount of the Athenian revenue, except one-tenth, distributed among the people for serving the office of dicast, the whole was consumed in peculation. This round assertion, put into the mouth of a comic character, will of course not obtain credit for exactness; yet, from the concurring testimonies of Xenophon and Lysias, (whose concurring testimonies, as they were of opposite parties, must be allowed powerful,) it seems to have been not very extravagant. Frequent capital punishments, with confiscation of all property, did not prevent the frequency of an alluring crime, where probity gave no security. Despotie governments, whether the power be in the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near resemblance of character. The frequent use of the bowstring in Turkey has not prevented the grossest peculation. We find indeed many marks of kindred between the Turkish despotism and

Xenoph.
anab. l. 4.
c. 6. s. 12.
Xen. resp.
Ath. &
Sympos.

Aristoph.
Vesp.
v. 667.
& seq.

Xenoph.
resp. Ath.
c. 3. s. 3.

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the Athenian democracy. It appears to have been a point of policy in the latter, as in the former, to connive at peculation in its servants, to approve tacitly their oppression of its subjects; to wait patiently till the private fortune, thus iniquitously collected, became sufficiently considerable to be a public object, and then to bring the criminal, hitherto the apparent favorite, to judgment, and condemning him to death or banishment, to enrich the treasury with his spoil.

A treatise remains from Xenophon expressly on the improvement of the Athenian REVENUE. The title, with the author's name, cannot fail to excite the modern politician's curiosity; who will however probably find himself at the same time informed, disappointed, and surprised by the contents of the work. Xenophon abandoned Solon's hope of making the Athenian people support themselves by sober industry: were the thing ever practicable, he thought the season past. His object therefore was to provide a revenue, less for public service than for maintaining the whole Athenian people, as the Lacedæmonians lived, in ease and idleness. He could devise no other remedy for domestic evils arising from the necessary inquietude of sovereign beggars; no other means to soften that spirit of tyranny in the Athenian people, under which so many subject Grecian states had suffered the severest and most contumelious oppression, the consequences of which had at length brought Athens herself to the brink of annihilation.⁶

⁶ Zeunius of Leipzig, who has published a collection of Xenophon's smaller works, supposes the Treatise on the Revenue to have been written during the war which we shall find Athens, in confederacy with Lacedæmon, waging against the Thebans, when Epaninondas was their general. Note, c. 4. s. 40. of Zeunius's edition. That treatise sufficiently marks itself to have been written when Athens was engaged in war, and not so early

Taxes therefore, to be paid by Athenian citizens, come scarcely within his view. The Attic silvermines are his great object. The public income from these he would improve by a measure which, at this day, would not find universal approbation. The immoderate proportion of slaves already in the population of Attica, the property of individuals, he would increase by purchasing a number on the public account, to work the mines for public benefit. He then considers the taxes, the customs and market-tolls, and the capitation paid by the metics. These branches of the revenue he would improve by the more liberal policy of giving new privileges and increased security to free foreigners settling in Attica.

The modern reader, less versed in Grecian politics, will then scarcely observe without wonder, that while Xenophon is anxious to increase the number of foreign residents and slaves, the increase of Athenian citizens, the only secure and effective strength of a state, appears totally out of his consideration. But, from all the remaining writers of the age, we may gather that the spirit of every Grecian government, whether oligarchy or democracy, was generally adverse to the increase of citizens. For every citizen having an interest in a certain public capital, increase of citizens was increase of partners, which would diminish every

as the Peloponnesian war; for the time before the occupying of Decælea by the Lacedæmonians is mentioned in it, (c. 4. s. 25.) as what few living would remember. During which of the various troubles, that afterward afflicted Greece, it may have had its date, is not at all clear; but evidently enough that conduct of the Athenian government, which produced the war called the Confederate, or Social war, furnished the immediate occasion, the stimulation to write it; and that conduct was little manifested, as in the sequel we shall have occasion to observe, till after the death of Epaminondas.

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old proprietor's share. If the Athenian commonwealth had had only two or three thousand citizens, the lands of Attica, cultivated by slaves, with the added produce of the silvermines, might have made all wealthy. But wealth so ill protected would have invited the rapacity of neighbouring people. The combined consideration therefore of the means of subsistence and gratification with the means of defence would decide the degree of population to be desired in a Grecian republic. But unless danger was pressing, the general disposition was always adverse to an increase. The rich disliked it, as any addition to the inhabitants in our parishes is commonly disliked, because there was a poor-law at Athens. The poor objected to it, in apprehension of its diminishing their chance of advantage from sacrifices, from treats to their ward, from pay for attendance on the tribunals, from that public allowance which was often given, not to those who best deserved or most needed it, but to those who could best make interest for it. Altogether, the idea of a common interest in a common stock, a fundamental principle of every Grecian republic, not only made the aversion to any increase of citizens popular, but gave the ablest politicians (all considering slaves indispensable) to imagine a necessity for limiting the number of citizens, and to a very scanty proportion.

Plat. de rep.

A very remarkable project, which seems to have been original with Xenophon, next occurs; the establishment of a bank, by subscription,⁷ open for all the Athenian people. The interest of money, it

⁷ The word Ἀφορμὴ appears to mean precisely a *subscription*. It occurs in the 6th, 9th, and 12th sections. The Greek index added to the Opuscula Xenophontis of Zeunius may also be consulted for it.

appears, was enormous at Athens; an unavoidable consequence of the wretched insecurity of person and property. Throughout modern Europe, land is, of all property, esteemed the safest source of income; but in Greece it was held that the surest return was from money lent at interest. For, in the multiplied division of Greece, into small republics with very narrow territories, the produce of land was continually liable to be carried off or destroyed by an invading enemy: but a monied fortune, according to Xenophon's observation, was safe within the city-walls. In proportion then to the interest of money, and the insecurity of all things, the profits of trade will always be high, and thus numbers would be induced to borrow even at a high interest. Xenophon therefore proposed, by lending from the public stock, and encouraging commercial adventure by just regulations, to raise a great revenue, and, by the same means, instead of oppressing, to enrich individuals. Xenoph. de vectigal. c. 3. s. 9. 10.

As a corollary then to his project, when the amount of the subscription, or its profits, might allow, he proposed to improve the ports of Athens, to form wharfs and docks, to erect halls, exchanges, warehouses, market-houses, and inns, for all which tolls or rents should be paid, and to build ships to be let to merchants. Thus, while numbers of individuals were encouraged and enabled to employ themselves for their private benefit, the whole Athenian people would become one great banking company, from whose profits every member, it was expected, would derive at least an easy livelihood. s. 12. 13.

Such was Xenophon's project for improving, not so much the revenue of the Athenian state, as the condition of the Athenian people, and of all who were in any degree dependent upon them. By

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taking away the incitements of absolute want, by creating a strong interest in the preservation of peace without, and good government within, he hoped to make the lower ranks quiet and orderly, and the higher secure, and at the same time to obviate that oppression of allies and subjects, the evils of which had often reverted upon Athens herself. The scheme, whatsoever difficulties or disappointments might have occurred in the execution, appears worthy of Xenophon; but unfortunately, passing his life in exile, his exertions for the good of his country were confined to speculation.

The gross vices of the government and judicature gave birth to that evil which, with the name of SYCOPHANCY, so peculiarly infested Athens. The term originally signified information of the clandestine exportation of figs. Apparently to gratify the idle populace of the city at the expense of the landholders, some demagogue had procured a law forbidding the exportation of that plentiful production of the Attic soil. The absurdity of the prohibition however making the information particularly invidious, the term Sycophant grew into use as a general appellation for all vexatious informers. Such was the encouragement which the Athenian government and judicature afforded for these that sycophancy became a profession, furnishing a livelihood for many. The sycophant courted the lower people, and was the terror and scourge of the rich. Intimation to a wealthy man, that he would be denounced as able to equip a trireme, or provide a dramatic entertainment, or give a supper to his ward, often sufficed to obtain money for preventing so serious an evil. But the sycophant's great engine of profit was accusation, whether true or false; though false accusation, we

Aristoph.
Equit.
v. 908. &
919.

Lys. pro
Polystr.
p. 158.
vol 663.

are told, was often preferred, as generally more lucrative.⁸ Those various public functions which the wealthy were not allowed to decline, magistracies, equipment of ships of war, and presidencies of choral festivals, made opportunities endless. On the expiration of office, the euthyne, a scrutiny before the council, must be undergone. Accusation was then in a manner invited; and if any, however unfounded, was offered, person and property were attached, and remained so till judgment was given. The sycophant was necessarily an Athenian citizen, for no other could denounce; but the evidence of strangers and slaves was admitted, and often preferred; because they might be examined by torture, which was sometimes carried to such inhuman severity that the sufferers died under it. But however little the accusation could be supported, it would always occasion trouble and expense; and any neglect of the fastidious multitude would involve danger. Bribes were necessary to procure dispatch from the officers who directed the business of the courts: an Athenian jury would be solicited for favor, or it would pronounce condemnation; and not by the accusation of Xenophon only, but by the confession of Lysias, the great advocate for democracy, we are assured that, at Athens, equally protection for iniquity might, and justice must, be bought.

A resource which, in this wretched insecurity for innocence under the Athenian government, Socrates recommended and Xenophon approved, may show the extent of the evil. Criton, an Athenian of rank, complained to Socrates (Xenophon says he was pre-

& Δήμ.
καταλύσ.
ἀπολογ.
p. 171.
vel 762.

Xenoph.
Athen. resp.
c. 3. s. 4.

Lys. adv.
Agorat.
p. 135.
vel 488.

Xenoph.
Athen. resp.
c. 13. s. 2.
Xen. & Plat.
apol. Socr.
& Aristoph.
Vesp.
Lys. adv.
Philocr.
p. 181.
vel 828.
& al.

Xenoph.
Mem. Socr.
l. 2. c. 9.

⁸ Τούτων γὰρ (τῶν συκοφάντων) ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς μὴδὲν ἡμαρτηκότας εἰς αἰτίαν καθιστάναί. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα χρηματίζειν.
Lys. Δήμ. καταλύσ. ἀπολογ. p. 171. vel 762.

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sent at the conversation) of the severity of their lot in Athens who, as he expresses himself, desired to concern themselves only with their own affairs. ‘I have a prosecution instituted against me,’ he said, ‘by persons whom I never injured, but who think I would rather pay some money than have much trouble.’ ‘Do not you keep dogs,’ said Socrates, ‘to guard your sheep against wolves?’ ‘Yes,’ answered Criton. ‘And could you not engage the friendship of some able man in low circumstances, who, in return for benefits conferred, would make it his business in the same manner to guard you against sycophants?’ A friend was fortunately found, able, and faithful. As an advocate however, he could serve his benefactor little; because, in the Athenian courts, the accused was generally required to plead in person. His business was, like that of the sheep-dog, to give security to the fold by attacking the wolf. When Criton was threatened with prosecution, he threatened the accusers; and as their profligacy offered opportunities which Criton’s probity denied, in fear of the consequences, they not only stopped their proceedings against Criton, but paid his advocate for similar forbearance toward themselves.

Where such was the best resource that Socrates or Xenophon could devise, we may conceive how precarious was the condition of men of property in Athens. Under oligarchy, as we find one of the most zealous partizans of democracy confessing, those might be esteemed good citizens, who did not covet other men’s goods; but, under democracy, no man was master of his own: property, person, everything must be devoted, not to the service only, but to the pleasure and fancy of the people. The wealthy were not allowed the choice of leaving Attica, and the

Ιυσ. Δήμ.
καταλύσ.
ἀπολογ.
p. 173.
vel 774.

constitution positively denied them the choice of quiet there. To execute the duties of magistracy, to equip a ship of war, to preside at a public feast, to direct a dramatic entertainment, and to furnish, on each occasion, the whole cost, were equally required of all supposed of competent estate. Hence indeed some small mixture of aristocracy remained in the Athenian government. Wealth was the allowed key to office and influence; birth and great connexions were not without weight; commands in the army and navy were seldom given but to men of birth, education, and considerable connexions; and even the council and the college of archons, both indeed open to men without property, but not without passing the scrutiny of the dokimasia, formed some small check upon popular rashness and folly. Hence we find, at intervals, the Athenian affairs so ably conducted; and while tumult and destruction were preparing within the volcano, the outside bore an appearance so fair and flourishing.⁹

Xenoph.
sympos.
c. 4. s. 30.

Xenoph.
resp. Ath.
c. 1. s. 3.

The spirit of tyranny, inherent in the Athenian constitution, and the disregard, upon principle, for property and the convenience and satisfaction of individuals, are very strikingly marked in a regulation which we find had the force of law. When an expensive office, and particularly when the equipment of a trireme, was assessed on any one, he might, for the time, avoid the burthen by indicating a richer man; and, if the superior wealth was denied, offering

Isocrat. de
permut &
de pace.

⁹ Under Solon those of competent estates only were eligible to office. Afterward magistracies were given by lot. Isocr. Areop. p. 108. 109. But Xenophon says all expensive offices were still imposed on the rich: especially choral presidencies, and the command, or the charge of equipment, of ships of war, which seem to have been particularly expensive.

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Beside the various modes of vexation and oppression to which the higher ranks were subject in their persons and properties, another remained by which their characters were affected. Satire against the people collectively, says Xenophon, the people will not allow; but personal satire they encourage; well knowing that, while it is permitted to exhibit the wealthy, the noble, the powerful, to popular derision and indignation, the meaner will escape; or those only will become objects for the poet, who, by aiming at some pre-eminence, separate themselves from

the common cause. To what excess that licence went, what gross ribaldry might delight, and what malicious calumny would not disgust an Athenian audience, the remaining comedies of Aristophanes, who could write equally for the highest and lowest ranks, who could be at the same time a consummate politician and a consummate buffoon, abundantly testify.¹⁰ The calm dignity of a Pericles could bear this unmoved: the intriguing ambition of an Alcibiades, exciting poet against poet, and mob against mob, might even profit from it: but the wealthy and noble of more common and quiet characters would often severely feel the apprehension, if it went no farther, of being exposed in effigy, by their proper names, to vulgar scorn upon the public stage, while, in witty dialogue, the most malignant turn was given to every the most innocent or even meritorious action of their lives. Nor were character and public estimation only endangered; for that turn in the public mind might be prepared in the theatre, and those prejudices against individuals excited, which afterward, in the agora or the tribunals, might produce decrees of confiscation, banishment, or capital condemnation.

In the dialogue remaining from Xenophon, entitled *The Banquet*, an eminent man, reduced by the

¹⁰ Aristophanes ventured satire upon the people collectively; but it required his courage to dare, and his abilities to succeed in such an attempt. With regard to his ribaldry, we may observe that something very like it seems to have suited the taste of readers of higher rank than the bulk of the Athenian audiences, in the age of Chaucer, in our own country. In calumny, as abundant remaining testimony evinces, his contemporaries far exceeded him; and indeed in every point, vulgar and gross as his jokes often are, yet among the Athenian comedians he may be considered as a very gentlemanly poet.

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war from wealth to indigence, is represented positively declaring that he felt his condition improved by the total loss of his property; 'inasmuch,' he says, 'as cheerfulness and confidence are preferable to constant apprehension, freedom to slavery, being waited upon to waiting upon others, being held an assured good subject to being an object of public suspicion. For,' he continues, 'while I lived a rich man in this city, I had reason to fear the attacks of house-breakers, which with my wealth might endanger my person. I was then under the necessity of courting the sycophants, knowing it was in their power to do me mischief which I could little return. Nevertheless I was continually receiving orders from the people, to undertake some expense for the commonwealth, and I was not allowed to go anywhere out of Attica. But now I have lost all my foreign property, and nothing accrues from my Attic estate, and all my goods are sold, I sleep anywhere fearless; I am considered as faithful to the government; I am never threatened with prosecutions, but I have it in my power to make others fear; as a free man, I may stay in the country or go out of it, as I please; the rich rise from their seats for me as I approach, and make way for me as I walk: I am now like a tyrant, whereas I was before an absolute slave; and whereas before I paid tribute to the people, now a tribute from the public maintains me.'

This picture, though from the pencil of Xenophon, will be likely to strike the modern reader as loaded, and somewhat extravagant. Occurring in a work of fancy, and not in historical narrative, perhaps the writer might claim some licence. Yet we find Iso-

lines and colors that the concurrence in representation, which also many other testimonies support, must exclude suspicion of any great extravagance.

Under circumstances then such as those of the Athenian republic, the rich and the poor evidently could not live in any harmony. An irritation, incessantly working in the minds of the few against the many, would be irremediable, and, in equally unavoidable consequence, the many would be tormented with an unceasing jealousy of the few; in its foundation sometimes reasonable, but generally in its manner illiberal, and often in its measure excessive. In fact, the balances of Solon's constitution were no sooner overthrown, and sovereign power become absolute in the hands of those without property, or rather in the hands of any demagogue who could, for the moment, lead them, than the interest of all, who had property, placed them necessarily in the situation of conspirators against the existing government. Indeed, throughout Greece, the noble and wealthy, served by their slaves, not only as domestics, but as husbandmen and manufacturers, had little connexion with the poorer many, but to command them in the oligarchal states, and, in the democratical, to fear, flatter, solicit, and either deceive or be commanded by them. No common interest, or scarcely any, united the two descriptions of men; so that, for maintaining civil order and holding the state together, flattery and bribes alone could persuade the multitude, and the only alternative was violence. Hence that impossibility of lasting harmony, and that readiness for extreme discord, so strikingly exhibited among the Grecian republics. What we are familiar with always appears obvious and easy; and hence, having ever before our eyes the equal freedom, secu-

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Xenoph.
Ath. resp.
c. 1. s. 1—9.
c. 2. s. 19. 20.
c. 3. s. 9.
10. 11. et
Cyropæd.
Plat. de
rep.

urity, and ease of all ranks among ourselves, we observe with wonder that the abilities and extensive experience of Xenophon could imagine no remedy for the evils of the Athenian constitution, or none in the practicability of which he had any hope, but in the subjection of the many to arbitrary command, either under the few or under one; and the genius of Plato, in earnest research after better political principles, could even in vision propose benefit only to a very small portion of mankind.¹¹

Where the constitution is such that all ranks have a clear interest in its preservation, where every man's house is his castle, where the property of the rich and the persons and honest earnings of the poor are equally protected by law, and the hope of rising to a higher station is denied to none, there the law of TREASON may be mild. But no mild law, no common precaution, could give security to a constitution like the Athenian. The law of treason accordingly, at Athens, was conceived in the highest spirit of despotism; it was atrocious. Before the council-hall stood a column, on which was thus engraved: 'Whoever shall overthrow the democracy, or hold any magistracy in Athens when the democracy

Andocid.
de myst.
p. 46.

¹¹ Ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ γὰρ πόλει τὸ βέλτιστον εὖνουν ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάκιστον ἐν ἐκάσῃ πόλει εὖνουν τῷ δήμῳ· οἱ γὰρ ὅμοιοι τοῖς ὁμοίοις εὔνοί εἰσι. Xen. Athen. resp. c. 3. s. 10. Xenophon esteemed the evils of the Athenian constitution irremediable, because necessarily flowing from the sovereignty of the people, and to be checked only by putting such a curb on that sovereignty as, in the nature of things, would lead to its complete overthrow. He seems to have supposed it impossible so to constitute a balanced government as to give it permanency: the people at large, he thought, must either command absolutely or obey implicitly. And for any experience that history to this day furnishes, perhaps he was right: perhaps a balanced government cannot be at once constituted: it must grow.

‘ shall be overthrown, may be lawfully killed by any one: the person killing him shall be held holy before the gods and meritorious among men; and shall be rewarded with the whole property of the person killed.’ The same principle of committing public justice to the discretion of individuals was pushed yet farther in the following oath, which was required of every Athenian: ‘ I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, whoever shall overthrow the democracy; and if any hold office under any other government, I will esteem holy before the gods whoever shall kill him. Whoever may lose his life in killing or attempting to kill such person, I will befriend his children and their offspring, as I would Harmodius and Aristogiton. Whatever oath may be taken, adverse to the democratical authority, I abjure and hold as nothing.’ Prayers and imprecations were added, for blessings on all who maintained this oath, and utter destruction to those and the race of those who should break it.

It is observed by Aristotle, that democracy and tyranny are, of all governments, most hostile to each other, as, according to Hesiod’s proverb, two of a trade never agree: for, he adds, absolute DEMOCRACY is TYRANNY.¹²

SECTION III.

First measures of the supreme council of Thirty at Athens: views of the Thirty: Critias; Theramenes; violences of the Thirty: death of Theramenes.

Such was the state of the Athenian government nearly, from the death of Pericles till it submitted

¹² Ἐναντίαι δ’ αἱ πολιτεῖαι Δῆμος μὲν Τυραννίδι, καθ’ Ἡσίοδον, Ὡς κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία Τυραννίς ἐστὶ. Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

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to the victorious arms of the Peloponnesians. The fate then of a fallen city deprived of command beyond its own narrow territory, and allowed to exist only under the control of a foreign power, it might seem would scarcely invite much of our farther attention. But Athens, after all her losses and with all her failings, has peculiar claim upon the curiosity and respect of men. In her fallen state she retained the germ of the sublimest philosophy, of all science, and of every liberal art: Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato still lived within her walls; Alcibiades, Thrasylus, and Conon, though in exile, adorned the list of her citizens; and she could still be the prolific mother and the able preceptress of artists, poets, warriors, orators, statesmen, and sages, who made their age the most brilliant in the annals of mankind, and through whom, when her political importance ceased, Athens continued, and may be said in some degree still to continue, to hold an empire among all the civilized nations of the earth.¹³ Nor was her political importance yet so far beyond recovery but that she became again a principal channel of Grecian history's multifarious stream.

After the view we have taken of the Athenian constitution, we shall not wonder if men of rank and property desired at any rate a change; nor can we impute it to any peculiar depravity, if they bore some

¹³ Tully's eulogies of Athens are well known:—*'Illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas.'* Cic. de Orat. l. 1. s. 4.—*'Unde humanitas, doctrina, religio, fruges, jura, leges ortæ atque in omnes terras distributæ putantur.'* Cic. or. pro L. Flacco, s. 26. And that of Velleius Paterculus, *'Adeo ut corpora gentis illius separata sint in alias civitates; ingenia vero solis Atheniensium muris clausa existimes.'* Vel. Pat. l. 1. c. 18.

antipathy toward the body of the lower people, from whom they suffered such oppression. Even the most moderate might look, not without some indignation, upon that imperious 'crowd of fullers, shoemakers, 'carpenters, braziers, dealers of all kinds,' I use the contemporary philosopher's words, 'the great object 'of whose lives was to buy cheap and sell dear,' whose despotic will nevertheless dispensed public and private law, directed the administration of the commonwealth, sent out fleets and armies, disposed of the lives and fortunes of individuals at home, and decided by a vote the fate of whole cities abroad, 'while some of 'them, not worth a drachma,' they are again Xenophon's words, 'were ready to sell their country with 'all in it, that they might have a drachma.' Accordingly, when Athens was invested by the Peloponnesian forces, and no prospect of successful resistance remained, many of those of higher rank saw, or thought they saw, means of mending their condition in the approaching wreck of the state. Through this opposition of interests among the Athenians the Lacedæmonians proposed to hold Attica in subjection, without the expense of garrisons; and thus they were induced to grant terms; to leave the town with walls and a citadel; to restore the whole territory; and even out of the captive fleet to allow twelve ships of war to the vanquished. The Athenian people had never treated a conquered city so mildly. But the Lacedæmonians depended upon the aristocratical party among the Athenians themselves as a faithful garrison, bound, by the most pressing interests, to hold all in subordination to Lacedæmon.¹⁴

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 3.
c. 7. s. 6.

¹⁴ The assertions of Lysias, in his orations against Eratosthenes and Agoratus, that the Lacedæmonians would have granted better terms, but that Theramenes prevented, scarcely

CHAP.
XXI.B. C. 404.
Ol. 94. 1.
Xenoph.
Hel. I. 2.
c. 3. s. 8.

On the surrender of the city then that vicious government, which has been described, was dissolved, and the supreme power of the Athenian state was committed to a Council composed of Thirty Athenians, chosen by the conquerors out of the aristocratical party, and all of them formerly members of that Council of Fourhundred, which had been established by Pisander. The first measures of this council were moderate and wise. Vested with full powers to new-model the whole fabric of the ancient constitution at their pleasure, with exception only for anything adverse to the superintending authority of Lacedæmon, they avoided all great and hasty changes which their situation did not indispensably require. The Laws, farther than what fell necessarily with the abolition of the popular sovereignty and the commission of the supreme power, to the Thirty, remained in force: all the ancient magistracies, care being taken to fill them with friends of the Thirty, were retained: the civil administration therefore, under the Thirty instead of the Fivehundred, proceeded in the accustomed course. A new supreme court of judicature only was established, with the title of The Council.

Matters being so far arranged, orders were given for immediately apprehending all who, under the democracy, had exercised the abominable trade of sycophancy. The evils of that practice were so gross, so extensively dreaded, and under popular sovereignty

need, the testimony of Xenophon to refute them. They are obviously mere calumnies; not proposed to the reason, but to the thoughtlessness and passion, of the multitude to which they were addressed. Xenophon's account is confirmed in clear and direct terms by Isocrates, in his oration on peace, p. 220. ed. Auger.

so irremediable, that, when every one prosecuted by the Thirty was condemned by the obsequious council, and executed, none, says the contemporary historian, not obnoxious to the charge, were dissatisfied with this arbitrary justice.

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The wrongs however of the higher orders being so far avenged, the hope was generally entertained that animosity would stop, and that the Thirty, proceeding with proper dispatch in their great business of legislation, would let the people know under what form of government, and subject to what laws, they were to live and might be safe. With this hope well-meaning men in general were easy: indeed hope was rather high among them; for, though successive demagogues had wretchedly degraded the ancient Athenian constitution, yet, if there existed in Greece a good foundation for a good government, it seems to have been in the laws, customs, and habits of Athens derived from the institutions of Theseus and Solon. That excellent principle of the English constitution, the only one on which a free government can be firmly founded, that the aggregate of private good constitutes public good, and its corollary, that the rights of individuals, once established by law, should be ever held sacred, seems to have been a principle of Theseus's kingdom and Solon's republic. But a different principle obtained very generally among the Grecian Commonwealths; an ideal public good, distinct from and often opposite to private good. It was carried into practice with best effect by Lycurgus, and can only be carried into practice with any good effect where, as in Lacedæmon, a communion of interest was established for everything, and private property scarcely existed. The brilliant success of his singular system gave reputation to this

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Xen. resp.
Athen.

principle, and party-leaders readily adopted it everywhere; for the good of their party was that to which alone they would allow the title of public good, and to this it was very convenient for them that every private interest should yield. The peaceful then and the quiet, who desired, not political power, but ease and security under civil order, were the only certain sufferers. The great defect of the constitutions of Theseus and Solon was the want of another principle, spread extensively over modern Europe through the feudal system, though not an original part of that system, the principle of representation. The advantage of this is not merely that a great nation can do conveniently by its representatives what even a small one cannot by its assembled numbers, but, farther, that responsibility may be attached to every constituted authority; by which alone, whatever the name or form of the government may be, real despotism can be obviated. In the want of this, the Grecian legislators were utterly at a loss to give secure liberty to the body of the people, without giving them despotic power. It may be held for certain that those are either not wise or not honest men, who pretend that political and legislative science is easy and obvious. The writings of the ablest of the Greeks, showing how deficient they were in it, abundantly show its difficulties; and the history of all nations will demonstrate by what slow steps and what accidental circumstances any perfection in government has been attained. The works of Plato and Xenophon should be read to form a just idea of the imperfection of the science in their time, and of their small ability to improve it; and then it may in some degree be conceived what were the difficulties under which, even had

they had the purest intentions, the sincerest desire of public good, the Thirty must have had to encounter, in reforming the constitution of Athens. SECT.
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But in addition to the difficulties always and everywhere existing, the peculiar circumstances of Athens at the time, obviating perhaps some considerable inconveniences, gave rise to many others. The controlling power of Lacedæmon would be necessarily invidious to those for whom the new rulers were to legislate; and yet much consideration for that controlling power would be, in their situation, unavoidable. Moreover the chance of future tranquillity for Greece, concord within itself and power to resist other nations, depended absolutely upon friendly and intimate connexion between Athens and Lacedæmon. Of the changes then which Athens had suffered, by the event of the war, some would be favorable to that concord and that power, but some far otherwise. Private distresses among all ranks were numerous and great. The loss of property in the foreign territories of the commonwealth had reduced several from affluence to want; and want such as to make them dependent upon what may be called the poor-laws of Athens, even for subsistence. The abolition of means, formerly ready, for making interest of money at home, also annihilated income for many. The advantages of military command then were lost for the higher ranks, reward of service for the lower, and the various profits of the equipment of fleets and armies for all: public revenue no longer flowed from numerous tributary states: neither the public treasury nor the wealth of individuals could, as formerly, provide gratifications for the people: the citizens of numerous subject republics were no longer amenable to Athenian tribunals: multitudes,

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 2.
c. 8. s. 1.

c. 7. s. 2.

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accustomed to fight and to judge, and to feast at sacrifices, and to be amused, but not to work, were without income, without employment, and without victuals: the court and the flattery, and the pay and the bribes, to which the Athenian people were accustomed, had all ceased together. The territory of Attica was again the quiet property of those who could ascertain their claims to land, which had been for so many years commanded or liable to be overrun by a hostile force. But the time when the country-houses of landed men of Attica were superior to those of the city, landed men having a disposition to live on their estates rather than in Athens, and the parties of the Attic people were distinguished as those of the highlands, the lowlands, and the coast, was gone by never to return. It was twenty-seven years since any had been born to the habits of a country life. Attica was committed to slaves, and the republic, from the time of the desertion of the country in the first year of the war, existed only in Athens.¹⁵

Plat.
Charmid.
p. 154. t. 2.

Such were the circumstances in which the council of Thirty entered, with absolute authority, upon the administration. Whether by appointment of the Lacedæmonians, or by election of the council itself, Critias presided; a man, by every advantage of birth, fortune, connexions, talents, and education, pointed out for the arduous office. His paternal great-grandfather was brother of the great lawgiver Solon; and, what should have been a more solid advantage, he had been himself a diligent hearer of Socrates. But the Athenian democracy, denying ease and se-

¹⁵ So far the same state of things appears to have continued in Attica to this day. Greeks live only in the city; the lands are held and cultivated wholly by Albanians.

curity, not only incited ambition and avarice, but stimulated the pride of nobility and wealth. Xenophon describes Critias, whom he knew well as his fellow-disciple, vain of his illustrious birth and large inheritance, elated with the possession of power and influence, and with the court and adulation ensuing, and then soured by a banishment which he had suffered from a decree of the people. Thenceforward Critias conceived a vehement aversion to the popular cause, and his pride and ambition became stimulated by indignation and revenge.

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III.

Xenoph.
Mem. Socr.
l. 1. c. 2.
s. 12—25.

But, among the members of this council, the man most distinguished in high office and in party measures was Theramenes son of Agnon; whom we have already seen a leader in one revolution which abolished, and in another which restored the sovereignty of the popular assembly. He engaged now in this third revolution, under the patronage of Lacedæmon, with a disposition and views widely differing from those of Critias. His family, though noble, had been popular. His father, Agnon, founder of Amphipolis, had been a distinguished favorite of the people; and however Theramenes himself might, with all reasonable men, dislike the sovereignty of the multitude, yet possessing an inherited family interest among the people, and talents to cultivate it, he loved popularity. In reforming the government therefore it was not his purpose to oppress the people. He seems rather to have proposed to restore, under sanction of the stronger means now possessed by the Thirty, that mixed government, which, upon the overthrow of the Fourhundred, he had framed, but could not support, and which we find so highly commended, but so little explained, by Thucydides.

Ch. 19. s. 7.
of this Hist.

The project of Critias, not altogether new in

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Greece, was however such as had not been executed, nor perhaps attempted, upon so extensive a scale. The habit of having all laborious offices performed by slaves gave to conceive that the existence of the lower orders of freemen might be dispensed with; and made that possible and even obvious in Greece, which, in modern Europe, could neither be executed, nor scarcely imagined. Critias would allow no mixture of popular folly and insolence in power: he would remove as far as possible the danger of having the democratical law of treason restored, and put in execution against himself. He would abandon all hope of the glory of presiding over a powerful independent state, to have ease and affluence in a subordinate command. He proposed therefore, under the protecting authority of Lacedæmon, to be lord of Athens; he would make the city and its whole territory the private property of himself and a few associates; allowing no more of the Athenian people to remain within the country than, with Lacedæmonian assistance, might be held in complete subserviency: possibly however hoping that, through a coalition of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments, his power might be extended beyond Attica.

With these extravagant and nefarious views, which it could not be prudent immediately to declare, Critias, in the outset, courted Theramenes; and, for a short time, there was the appearance of perfect harmony between them. Soon however differences arose, but still Critias maintained a show of deference for his colleague. Meanwhile among the rest of the Thirty he made his party secure. No eminence of character there moved his envy; no superior talents excited his apprehension; no firmness of principle, in any amount likely to be prevalent, thwarted his

purposes. Concert then being established among them, the abilities, and yet more the popularity of Theramenes, became suspicious to all. For security against their effects it was resolved to solicit an armed force from Lacedæmon. Theramenes, not yet aware that he was himself the object, in vain remonstrated; the resolution passed, and Æschines and Aristoteles, two of the Thirty, were deputed to Sparta, authorised to engage that the Athenian treasury should furnish pay for the troops desired. A force for holding Athens in obedience, and to be paid for doing so, was not likely to be denied. A body of Lacedæmonians was sent; and Callibius, their commander, with the title of Harmost, meaning regulator, (which the Lacedæmonians affected for those to whom they committed really the command, as governors, of Grecian cities,) took his residence in the citadel of Athens, with his troops as its garrison.

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 3. s. 13.

Confident now of means to overbear opposition, Critias no longer kept measures with any, whether of the democratical or oligarchal interest, whom he suspected of inclination, with power, to thwart his designs: but he began to consider some of the oligarchal party, whom it was in the general policy of Lacedæmon to raise to power, as more dangerous opponents than any in the democratical interest, now sufficiently depressed. From the first arrival of the Lacedæmonians, he was sedulous in attention to the harmost; and by the show of much deference obtained the effectual command of him. Callibius, under pretence, or perhaps in the belief, that the interest of Lacedæmon so required, issued orders as Critias instigated; and the Lacedæmonian soldiers were employed to apprehend whomsoever the Thirty denounced. Prosecution was no longer then con-

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Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 3. s. 12.

fined to sycophants, and men notoriously turbulent or infamous, but extended to characters the most irreproachable. Some forms of legal process were observed, and those of the old constitution were mostly retained; but whomsoever the Thirty accused the obsequious council never failed to condemn, and deliver to the executioner.

Xen. *ibid.*

Such proceedings excited astonishment with alarm among all ranks. What could be the motive, and where the end of them, and what the form of government at length to be established, were the anxious subjects of general wonder and inquiry. Theramenes himself, surprised as dissatisfied, while Critias yet maintained a decent exterior toward him, remonstrated among his colleagues on the impolicy of their measures: ‘Without some party among the people,’ he said, ‘no oligarchy could stand: but alarm and offence were now extended to all parties.’ The admonition was taken, but not as Theramenes intended. Nothing the majority of the Thirty, under the influence of Critias, so much still feared as the popularity of Theramenes himself. To obviate its efficacy they hastened the publication of a catalogue of three thousand citizens of their own selection, who should partake of the sovereign power in common assembly, and be competent for magistracy.¹⁶ All other Athenians were reduced to the condition of subjects, not to the Threethousand only, but the Thirty, whose sovereignty over them was declared absolute.

s. 20.

s. 13.

Theramenes again remonstrated: ‘Their faith was pledged,’ he said, ‘by their former declarations, that only those, but all those, should share in the go-

¹⁶ Thus I think the phrase *μεθ' ἑξόντας τῶν πραγμάτων* may best be interpreted.

‘vernment, whose education might give the necessary knowledge, and whose property would afford means to allot leisure for its functions. Pay for attending the general assembly or the courts of justice, it had been agreed, should no longer be allowed. But three thousand men, as if there were some virtue in the number, had been arbitrarily chosen, without any attention to the proposed qualifications; and all other Athenians were as arbitrarily deprived of the rights of citizens. The imprudence was equal to the injustice of the measure: violence only could support it; and the force of those who were to command was inferior to that of those who were to be held in subserviency.’ This admonition also was taken, but, like the former, very differently from the monitor’s intention. A review of arms was ordered; of the Threethousand in one place; of the other citizens in another. The avenues to the latter were occupied by the confidential adherents of the Thirty, supported by the Lacedæmonian troops. The arms of the citizens, not of the catalogue, were taken from them as they passed, and being carried to the temple of Minerva in the citadel were committed to the care of the Lacedæmonian garrison.

Effectual opposition being thus obviated, the Thirty proceeded with a shamelessness in crime, for which, after all we have seen of crime in Grecian history, could he be suspected of partiality for the democratical cause, we should with difficulty believe the express testimony even of Xenophon. The credit of his account however, strong as his authority is, does not rest on his single authority. We find it supported by two other contemporary writers; one his decided adversary in politics, the other not his friend, Lysias

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Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 3. s. 15.
Lys. con.
Agorat.
p. 133.
vel 470.

and Plato. From their united evidence we learn, that the most abominable policy guided the measures now pursued. Revenge and avarice had their full sway: many suffered death for private enmities; many merely for their wealth. Every eminent man was either to be destroyed or gained: but as means were wanting to attach a sufficient number by favors, the infernal expedient was practised of forcing men to a community of interest through a participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical orders, they became involved in the same guilt, and obnoxious to the same resentment, and thus theirs and that of the Thirty became a common cause.¹⁷

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 3. s. 18.
Lys. pro fil.
Eucrat.
p. 149.
Xenoph.
ut sup.

Amid numerous enormities the death of three men, the most eminent of the commonwealth, and all notoriously attached to the oligarchal interest, particularly excited general wonder and alarm. Of Niceratus, son of the rich and worthy Nicias, who perished at Syracuse, it was said that he inherited the aristocratical spirit; neither father nor son, by any one action or word, having ever favored democracy. The able advice and powerful eloquence of Antiphon had served so many individuals, while the free expenditure of his private fortune in public service, during the war, had acquired him such reputation for public spirit, that he was in favor with all parties, though his whole political conduct had been directed to promote aristocracy. Leon of Salamis, amid the turbulence and crimes of his age and country, had been eminent for his blameless life. The monster Critias proposed to involve his master Socrates in the odium of the execution of so excellent a man. A message from the Thirty required the attendance of

Plat. apol.
Socrat.
p. 32. t. 1.

¹⁷ Οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὥς πλείους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 32. t. 1.

Socrates, with four others. Critias himself gave the order for them to go to Salamis, to apprehend Leon, and bring him to Athens. This order, knowing its purpose, and holding it contrary to law, Socrates disobeyed. The other four, less scrupulous or less courageous, performed it. To be apprehended and to be condemned were nearly the same: Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon were all delivered to the executioner.

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Numerous as the executions of men of property had been, the confiscation ensuing did not suffice to supply the deficiencies of the public revenue, so curtailed by the event of the war, for public purposes, and at the same time to furnish the rewards claimed by the forward adherents of the Thirty. Money was wanting to pay the Lacedæmonian troops in the citadel. The metics were thought the best resource. Much of the commerce and manufactures of Athens was in their hands: many were wealthy; and the oppression, which had been successfully dared against the first of the Athenians, might be exercised, it was hoped, against aliens with less noise, and no hazard. Some symptoms of disaffection toward the ruling powers were made the pretence, and it was resolved to accuse eight of the richest, to whom, as a blind, were added two in indigent circumstances.

Xenoph.
Hel. 1.2. c.3.
s. 15.

The orator Lysias, from whom we have the detail, was of the order of metics, and among the sufferers. His father, Cephalus, was a Syracusan, whom faction in his own city had driven to migrate with a large fortune to Attica, when the able administration of Pericles, in aid of what remained of Solon's laws, made Attica the most desirable residence in Greece. He had enjoyed the friendship of Pericles and of Socrates; and his house in Piræus is the supposed scene of those dialogues so celebrated under the title

Lys. con.
Eratosth.

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of Plato's Republic. Lysias had gone a boy to Italy, with the historian Herodotus, when, under the patronage of Pericles, the colony of Thurium was settled on the ruins of Sybaris. There he had lived above thirty years when, by the defeat in Sicily, the Athenian interest in those parts was overthrown, and Thurium was no longer a safe residence for men of property, who would not accept or could not obtain Lacedæmonian protection. Lysias, collecting whatever he could carry, returned to Athens; where, in partnership with Polemarchus his brother, a manufactory of shields, in which above a hundred slaves were employed, still gave him affluence.

He was, as he relates, entertaining some strangers at supper, when some of the Thirty entered, commanded the guests to withdraw, and himself to remain their prisoner. Committing him then to the care of Piso, one of their number, they proceeded to take account of his effects, of which the slaves were a principal part. He meanwhile, fearing for his life, tampered with his keeper; and, for a bribe of a talent, obtained a promise of safety: but to pay the money, being obliged to open a chest, in which were more than three talents in silver, above seven hundred pounds sterling, with Cyzicenes and Darics, the gold coins then most current in Greece,¹⁸ to the amount of near five hundred pounds more, Piso seized the whole. Remonstrance was vain, but the admonition was salutary to Lysias. Watching opportunity, while the Thirty were still occupied in pillage, he found means to escape, and hastening to Piræus, proceeded thence by sea to Megara. His

¹⁸ The Cyzicene, named from the city of Cyzicus in the Propontis, was in value about a pound sterling; the Daric, a Persian coin, about fifteen shillings.

brother, Polemarchus, less provident or less fortunate, was carried to the common prison. Melobius, one of the Thirty, tore from his wife's ears the golden rings she wore. All the property of both the brothers was confiscated. Polemarchus, in pursuance of a simple order from the Thirty, was executed, in the Athenian manner, by a draught of hemlock. His body was not denied to his friends for burial; it would have been bootless impiety; but clothes for it, solicited from his large wardrobe, and an apartment in one of three houses of the family, for the preparation of the funeral, were refused.

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Such are the circumstances related by Lysias himself. We shall receive the account with caution, as from an orator, famed for the talent of giving falsehood the air of truth, and, on this occasion, not merely pleading a cause, but the cause of his own revenge, and avowing his purpose to inflame the multitude who were to judge it.¹⁹ The testimony of Xenophon however seems to show that the whole detail might be nearly true,²⁰ and indeed, had not the conduct of some of the Thirty been marked with

Dion. Hal.
vit. Lys.
p. 196. t. 6.
or. Gr.
Reisk.

¹⁹ Ὀργίσθητε μὲν, ὥσπερ ὄτ' ἐφεύγετε. Which may be expressed faithfully, though paraphrastically, thus: let the anger and indignation which you felt, when injuriously driven into banishment, now revive in your minds.

²⁰ Demosthenes (or. in Androt. & or. con. Timocr.) has said that under the tyranny of the Thirty no man was taken from his house. On this the learned Markland, in a note on the oration of Lysias against Eratosthenes, observes, 'that Lysias is rather to be believed of what himself experienced; unless some distinction can be found.' The distinction seems obvious: Demosthenes probably meant to speak only of citizens; Lysias was not then a citizen. The matter is of consequence only that the faith of history be not unduly made questionable: more than enough will always remain uncertain.

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Xenoph.
Hel. 1. 2.
c. 3. s. 16.

peculiar atrocity in this transaction, had there not been something in it particularly shocking to the general feelings and prejudices of the Athenian people, Theramenes would scarcely have taken up the proceedings against metics, rather than those against citizens, for the ground of increased vehemence in opposition to his colleagues. He was now so direct and severe in blame of their measures as to give them serious alarm. Their safety and his it was indeed evident were become incompatible, and they resolved that he should himself be the next prosecuted.

s. 17.

But the council of Judicature, though thus far obsequious to their views, was not yet duly prepared for their purpose against Theramenes. Measures therefore were to be taken to make it their instrument for his destruction. Some of the members they could command: they endeavoured to persuade some, to alarm others. Matters being arranged with those in whom they could best confide, the council was summoned. A body of men with concealed arms surrounded the hall while the Thirty were sitting, and Theramenes in his place among them. Critias then rising accused him, in a set speech, of meditated treason against the existing government. Stating no facts amounting to treason by any known law, he argued rather as a conspirator to his accomplices than a public accuser before a court of justice; contending, not on the ground of public law, but only of convenience for the party, that the accused should be capitally condemned.

Theramenes, eloquent, and practised in those difficult and dangerous situations which require, with a firm mind, the readiest exertion of great powers, adapted his defence ably to the existing circum-

stances. To have asserted, as before a just judicature, the right and the duty of a public man, in his place in council, to declare his opinion on public matters (which almost alone had been imputed to him) he knew would be at least useless, and perhaps injurious. He therefore addressed himself rather to the fears and feelings, than to the conscience and justice of his judges; and he so demonstrated the expediency of the measures which he had always recommended, and not only the iniquity, but the danger of those pursued by Critias, that he disposed a majority of the council in his favor.

SECT.
III.

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c.3. s.18.19.

The moment was critical. Critias was aware that his own ruin could now scarcely fail to follow the miscarriage of his purpose against Theramenes. After short communication with the Thirty, he went out and directed his armed attendants to show themselves. Returning then, he addressed the council thus: ‘I esteem it a duty of my station’ (he was s. 20. president of the Thirty) ‘to prevent those acting under me in the administration from being deceived and misled. I shall therefore take upon myself to do what the present emergency requires. The crowd, at your doors, have declared they will not rest under the acquittal of one, whose known purpose is the overthrow of the oligarchy. In the new code it is enacted that the citizens of the catalogue shall be liable to capital punishment only from the judgment of the council; but over all others the authority of the Thirty is absolute. I therefore, confident of your unanimous approbation, strike the name of Theramenes from the catalogue, and we, the Thirty, condemn him to death.’

To Athenians, familiar, under their democracy, with the most anomalous and tyrannical measures of

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Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 3. s. 21.

government, these proceedings were not astonishing and shocking, as they would be among those accustomed to the better political order of modern Europe, and especially of England. No opposition was made to them, either among the Thirty or by the council. Theramenes saw that his destruction was resolved, and instantly had recourse to what alone seemed to afford a chance for safety. He sprang to the altar (for, among the Greeks, every council-hall had its altar) and thence claimed the protection of a law so lately made, which Critias was proposing so grossly to violate. 'As for this altar,' he said, 'I know its sacredness will not protect me; but I will at least show that the impiety of those men is equal to their injustice. Yet I cannot but wonder that you, councillors, men of rank and high worth, will not assert your own cause: for the name of any of you may be erased from the catalogue with as little ceremony as mine.'

The herald of the Thirty had been dispatched to command the attendance of those high officers of justice called the Eleven, who were already gained to the views of Critias. They entered the council-hall with their usual attendants, while Theramenes was still speaking from the altar. Critias immediately told them that Theramenes had been condemned to death according to law; and commanded them to do what in consequence became their duty. In vain Theramenes alleged illegality and impiety. The council, awed by those around the hall, now known to be armed, was passive, while Satyrus, a man of ability, versed in high office and leading situations, but whom Xenophon describes as the most profligate as well as the most daring of the Eleven, set the example for laying hands on The-

Lys. or. con.
Nicom. p.
847. & 850.

ramenes, dragged him from the altar, and hurried him away to the prison. Boldly, or perhaps incautiously, as the nearest way, he passed through the agora. Theramenes, with exerted voice, endeavoured to excite the people in his favor. Exasperated by this, 'If you speak again,' said Satyrus, 'I will make you groan.' 'And had I said nothing,' replied Theramenes, 'should I escape groaning?' The people, prepared to fear, and not to resist, made no stir. In the prison, the deadly potion being brought, Theramenes drank it with a serene countenance, and then, tinkling the reversed cup (the Grecian custom at banquets, in passing the cup to another) as a remaining drop fell, 'This libation,' he said, 'is for the worthy Critias.' 'Such particulars,' says the contemporary historian, 'are, I am aware, of little worth in themselves; yet what they prove of Theramenes I think deserving admiration, that neither readiness nor pleasantry forsook him, even with immediate death impending.'

SECT.
IV.

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 3. s. 21.

M. T. Cic.
Tusc.
l. 1. s. 40.

Xenoph.
ut supra.

SECTION IV.

Farther violence of the Thirty: measures of Thrasybulus against the Thirty: Piræus occupied by the Athenian refugees under Thrasybulus: death of Critias: the Thirty deposed and a supreme council of Ten elected: interference of Lacedæmon: the Athenian democracy restored.

The concurrent testimony of contemporary writers of different parties assures us that, under the democracy, after it became absolute, the principal road to the honors of the Athenian state was through bribery to the people, in various ways administered. A military officer, soliciting a command, would to little purpose relate the length and variety of his service,

Xenoph.
Mem. Socr.
l. 1. c. 4.
init.

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Lys.
ἀπολογ.
δαροδοκ.
p. 161.
vel 697.

or the wounds he had received in it, if his competitor had been more magnificent in theatrical exhibitions.

An orator, defending his client under criminal prosecution, considered the expenses of that client for the people's amusement of more importance to enumerate than any military or naval merits; or, if he was conducting a criminal prosecution, he would not omit to detail the theatrical exhibitions with which his own family had entertained the people, in the hope, by so recommending himself, the more efficaciously to urge the condemnation of his enemy. Under every view then of the circumstances it will appear evident that bribery, high bribery, would be absolutely necessary to the Thirty, for keeping the Threethousand of their catalogue firm to their party. To mark, on all occasions, the most pointed partiality for them, to give them the most decided pre-eminence, and, on the other hand, to take the strongest precautions against those not of the catalogue, was indispensable. But the necessity of bribing high would carry with it the necessity of increased violences, and new crimes. For these the execution of Theramenes had been a preparatory step. That able leader being removed, measures the most violent and injurious against the multitude, already deprived of arms, were no longer scrupled. Lands and country-houses were seized for the benefit of the Thirty and their adherents, and shortly an order was issued for all not of the catalogue to quit Athens. The greater part took refuge in Piræus; but the jealousy of their oppressors did not allow them to remain long there. Fortunately the ruling party in the neighbouring city of Megara, being democratical, was friendly to their cause; and some revolution, of which no satisfactory account remains, had so altered things in the

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 1.
Lys. or. 25.
Δήμ.
καταλίσ.
ἀπολογ.
p. 173.
vel 776.

larger and more powerful city of Thebes, long the most virulent enemy of democracy and of Athens, that there also a disposition favorable to them prevailed. Thebes accordingly and Megara became crowded with Athenian fugitives.²¹

²¹ If, in pursuing the course of Athenian affairs, the reader carries in his recollection the progress of the French revolution, he cannot fail to be struck with the many points of resemblance between the proceedings of the Thirty in Athens, with its Council of Judicature, and of the Committee of Public Welfare, in Paris, with its Revolutionary Tribunal; and the consideration is not unimportant to Grecian history, inasmuch as it restores evident probability to the accounts of enormities which, however well attested, the desuetude of modern times, in the order of things established in even the worst of European governments, had rendered, till new example arose, almost incredible. And here the similitude between what in France is called democracy, and what in Greece was esteemed an oligarchy, will become striking. Their character, as it stands marked by their conduct, has hardly a difference; and thus it may appear that, with allowance for that latitude of expression which poetry may claim, Pope is right where he has said,

For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.

The phrase indeed, without a comment, is hazardous, yet it may be creditably explained thus: 'The form of a government, merely as it gives a claim to this or that title, democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, signifies little. That is really the best government, which is so constituted, in whatever form, as most to ensure a just administration.' But this cannot be absolute monarchy; for there all must depend upon the accidental character of the reigning prince: it cannot be democracy; for there the popular passion, which interested demagogues may in the moment excite, or the exertions, not even of the most numerous, but of the most turbulent and least scrupulous party, will decide every thing: it cannot be oligarchy, or what is vulgarly called aristocracy; for there a part of the people has an interest separate from the rest: it can only be a government so mixed and balanced that it may have strength to restrain popular folly and popular injustice, without being strong enough to support its own injustice or folly.

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XXI.Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 2.

Among those whom the tyranny of the Thirty had early driven to seek safety in banishment was Thrasybulus son of Lycus, already known for many important services to his country. Thrasybulus, residing in Bœotia, was rather watching for movements within Athens favorable to his views, than hoping to see a multitude driven to join him in exile, such as might form a force sufficient to assail the tyrants from without. On the accumulation of fugitives in Thebes he quickly decided his plan. It was toward midwinter, and scarcely six months after the establishment of the Thirty, when with only about seventy heavy-armed he seized Phyle, an Attic fortress near the Bœotian border.

Such an enterprise might bear, on first view, the appearance of imprudent haste and rash adventure. It gave little alarm to the Thirty, who trusted that they could easily prevent depredation on the neighbouring lands, which alone they thought threatened, by marching immediately against the little garrison. Phyle was scarcely more than twelve miles from Athens. Reaching it therefore early in the day, they directly led their forces to assault, but with the ill success which, in that age, so commonly attended the attack of walls. In their hurry, for so small a distance, and against an enemy supposed little able to resist them, they had omitted to bring tents and camp-equipage. Nevertheless the weather being, for the season, fine, though among the highlands, they resolved to remain before the place and immediately begin a contravallation. That same night a heavy fall of snow so distressed them that next morning they withdrew hastily to Athens; and with so little conduct that much of their baggage was taken by the activity of the pursuing enemy.

Had Thrasybulus assembled a numerous body for his outset, it might have excited an alarm ruinous to his purpose; and, unless he could immediately have struck some great blow, subsistence would probably have failed. But the season favored enterprise with a small force. It was not easy to keep the field with a large one against him; and in midwinter the Lacedæmonians would not, for a light cause, send troops from Peloponnesus. The Thirty, even after their miscarriage against Phyle, seem to have apprehended nothing from its garrison beyond excursion for plunder. To obviate this they sent the greater part of their Lacedæmonian troops, with a body of their own horse, to a station near the place. But the credit of success having enabled Thrasybulus to increase his forces, he marched with seven hundred heavy-armed, surprised the camp of the Thirty at daybreak, killed a hundred and twenty of their heavy-armed, and put the rest to flight.

This unexpected stroke produced an effect on the minds of men far over-proportioned to its real importance. The partizans of the Thirty were so alarmed that the tyrants themselves doubted if they could be safe, even in Athens, till assistance might be obtained from Lacedæmon. Their resources then, in beginning distress, were congenial to their measures for the establishment of power. Should they, by any train of misfortunes, be reduced to quit Athens, Eleusis would be the most desirable refuge. It was, next to the capital, the largest town of Attica, favorably situated for receiving succour from Peloponnesus, and fortified; but many of the inhabitants were disaffected. This inconvenience therefore they resolved to obviate; and the cavalry, whom they considered as the most trustworthy of their troops, were the

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 4. s. 5.

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Aristoph.
Equit.

instruments chosen for the occasion. For the equestrian order, composed of the wealthiest families of the commonwealth, having been common sufferers from the oppression of popular tyranny, rejoiced in the prospect of an improvement of their condition by an alteration of the constitution. Thus predisposed to the Thirty, it had been the policy of those insidious tyrants to court that order, and they had succeeded in holding the larger part attached to their cause.

At the head of the cavalry therefore Critias went to Eleusis. All the Eleusinian people, of age to bear arms, were summoned, under pretence of a muster, for ascertaining their strength as a garrison for their town. Every man, as his name was enrolled, was ordered to go through the gate leading to the shore. Without the wall the Athenian cavalry were posted, with some of the Thirty attending. These indicated the suspected, as they passed singly, and the servants of the cavalry (for a Grecian trooper was always attended by one or more servants afoot) seized and bound them. The scrutiny being completed, they were immediately marched away to Athens, and delivered into the custody of the Eleven.

These unfortunate men, together with some who, for the same crime of suspected disaffection, had been brought from Salamis, were sufficiently at the mercy of Critias and his associates. But an infernal policy dictated farther ceremony. To strengthen the tie between himself and his chosen three thousand, Critias would make these his accomplices in every crime, and sharers in the consequent enmity and abhorrence of men. On the following day therefore the Threethousand of the catalogue, together with the cavalry, were assembled in that splendid edifice, raised for far other purposes by the taste and mag-

nificance of Pericles, the Odeum or music-theatre: and, lest all should not be sufficiently zealous in the cause, or sufficiently obsequious to the Thirty, the Lacedæmonian garrison attended. Critias, according to the contemporary historian, addressed the Athenians in these extraordinary terms: ‘In the government which we have been establishing, your interest has been considered equally with our own. Sharing therefore its advantages, you will not refuse to share with us its dangers. Your common voice must ratify an order for the execution of the prisoners yesterday brought hither; that your security and your peril may rest on the same foundation with ours.’ Suffrages were given by ballot, as under the democracy; but openly, that it might be seen if any were untrue to the cause; and the prisoners from Eleusis and Salamis, together about three hundred, were all condemned to death together by one vote. And among the Athenians, says the contemporary historian, there were some so intent upon the acquisition of wealth and power as to be even gratified with these proceedings.

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It was not long after this massacre, so ineffectual was the horrid policy of Critias to secure his command over Attica, that Thrasybulus, with about a thousand heavy-armed, marching by night, entered the town of Piræus, open since it was dismantled by the Lacedæmonians, and took possession of it without opposition. The Thirty led their whole force to attack him. The extent of Piræus being too great for his scanty numbers to defend, he moved to the adjoining suburb of Munychia, which afforded also more advantageous ground. The Thirty did not delay their assault. Next to victory, death in battle was certainly the most desirable lot for Critias; and he was fortunate enough, beyond his desert, to

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 7.

s. 8.

s. 12.

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obtain it. Hippomachus, another of the Thirty, was also killed. Hardly more than seventy of their followers had fallen when the rest fled, and the victory of Thrasybulus was complete. His troops carried off the arms of the dead; but their clothes, a common object of plunder among the Greeks, were, in pious respect for deceased fellow-citizens, left untouched.

When pursuit ceased a truce for burial of the slain was, in the usual form, solicited by the defeated and granted by the conquerors. Opportunity to communicate being thus open, numbers from both sides assembled in conversation. Among those from Piræus was Cleocritus, herald of the mysteries, a man respected for his birth, connexions, and abilities, as well as for the sacred office which he bore, and, what was particularly advantageous on the immediate occasion, endowed by nature with a voice singularly capable of prevailing over the murmur of talking numbers. Having procured silence, he addressed the throng in a conciliatory speech, in which, professing for himself and his party every disposition to friendly union with the Threethousand, he imputed to the Thirty alone the evils suffered on both sides. 'The Thirty,' he said, 'only to gratify an inordinate thirst of wealth and power, had destroyed as many Athenian citizens in eight months as all the Peloponnesians in ten years; and, when no obstacle existed to prevent their establishing a good government in peace, they had forced on this most shameful, cruel, wicked, and, to gods and men, hateful civil war. For himself and those with whom he acted, he protested that the death of those misled men, whose obsequies were about to be performed, was a subject of sincere grief not less than to their own party.'

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 13.

This speech, gaining anxious attention from the

many, alarmed their chiefs, who sedulously hurried them away. Next day the Thirty, for that remained their title, met, and with faded hopes consulted concerning their affairs, while the Threethousand were in altercation in various parts of the town; those who had been forward in the late violences urging opposition to the utmost against Thrasybulus and his adherents, while those who thought themselves less personally obnoxious insisted on the necessity of an accommodation; unreservedly declaring that they would no longer obey the Thirty, to their own destruction and that of the commonwealth. The result of the contention was a resolution, passed in the form of a decree, by which the Thirty were deposed, and a council of Ten was appointed in their room, one from every ward, for the express purpose of negotiating an accommodation with those in Piræus. Neither was resistance attempted by the fallen tyrants, nor violence used against them. Two of their number, Eratosthenes and Phidon, were elected of the Ten; the others, weak as cruel, and neglected as worthless, retired to Eleusis.

SECT.
IV.

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 15.

Lys. con.
Eratosth.
p. 125.
vel 422.

Id. p. 125.
vel 419.

Opposition to Critias had recommended Eratosthenes and Phidon to the choice of the Threethousand, and a disposition adverse to the Thirty was also the supposed merit of their new colleagues. But no sooner were the Ten vested with supreme authority than they betrayed the trust. Appointed for the express purpose of negotiation with Thrasybulus, they resolved not to do what would presently reduce them to the general level of Athenian citizens. To this determination they were perhaps instigated, but at least they were warmly supported, by Lysimachus, general of the cavalry, a most vehement enemy of democracy. The cavalry were almost universally

Ibid.

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 3. s. 15.

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disposed to the sentiments of their chiefs; and, a large proportion of the Threethousand being found still well inclined to the cause, the resolution was taken to oppose Thrasybulus, to maintain oligarchy, and, in reliance on support from Lacedæmon, to exert themselves for the present in defensive measures. The Threethousand being however far from unanimous, the cavalry took on themselves the principal care, both of preserving peace within the city, and giving security against the enemy without. The whole body constantly slept in the Odeum, with their horses at hand bridled, and their spears by them, that they might act instantly, as emergencies might require, either as cavalry or infantry; for beside unceasing apprehension of sedition within the city, attack from Piræus was hourly expected.

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 3. s. 16.

Meanwhile citizens, metics, and former inhabitants of Athens of all denominations, who had fled from the tyranny of the Thirty, allured by the fame of the successes of Thrasybulus, flocked to join him. The greater part, disarmed, as we have already seen, by the policy of Critias, brought only their personal ability and zeal in the cause: but all were sedulous in providing themselves to the best of their skill and means; some making shields of wood, some of wicker; and, whether merely for uniformity and distinction, or that no visible weakness of the material might encourage the enemy, they whitened all. Fellowship in adversity, and unity of object under one able leader, promoted concord among them. About the tenth day from their first occupying Piræus, in general assembly they solemnly pledged themselves to fidelity in the common cause, and then came to a liberal resolution, that the rights of citizenship should be common to all, even foreigners having right of

hospitality, who should faithfully do the duty of soldiers in the war in which they were engaged for the recovery of their country. They were now strong in heavy-armed; their light-armed were still more numerous, and they had about seventy horse. They commanded the country, so that they were at no loss for provisions, and it was resolved, with general approbation, to besiege the city.

SECT.
IV.

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 4. s. 18.

Though the transient reign and hasty downfall of the Thirty might, on a first glance, give to suppose that their projects were as unaccountably rash and imprudent as grossly nefarious, yet they were not so lightly founded. Critias had proposed, not to establish an independent dominion, but only to be lord of Attica, under the sovereignty of Lacedæmon; and he confided in the Threethousand heavy-armed of his catalogue, together with the greater part of the Athenian cavalry, who were warm in his cause, only as force sufficient in emergencies, till support from Lacedæmon might be obtained. Attica, divided among three or four thousand families, would afford every man a maintenance. Every Athenian thus, like every Lacedæmonian, would be a gentleman; all the offices performed among the modern European nations by the lower classes of freemen would be supplied by slaves. An extraordinary concurrence of favoring incidents with bold and well-concerted enterprise had shaken this system almost in the outset. But, though Critias himself had fallen, and the people under him were ready for a revolution, yet his successors in power, who had been his opponents in council, found his plan so far inviting that they adopted it almost entirely; while his opponents in arms, almost grasping the object of their wishes,

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were still very far from any clear prospect of obtaining permanent possession.

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 19.

Thrasybulus had indeed so chosen his season, so avoided to excite alarm, was so rapid in his measures, and so favored by contingencies, that the revolution was on the point of taking place before his opponents began to think any addition to their own strength wanting. At length however nearly at the same time, from the Thirty in Eleusis, and from the Ten, in the name of the Threethousand, in Athens, ministers reached Lacedæmon. But with a government ill-formed for extensive dominion, Lacedæmon itself was at this time divided by faction. But the support of oligarchy was necessary to the existence of Lacedæmonian influence in any foreign state, and all the standing principles of Spartan policy would urge it. The powerful interest of Lysander therefore, whose credit was deeply concerned in the maintenance of the Lacedæmonian authority in Athens, sufficed to obtain for him the appointment of commander-in-chief in Attica with the title of harmost, and for Libys, his brother, the command of a squadron to co-operate with him. He desired no Lacedæmonian land force, but he procured a loan from the treasury to the Athenian state, of a hundred talents, for paying troops, which he could easily hire among the other states of Peloponnesus. He passed immediately to Eleusis, where he was soon joined by his mercenaries, and he prepared to blockade Piræus by land and sea.

Ibib.

Lys. Isocr.

These were circumstances to which the Ten, from their first appointment, had looked forward; and the hopes of their party now became high again, while inevitable ruin seemed to threaten Thrasybulus and

his followers. Certainly no exertion of prudence and bravery, on their part, could enable their scanty number and deficient resources to withstand the power of Lacedæmon. But the state of parties in Lacedæmon itself, not likely to have been totally unknown to Thrasybulus, was probably among the encouragements to his enterprise: and indeed it seems more than possible that he had communication there, and reasonable dependence upon intrigue favorable to his views. Xenophon has apparently not said all that he knew or thought upon the subject; certainly he has not explained all that appears mysterious in it; and though he generally writes freely, yet this is not the only occasion upon which he appears to have carefully avoided declaring what might involve the safety or the character of persons living when he wrote. The facts however, which were of public notoriety then, are not doubtful now. Pausanias, s. 20. the reigning king of the Eurysthenidean family, was of the party that envied or feared the power and influence of Lysander. But the ephoralty was the hinge on which the politics of Lacedæmon turned: whatever party could obtain a majority of the five ephors, commanded the administration for the year. The expectation that Lysander would make Attica, according to Xenophon's expression, his own, gave much uneasiness. An exertion was therefore made by the king's party; and, three of the ephors favoring, a decree of the general assembly was procured, which, without taking from Lysander the particular command, so lately conferred upon him, put the supreme direction of the business into the king's hands. It was resolved that the affair was important enough to require that the allies should be summoned.

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 4. s. 19.

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The general assembly then directed, that a Lacedæmonian army should march, that Pausanias should command, and that two of the ephors should attend him, as his council.

Xenoph.
Hel. 1. 2.
c. 4. s. 21.
s. 20.

In pursuance of these resolutions, taken in the absence of Lysander, the contingent of forces was required from all the allies. The Bœotians and Corinthians, already jealous of Lacedæmon, found pretences to disobey; but all the other allies sent their proportions of troops, and Pausanias led a very powerful army into Attica. Lysander, with due submission to legal authority, joined him, and they encamped together in the plain called Halipedon, Seaside level, before Piræus. A message was immediately sent to Thrasybulus, requiring his followers to disperse.

s. 22.

Obedience was refused, and then Pausanias led his troops to assault. He had however no intention that it should succeed, and of course it was ineffectual. Next day he examined the ground about the port, with the pretended purpose of forming a contravallation. His escort, consisting of Lacedæmonian infantry and Athenian cavalry, being molested by the enemy's light-armed, he ordered the cavalry to charge. The irregulars fled, and the cavalry, killing some, pursued as far as the theatre in Piræus, where they were met and checked by targeteers and heavy-armed.

s. 23.

The Lacedæmonians following to support the Athenian horse, were so annoyed by the missile weapons of the targeteers, that they were compelled to retreat with loss, and two polemarchs were among the killed.

s. 24.

Thrasybulus then led on the whole of his heavy-armed, and Pausanias not without difficulty reached a hill, at the distance of half a mile, where he could defend himself while he sent for support. Having collected

s. 25.

his forces, and formed his phalanx in very deep order, he drove back the enemy, with some slaughter, raised his trophy, and withdrew to his camp. SECT.
IV.

This action, critical as it had been, very exactly answered the purpose of Pausanias. He was anxious to establish the opinion of his serious desire to reduce the democratical Athenians by arms, while he carried his real purposes by secret negotiation. Quitting therefore his situation before Piræus, he encamped under the walls of Athens, taking his own quarters in the celebrated Academia. He had probably, not less than Lysander, his view to a commanding influence in Attica. He was connected by hereditary hospitality with the family of Nicias, of which the chief, Niceratus, the unfortunate son of the unfortunate general, had perished, as we have seen, under the Thirty. Having communicated with the survivors of the family, he directed them to come to him, numerously attended by their party, to give weight to a declaration of their wish for an accommodation with their fellow-countrymen in Piræus. At the same time he invited Thrasybulus to send commissioners to treat with him, and intimated the terms which those commissioners should propose. He was readily obeyed by both; and with the advice and concurrent authority of the two ephors, his council, he gave passports for the commissioners from Piræus, and for Cephisophon and Melitus,²² as representatives of the moderate in Athens, to proceed to Lacedæmon.

Lys. pro fil.
Eucr. p. 604.

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 4. s. 26.

The Ten and their associates were alarmed at these missions. Their general assembly was summoned, and they procured a decree for sending ministers to Lacedæmon, on the part of the existing government s. 27.

²² Perhaps father of the accuser of Socrates, who was Melitus son of Melitus.

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XXI.Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 4. s. 28.

of Athens. By these they urged, 'That as they had voluntarily placed their city and themselves under the protection, and to be disposed of at the pleasure, of the Lacedæmonians, nothing less ought to be required of those who now held Munychia and Piræus than an unconditional surrender.' All the parties were temperately heard by the ephors and the Spartan assembly. Their ensuing decree directed 'That fifteen commissioners should be appointed, in conjunction with the king Pausanias, to settle with the strictest impartiality and equity the differences existing among the Athenian people.'

This resolution, generous we should wish to consider it, though evidently in no small degree a party measure, appears however to have been faithfully and liberally executed: All Athenians of all parties, the Thirty, and some few who had acted in the most invidious offices under them, alone excepted, were restored to their rights as Athenian citizens, an oath only being required of them to keep the peace and be true to a universal amnesty: and even the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten were not to be denied those rights, provided they would abide a judicial scrutiny of their conduct.²³ Humanity perhaps and prudence demanded the exception, as not less necessary to the safety of the excepted than to the general quiet. Eleusis was given them for their residence, and to be also the refuge of all who, with them, might fear to live under the restored commonwealth. Matters being so far settled, Pausanias led away the whole of the Peloponnesian forces, leaving the Athenians of the city at perfect liberty with regard to their future civil government.

²³ "Ὅς ἂν ἐθέλοι εὐθύνας δίδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἡρξεν. Andoc. de Myst. p. 42.

The retreat of the Lacedæmonian army was the signal for Thrasybulus and his followers to march to Athens. In solemn procession, like the Roman triumph, they ascended into the citadel, and in their arms offered a thanksgiving sacrifice to Minerva. A general assembly was then held, to give the sanction of the popular will to the measures which the circumstances might require. Phormisius, though one of the army from Piræus, proposed that landowners only should have votes in the general assembly, and be competent for magistracy. The more prudent Thrasybulus saw that, though the evils of the old government were great, this was not the proper remedy; nor would the times have borne it. More than five thousand citizens would so have been deprived of the privileges to which, under the old constitution, they were entitled; and would of consequence have sunk into a condition of little more security for person and property than slaves. For so it was, in the want of any just idea of balanced government among the Greeks, that portion of the people which held the sovereign power was despotic, and the rest were their subjects, more depressed than the subjects of any single despot easily can be. In addressing the assembly therefore, after some expostulation to the oligarchal party, Thrasybulus strongly recommended, to the democratical, peaceful behaviour, and the strictest observance of the oath of amnesty just taken. Stating then the inexpediency of risking new troubles, by attempting, at such a season, any innovation, he recommended the complete restoration of the constitution, as it stood before the appointment of the Thirty. The assembly decreed as he advised: all the magistracies were filled in regular form, and the government resumed its ancient course. Thus, by a series

Xenoph.
Hel. 1. 2.
c. 4. s. 29. &
Lys. c.
Agorat.
p. 137.
vel 499.

Lys. or de
non abol.
rep. &
Dion. Hal.
vit. Lys.
Xenoph.
ut supra.

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of conduct, as wise and moderate in civil business as able and daring in military, the latter a common merit among the Greeks, but the former very uncommon, Thrasybulus enjoyed the satisfaction while he lived, and through succeeding ages has had the glory, of being the restorer of the Athenian commonwealth, the second founder of Athens.

Attica however was not yet united under one government: it was divided between a democratical republic, of which Athens, and an oligarchal, of which Eleusis, was the capital; an arrangement suiting the policy of Lacedæmon, as it facilitated the means of holding all in subjection. These means nevertheless were neglected. As the Lacedæmonians wrote no books, and foreigners had little access to their city, we are very deficiently informed of their domestic affairs. They seem however to have been at this time so warm in faction, the party of Pausanias overbearing, but hardly overbearing, that of Lysander, that they had little leisure for interfering in the affairs

B. C. 402.*
Ol. 94. $\frac{2}{3}$.

Xenoph.
Hel. I. 2.
c. 4. s. 30.

of neighbouring states. Meanwhile the people of Athens were alarmed with information that those in Eleusis were engaging mercenary troops. The vehemence of jealousy, natural to those who had so lately been suffering the evils of exile, and who expected no alternative but death or expatriation from the success of the supposed design, instantly possessed the public mind. The service of all able to bear arms was strictly required, and the whole strength of the city marched. The leaders in Eleusis, whose purpose seems to have been but suspected, trusting themselves to a conference, were massacred; but fortunately, so moderate was the popular fury, or such the influence

[* Mr. Clinton establishes the date of the amnesty, mentioned below, 12 Boedromion, Sept. B. C. 403. *Fasti Hellen.* p. 86.]

of the chiefs to restrain it, perjury and bloodshed went no farther. Proposals of peace and complete amnesty were offered and accepted, and the refugees, mostly of the noblest and wealthiest families of Attica, were restored to the rights of Athenian citizens. The multitude, who had the power in their hands, as the contemporary historian, not their partial friend, observes, remained faithful to their oaths, 'and the government,' he continues, 'is still carried on with harmony between them.' Thus at length the Athenian commonwealth was completely restored, and all Attica re-united as its territory.

In the accounts remaining of these vicissitudes in the affairs of Athens no mention occurs of Alcibiades: after his ineffectual interference to prevent the defeat of Ægospotami, he is not even named by the contemporary historian. His fate nevertheless, as it may best be gathered from imperfect accounts of later writers, is altogether too interesting not to require notice.

Alcibiades seems to have possessed, in the Thracian Chersonese, a large estate, even a princely command, and extensive influence; the estate apparently inherited from his ancestors; for avarice, and that low dishonesty which has the accumulation of wealth for its object, were not among his vices. When he was a second time driven, from the head of his country's forces, to seek safety in exile, his property, in the expectation of a great booty for the treasury, was strictly inquired after, and private interest, as we have seen, made such inquiries at Athens very severe. But though in issues from the treasury and collections from tributary states the public money which had come into his hands very greatly exceeded what had

*Lys. pro
Aristoph.
p. 654.*

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In exile therefore, and after the overthrow of his country, Alcibiades, with the consideration arising from property and power, enjoyed that which extraordinary abilities and magnanimous disinterestedness, displayed in great commands, would add. But as it often happens, in human affairs, that circumstances apparently most advantageous and desirable lead to misfortune, so the very credit of Alcibiades was the occasion that, though in exile, the overthrow of his country involved his ruin. Athens was thought not in secure obedience to the Thirty or to Lacedæmon while Alcibiades lived; and, the authority or influence of that sovereign state pervading all the Grecian settlements, it was difficult to find a residence where he could be safe. Perhaps indeed his disposition too little allowed him to rest in quiet security. Finding himself however threatened on his estate in the Chersonese, he passed over into Bithynia. He had some confidence in the friendship, as well as in the tried honor, of the satrap of that country, Pharnabazus. But little contented with safety there, he conceived projects, not simply for restoring himself to his country, but for restoring his country to its former pre-eminence in Greece. His hopes were excited, and his views directed, by the well-known success of Themistocles at the Persian court; and, under the protection and with the recommendation of Pharnabazus, he proposed to go to Susa. Arrangements seem to have been in some forwardness for his purpose, when, in his residence in Bithynia, he was attacked by an armed multitude, whose provocation or whose instigators are not certainly indicated. Pharnabazus, the

Lacedæmonians, and his own passions have all been accused; but the many well-attested proofs of the satrap's integrity, magnanimity, and honor seemingly should exculpate him. The assailants, an armed multitude against a few domestics, feared to enter the house, but they set fire to it. Alcibiades then sallying sword in hand, none dared await his assault; but, from a distance, he was overwhelmed by a shower of darts and arrows. Nearly thus, according to all remaining accounts, fell that extraordinary man, before he had reached his fortieth year.*

[* Mr. Clinton places the death of Alcibiades B. C. 404. at the age of at least 44. Under the date B. C. 423. he thus traces his age in opposition to Mr. Mitford: 'Alcibiades seems to have 'already begun to act in public affairs. See Aristoph. Vesp. '44. where his speaking is ridiculed. He had been noticed two 'years before in the 'Ἀχαρνεῖς B. C. 425. Acharn. 716. et Schol. 'ad loc. And even in the Δαιτυλεῖς B. C. 427. Cf. Galen. ap. 'Brunck. fr. 3. from whence it appears that he had already 'spoken in public in B. C. 427., probably at the age of twenty; 'which would suppose him at this time to be 24. years of age. 'And he must have been 24. at the least, because he 'was left 'an orphan by the death of his father' (Isocr. Big. c. 11. 'p. 352. b.) in B. C. 447. and *was at least 44. at his own death* 'B. C. 404. in the year of *Pythodorus*, the 44th Archon, including both, from *Timarchides*, in whose year Clinias fell. 'Nepos therefore, Alcib. c. 10., inaccurately—*annos circiter* 'QUADRAGINTA natus diem obiit supremum Alcibiades. Mr. 'Mitford has followed the erroneous account of Nepos: 'thus 'fell that extraordinary man *before he had reached his fortieth* 'year.'" Fasti Hellen. p. 68.]

CHAPTER XXII.

Illustrations, from the orators and philosophers, of the civil history of Athens, and the condition of the Athenian people, between the ages of Pericles and Demosthenes, with a summary view of the rise of philosophy and literature in Greece.

SECTION I.

Short political quiet at Athens. Transcription of Solon's laws. Violence of party-strife renewed: sycophancy revived: rise of the rhetoricians. Prosecutions—of the son of Alcibiades; of the nephews of Nicias; of a citizen, supposed to have appropriated property forfeited to the commonwealth; of those who prosecuted the assassins of Phrynichus; of a citizen, for grubbing the stump of a sacred olive tree.

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ON the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war there followed a suspension rather of the usual turbulence throughout Greece than what, in modern Europe, would be esteemed a political calm, Attica only remaining, as we have seen, for some time, violently agitated. The state of the rest of the country, under the undisputed supremacy of Lacedæmon, though not particularly described by any ancient author, we shall gather from circumstances hereafter occurring. Of the state of Athens, after the restoration of democracy, which Xenophon's short eulogy might give a modern reader to suppose all concord, tranquillity, and happiness, we have from the contemporary orators and philosophers large information. Hence indeed we derive almost all that we learn of Athenian history,

and no uninstrusive portion of it, till Athens became again implicated in the troubles which anew involved all Greece; amid which she so recovered strength and importance as again to take a leading part in them.

It is a strong testimony to the merit of Solon's laws, that, in all revolutions of the Athenian government, they never ceased to be highly respected. The legislative and executive powers, never well defined in any ancient government, might receive changes, the judicial might pass to new tribunals; but no innovating demagogue dared make a direct attack upon Solon's legal system. Nevertheless there existed, for some ages, only one complete copy of his laws, which was kept with great care in the citadel, where all might have access to it and transcribe any parts particularly wanted. Among the violent internal troubles, preceding the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, it seems to have been a measure of the better-minded men, for restoring the most valuable part of the old constitution, and providing new security for civil order, to procure a decree for a second copy of the whole code for public use. The important business, of making or superintending the transcription, was committed to Nicomachus, a man of rank, connected with the oligarchal party; and it was expected that the work would be completed in four months. But new troubles within, the pressure of an enemy without, and at length the capture of the city, interfered. Meanwhile Nicomachus, and those connected with him, found themselves possessed of power which they were unwilling to resign. Litigants and others, who wanted copies of any particular laws, could have them only through Nicomachus. The transcription of parts, for private purposes, unavoidably interrupted that of the whole for public use: and thus, independently

Lys. adv.
Nicom.
p. 836.

p. 839.

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of the political troubles, arose a pretence for delay, which would require reasonable allowance, while the extent of reasonable allowance, under these circumstances, could scarcely by any measure be estimated; and thus six years passed before the complete copy was delivered for public use.

Ch. 21. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Amid the disorders of conquest and revolution meanwhile circumstances, how far really injurious cannot be known, subjected the code to suspicions, not to be completely obviated. Nicomachus was much connected with Satyrus, whom we have seen distinguishing himself, among the Eleven, as a zealous minister of the violences of the Thirty Tyrants. Nicomachus and Satyrus had before been together among the leaders of the oligarchal party, in opposition to Cleophon. They together joined the party of Critias; and thus, when, by the death of Theramenes, opposition to that party was quelled, the code of Solon was at its mercy.

Nevertheless, if we put together all that remains on the subject, it appears not likely that the code was very essentially injured. Lysias, as an advocate by profession, must himself have had a general knowledge of the laws, and he could not want opportunity for learning the opinions of the best informed about them; yet, when, in conducting the prosecution afterward instituted against Nicomachus, it was most his object to point out what had been destroyed or interpolated, he seems to have been unable even to name any thing very material, except that forgery which he affirms to have occasioned the condemnation of Cleophon. All other alterations, made, as he says, principally under the Thirty, appear to have had no farther purpose than to authorize increased expense in public sacrifices. A public sacri-

Lys. adv.
Nicom.
p. 849.

fice was always a feast for the lower people. The object being then only to enable the Thirty to feed the Three-thousand of their catalogue at the public expense, the interpolations could hardly much affect the general system.

When therefore, on the expulsion of the Thirty, the democracy was restored, the inestimable advantage was experienced of possessing a system of law which the people had been accustomed to revere, and the Athenian state became resettled at once on the code of Solon, as on a basis in whose firmness all had confidence. But, on the contrary, intolerable inconvenience had been experienced from the variety of laws added since his time; for many had been made only to answer the momentary purposes of faction; some oppressive in their tenor; some contradictory to others; insomuch that, in the end, the most cautious man could scarcely direct his conduct so as not to become obnoxious to legal punishment. Fortunately the laws of Solon, together with a few unrepealed statutes of Draco, were sufficient, in the moment, for the purposes of civil life. It was therefore decreed that all later laws should be suspended till they had undergone a revision, and that those only which might be advantageously grafted on the old system should be re-enacted.

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 39. & 52.

Thrasybulus, and those who with him guided the popular will, certainly deserve high honor for that political calm, short as it was, which Athens now enjoyed. Not the public measures only, but the public temper was marked with a wise moderation and a magnanimous liberality. Sycophancy was discouraged; party was nearly abolished; several of those who had acted with the Thirty, who had served under them in the cavalry, their guard and principal

Lysias,
δοκιμαζ.
ἀπολογ.
p. 575. &
adv. Poliuc.

p. 609. &
Xenoph.
Hel. l. 2.
c. 4. s. 30.

support, were admitted into the council; and allowed to aspire to the highest offices, civil and military. Harmony and internal quiet prevailed, such as, perhaps since the death of Pericles, had been unknown in Athens.

Lysias, ut
supra.

While sobriety and moderation, the fruit of severe suffering, thus pervaded the public mind, a vain attempt was made by the patriotic leaders, without the hazard of great changes, to put legal restraint upon democratical despotism. A law was proposed and enacted, declaring that no decree, whether of the council or even of the general assembly, should be valid in opposition to the law, as it stood then established. But the restraint of law, in an unbalanced democracy, was a phantom, which party-leaders easily taught their favoring majority in the sovereign assembly to despise. The constitution therefore remaining unaltered, the former temper of the government soon returned, and all its inherent evils again broke out. Party-spirit resumed its violence, tyranny again marked the decrees of the assembly and the judgments of the tribunals, and even the amnesty, that solemn engagement to which the whole people had sworn, as the very foundation of order and quiet in the restored commonwealth, was, not openly indeed, but under various subterfuges, violated. If the interest of a party required the exclusion of some eminent man from the college of archons or from the council, nice distinctions were taken to prove the cases of such men exceptions to the general pardon, and to contend that the approbation of the council in the dokimasia should be withheld. Success in such an argument before the council, which went no farther than to exclusion from office, encouraged accusation on similar grounds in the ordinary courts, or

Lys. pro
Mantith.
& id. adv.
Evand. &
con. Philon.

before the assembled people : which might produce confiscation and banishment, or even death. Needy and profligate men caught at the opportunity, and sycophancy revived, with all its public evils and all its private horrors.

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In a popular government the art of public speaking cannot fail to be important, and in Athens it was more extensively so, as no man, who possessed anything, could, by the most upright conduct, be secure against prosecution ; and as moreover it was expected of the prosecuted, though friends or council might assist, that they should nevertheless also speak for themselves. The importance of eloquence, in a court of justice, will also bear some proportion to the numbers which compose it. Eloquence will often operate powerfully upon an English jury of only twelve men ; though the judge will check deception, inform ignorance, and correct misinformation ; and the jury, in conference before they decide, discussing their own opinions, the recollection of the informed and wary may obviate the fascination of oratory upon the ignorant, the passionate, and the giddy. But in the Athenian courts, consisting of from five hundred to six thousand jurors, no conference could take place ; no salutary influence of the wiser few could easily affect the mass ; the decision must generally be that of ignorance and passion, operated upon, as might happen, by the powers of contending speakers.

‘ Exasperated by eloquence,’ says Xenophon, ‘ they often condemn the innocent ; moved to pity, or even to favor, by eloquence, they acquit and even honor the guilty.’

Xenoph.
Apol. Socr.
s. 4.

In this state of things at Athens it was unfortunate to want eloquence. A wealthy man, unable to speak for himself in public, was doubly an object

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for the sycophants. Hence the profession of the rhetorician, who composed orations to be spoken by others, arose and gained high credit. Eminent men, of superior abilities, attached themselves to it, whose compositions, as valuable models of an important art, were collected and transmitted to posterity; and much of the works of two of the most eminent, Lysias, whose name has already occurred for notice, and Isocrates, who soon after acquired celebrity, fortunately remain to us. In the Grecian annals of the contemporary Athenian historian we find, after the restoration of the democracy, a void in Athenian history. Those factious intrigues, those strifes in the tribunals and in the agora, which alone offered themselves, were apparently, in his idea, either too familiar to his contemporaries, or too hazardous for historical narrative. He has therefore referred his notice of them to those valuable dissertations which remain to us from him. These, with the works of the orators and rhetoricians, who often passed under the common title of orators, enable us in some degree to fill the void; not indeed with a series of connected events, but with facts which afford much illustration of the character of the Athenian constitution, and of the condition of the people under it.

Among the early objects of reviving sycophancy we find Alcibiades, son of the extraordinary man of that name who has already engaged so much of our attention, by Dinomache daughter of Megacles, the noblest and wealthiest heiress of her time in Athens, to whom he was married in early youth. The younger Alcibiades, from deficiency, whether of talents, or activity, or opportunity, made no figure, in public life, proportionate to his father's fame. He is chiefly known to us through two orations, com-

posed, on different occasions, by the two celebrated rhetoricians just mentioned, one in his accusation, the other in his defence. These however show that he was eminent enough to excite the attacks, not only of sycophancy but of faction.

The Athenian people had decreed a military expedition, on what occasion does not appear, and the generals were empowered (such was the tyrannical authority with which the despotic multitude not unfrequently intrusted its favorites) to name the citizens who should serve upon it. Party-interest or party-resentment, or possibly some view to favor with the lower people only, prompting, several men of rank and property were called upon to serve as common foot-soldiers. Most of them, dreading the consequences of a despot's resentment, obeyed the injurious mandate; but young Alcibiades dared to refuse. Mounting his horse, he joined the cavalry, and said, there he was in his post; there he was ready for the duty which the constitution and the laws required of him.

Lys. con.
Alcib.
Xenoph.
Hcl. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 24.

The oration composed by Lysias, for the prosecution, will not impress the most favorable idea of the rhetorician himself, or of the prosecutor for whom he wrote, or of the court to which the speech was addressed, or of the general administration of law at Athens, after the boasted restoration of the commonwealth. Private revenge is a motive of the accuser, directly and repeatedly avowed; and not only the most illiberal personal abuse of the accused, but all that faction had ever, truly or falsely, imputed to his father, was urged to influence the tumultuary tribunal. The lost defence is not wanting to evince that the accusation, which we must suppose so able a pleader well knew how to adapt most ad-

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vantageously to the capacity and temper of the court, was weakly founded and malicious. The testimony afforded by it is in more than one view valuable. We might question the evidence of Xenophon to the insecurity of individuals at Athens, and the tyranny exercised over all possessing, or reputed to possess property; he was a sufferer from popular sovereignty; but the concurring testimony of Lysias, a sufferer from oligarchy, and thence a vehement advocate for popular power, completes the proof.

In the oration against Alcibiades we find three penal laws quoted: one against cowardice in battle; another against omission of service with the infantry; and a third against presuming to act with the cavalry, without the previous approbation of the council in the scrutiny called dokimasia. By a violent construction the accuser endeavoured to persuade the court that Alcibiades was obnoxious to the first of these laws; though not only his service with the cavalry was admitted, but no battle had taken place. 'But this is a case,' says the accuser, 'that has not occurred before since the restoration of the democracy. It behoves you therefore to act, not merely as judges, but in some degree as legislators; not confining yourselves to a strict construction of the law as it stands, but rather deciding how the law should ever hereafter be understood. Alcibiades, regularly summoned for the infantry, having sought shelter in the less dangerous service of the cavalry, it is a duty you owe to justice and to your country to presume his cowardice, as if a battle had actually been fought and he had fled; and sentence ought to be pronounced accordingly.' The strong contrast of the principle, here inculcated, to that of the English jurisprudence, which requires

the strictest construction of penal laws, cannot fail to strike the English reader; nor can he have examined Grecian history, in the genuine portraits given by contemporary writers, without observing that it is in the character of democracy, more even than of the most absolute monarchy, to be careless of the safety of individuals, where but a shadow of the interest of the sovereign interferes; and in a democracy the prevailing faction is the absolute sovereign. The accuser's own argument shows that by no fair construction Alcibiades could be deemed to have incurred the penalty of the first law. The case seems not to have been within the meaning even of the second; intended apparently to apply only to those who owed no military service but in the infantry. Upon the third a question arises which we have not means to decide; but we may safely pronounce that either the case of Alcibiades was not within it, or the law was a dictate of the purest tyranny. For if, in any suspension of the dokimasia, those who had every requisite for the cavalry-service were legally compellable to serve in the infantry, what must have been the situation of leading men, in a party to which the general of the day, and a majority of the council were inimical? Any one or all of them might be banished, at the nomination of the general, in the situation of common foot-soldiers, to any part of the world to which the Athenian multitude might be persuaded to decree an expedition.

Alcibiades had the good fortune to escape condemnation; for in his behalf the general himself came forward with his nine colleagues, declaring that, though Alcibiades had been regularly summoned to serve in the infantry, yet he had had their leave to act with the cavalry. But apparently the Athenian

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law did not, like the English, forbid a second prosecution for the same imputed crime. The accuser pursued his purpose, and a fragment of a second oration, composed for him by Lysias, remains to us, in which the most striking feature is the impudence with which the generals are called upon, with threats, to retract, and acknowledge as faults, the evidence which they had given on oath to the court, in the face of the people.

Young Alcibiades, it is said, inherited his father's fine person and his profligacy, without his talents. For the blemishes of his character however we shall not implicitly believe an avowed enemy, or a venal rhetorician, paid for giving a specious form to calumny. It is creditable for both father and son, that a rhetorician of far fairer reputation than Lysias, a real patriot and a scrupulously honest man, has been the eulogist of one and advocate of the other. A prosecution was instituted against the younger Alcibiades, to recover damages for a violence, pretended to have been, many years before, committed by his father, in forcibly taking, from a person named Tisias, a pair of horses, which won for him the prize in the chariot-race at Olympia. Isocrates composed the speech, yet extant, which the younger Alcibiades spoke in his own defence. It is mostly apology for some parts, and panegyric of the rest, of his father's public conduct. What deserves our notice here is an animadversion upon the sycophants. 'You are 'now informed,' says Alcibiades to the court, 'by 'the testimony of many acquainted with the trans- 'action, and among others by the ambassadors them- 'selves of Argos, that the horses were not taken by 'violence from Tisias, but were fairly bought, by my 'father, of the Argive commonwealth. Attacks how-

‘ ever like the present are not new to me; and in all
 ‘ of them the insidious policy of the sycophants has
 ‘ been the same. Instituting an action on pretence
 ‘ of some private wrong, they constantly implicate in
 ‘ their plea some charge of public misdemeanour.
 ‘ They employ more time in calumniating my father,
 ‘ than in proving what they have sworn to as the
 ‘ foundation of their suit against me; and, as if in
 ‘ contempt of every principle of law and justice, for
 ‘ crimes committed, as they affirm, by him against
 ‘ you, they demand reparation from me to themselves.’

Those unversed in the Athenian pleadings may possibly not immediately see the force or the exact drift of the concluding observation. The multitude ordinarily composing an Athenian court of justice was so great that the pleaders always addressed it as under the impulse of the same interests, and subject to the same feelings as the general assembly, and equally without responsibility. Impartiality was never supposed; the passions were always applied to; and it never failed to be contended, between the parties, which could most persuade the jurors that their interest was implicated with his, and that by deciding in his favor they would be gainers.¹

¹ The orators abundantly show the justice of Xenophon's assertion, *Ἐν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῦ δικαίου αὐτοῖς μέλει μάλλον ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῖς συμφέροντος*. Athen. resp. c. 1. s. 13. See particularly the oration of Lysias for the estate of Aristophanes, p. 157. or 656—660.

The extravagant use made of public accusation, as the tool of private malice and private gain, profiting from the extravagance of democratical jealousy, has not escaped the animadversion of the comic poet of the day. ‘Run and tell Cleon,’ says the chorus in *The Wasps*, (v. 407.) ‘that here is a disaffected man, bent upon the commonwealth's ruin. He asserts that litigation and prosecutions should be discouraged! Is not this abominable?’

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With the son of Alcibiades, we find under the persecution of revived sycophancy the nephews of his colleague in command and adversary in politics, the rich, benevolent, unfortunate Nicias. The family was unfortunate. Niceratus the son, and Eucrates the brother, of Nicias, had suffered death under the tyranny of the Thirty. What crime, under the restored democracy, was imputed to his nephews, the sons of Eucrates, for which they were threatened with confiscation of their property, the remaining fragment of their defence, written by Lysias, does not inform us. A decree had already been given against them, which is complained of as a direct violation of the amnesty. The services of their family to the commonwealth are urged in their favor; and occasion is taken, from the sufferings of Eucrates and Niceratus under the odious tyranny of the Thirty, to affirm, what however we learn, on the best authority, to have been false, that the whole family had always been attached to the democratical interest. With more truth perhaps, the orator insists that, as the three brothers, objects of the prosecution, were all supporting the burthensome command of triremes, and liable to every other expensive office, as well as to calls, unlimited, for occasional contributions to the treasury, their property was more valuable to the

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 2.
c. 3. s. 18.

‘Is it not manifest tyranny?’ An opponent of the faction of Cleon observes upon this: (v. 486.) ‘Every-thing with you is tyranny and conspiracy. Even in the market everything is tyranny. If any one buys haddock in preference to sprats, the spratseller says he is laying out for the tyranny. If any one wants to have leeks thrown into the bargain, as sauce for mackarel, ‘What,’ says the herbwoman, ‘are you looking for the tyranny? Do you think Athens will find you sauce for tribute?’ A joke follows to the same purpose from Xanthias, the slave, too indelicate for translation.

commonwealth in their own hands than if actually confiscated. Such are the principal heads of the defence. Of the final event of the prosecution we are no otherwise informed than by a report, little likely to have been strictly true, that, with one exception only, all the pleadings of Lysias were successful.

An oration, written by Lysias, for a defendant against a prosecution instituted by the treasury, exhibits a far deeper scandal to the laws and constitution of Athens. Nicophemus and Aristophanes, father and son, served their country in high situations; whether really well or ill we know not; but they were introduced to the public favor which raised them by Conon, whom we shall find one of the most illustrious characters in Athenian history. On some turn in the popular mind, some change in the administration, some machination of faction, unreported by ancient writers, they were imprisoned, secretly made away with, so that their friends could not, as usual when executions were regular, obtain their bodies for burial. This atrocious act, more strongly impressed with the purest character of despotism than any recorded even of the Thirty, received the fullest and most deliberate approbation and support of democratical authority. Confiscation of property followed the murder, as if the sufferers had been lawfully executed, in pursuance of the most regular conviction; and, the amount disappointing the expectation of the greedy many, whether animosity, or the desire of plunder only, still incited, a prosecution was instituted against the brother of the widow of Aristophanes, as the nearest relation, to compel payment to the treasury of the supposed deficiency, on pretence that it must have been embezzled by the family.

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These facts indeed we have only from the defendant himself. But to authenticate them it seems sufficient, that a defendant in such circumstances could dare, or that an advocate such as Lysias could advise him, to state them before the Athenian people. The whole oration is in a style of humble supplication for justice, little to be expected, unless the passions of the despotic throng could be interested. 'A patient hearing,' says the accused, 'such as you have granted to my prosecutors, is what I most earnestly solicit. — Accusations of the most atrocious crimes, it is well known, sometimes have been supported only by such gross falsehood, so immediately detected, that the witnesses have carried out of court with them the detestation of all present. At other times the most iniquitous prosecution hath succeeded, and detection has followed, not till reparation to the injured was no longer possible.'²—The profession of apprehension that a part of the numerous court would be influenced by interested motives, is however not scrupled: 'I know,' says the accused again, 'how difficult it will be effectually to refute the received opinion of the great riches of Nicophemus. The present scarcity of money in the city, and the wants of the treasury, which the forfeiture has been calculated upon to supply, will operate against me.'

If the possession of absolute power spoils individuals, much more certainly it spoils a multitude. An expression follows, in the oration we are considering, singularly marking the persuasion of the speaker, and of the able rhetorician who wrote for him, that, in addressing the many of Athens, he was addressing a body impregnated with all the illiberal jealousy, all the haughtiness, and all the selfishness of tyranny.

² The same thing is said by Andocides, in his defence of himself, p. 2. Or. 3. & 4.

To illustrate a point he wanted to establish, he introduced the supposition 'that the estate of Timotheus, 'son of Conon,' the greatest, most irreproachable, and most popular character then in Athens, 'was to 'be confiscated: but,' he adds, 'the gods forbid that 'it should be so, UNLESS SOME SIGNAL BENEFIT TO 'THE COMMONWEALTH MIGHT FOLLOW.' He feared to have offended by the supposition of an injurious indignity to the people's favorite: he feared to have offended by the supposition that the people's present interest ought not to be the first consideration upon all occasions: he dared not deprecate the grossest injustice to the most respectable individual, if benefit to the multitude might follow: and he thought it a necessary tribute of compliment to the Athenian multitude, to express, what the better nature of men the most uneducated, accustomed to enjoy real freedom, but not to abuse power, would revolt at as an insult, his opinion of their grasping selfishness, and his doubt of their liberality and justice.

A detail follows, of the public merits of the accused and his family; totally alien to the merits of the cause, but strongly marking the condition of men of property at Athens. It assists also to explain the assertion of Xenophon before noticed, so strange on first view to the modern reader, that, under the Athenian government, it was matter of question whether it were better for an individual to have property or to be destitute, and whether it were better for the state to have a regular revenue, or to depend upon the voluntary, or forced, contributions of individuals for every exigency. 'There are some,' the accused proceeds to say, 'who spend their estates in 'public service or public gratifications, that they may 'receive twofold through your favor. But my father

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‘ neither solicited gainful, nor avoided expensive
 ‘ offices. He took the presidency successively of all the
 ‘ choral exhibitions. He was seven times trierarch,³
 ‘ and he paid many and large free-gifts to the treasury.
 ‘ He kept horses for public service; his equestrian
 ‘ rank indeed required it; but whether of a superior
 ‘ kind and in superior condition, their victories at
 ‘ the Isthmian and Nemean games may tell; where
 ‘ my father was crowned and the fame of Athens was
 ‘ proclaimed.⁴ He was besides liberal to his fellow-
 ‘ citizens individually. Some he assisted in giving
 ‘ marriage-portions to their daughters and sisters;
 ‘ some he redeemed from captivity; for some he fur-
 ‘ nished the expense of burial. He died in the office
 ‘ of trierarch, leaving scarcely two talents and a half
 ‘ to his family; and from so slender a fortune I now
 ‘ support the same burthensome honor. All that we
 ‘ have possessed has thus, you see, always been yours;
 ‘ what now remains to us is yours, and if we could
 ‘ acquire more, it would still be yours. Fairly weigh-
 ‘ ing then what has been proved to you by undeniable
 ‘ evidence, it will be found that, justice apart, the
 ‘ public interest should lead you to decide in our
 ‘ favor; since the small relic of our fortune will be
 ‘ unquestionably more profitable to the commonwealth

³ The exact value of this phrase seems not ascertained: whether he fitted out seven different triremes, or only supported the expense of the same command renewed seven times.

⁴ A merit was imputed to these victories, beyond what appears easy either to account for or to conceive. We learn from Plato, that an Athenian who won in the chariot or horse-race at Olympia was often rewarded for it with a maintenance in the prytaneum, (Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 36. D.) and it seems to have been common, among the Grecian republics, to give an honorary pension to those of their citizens who gained a victory in any of the games, at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, or Nemea.

‘ in our possession, than if conveyed to the treasury.
 ‘ Have mercy on us then, and, for the Olympian
 ‘ gods’ sake, let truth and justice bear out this great
 ‘ accusation. By pronouncing in our favor you will
 ‘ act at the same time uprightly, and for yourselves
 ‘ beneficially.’

SECT.
I.

It will be remembered that the assassination of Phrynichus, an able commander, but an unprincipled politician, was a leading step to the overthrow of the oligarchy of the Fourhundred, and the restoration of democracy under Theramenes and Alcibiades; and it may deserve notice how the principle of that assassination, the ground of some strong measures of government immediately following, was avowed and gloried in, after the overthrow of the tyranny of the Thirty, and the restoration of democracy under Thrasybulus. Two of those concerned in the murder had been shortly apprehended by the friends of Phrynichus, and public justice did not refuse their confinement in prison. But instantly the opposite party was vehement in clamor against this persecution, as they called it, of those who had deserved well in the popular cause: and they prevailed so far that the prisoners, one a Megarian, the other an Ætolian, not only were released, but presented with the privileges of Athenian citizens and a grant of lands in Attica, to reward their democratical virtue. Their prosecutors, Aristarchus and Alexicles, Athenians, and of the highest rank, were prosecuted as friends of a traitor and enemies of the people. They had certainly been active in the oligarchal party: but the prosecution of assassins in due course of law was the offence of the sovereign many that superinduced their ruin. They were condemned and executed,

Ch. 19. s. 7.
of this Hist.

Lycurg.
or. con.
Leocrat.
p. 164.
vel 217.

Lys. or. con.
Agorat.
p. 136. 27
vel. 492.
& de olcâ
sacrâ,
p. 108. 33.
vel 263.

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XXII.

and even their bones were forbidden burial within the Attic territory.

If this violence of democratical despotism might ever demand excuse, it would be when the public mind, heated by recent injuries, was still agitated by the ferment of faction. But, after the restoration of democracy by Thrasybulus, and the wise measures then taken for promoting concord, which actually produced at least a comparative quiet, it might seem not unreasonable to expect, if ever it could be reasonably expected under democracy, that maxims more consistent with a wise policy, as well as with a just morality, might have gained ground. But, on the contrary, to have been an accomplice in the assassination of Phrynichus was still deemed meritorious; so meritorious that it might even cover the guilt of farther murders, the criminality of which had no other palliative. We find a man, under capital prosecution, absolutely pleading it as the merit which should save him; and the accuser so completely concurring in principle that, far from denying the assassination to have been meritorious, he used his utmost endeavours to prove that the accused had no participation in it. Nor was this a passing doctrine, rising and falling in credit with circumstances of the times: the remaining works of succeeding orators fully evince its permanency as a democratical principle.

Among circumstances marking the condition of landed men under the Athenian democracy, the prosecution of one for removing the decayed stump of an olive-tree, from his own ground, will deserve notice. The land of individuals in Attica, as we have observed in treating of the Athenian revenue, was very commonly encumbered with olive-trees belonging to the commonwealth. For their security, which

Lys. con.
Agorat.
p. 136. 15.
vel 491.

Lycurg.
or. con.
Leocrat.
p. 164.
vel 217. &
Demosth.
con.
Aristocr.

Lys. or. de
oleâ sacrâ,
p. 110.
vel 283.

perhaps was, in early times, of public importance, policy had procured them the reputation of being sacred to Minerva, and placed them under the guardian care of the court of Areopagus. Either to injure the tree, or to till the soil immediately around, or feed cattle on it, was highly penal. The fruit, gathered under the council's direction, was sold for public benefit, and the produce carried to the treasury. These trees however, thus protected from domestic injury, were liable to suffer from foreign enemies, who either did not know, or would little regard, their sacred character; and, in the several invasions of Attica by the Lacedæmonians, many estates, with whose cultivation the sacred olives had formerly very inconveniently interfered, were, through the calamities of war, delivered from the encumbrance.

SECT.
I.

Lys. or. de
olcâ sacrâ,
p. 282.

p. 103. 39.
vel 264.

The Megarian, who has already been mentioned as an accomplice in the assassination of Phrynichus, and whose name was Apollodorus, had been rewarded for that deed, so meritorious in the estimation of the friends of democracy, with a part of the estate of the oligarchal leader Pisander, which had been forfeited when he fled from Athens on the dissolution of the government of the Fourhundred. This public present the assassin had had the precaution or the good fortune to sell, before the establishment of the government of the Thirty gave prevalence to other political principles, according to which his merit would be very differently estimated, and his estate, had he still held it, would probably have been taken from him. The land being offered for sale again by the purchaser, was bought by the wealthy and prudent proprietor of an adjoining estate, who managed so as to live quietly under the Thirty, without engaging so

p. 263.

Ch. 19. s. 7.
of this Hist.

Lys. de
ol. sacrâ,
p. 110. 34.
vel 183.

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Lys. or. de
oleâ sacrâ,
p. 111. 6.
vel 285.

Ejusd. or.
init.

far in their measures as to be involved in their disgrace. Under the restored democracy therefore, entitled to the benefit of the amnesty, if for anything he wanted it, and having never been deficient either in free-gifts to the treasury, or in any of those expensive offices, whether of public service or public amusement, which the wealthy were required to undertake, he hoped, as he says for himself, that, avoiding to trouble others, he might avoid being troubled.

Notwithstanding all these advantages and all these attentions, on the revival of sycophancy the ingenuity of its professors found a pretence to attack him. On his ancient estate were many olive-trees, the property of the goddess, and many his own property; on the adjoining new purchase not one of either sort remained. A prosecution for destroying a sacred olive-tree on that lately purchased land, formerly part of Pisander's estate, was instituted against him in the Areopagus. His defence, written by Lysias, will impress no favorable idea on modern, at least on English readers, even of that celebrated court. Frivolous and vexatious prosecution, it appears, was not deterred by its respectable character: sycophants could, even there, find encouragement. In the action in question the accusation first stated, that a fruit-bearing olive-tree had been destroyed. But evidence to this point having been vainly sought among the contractors for the commonwealth's fruit, the charge was altered, and it was stated that a decayed trunk only had been removed. This however, such sacredness did the superstition of that philosophical age impute to the sapless wood, was, in the acknowledgment of the accused himself, an enormous offence, the legal punishment for which was no less than

p. 281.

p. 269.

SECT.
I.

banishment for life. The temptation to commit the crime, as the accused justly observes, bore no proportion to the penalty imposed, nor the hope of escape to the probability of detection. Neither house nor vineyard was near, to make the destruction of a tree particularly desirable; but a high road passed hard by, and the act was of a kind not to be easily done but in presence of witnesses, either passengers or assistants. ‘Heretofore,’ says the accused, ‘I might have taken offence at being called fearfully cautious: yet I think my conduct has never been marked with such imprudent boldness as to warrant the supposition that I would put myself so in the power of my slaves as unavoidably I must by the act of which I am accused. Slaves, it is universally known, are always unfriendly to their masters. After therefore giving them opportunity for such accusation against me, I could no longer command mine, but they would command me.’ This does not offer the pleasantest picture of the state either of slaves or of masters at Athens. Nor is the idea altogether improved by what follows, though the master in question must have had confidence in his slaves, since he freely offered them for examination by torture. To reconcile such inhumanity with such confidence appears difficult: yet the slaves appear to have deserved more credit for attachment to their master than his account would impress; and a high opinion seems to have been entertained of their fortitude, since the prosecutor, without any claim to finer feeling, refused their testimony as subject to influence.

This prosecution, it appears, rested on the single evidence of the prosecutor. All his proposed witnesses failed; while many, farmers who had rented the land, and others acquainted with it, swore posi-

Lys. or. de
oleâ sacrâ,
p. 290.

p. 287.

CHAP.
XXII.Lys. de
ol. sacrâ.
p. 291.

tively that, since the accused had purchased the estate, no such stump, as that stated in the indictment, had existed. Two motives for the prosecution are assigned by the accused; the hope of extorting money, and the instigation of powerful men with political views. It was not instituted till some years after the pretended commission of the crime, and it seems to have been unsupported even by any probability; yet it appears that the accused was under no small apprehension, that even the venerable court of Areopagus might be influenced to give an unjust decision against him.

SECTION II.

Prosecution of Andocides for impiety: petition of Andocides for a decree of protection.

It has been a favorite tenet among political writers that republican government is fit only for small states. But small states are liable to suffer, more than large ones, from one evil inseparable from republican government, the contest of parties: for, in proportion to the narrowness of its bounds and the scantiness of its population, the spirit of party will pervade a state with more untempered and more lasting violence. This was experienced in all the little Italian commonwealths of modern times. It has been seen in Geneva, in amount such as perhaps to warrant a doubt if even the despotism with which France has extinguished it be a greater evil. All the Grecian republics felt it severely. But modern speculators in politics might have had opportunity, which the Greeks wanted, to observe, in the example of Britain, that extensive territory, with a numerous population, giving means for the violence of the spirit to be tem-

pered, and the malignity softened, by diffusion, affords the fairest field, for an able legislator, to obviate the worst effects of what always must exist in free governments, while mankind have passions.

SECT.
II.

Among the numerous prosecutions of this period, known by the remaining works of the Athenian orators, that of Andocides, on a charge of impiety, for the variety and importance of the information it affords, will deserve particular notice. Two orations pronounced in that remarkable trial, and a third in consequence of it, remain to us; one, in accusation, composed by Lysias; the others, in defence, by the accused himself.

Andocides was born of one of the most illustrious families of Athens. His ancestors had filled the first offices of the commonwealth, military and civil. His great-great-grandfather, Leogoras, was a leader of the party in opposition to the Pisistratidæ, and commanded the exiled people in a successful battle against the tyrants. His grandfather, Andocides, commanded a fleet, with reputation, in the Corinthian war which preceded the Peloponnesian.⁵ His father, Leogoras,

Andoc.
de myst.
p.14. vel 53.
& p. 18.
vel 72. 73.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 51.
& seq.
Plut. vit. or.

⁵ Were Plutarch and the scholiast of Thucydides to be believed, Andocides the orator was himself the commander. It is far from my desire that either should have less credit than he deserves; yet I perfectly agree with Taylor in the opinion of their error on this occasion, though I would not give quite such harsh language: 'Ad hæc tamen,' says Taylor, 'non animos advertabant σχ. Thucyd. neque mendax ille Plutarchus, qui 'vitas oratorum, dolis et erroribus consutas, olim conscribil- 'lavit.' Annot. ad Lys. or. con. Andoc. p. 107. vel 244.

Concerning the ancestors of Andocides we find a difference in our extant copies of his orations. Leogoras, opponent of the Pisistratidæ, is mentioned, in the first oration, as his great-grandfather; in the second, as his father's great-grandfather. The difference is of no great historical importance, but the latter account seems best to agree with other reported cir-

CHAP.
XXII.Andoc. de
myst. p. 14.
vel 53.

was first commissioner in a treaty for peace with Lacedæmon. Andocides himself was a youth, familiar through his birth and connexions with men of highest rank in the republic, when he became implicated in that accusation of profaning the mysteries and mutilating the Mercuries which first drove Alcibiades from his country.

That extraordinary affair, so strange, it might be said childish, in itself, so important in its consequences, remains involved in deep obscurity; though the use made of it by Lysias, in accusation, brought from Andocides, in his defence, what he has given as an explanation of it. Little satisfactory however as this explanation is concerning the mutilation of the statues, it affords illustration of the character of the Athenian government, for which it may be well worth while to revert, for a moment, to the circumstances of that period.

In the vehemence of popular alarm, excited by the party in opposition to Alcibiades, when witnesses to the profanation were sought, or pretended to be sought, on all sides, the first brought forward was a servant of Alcibiades himself, named Andromachus.

p. 2. vel 6. On his evidence one man only was executed in pursuance of condemnation by the popular tribunal. But aware that when the tyrant was enraged no certain measure of justice was to be expected, many fled, and, in their absence, were all condemned to death. Large rewards were held out to invite farther indication.

cumstances of the family, and best to accommodate chronology. I should therefore suppose the pedigree, which, in the Greek manner of stating it, exactly resembled the Welsh, to have run thus: 1. Leogoras, opponent of the Pisistratidæ; 2. Leogoras of Leogoras; 3. Andocides of Leogoras, naval commander in the Corinthian war; 4. Leogoras of Andocides, commissioner for negotiating peace; 5. Andocides of Leogoras, the orator.

No other witnesses however offered; but it was understood that a metic, named Teucer, who had fled to Megara, could indicate much, and would return and declare all he knew, if he might be taken under the protection of the council of Fivehundred. That council engaging for his safety, he denounced twenty-eight persons, among whom were Plato, the scholar of Socrates, and Melitus, perhaps father of his accuser. These, with some others, fled. Of those indicated, all taken were executed. We can only wonder that informers were so slow and scarce, when we learn that Andromachus, a servant, in reward of his forward zeal, received no less than ten thousand drachmas, about four hundred pounds sterling; and Teucer, a foreigner, who, as he bargained for personal safety, was less an object of popular generosity, one thousand drachmas, about forty pounds, for their information.

The democratical interest, it appears, was now divided. Alcibiades had risen upon the democratical interest; and, while he remained in Athens, none, leaning on the same interest, could hope for success in competition with him. But his absence, and the alarm so successfully excited, gave opportunities; insomuch that Pisander, afterward founder of the oligarchy of the Fourhundred, now stood forward as one of the greatest favorites of the people. He was appointed, together with Charicles, as confidential commissioner of the people, to investigate this very mysterious and very alarming business. After short inquiry, they declared their opinion that it was a deep-laid plot to overthrow the democracy, and that the conspirators were numerous. On the publication of this declaration, in the distraction of party-interests, alarm so pervaded the lower people, uncertain whom they might trust, that the signal

SECT.
II.

Andoc. de
myst. p. 7.

p. 8. vel 18.

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for the meeting of the council served as a signal for all to fly from the agora: it was completely deserted; every man doubting his neighbour, and fearing that he might himself be the next to be apprehended.

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 19.

p. 22.

In the midst of this popular terror another informing adventurer came forward. A man named Dioclide, brought before the council, deposed that he knew the mutilators of the Mercuries to be no less than three hundred: forty-two he indicated by name, and among them he did not scruple to accuse Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two of the councillors present. A proposition was immediately made by Pisander, the demagogue of the day, which could be tolerated only in a democracy or a divan, 'That the decree of Scamandrius, which forbade the torture of Athenian citizens, should be suspended, and that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be put upon the wheel; for day ought not to close,' he said, 'before every name were known.' Not the wild multitude, but the council, taken indeed by lot from the multitude, but men all first approved in the dokimasia, applauded this measure of pure tyranny. Mantitheus and Aphepsion betook themselves to the altar of the council-hall; and, by force of supplication, with difficulty obtained indulgence, so far as to avoid the torture, and to be allowed to give security for standing trial. But a government so tyrannical, overwhelming principle, urges and almost forces men to dishonorable actions. Mantitheus and Aphepsion were no sooner at liberty, than they mounted their horses and fled; leaving their bondsmen legally liable to that punishment which, in case only of their conviction, should have fallen on themselves.⁶

⁶ In the extant copies of the oration it is said, that Mantitheus and Aphepsion fled to 'the enemy at Decelea.' According to

Whether put forward to answer any party purpose, or merely the self-arising fancy of the multitude, Diocles, the accuser, became, or appeared to become, the popular favorite, and extravagantly the favorite. He was conducted by the people in a carriage to the prytaneum, crowned as the saviour of the commonwealth, and entertained with a supper at the public expense. Meanwhile forty persons, whom he accused, were imprisoned. Andocides, p. 24. Leogoras, father of Andocides, three cousin-germans, and seven more distant relations, among whom was Eucrates, brother of Nicias, were of the number. 'We were all bound,' said Andocides, speaking his defence; 'night came on, and the prison was locked; 'when, as intelligence of our misfortune was communicated, many women, the mother of one, the sister of another, the wife with the children of a third, came and vented their lamentations about the place.' Amid this complicated scene of woe, this anxiety within and without the prison, for what was next to happen, the kinsman of Andocides, imprisoned with him, knowing that he had lived in intimacy with some who had been executed, and with some who had fled, and apprehending more certain destruction from the blind jealousy of the tyrant multitude than from anything that could be fairly stated against them, importuned him to offer himself

SECT.
II.

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 23.

p. 25.

the account of Thucydides no enemy was then, or could be, at Decelea. It cannot be supposed that Andocides could have mistaken about such a matter, or would venture an untruth, of which the knowledge and memory of numbers present could convict him. But what has certainly happened in other cases may possibly have happened in this; that some annotator, ignorant and officious, may have inserted words in the margin, with which following ignorant transcribers may have corrupted the text.

CHAP.
XXII.Andoc. de
myst. p. 26.
& 31.

for evidence, and declare all he knew. Andocides yielded to this persuasion, and accordingly was examined before the council. He had his information, as he affirmed, from Euphiletus and Melitus, who had been active in the mutilation of the Mercuries. All those already executed, and several who had fled, he said, had been justly impeached, and he indicated four, still in Athens, as accomplices. What however was the purpose of so apparently strange a wildness as the mutilation of the statues, or what the temptation to it, is not in the least indicated by anything remaining from him. Though he pretends to account for the odd circumstance that the Mercury before his father's door, alone of all in Athens, remained uninjured, yet even thus he throws no light on the object of the persons concerned. But his confirmation of the evidence before given against those executed and those who had fled, together with the indication of four additional criminals, though these all escaped the officers of justice, calmed the minds of the people, before mad with fear and suspicion. This, extraordinary as it appears, is so supported by Thucydides that the fact seems not reasonably questionable. Perhaps the multitude wanted the testimony of an Athenian citizen and a man of rank to calm their apprehensions, though that of Teucer, a metic, and Andromachus, a freed-man, if he was not still a slave, had sufficed them for condemning many citizens of the first consideration to death. Not that this supposition will wholly explain the mystery. There was surely party intrigue connected with the deposition of Andocides; for the furious Pisander was at once appeased;⁷ and the miserable tool Dio-

⁷ Ἐξελέγχοντες δὲ τὸ πρῶγμα ἢ τε βουλή καὶ οἱ ζητηταί.—p. 32.
The ζητηταί, it will be remembered, were Charicles and Pisander.

clides, who had been held up almost as an idol to the multitude, was now hurled at once to perdition. Being brought again before the council, and confronted with Andocides, he acknowledged, if we may believe the orator, the falsehood of all the evidence he had before given. This, whether by the standing law of Athens, or by law established for the occasion, subjected him to capital punishment. The council promised him pardon, on condition of declaring his instigators. Diocliides seems to have been ready for any declaration that might save his life, and he named many; but all, getting timely information, escaped out of Attica. The people became furious, or those who led the people thought the death of Diocliides necessary for their own security; and by a passionate decree, the unfortunate, but apparently worthless man was, without trial, sent to the executioner. Andocides and his father, and all imprisoned with them, were immediately released; and those fugitives, whose impeachment by Teucer was not confirmed by the evidence of Andocides, were recalled.

But though Andocides was thus delivered from confinement and the fear of death, yet he seems to have remained under the ban of the atimy, or exclusion from magistracy, and all posts of honor and command. He chose therefore to leave Athens. But the consideration of his family and connexions, and his own talents, procured him an honorable and advantageous reception successively in Sicily, Italy, Peloponnesus, Thessaly, the Hellespont, and especially in Cyprus.⁸ Considering the general disposi-

⁸ This, asserted by Andocides, (*De myst.* p. 18. vel 72. & *de redivit.* p. 21. vel 80.) seems confirmed even by the reproaches of his prosecutor. (*Lys. con. Andoc.* p. 103. vel 200. & 107. vel 248.)

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Lys. con.
Andoc.
p. 103.
vel 201.
Andoc. de
myst. p. 1,
vel 2. &
Lys. con.
Andoc.
p. 107.
vel 248.

Plut. vit.
Andoc.
Andoc. de
red. p. 21.
vel 80.

p. 82.

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 1. vel 2.

tion of later writers among the ancients, who have been implicitly followed by the moderns, to revile Andocides, it is rather remarkable that the only eminent man in the countries he visited, who is said to have denied him favor, was Dionysius of Syracuse, whose character, blackened by some eminent writers, will be for future notice; and that Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, of reputation among the most highly eulogised of the age, was his principal patron.⁹ Toward the end of the Peloponnesian war, he returned to Athens; whether hoping for favor from the people, in consequence of a considerable service he had found means to do the Athenian fleet, when lying at Samos; or whether, as perhaps may be suspected, he rather depended upon interest with the party of the Fourhundred, then in possession of the government. We may however trust his account so far, that, instead of finding the expected favor, he suffered imprisonment, and narrowly escaped capital condemnation from the party violence of Pisander; whence he took occasion to assert that he was persecuted for attachment to the democratical cause. On regaining liberty Cyprus became again his refuge. There he was living in affluence, of which apparently he owed much to the friendship and generosity of Evagoras, when the overthrow of the government of the Thirty at Athens produced the general amnesty, which seemed to afford opportunity for all Athenian exiles to return securely to their country. However therefore the friendship of Evagoras, and a considerable property in the island of Cyprus, might soften banishment, Athens became again the inviting scene

⁹ Lysias says (p. 226.) that he was imprisoned by Evagoras, and escaped by flight. There is much appearance that this was calumny. On the contrary, that he received very great favor from Evagoras appears unquestionable.

for a man of the connexions and talents of Andocides; and, at the age of somewhat more than forty, he returned thither.¹⁰

SECT.
II.

It does not appear that any exception was immediately taken against his resuming every right of an Athenian citizen. On the contrary, if we may believe his own probable account, the very party by which he was disliked, and afterward persecuted, put him into the honorable but expensive, and therefore generally avoided offices, first of president of the Hephæstia, games of Vulcan, at Athens, then of architheorus, minister representative of the Athenian commonwealth, successively at the Isthmian and Olympian games, and afterward of treasurer of the sacred revenue.¹¹ Meanwhile he was active in public business; his eloquence procured him attention from the people; his great connexions and great talents procured him consideration with the council. Forward, and perhaps little scrupulous in accusation, he disturbed the measures, checked the hopes, and excited the apprehensions of the party in opposition to that with which he was connected. His arguments before the council procured the rejection of one of them, in the dokimasia, as of objectionable character, and of course exclusion from the cavalry service, and from the higher civil offices. Hence arose great

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 17.
vel 64.

Lys. con.
Andoc.
p. 106.
vel 230.

¹⁰ Taylor has fancied, and endeavoured to prove, that Lysias, in saying that Andocides was more than forty, meant to reckon the years, not from his birth, but from his age of eighteen, his first manhood. The learned and ingenious argument carries, to me, no degree of conviction.

¹¹ Perhaps the revenue (whence arising I know not) from which the expense of the Eleusinian mysteries, and the sacrifices, processions, and other appertinent ceremonies, was defrayed.

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alarm, and a resolution to crush him, if their policy, in aid of their collected strength, could effect it.¹²

The first attempt was of a very extraordinary kind: at least so it appears to the modern reader. We have the account indeed only from Andocides himself; but this was pronounced before the Athenian people, when he apprehended oppression from a party more powerful than his own; and it contains such a detail of matters open to the knowledge of numbers that he surely would not so have committed himself if the truth of the tale had not been either generally known, or within his power to prove.

Andoc. de
myst. p. 54.

It was supposed, we find, of much efficacy toward obtaining the favor of any deity, to place upon the altar, as a supplication-offering, an olive-branch wrapt in a woollen veil. But it was forbidden to do this in the temple of Ceres during the mysteries; whether because individuals should not draw the attention of the goddess from rites instituted to conciliate her favor to the commonwealth, or under what other idea, does not appear. Among the powerful enemies of Andocides was Callias, hereditary torch-bearer of the Eleusinian mysteries: an office whence his family derived the surname of Daduchus. He was son of Hipponicus, esteemed the richest man of his time in Greece, and descended from Callias Daduchus, said to have fought, habited in the sacred robe of his office, against the Persians at Marathon. 'We were returned,' says Andocides, 'from Eleusis' (apparently he was then treasurer of the sacred revenue) 'when the king' (the second archon) 'going 'in regular form, to report the circumstances of the

p. 55.

¹² From the accuser himself may be gathered the motives to the prosecution. Lys. con. Andoc. p. 106, vel 230.

‘ procession, was directed, by the prytanes, to make
 ‘ his report to the council, and require Cephisius and
 ‘ myself to attend in the Eleusinium; for there,
 ‘ according to the ordinance of Solon, the council
 ‘ sits on the morrow of the mysteries. We attended
 ‘ accordingly; and, the council being met, Callias,
 ‘ habited in the sacred robe, arose and declared, that
 ‘ a supplicatory bough was lying on the altar; placed
 ‘ there, as he was informed, by Andocides; and the
 ‘ laws of their ancestors, which had been satisfac-
 ‘ torily explained to the people by his father Hippo-
 ‘ nicus, devoted the person, so offending, to death
 ‘ without trial.’

It is remarkable that the accused objected nothing to the principle of a law devoting a citizen to death without trial; or to the law itself, which seems to have been merely traditionary, and both in words and purpose very doubtful, or to the interpretation insisted on by the accuser, or to such authority as that referred to for the validity of the interpretation. Andocides, able and experienced, was aware that it was congenial to democracy to be careless of the rights of individuals; and, in his situation, he dared not question the right of the sovereign to send anybody at pleasure to the executioner. His defence was of another kind. He contended, in the first

Andoc. de
myst. p. 58.

place, that the law, which should direct the decision of the council, was engraved on a pedestal within the temple; and the punishment for the offence in question was there clearly declared to be, not death, but a fine of a thousand drachmas, less than forty pounds sterling. He then admitted, which may seem not less strange to the modern reader, that, whether the profanation were intentional or unintentional, the punishment being piacular, should equally attach

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upon it. But the accuser had said that 'The goddesses themselves, desirous of the punishment of Andocides, instigated him to the profanation, of the consequence of which he was ignorant.' The defence of Andocides, against an attack so apparently difficult to ward, is truly curious. 'I maintain,' he said, 'that, if what my accusers affirm is true, the goddesses have shown themselves propitious to me. For had I placed the supplicatory offering, and confessed it, I should indeed have wrought my own destruction: but, having kept my counsel, when confession alone could convict me, for it is not pretended that there were witnesses to the fact, the goddesses may be supposed to have interested themselves in my preservation. Had they desired my destruction, they would have prompted me to confess the profanation, which I certainly did not commit.' It appears indeed that no evidence to fix the fact upon Andocides could be produced; and he was acquitted.

This strange attempt in the council having failed, it was resolved next to bring Andocides before a popular tribunal; and it would probably now be the more necessary to push measures against him, as he and his party would be exasperated by that attempt, and encouraged by its failure. No act of Andocides, since his return to Athens, gave any opportunity. It was determined therefore to take advantage of the indiscretion or the misfortune of his early youth; and, without regard to the many wounds in the commonwealth, now happily healed, which it might open again, to institute a capital accusation against him on the pretence that his case was an exception to the general amnesty.

Cephisius, apparently his colleague in the office of

treasurer of the sacred revenue, was the ostensible conductor of the prosecution; Lysias composed the principal speech in accusation. The acts of criminality stated in the indictment were, that Andocides had frequented the temples, sacrificed on the altars, and acted in civil affairs, as if in the legal enjoyment of the perfect rights of an Athenian citizen, when the decree of atimy, or deprivation of rights and honors, which had been passed against him on occasion of the mutilation of the Mercuries, remained unrepealed; and that, by false accusation, in which, with other near kinsmen, his own father was involved, he had occasioned the execution of innocent citizens. The punishment which the accuser insisted on was, according to the usual Athenian form, subjoined, death.

The speech in accusation, written by Lysias, remains to us nearly entire. It has been studiously adapted, by the ingenious and experienced rhetorician, to the information and the temper of a mob-tribunal. Little solicitous to convince reason, he has applied to the passions, and especially to that of superstitious fear: a passion very prevalent among the Greeks, and beyond all others likely to cloud and disturb reason. His great object has been to persuade that the impiety of Andocides, if not expiated by his death, would implicate the court and the whole commonwealth in his guilt; and that the greatest misfortunes, public and private, might be reasonably apprehended from the consequent anger of the gods.

Lys. con.
Andoc.
p. 104.
vel 209.
& 105.
vel 217.
& 106.
vel 231.

The tale told at the outset of the speech, of a kind not to be omitted, is yet difficult to report.¹³

¹³ The beginning of the oration is wanting; but the tale, though setting out with a broken sentence, is completely clear.

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XXII.Lys. con.
Andoc. init.

The purport was to impress the court with a conviction of the reality, and the immediate impendence, of danger from the divine wrath. 'A horse,' says the orator, 'was tied to the rail of the temple of the goddesses (Ceres and Proserpine) with the pretended purpose that the owner, who had lost it, might reclaim it; but, in the night, it was stolen by the man who had brought it thither. This profanation escaped the law, but did not escape divine vengeance; for the sacrilegious criminal perished by a most dreadful death. All food emitted, to his sense, so offensive a smell that, unable to eat, he died of hunger. The testimony of the hierophant to these facts has been heard by numbers now living.' While we wonder at such a tale seriously told, in the age of Xenophon and Plato, in one of the principal courts of justice in Athens, we should recollect how lately the laws against witchcraft were in force among ourselves.

Lys. con.
Andoc.
p. 234.

The rhetorician then labored to prove that the case of Andocides was not within the meaning of the general amnesty. For the quiet of the commonwealth it would have been better that such proof should have been in no case attempted. All the rest of the reasoning, and most of the declamation, are founded upon a gross falsehood. It is impudently asserted, that the profanation of the mysteries, and the mutilation of the Mercuries by Andocides, not only were notorious, but confessed by himself. The peroration then runs thus: 'Give your attention, and let your imagination picture to you what this man has done. Clothed in a sacerdotal robe, in presence of the uninitiated, he acted the sacred ceremonies; exposed what ought not to be seen, and declared what ought not to be heard. The images of the

' gods, in whom we believe, whom we worship, and
 ' to whom, after careful purification, we sacrifice and
 ' pray, he mutilated. To expiate this pollution, the
 ' priestesses and priests, turning toward the setting
 ' sun, the dwelling of the infernal gods, devoted
 ' with curses the sacrilegious wretch, and shook their
 ' purple robes, in the manner prescribed by that law
 ' which has been transmitted from earliest times.
 ' These deeds he has confessed; yet in violation of
 ' your decree, which declared him excluded from
 ' temples and sacred ceremonies, as impure and
 ' piacular, he has returned to the city, sacrificed upon
 ' the altars, mixed in those holy ceremonies which
 ' he had profaned, entered even the temple of the
 ' goddesses, and washed his polluted hands in the
 ' sacred ewer. Whom can it become to suffer such
 ' things? What friend, what kinsman, but especially
 ' what member of a court of judicature will risk, by
 ' the most secret favor to such a man, to bring the
 ' divine anger on himself? No: by avenging the
 ' gods, by putting Andocides out of the world, you
 ' must purify the city; and let the pollution of sacri-
 ' lege, the poison of impiety, the offence to whatever
 ' is holy, be sent far from you.¹⁴ It has been among
 ' the custom of your ancestors to devote the impious
 ' to death, without the formality of trial, by a simple
 ' decree. You do better to make a more solemn
 ' example of them. But, knowing what becomes
 ' you, no persuasion ought to move you from the
 ' pious purpose. The criminal will supplicate and
 ' entreat, but pity should be far from you. Not who
 ' perish justly, but those only who perish unjustly,
 ' deserve commiseration.'

¹⁴ Thus far the peroration is translated: what immediately follows is abbreviated: the three last sentences again are translated.

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The speech of Andocides, in his defence, is a masterly and manly composition, containing a clear detail of facts, strongly supported by witnesses, and by appeals to the knowledge of the multitude composing the court before which he pleaded; carrying a doubtful appearance, and in some points little intelligible to the modern reader, only in what regards the profanation of the mysteries, and the mutilation of the Mercuries; every assertion concerning which is nevertheless still supported by evidence, oral or written. The confession, which his accuser affirmed him to have made, is strongly and repeatedly denied, together with the facts said to have been confessed. The improbable assertion, that the accused impeached his own father and other kinsmen, he so shows to have been a gross falsehood, that we can only wonder how such an attempt of the accuser could pass without censure from the court.¹⁵

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 15. & 17.

After then mentioning the attempt, which has been already related, to procure his condemnation by the council without trial, he proceeds to some private history, curious in itself, but foreign to the cause, and brought forward only to show that the malice of Callias originated in circumstances highly discreditable to himself and honorable to Andocides; unless it was farther in view to point out an object which might draw away, from the latter, a part of that public indignation which he found pressing on him. Too long, too intricate, too much entering into detail of private life to be conveniently reported here, it must

¹⁵ The clear detail, in the first oration, of matter of such public notoriety, and which one should suppose matter of record, is of itself evidence; and it is corroborated by the mention again made of the same matter in the second oration, in which it must have been the height of imprudence for the accused to bring it forward again, were there any doubt of the truth.

suffice to say of it, that it tends strongly to show to what a degree, in so small a state as Athens, party influence enabled men to scorn the laws, and how much more, than can easily be in extensive dominion, private interests had sway in public concerns.¹⁶

A tale, relating to a public business, follows, which must not be omitted. The tax of a fiftieth on imports and exports was commonly farmed by auction for three years. The spreading boughs of a plane afforded convenient shade, under which the bidders commonly assembled. A company, with one named Argyrius at its head, had farmed this revenue at thirty talents yearly, between six and seven thousand pounds sterling. When their term expired, finding means, by interest and money, to obviate competition, they obtained a renewal at the same rent. Andocides, knowing the tax produced much more, made a regular offer to the council to advance upon the bargain. The auction was, in consequence, opened again, and closed finally with letting the tax to Andocides at thirty-six talents, being an advance of fourteen or fifteen hundred pounds sterling yearly. At this rent Andocides declares it was no disadvantageous contract. The use that he proposed to make of the mention of the transaction, on his trial, was to fix popular odium on his accusers, and particularly on Callias, as connected with Argyrius, and interested in the contract; to show that the motive to his prosecution was not public spirit, but private malice; to claim to be himself a useful and necessary man to the popular

SECT.
II.

Andoc.
de myst.
p. 65.

¹⁶ Γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ τάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, is an observation of Aristotle, preliminary to a report of many instances of revolutions in Grecian states, originating from private quarrels. Aristot. Polit. 1. 5. c. 4.

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interest; and to endeavour farther to allure popular consideration by promising that, if he might, through justice done him, be at liberty to act in the popular cause, he would prevent such imposition on the public in future, or bring the delinquents to condign punishment.

In the conclusion of his defence, Andocides endeavoured to draw advantage from the popularity of his family, and the merit of his ancestors; for, with all the vehemence of democratical jealousy among the Athenian people, family eminence was still in estimation. 'If you destroy me,' he says, 'my family 'is extinct: and does the family of Andocides and 'Leogoras deserve so to perish? and is it not a reproach to the commonwealth that their house should 'be occupied, as during my exile it was, by Cleophon 'the musical-instrument maker? that house, of which 'none of you, in passing, could say that thence either 'public or private evil had come upon him: that 'house, which has furnished commanders of your 'forces, who have won many trophies, by land and 'by sea; magistrates who have filled all the highest 'offices of your government, through whose hands 'the public treasure has passed, and who never turned 'any to their own profit; a family who never had 'cause to complain of the people, nor the people 'of them; and of whom, from remotest antiquity, 'whence they trace themselves, never were any before 'brought into a situation to supplicate your mercy.'

'If they are now all dead, let not their good deeds 'be forgotten. Rather let their persons be present 'to your imagination, soliciting your protection for 'me. For, alas, whom among the living can I bring 'forward to move your commiseration? My father?

‘no, he is no more. Brothers? I never had any. Children? I have none yet born.¹⁷ Be you therefore to me instead of a father, of brothers, of children. To you I betake myself: you I implore. Be advocates to yourselves in my favor; and, while, to supply the deficient population of the city, you are admitting Thessalians and Andrians to its rights, devote not to destruction your true citizens, whom, certainly more than strangers, it behoves to be good citizens, and who want neither the will nor the ability to be so.’

It was usual in the criminal courts of Athens to try all expedients for impressing the passions of the numerous tribunal. Pitiable sights were offered to the eyes, and pitiable tones to the ears; aged parents, weeping wives, and helpless children were brought forward to assist or to obstruct justice, by the most affecting entreaties. Andocides, after having urged, in the best way his circumstances admitted, that degrading supplication which the tyrannous temper of the people made necessary, assumed a more dignified manner in calling forward a support that, with a court properly composed, should have been more efficacious. ‘Now,’ he says, ‘let those who have most approved themselves friends of the people and worthy of public favor ascend the bema, and declare their opinion of me. Anytus and Cephalus, come up; and those of my fellow-wardsmen who are appointed my advocates, Thasyllus and the rest.’ These were men of the first consideration in Athens.

Plutarch, in his short life of Andocides, omits all information of the event of this trial, nor does he say

¹⁷ This expression surely escaped Taylor, when he was intent upon proving Andocides, at the time of his trial, seventy years of age.

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when or how Andocides died. We learn however, from a second oration of Andocides himself, that the first neither completely effected its purpose, nor entirely failed. The decision was against him, but not to the extent that his enemies had proposed. His life was not affected, for in the second oration we find no prayer for mercy: he laments only those unfortunate circumstances which had brought on him that reprobation of a majority of his fellow-countrymen to which, clear as he was of criminal intentions, he must bow. But he was not without hope of even regaining all the advantages of popular favor. It had been found expedient, in the insecurity, especially of men in public situations, under the deficient protection of the Athenian law, to grant decrees of protection¹⁸ to individuals, to enable or to encourage them to undertake or proceed in public service. Such privilege, under a decree of the people, Andocides himself had once enjoyed; and it would still have been in force but for a special repeal of it, which his political enemies had procured. His object was now to obtain a renewal of that decree of protection. The inducement, which he held out, was his knowledge of matters of the utmost importance to the public welfare, which he could not safely declare without such security against oppression from his powerful enemies. Under engagement for secrecy he had already communicated the information to the council, who were fully satisfied of the reality of its importance, and desirous that he should have the protection necessary to enable him to serve the commonwealth. We learn no farther what the matter to be indicated was than may be gathered from the following passage

Andoc. de
reditu,
p. 22.
vel 86.

p. 20.
vel 76.
& 22.
vel 84.

¹⁸ " Ἀδεία.

of the speech: 'What I may previously declare,' says Andocides to the Athenian people, 'you shall now hear. You know it has been told you that no corn is to be expected from Cyprus. Now I can undertake to say that the men who have so informed you, and who, as far as depended upon them, have provided that it should be so, are mistaken. What has been the management it is needless for you now to know: but thus much I wish you to be informed, that fourteen corn-ships are actually approaching Piræus, and the rest, already sailed from Cyprus, may be expected soon after them.'

It appears that Athens, always in the unfortunate circumstance of depending upon uncertain supply by sea for subsistence, was in want of corn; that the people, perhaps already oppressed by dearth, were uneasy under the apprehension of famine; and that Andocides meant to accuse some powerful men, his opponents in politics, of enhancing the public distress for their private profit, and to claim to himself the merit of defeating their purpose, by procuring relief for the people. Of the event of this project of the orator we have no information. Plutarch, professing to relate the life of Andocides, mentions no circumstance of it after the trial for impiety.

What were the real merits or demerits, either of Andocides or of his prosecutors and political opponents, is not very decisively indicated by any memorials remaining of them. But, what is of more importance, we gain from their united evidence the most undeniable testimony to the gross evils inherent in the Athenian constitution; its irremediable unsteadiness, its gross tyranny, the immoderate temptation and the endless opportunities it afforded for knavish adventure in politics. What moreover deserves notice,

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we learn from them that a strong disposition to religious persecution prevailed among the Greeks of their age; insomuch that, where the supposed interests of religion interfered, all forms of justice to individuals were set at naught. In short, the remaining works of the Grecian orators bear the most unquestionable proof that democracy, with the pretence of an establishment proposing nothing but the equal welfare of the people, is, beyond all others, a constitution for profligate adventurers, in various ways, to profit from at the people's expense.

SECTION III.

*Virtuous age of Greece romantic: deficiency of Grecian morality.
Summary view of the origin and progress of Grecian philosophy.
Religious persecution. Sophists; Socrates.*

It may appear superfluous to repeat, that the business of history is neither panegyric nor satire, but to estimate justly and report faithfully the virtues and vices of men who, individually or collectively, have been engaged in circumstances marking them for historical notice. Yet panegyric hath commonly been so mixed with certain portions of Grecian history that an honest declaration of that truth, which a careful investigation will discover, may, on more than one occasion, with many readers, need apology. Authors under the Roman empire, and many in modern Europe, of reputation to have engaged almost universal credit, have spoken in rapturous language of the virtuous age of Greece, and especially of Athens, as of something not only well known by fame, but undoubtedly once existing. When it existed nevertheless, even in their imagination, seems im-

possible to fix, so that testimony, overthrowing the supposition, shall not be obvious. For the age before Solon, memorials of men and things are too scanty to furnish ground for the character. For that extraordinary man's own age, our means for tracing the course of events are still very deficient; but there remains from his own hand, among the works of Demosthenes, a picture of the Athenian people. The profligacy of all ranks is there exhibited in strong colors: of their virtues nothing appears. Yet Solon seems to have had the merit of preparing what, if we may believe Thucydides and Plato, might best deserve the title of the virtuous age of Athens; for (may I venture on the authority of Thucydides and Plato to say it?) the nearest approach to so advantageous a state of things appears to have been made under what declaimers, who lived many centuries after, have assumed to themselves to reprobate, as the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

SECT.
III.

Demosth.
de legat.

But, in the age with which we are now engaged, the age of Plato, Xenophon, and philosophy, morality seems not only to have been not better practised, but even not better understood, than in Homer's time. That Might made Right, especially in public transactions, was a tenet very generally avowed; the incalculable mischiefs of which were checked only by the salutary superstition, which taught to respect the sanction of oaths, in the fear that immediate vengeance from the gods would follow the violation of it, as a personal affront to themselves. It appears however, in the remaining works of the great comic poet of the day, that this salutary superstition was in his time fast wearing away. The light of reason, improved by much communication of men among one another, had enabled the more quicksighted to discover that

CHAP.
XXII.Ch. 2. s. 1.
of this Hist.Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 4.
c. 2. & 4.
Plat. Alcib.
1. p. 117.
t. I.
Protag.
p. 357. &
de rep.
1. 2. p. 362.
& de Leg.
1. 10. p. 905.
& seq.

temporal evil, of any kind obvious to common observation, fell no more upon false-swearers than upon the most scrupulous observers of their oaths. The perjured might suffer in secret, under those alarms of conscience which Homer's penetration has attributed to them; but experience had sufficiently taught to consider Hesiod's denunciations as anile fables.¹⁹ The mischief thus done by human reason, in the destruction of one of the greatest safeguards of society, human reason could not perhaps at all, but certainly could not readily, repair. It is evident from the writings of Xenophon and Plato that, in their age, the boundaries of right and wrong, justice and injustice, honesty and dishonesty, were little determined by any generally-received principle. There were those who contended that, in private as in public affairs, whatever was clearly for a man's advantage, he might reasonably do; and even sacrifice was performed and prayer addressed to the gods for success in wrong. When therefore that cloud of superstition, which produced a regard for the sanction of oaths, was dissipated by the increasing light of reason, an increased depravity would of course gain among the Grecian people. We learn indeed, from the best contemporary testimony, that of Thucydides, that the fact was so; and hence occasion may have

¹⁹ 'Men hid from the sight of the gods by clouds,' says one of the characters in the comedy of *The Birds*, 'commit perjuries undiscovered; but if the gods could manage an alliance with the Birds, then, should a man who had sworn by the crow and by Jupiter, break his oath, the crow would fly down slyly and pluck him an eye out.' Aristoph. *Av.* v. 1607. The jokes which follow, about Jupiter dying and Hercules cooking, seem, like some other jokes of Aristophanes, to have had no other object than to bring the gods, or at least the notions of them which the established religion inculcated, into contempt.

been taken by the orators of the next age, who seem first to have cherished and promulgated the notion, which in any other point of view appears purely romantic, to call the preceding times the VIRTUOUS AGE OF GREECE.

Yet while thus, not morality only, but, as we have before observed, politics, were defective among the Greeks, to a degree to excite wonder, science was in esteem, and had, in some branches, the foundation already laid of all that is now most valued in them. Grecian PHILOSOPHY is said to have had its origin from Thales, whom we have seen a leading man of Miletus in Ionia, at the time of that rebellion of the Asian Greeks against the Persian empire which led to the invasion of Greece itself, and the glory of the Athenians at Marathon. The learning, through which Thales became so distinguished among his fellowcountrymen, and so eminent in the republic of letters through all ages, he is said to have acquired in Egypt. The circumstances of individuals, in the Grecian commonwealths, but more especially in those of Asia, were more favorable for the cultivation of science than a transient view of the political state of the country might give to suppose. Few had large incomes; but numbers lived in leisure; mostly maintained by the labor of slaves; assembled in towns, and all communicating with all. Manners were thus formed; politeness was diffused; genius was invited to display itself; and minds capacious and active, but less daring or less turbulent, or more scrupulously honest, avoiding the thorny and miry paths of ambition, which required not only courage beyond the powers of the weak, but often compliances beyond the condescension of the liberal, would naturally turn themselves to the new modes of employment and of

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distinction which the introduction of science offered. A lively imagination was among the national characteristics of the Greeks; and, from the earliest accounts of the nation, we find that whenever new knowledge beamed it was received with eager attention.

Thus, from the light acquired by Thales in Egypt, arose what has obtained the name of the Ionian school of philosophy. Thales is said to have been the first among the Greeks who calculated an eclipse of the sun. He is said also, by Cicero, to have been the first to think that one almighty mind was the author and maintainer of all the visible creation, and that men therefore should act as always under the circumspection of such an all-powerful being. Soon after him Pythagoras, driven by political troubles from his native Ionian island, Samos, diffused information, nearly similar, derived from the same source, yet mixed with other fancies, among the Grecian towns of Italy. But we have had occasion formerly to advert to the doubtfulness of all accounts of Pythagoras, beyond the very little that Herodotus and Aristotle have recorded of him.

‘To do as you would be done by,’ seems, when once stated, so obvious a maxim for directing the conduct of men toward one another, and, when dispassionately considered, so incontrovertibly just a foundation for all moral philosophy, that we may wonder at any delay in its discovery, and any hesitation about its reception. Nevertheless self-love, perpetually instigating the desire to command others and to profit at their expense, operates so powerfully in the contrary direction that Thales may deserve great credit for the rule approaching, but far from reaching it, ‘Not to do to others what, if done to

De Nat.
Deor. l. 1.
c. 10.

‘us, we should resent.’²⁰ But dry unconnected precepts, thwarting the passions and unalluring to the imagination, did not win attention like physical and metaphysical inquiries. The calculation of an eclipse of the sun led the mind to more amusing speculation, and left the passions free. The formation of the world, the nature of matter and of spirit, the laws of the heavenly bodies, were therefore subjects which, in the intervals of political strife, deeply engaged the minds of the Asian Greeks. But, in the want of convenient materials and method, books were yet so rare that few could study in retirement. Knowledge was communicated in discourse; and the gymnasia and public porticos, built for exercises of the body, became places of meeting for the culture of the mind.

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 11.

The love of science is universally said to have been first communicated, among the Athenians, under the able and benign administration of the Pisistratidæ. But science itself was then in infancy, and its immediate growth in Athens was checked by the violence of political contest, which produced the ensuing revolution, and was kept low by the long-subsisting fervor of party-spirit. The Persian invasions, quickly following, absorbed all attention, and the great political objects, which afterward engaged the general

²⁰ Mr. Gibbon has considered the two rules as the same, or of equal value: ‘The golden rule, of doing as you would be done by, a rule which,’ he says, ‘I read in a moral treatise of Isocrates (in Nicocle) four hundred years before the publication of the gospel: “*Ἀ πᾶσχοιτες ὑφ’ ἐτέρων ὀργίζεσθε, ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ ποιεῖτε.*” Gibbon’s Rom. Hist. c. 54. note 36. The difference between them appears however to me very great; one forbidding only evil-doing, the other commanding universal charity. Xenophon, I remember somewhere, I believe in the Cyropædia, commending benevolence to enemies, has approached much nearer to the Christian doctrine.

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 XXII. was not till the superior talents of Pericles had quieted
 the storms of war and faction that science, which had
 in the interval received great improvement among
 the Asian Greeks, revived at Athens with new vigor.

Arist. Anaxagoras of Clazomene, the preceptor and friend
 de animâ, of Pericles, bred in all the learning of the Ionian
 l. 1. c. 2. school, is said first to have introduced what might

Aristot. properly be called Philosophy there. To him is at-
 metaphys. tributed the first introduction in European Greece
 l. 1. c. 4. of the idea of one eternal, almighty, and all-good
 Being, or, as he is said, after Thales, to have ex-
 pressed himself, a perfect mind, independent of body,
 as the cause or creator of all things. The gods re-
 ceived in Greece, of course, were low in his estima-
 tion; the sun and moon, commonly reputed divinities,
 he held to be mere material substances, the sun a
 globe of stone, the moon an earth, nearly similar to
 ours. A doctrine so repugnant to the system on
 which depended the estimation of all the festivals,
 processions, sacrifices, and oracles, which so fascinated
 the vulgar mind, was not likely to be propagated with-
 out reprehension. Even the science which enabled
 to calculate an eclipse was offensive, inasmuch as it
 lowered the importance, and interfered with the
 profits, of priests, augurs, interpreters, and seers.
 An accusation of impiety was therefore instituted
 against Anaxagoras; the general voice went with the
 prosecutors; and all that the power and influence of
 Pericles could do for his valued friend, was to pro-
 cure him means of escape from Attica.

Plat. apol. Socr.
 p. 26. t. 1.

Plut. vit.
 Pericl.
 Schol. in
 Nub. Ari-
 stoph. v. 338.

But while physical and metaphysical speculation
 engaged men of leisure, other learning had more
 attraction for the ambitious and needy. To men in-
 deed in general, living in an independent, and still

more if in an imperial democracy, whatever might best enable them to sway the minds of their fellow-citizens, and, through such influence, raise themselves to commanding, dignified, and profitable public situations, would be the most interesting science. He who, knowing more than others, could also express himself better, would command attention in the public assemblies. That general education therefore which gave the greatest advantage to talents for public speaking, a knowledge of letters and language, of mathematics, of laws, of history, of men and manners; whatever might contribute to form what we call Taste, which enables the possessor, by a kind of sentiment, without reflection, to give advantage to everything by the manner of speaking and acting, and still more to avoid whatever, either in itself or by the manner of putting it forward, can excite disgust or contempt, these would be in the highest request.

Yet there would be able men to whom, in the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, public situations would be little inviting: in some of the smaller states they were beneath a soaring ambition; in the larger, amid the competition of numbers, success would to many be hopeless; some men, possessing high mental faculties, might want strength of body or powers of elocution; and many would be excluded or deterred by unfortunate party-connexions. From among all these therefore some, instead of putting themselves forward for public situation, sought the less splendid but safer advantages to be derived from communicating to others that science and that taste which might enable them to become considerable as public men. Athens always was the great field for acquiring fame and profit in this line; yet those who first attained eminence in it were foreigners there, Gorgias

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XXII.Plat. Socr.
apol. p. 19.

of Leontini in Sicily, formerly noticed as chief of an embassy from his own city to Athens, Prodicus of the little island of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. All these are said to have acquired considerable riches by their profession. Their success invited numbers to follow their example; and Greece, but far more especially Athens, shortly abounded with those who, under the name of sophists, professors of wisdom, undertook to teach every science. The scarcity and dearness of books gave high value to that learning which a man with a well-stored mind, and a ready and clear elocution, could communicate. None, without eloquence, could undertake to be instructors; so that the sophists, in giving lessons of eloquence, were themselves the example. They frequented all places of public resort, the agora, the public walks, the gymnasia, and the porticos; where they recommended themselves to notice by an ostentatious display of their abilities, in disputation among one another, or with whoever would converse with them.

In the competition thus arising, men of specious rather than solid abilities would often gain the most extensive estimation. A certain dignity of character was generally affected, to which decency of manner was indispensably necessary; whence arose the opposition of the sophists to the comic poets: but, if the doctrine of a licentious rather than a severe morality would recommend them to extensive favor, their efforts would be more directed to excuse and give a specious appearance to the former than to enforce the other. Many of them indeed would take either side of any question, political or moral; and it was generally their glory to make the worse appear the better cause.

The profession of sophist had not long flourished,

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and no Athenian had acquired fame in any branch of philosophy, when the singular talents, and singular manners and pursuits, of Socrates son of Sophroniscus engaged public attention. The father was a statuary, and is not mentioned as very eminent in his profession; but, as a man, he seems to have been respected among the most eminent of the commonwealth: he lived in particular intimacy with Lysimachus, son of the great Aristides. Socrates, inheriting a very scanty fortune, had a mind wholly intent upon the acquisition and communication of knowledge. The sublime principles of theology, taught by Anaxagoras, made an early impression upon his mind. They led him to consider what should be the duty owed by man to such a Being as Anaxagoras described his Creator; and it struck him that, if the providence of God interfered in the government of this world, the duty of man to man, little considered by poets or priests as any way connected with religion, and hitherto almost totally neglected by philosophers, must be a principal branch of the duty of man to God. It struck him farther that, with the gross defects which he saw in the religion, the morality, and the governments of Greece, though the favorite inquiries of the philosophers, concerning the nature of Deity, the formation of the world, the laws of the heavenly bodies, might, while they amused, perhaps also enlarge and improve the minds of a few speculative men, yet the investigation of the social duties was infinitely more important, and might be infinitely more useful, to mankind in general. Endowed by nature with a most discriminating mind, and a singularly ready eloquence, he directed his utmost attention to that investigation; and when, by reflection, assisted and proved by conversation among the so-

Plat.
Alcib. 1.
p. 131. t. 2.

Plat.
Laches,
p. 180. t. 2.

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phists and other able men, he had decided an opinion, he communicated it, not in the way of precept, which the fate of Anaxagoras had shown hazardous, but by proposing a question, and, in the course of interrogatory argument, leading his hearers to the just conclusion.

Mem.
Socr. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 10.

We are informed by his disciple Xenophon how he passed his time. He was always in public. Early in the morning he went to the walks and the gymnasium: when the agora filled, he was there; and, in the afternoon, wherever he could find most company. Generally he was the principal speaker. The liveliness of his manner made his conversation amusing as well as instructive, and he denied its advantages to nobody. But he was nevertheless a most patient hearer; and preferred being the hearer whenever others were present able and disposed to give valuable information to the company. He did not commonly refuse invitations, frequently received, to private entertainments: but he would undertake no private instruction; nor could any solicitation induce him to relieve his poverty by accepting, like the sophists and rhetoricians, a reward for what he gave in public.

Plat. apol.
Socr. p. 31.
Xenoph.

In the variety of his communication on social duties he could not easily, and perhaps he did not desire entirely to avoid either religious or political subjects; hazardous, both of them, under the jealous tyranny of democracy. It remains a question how far he was subject to superstition; but his honesty is so authenticated that it seems fairer to impute to him some weakness in credulity than any intention to deceive. If we may believe his own account, reported by his two principal disciples, he believed himself divinely impelled to the employment to which he devoted his life, inquiring and teaching the duty of man to man.

A divine spirit, in his idea, constantly attended him; whose voice, distinctly heard, never expressly commanded what he was indisposed to do, but frequently forbade what he had intended. To unveil the nature of Deity was not among his pretensions. He only insisted on the perfect goodness and perfect wisdom of the Supreme God, the creator of all things, and the constant superintendence of his providence over the affairs of men. As included in these, he held that every thing done, said, or merely wished by men, was known to the Deity, and that it was impossible he could be pleased with evil. The unity of God, though implied in many of his reported discourses, he would not in direct terms assert; rather carefully avoiding to dispute the existence of the multifarious gods acknowledged in Greece; but he strongly denied the weaknesses, vices, and crimes commonly imputed to them. Far however from proposing to innovate in forms of worship and religious ceremonies, so various in the different Grecian states, and sources of more doubt and contention than any other circumstances of the heathen religion, he held that men could not, in these matters, do wrong if they followed the laws of their own country and the institutions of their forefathers. He was therefore regular in sacrifice, both upon the public altars and in his family. He seems to have been persuaded that the Deity, by various signs, revealed the future to men; in oracles, dreams, and all the various ways usually acknowledged by those conversant in the reputed science of augury. 'Where the wisdom of men cannot avail,' he said, 'we should endeavour to gain information from the gods; who will not refuse intelligible signs to those to whom they are propitious.' Accordingly he consulted oracles himself,

Plat. Apol.
Socr. p. 23.
& 31. t. 1.
Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 3.

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 19.

s. 2.

Plat.
Euthyph.
& de rep.

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 1.
c. 3. s. 1.

c. 1. s. 7.
8. 9.

Xen. Anab. and he recommended the same practice to others, in every doubt on important concerns.

The circumstances of the Athenian government, in his time, could not invite a man of his disposition to offer himself for political situations. He thought he might be infinitely more useful to his country in the singular line, it might indeed be called a public line, which he had chosen for himself. Not only he would not solicit office, but he would take no part in political contest. In the several revolutions which occurred he was perfectly passive. But he would refuse nothing: on the contrary he would be active in everything that he thought decidedly the duty of a citizen. When called upon to serve among the heavy-armed, he was exemplary in the duties of a private soldier; and as such he fought at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium. We find him mentioned in civil office; at one time president of the general assembly, and at another a member of the council of Fivehundred. In each situation he distinguished himself by his unbending uprightness. When president, he resisted the violence of the assembled people, who voted a decree, in substance or in manner, contrary to the constitution. Neither entreaties nor threats could move him to give it the necessary sanction of his office. As a member of the council we have already seen him, in the office of prytanis, at the trial of the six generals, persevering in resistance to the injustice of popular tyranny, rendered useless through the want of equal constancy in his colleagues, who yielded to the storm. Under the Thirty again we have seen him, not in office indeed, but daring to refuse office, unworthy and illegal office, which the tyranny of the all-powerful Critias would have put upon him.

Plat. Apol.
Socrat.
p. 23. & 36.

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 4.
c. 4. s. 2.
& 5.
Plat. Apol.
Socr. p. 32.

We are not informed when Socrates first became distinguished as a sophist; for in that description of men he was in his own day reckoned. When the wit of Aristophanes was directed against him in the theatre he was already among the most eminent, but his eminence seems to have been then recent. It was about the tenth or eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war, when he was six or seven and forty years of age, that, after the manner of the old comedy, he was offered to public derision upon the stage, by his own name, as one of the persons of the drama, in the comedy of Aristophanes, called *The Clouds*, which is yet extant. Some antipathy, it appears, existed between the comic poets, collectively, and the sophists or philosophers. The licentiousness of the former could indeed scarcely escape the animadversions of the latter; who favored the tragic poets, competitors with the comedians for public favor. Euripides and Aristophanes were particularly enemies; and Socrates not only lived in intimacy with Euripides, but is said to have assisted him in some of his tragedies. We are informed of no other cause for the injurious representation which the comic poet has given of Socrates;²¹ whom he exhibits, in *The Clouds*, as a flagitious, yet ridiculous pretender to occult sciences, conversing with the clouds as divinities, and teaching the principal youths of Athens to despise the received gods and to cozen men. The audience, accustomed

Diog. Laert.
vit. Socr.
init.

Aristoph.
Nub. v. 112.
& 246.

v. 525.

²¹ The learned Brunck, in a Note on *The Clouds* of Aristophanes, contends that the poet bore really no ill-will to the philosopher. He draws his proof chiefly from the circumstance that in Plato's dialogue, entitled *The Banquet*, Socrates and Aristophanes are represented sitting, in no unfriendly way, at the same table, and in confirmation of it he adduces the celebrated panegyric epigram on Aristophanes, which has been commonly attributed to Plato. Aristoph. Brunck. p. 65. t. 2.

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to look on defamation with carelessness, and to hold as lawful and proper whatever might amuse the multitude, applauded the wit, and even gave general approbation to the composition; but the high estimation of the character of Socrates sufficed to prevent that complete success which the poet had looked for. The crown, which rewarded him whose drama most earned the public favor, and which Aristophanes had so often won, was on this occasion refused him.

Brunck.not.
in Nub.
Aristoph.
init.

Two or three and twenty years had elapsed since the first representation of *The Clouds*; the storms of conquest suffered from a foreign enemy, and of four revolutions in the civil government of the country, had passed; nearly three years had followed of that quiet which the revolution under Thrasybulus produced, and the act of amnesty should have confirmed, when a young man, named Melitus, went to the king-archon, delivered, in the usual form, an information against Socrates, and bound himself to prosecute. The information ran thus: ‘Melitus son of Melitus, of the borough of Pitthos, declares these upon oath against Socrates son of Sophroniscus, of the borough of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of reviling the gods whom the city acknowledges, and of preaching other new gods: moreover he is guilty of corrupting the youth. Penalty, death.’

Plat. Euth.
p. 2. t. 1. &
Apol. Socr.
p. 24.
Xen. Mem.
Socr. init.
Diog. Laert.
vit. Socr.

Xenophon begins his *Memorials* of his revered master with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been persuaded to condemn to death a man of such uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth. Ælian, though for authority not to be compared with Xenophon, has nevertheless, I think, given the solution. ‘Socrates,’ he says, ‘disliked the Athenian constitution. For he saw that democracy is tyrannical, and abounds with all the

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‘ evils of absolute monarchy.’²² But though the political circumstances of the times made it necessary for contemporary writers to speak with caution, yet both Xenophon and Plato have declared enough to show that the assertion of Ælian was well-founded; and farther proof, were it wanted, may be derived from another early writer, nearly contemporary, and deeply versed in the politics of his age, the orator Æschines. Indeed, though not stated in the indictment, yet it was urged against Socrates by his prosecutors before the court, that he was disaffected to the democracy; and in proof they affirmed it to be notorious that he had ridiculed what the Athenian constitution prescribed, the appointment to magistracy by lot. ‘ Thus,’ they said, ‘ he taught his numerous followers, youths of the principal families of the city, to despise the established government, and to be turbulent and seditious; and his success had been seen in the conduct of two, the most eminent, Alcibiades and Critias. Even the best things he converted to these ill purposes: from the most esteemed poets, and particularly from Homer, he selected passages to enforce his anti-democratical principles.’

Xen. mem.
Socr. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 9.

c. 2. s. 56.
et seq.

Socrates, it appears indeed, was not inclined to deny his disapprobation of the Athenian constitution. His defence itself, as it is reported by Plato, contains matter on which to found an accusation against him of disaffection to the sovereignty of the people, such as, under the jealous tyranny of the Athenian democracy, would sometimes subject a man to the penal-

Lys. or.
pro Polyst.

²² Σωκράτης δὲ τῇ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἠρέσκετο· τυραννικὴν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἑώρα τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν. Ælian. var. hist. 1. 3. c. 17. And this is consonant to Aristotle’s observation, quoted at the end of the first section of the twenty-first chapter, Ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία Τυραννίς ἐστὶ.

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 XXII. 'Athenians, that, had I engaged in public business,
 Plat. Apol. 'I should long ago have perished, without procuring
 Socrat. 'any advantage either to you or to myself. Let not
 'the truth offend you: it is no peculiarity of your
 'democracy, or of your national character: but,
 'wherever the people is sovereign, no man who shall
 'dare honestly to oppose injustice, frequent and ex-
 'travagant injustice, can avoid destruction.'

Without this proof indeed we might reasonably believe that, though Socrates was a good and faithful subject of the Athenian government, and would promote no sedition, no political violence, yet he could not like the Athenian constitution.²³ He wished for wholesome changes by gentle means; and it seems even to have been a principal object of the labors to which he dedicated himself, to infuse principles into the rising generation that might bring about the desirable change insensibly. His scholars were chiefly sons of the wealthiest citizens, whose easy circumstances afforded leisure to attend him; and some of these, zealously adopting his tenets, others merely pleased with the ingenuity of his arguments and the liveliness of his manner, and desirous to emulate his triumphs over his opponents, were forward, after his example, to engage in disputation upon all the subjects on which he was accustomed to discourse. Thus employed and thus followed, though himself avoiding office and public business, those who governed or desired to govern the commonwealth through their influence among the many, might perhaps not unreasonably consider him as one who was, or might become, a formidable adversary; nor might it be difficult to excite popular jealousy against him.

²³ His political principles seem most particularly declared in Plato's *Crito*.

Melitus, who stood forward as his principal accuser, was, according to Plato, not a man of any great consideration. His legal description however seems to give some probability to the conjecture that his father was one of the commissioners sent to Lacedæmon from the moderate party, who opposed the ten successors of the Thirty Tyrants, while Thrasybulus held Piræus, and Pausanias was encamped before Athens. He was himself a poet, and stood forward as in a common cause of the poets, who esteemed the doctrine of Socrates injurious to their interest. Unsupported, his accusation would have been little formidable. But he seems to have been a mere instrument in the business. He was soon joined by Lycon, one of the most powerful speakers of his time, and the avowed patron of the rhetoricians, who, as well as the poets, thought their interest injured by the moral philosopher's doctrine. I know not that on any other occasion in Grecian history we have any account of this kind of party-interest operating; but, from circumstances nearly analogous, in our own country, if we substitute for poets the clergy, and for rhetoricians the lawyers, we may gather what might be the party-spirit, and what the weight of influence, of the rhetoricians and poets in Athens. But Anytus, a man scarcely second to any in the commonwealth in rank and general estimation, who had held high command with reputation in the Peloponnesian war, and had been the principal associate of Thrasybulus in the war against the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy, declared himself a supporter of the prosecution.²⁴ Nothing in the

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Plat. Euth.
ad init.

Ch. 21. s. 3.
of this Hist.

²⁴ "Ανυτον—των μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξιούμενον. Xen. apol. Socr. s. 29. Anytus came forward as patron of the demiurgi. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 23. E. What these were I find no information.

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accusation could, by any known law of Athens, affect the life of the accused. In England no man would be put upon trial on so vague a charge: no grand jury would listen to it. But in Athens, if the party was strong enough, it signified little what was the law. When Lycon and Anytus came forward, Socrates saw that his condemnation was already decided.

By the course of his life however, and by the turn of his thoughts for many years, he had so prepared himself for all events, that the probability of his condemnation, far from being alarming, was to him rather matter for rejoicing, as, at his age, a fortunate occurrence. He was persuaded of the soul's immortality, and of the superintending providence of an all-good Deity, whose favor he had always been assiduously endeavouring to deserve. Men fear death, he said, as if unquestionably the greatest evil; and yet no man knows that it may not be the greatest good. If indeed great joys were in prospect, he and his friends for him, with somewhat more reason, might regret the event; but at his years, and with his scanty fortune, though he was happy enough, at seventy, still to preserve both body and mind in vigor, yet even his present gratifications must necessarily soon decay. To avoid therefore the evils of elderhood, pain, sickness, decay of sight, decay of hearing, perhaps decay of understanding, and this by the easiest of deaths, (for such the Athenian mode of execution by a draught of hemlock was reputed,) and cheered with the company of surrounding friends, could not be otherwise than a blessing.

Xenophon says that, by condescending to a little supplication, Socrates might easily have obtained his acquittal. It was usual for accused persons, when brought before the court, to bewail their apprehended

Plat. Phæd.

Plat. apol.
Socr. p. 29.

Xenoph.
apol. Socr.
s. 7. & 23.
& 27.
& Mem.
Socr. l. 4.
c. 3. s. 6.
& seq.

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 4.
c. 4. s. 4.
Plat. Apol.
Socr. p. 34.

lot, with tears to supplicate favor, and, by exhibiting their children upon the bema, to endeavour to excite pity. No admonition or entreaty of his friends however could persuade him to such an unworthiness. He thought it, he said, more respectful to the court, as well as more becoming himself, to omit all this; however aware that their sentiments were likely so far to differ from his that judgment would be given in anger for it. Accordingly, when put upon his defence, he told the people that he did not plead for his own sake, but for theirs, wishing them to avoid the guilt of an unjust sentence.

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Condemnation pronounced wrought no change upon him. He again addressed the court, declared his innocence of the matters laid against him, and observed that, even if every charge had been completely proved, still all together did not, according to any known law, amount to a capital crime. 'But,' in conclusion he said, 'it is time to depart; I to die, you to live: but which for the greater good, God only knows.'

Plat. apol.
Socr. p. 30.

Xen. apol.
Socr. p. 24.

p. 25.

Plat. apol.
Socr. in fine.

It was usual at Athens for execution very soon to follow condemnation; commonly on the morrow. But it happened that the condemnation of Socrates took place on the eve of the day appointed for the sacred ceremony of crowning the galley which carried the annual offerings to the gods worshipped at Delos; and immemorial tradition forbade all executions till the sacred vessel's return. Thus the death of Socrates was respited thirty days, while his friends had free access to him in the prison. During all that time he admirably supported his constancy. Means were concerted for his escape; the gaoler was bribed, a vessel prepared, and a secure retreat in Thessaly provided. No arguments, no prayers could persuade

Plat. Phæd.
p. 58. t. 1.

Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 4.

Plat. Crit.

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him to use the opportunity. He had always taught the duty of obedience to the laws, and he would not furnish an example of the breach of it. To no purpose it was urged that he had been unjustly condemned: he had always held that wrong did not justify wrong. He waited with perfect composure the return of the sacred vessel, reasoned on the immortality of the soul, the advantage of virtue, the happiness derived from having made it through life his pursuit, and, with his friends about him, took the fatal cup, and died.

[B. C.
399. Cl. *]

Writers who, after Xenophon and Plato, have related the death of Socrates, appear to have held themselves bound to vie with those who preceded them in giving pathos to the story. The purpose here has been rather to render it intelligible; to show its connexion with the political history of Athens; to derive from it illustration of the political history. The magnanimity of Socrates, the principal efficient of the pathos, surely deserves admiration; yet it is not that in which he has most outshone other men. The circumstances of lord Russel's fate were far more trying. Socrates, we may reasonably suppose, would have borne lord Russel's trial: but, with bishop Burnet for his eulogist, instead of Plato and Xenophon, he would not have had his present splendid fame. The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and the usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steadiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and the zeal with which he devoted himself to the

[* 'Xenophon (Hel. i. 7. 15.) attests that Socrates was still living in B. C. 406. —and in B. C. 401. Anab. iii. 1. 5. That he died during the absence of 'Xenophon in Asia may be collected from Memor. iv. 8. 4.' Clinton, Fasti 'Hellen. p. 91.]

benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm benevolence, whence his supreme and almost only pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of Christian morality, little enough indeed seen in practice, nevertheless is become so familiar in theory that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may from the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors, how little conception was entertained of it before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been; how slow the progress in the investigation of moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and, when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs beyond controversy, or proofs even that should be generally admitted by the reason of men. It is through the light which Socrates diffused by his doctrine, enforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and the practice exhibited to highest advantage in the incomparable writings of disciples such as Plato and Xenophon, that his life forms an era in the history of Athens and of man.²⁵

²⁵ The life and manners of Socrates remain reported with authority not to be found for any other character of heathen antiquity. Two men of the best ability and best reputation, who had lived familiarly with him, but whom circumstances afterward separated, and set in some degree at variance, have each described them in much detail. No deficiency of knowledge of their subject can be suspected; nothing can be reprehended, in either account, on the score of probability: clearly, without concert, they agree; and each bears the fullest testimony to the

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integrity of Socrates, and to the purity of his manners, purity beyond even the precepts of that age, as well as to the excellence of his doctrine. On the contrary, those foul aspersions upon his character, which remain scattered among later ancient writers, and which the learned and ingenious author of *The Observer* has, now in our days, thought it worth his while to seek, to collect, and to exhibit in group, in a daylight which they had not before known, are reported neither on authority to bear any comparison with the single evidence of either Plato or Xenophon, much less with their united testimony, nor have they any probability to recommend them. They carry every appearance of having originated from the virulence of party-spirit, the spirit of that party which persecuted Socrates to death; and they have been propagated by writers in the profligate ages that followed, accommodating themselves to the taste of those ages, which their own profligacy, apparently, has led some of them to defend and to flatter. The propensity to involve men of former times, of best report, in the scandal of that gross immorality which disgraced the fall of Greece and of Rome, is conspicuous among some of the writers under the Roman empire.

The quarrel of the learned author of *The Observer* with Socrates has been taken up in revenge for the imputations which some admirers of the philosopher, with more zeal than either candor or good sense, have thrown upon the comic poet Aristophanes. The story reported by *Ælian*, that Aristophanes was bribed by Anytus and Melitus, to write the comedy of *The Clouds*, purposely to prepare the way for the impeachment of Socrates, which did not follow till after so many years and so many revolutions in the government, is evidently absurd and malicious; and yet it is not impossible but that comedy may have contributed to the popular prejudices, which enabled the enemies of Socrates to procure his condemnation. We do not learn from Xenophon or Plato either what incited Aristophanes so to traduce Socrates, or how the poet and the philosopher afterward became, as from Plato it appears they did become, familiar friends. Possibly Aristophanes, when he wrote *The Clouds*, was little acquainted with Socrates, and possibly bore him no particular malice. His object seems to have been to stigmatize generally the quibbling of the sophists, and to ridicule the trifling of the naturalists. Some of the principal jokes, measuring the flea's jump, and accounting for the gnat's noise,

have no apparent relation to any doctrine or usual inquiry of Socrates; and possibly the philosopher may have been chosen for the hero of the piece only because he was more known to fame, more remarkable by his doctrine, by his manner, and, what might be a consideration for a comic poet, by his person, than any other public teacher.

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CHAPTER XXIII.

Transactions of the Greeks in Asia and Thrace from the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, in which Persia was the ally of Lacedæmon, to the renewal of war between Lacedæmon and Persia.

SECTION I.

Increased connexion of Grecian affairs with Persian. Succession of Artaxerxes Mnemon to the Persian throne. Weakness of the Persian government. Grecian forces raised by Cyrus, brother of the king: Clearchus, Proxenus, Xenophon.

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IN the latter years of the Peloponnesian war the affairs of Greece became, as we have seen, more than formerly implicated with those of Persia; and, during the short calm which succeeded the long troubles of the former country, some events in the latter will require attention. The detail will lead far from Greece; but, beside involving information of Grecian affairs not found elsewhere, it has a very important connexion with Grecian history, through the insight it affords into circumstances which prepared a revolution effected by Grecian arms, one of the greatest occurring in the annals of the world.

By the event of the Peloponnesian war the Asian Greeks changed the dominion of Athens, not for that of Lacedæmon, the conquering Grecian power, but of a foreign, a barbarian master, the king of Persia, then the ally of Lacedæmon. Toward the end of the same year in which a conclusion was put

to the war, by the taking of Athens, Darius king of Persia, the second of the name, died. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Artaxerxes, also the second of his name, and, for his extraordinary memory, distinguished among the Greeks by the addition of Mnemon, the Mindful. The old king, in his last illness, desirous to see once more his favorite son Cyrus, sent for him from his government in Lydia. The prince, in obeying his father's requisition, travelled in the usual manner of the Eastern great, with a train amounting almost to an army; and, to exhibit in his guard the new magnificence of troops so much heard of in the upper provinces, but never yet seen, he engaged by large pay the attendance of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, under the command of Xenias of Parrhasia in Arcadia. As a friend and counsellor, he took with him Tissaphernes, satrap of Caria.

On the decease of Darius, which followed shortly, a jealousy, scarcely separable from a despotic throne, but said to have been fomented by the unprincipled Tissaphernes, induced the new monarch to imprison his brother; whose death, it was supposed, in course would have followed, but for the powerful intercession of the queen-mother, Parysatis. Restored, through her influence, not only to liberty but to the great command intrusted to him by his indulgent father, Cyrus nevertheless resented highly the indignity he had suffered. He seems indeed to have owed little to his brother's kindness. Jealous of the abilities and popular character of Cyrus, apprehensive of his revenge, and perhaps not unreasonably also of his ambition, Artaxerxes practised that wretched oriental policy, still familiar with the Turkish government in the same countries, of exciting civil war

Xen. Anab.
l. 1. c. 1.

Id. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 4.

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Xen. Anab.
l. 1. c. 6.
s. 1. 6. 7.

between the commanders of his provinces, to disable them for making war against the throne. Orontas, a person related to the royal family, governor of the citadel of Sardis, was encouraged by the monarch's councils to rebel against that superior officer, under whose immediate authority, by those very councils, he was placed, and ostensibly still required to act. Cyrus subdued and forgave him. A second opportunity occurring, Orontas again rebelled; again found himself, notwithstanding the secret patronage of the court, unable to support his rebellion; and, soliciting pardon, obtained, from the generosity of Cyrus, not pardon only but favor. But according to report, to which Xenophon gave credit, the queen-mother herself, Parysatis, whether urged by the known enmity of Artaxerxes to Cyrus, or by whatever other cause, incited her younger son to seek the throne and life of the elder. Thus much however appears certain, that, very soon after his return into Asia Minor, Cyrus began preparations with that criminal view. For a pretence, it must be allowed, he seems not to have been totally without what the right of self-defence might afford; yet his principal motives evidently were ambition and revenge.

c. 6. s. 7.
l. 2. c. 5.
s. 2.

The disjointed, tottering, and crumbling state of that empire, which, under the first Darius, appeared so well compacted, and really was so powerful and flourishing, favored his views. Egypt, whose last-
ing revolt had been suppressed by the first Artaxerxes, was again in rebellion, and the fidelity of other distant provinces was more than suspected. Within his own extensive viceroyalty, the large province of Paphlagonia, governed by its own tributary prince, paid but a precarious obedience to the Persian throne; the Mysian and Pisidian mountaineers made

c. 6. s. 3.

l. 3. c. 2.
s. 14.

open war upon the more peaceful subjects of the plains; and the Lycaonians, possessing themselves of the fortified places, held even the level country in independency, and refused the accustomed tribute. A large part of lesser Asia was thus in rebellion, more or less avowed. Hence, on one hand, the attention of the king's councils and the exertion of his troops were engaged; on the other, an undeniable pretence was ready for Cyrus to increase the military force under his immediate authority.

SECT.
1.

Cyrus, on his first arrival in the neighbourhood of the Grecian colonies, became, as we have seen, partial to the Grecian character. The degeneracy, effeminacy, pride, servility, and falsehood, prevalent among the Assyrian and Median great, seem to have led the first Cyrus to establish as a maxim for the Persians, that to excel in drawing the bow, riding on horseback, and speaking truth, should be their characteristic, and the great object of Persian education. The younger Cyrus, born with a generous temper, and superior powers of body and mind, and excelling in the two former requisites, would be likely to conceive a proud value for the latter; and, at an early age, to abhor and despise the duplicity and baseness in which the Persian were no longer distinguished from the Median and Assyrian courtiers. With a mind capable of friendship, and naturally solicitous for the esteem of those like himself, the superior character of men bred in the schools of Lycurgus, Anaxagoras, and Socrates, and formed in the wars and political turbulence of the Grecian commonwealths, could not fail to strike him. His vanity would co-operate with his judgment in courting their good opinion; and, as his penetration discovered the

Ch. 20. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 7. s. 3.

CHAP. use to be made of them, even his ambition would lead
 XXIII. him to cultivate their friendship.

As soon as the design against his brother's throne was decided, Cyrus, with increased sedulity, extended his connexions among the Greeks. They alone, among the nations of that time, knew how to train armies, so that thousands of men might act as one machine. Hence their heavy-armed had a power, in the shock of battle, that no number of more irregular troops, however brave, could resist. To men of character therefore, from any part of Greece, but especially from Peloponnesus, whose heavy-armed were of highest reputation, introduction to Cyrus was easy. The fame of his munificence and of his liberal manner invited; and many became connected with him by the pledge of hospitality, which, with the Persians, not less than among the Greeks, was held sacred. Through the long and extensive war lately concluded, Greece abounded with experienced officers, and with men of inferior rank, much practised in arms, and little in any peaceful way of livelihood. Opportunity was thus ready for raising a force of Grecian mercenaries, almost to any amount. What required circumspection was to avoid alarming the court of Susa; and this the defective principles and worse practice of the Persian administration made even easy.

Xen. Hel. The superintending command of Cyrus extended over all Lesser Asia within the river Halys. The large province, committed to his immediate government, was composed of Lydia, the Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia. The Ionian cities had been reserved to the satrapy of Tissaphernes. But the prince's character was popular, the satrap's unpo-

Anab. l. 1.
 c. 9. s. 5.
 c. 1. s. 6.

pular ; insomuch that, finding their offered homage acceptable, all those cities, excepting Miletus, paid their appointed tribute to Cyrus, and no longer acknowledged the satrap's orders. To contest such matters by arms was become so ordinary among the Persian governors, that raising troops for the purpose was little likely to give umbrage to the court ; careless how the provinces were administered, provided only the expected tribute came regularly to the treasury. Cyrus therefore directed his Grecian commanders, in the several towns, to enlist Greeks, especially Peloponnesians, as many as they could ; with the pretence of strengthening his garrisons against the apprehended attempts of Tissaphernes. In Miletus, so the popularity of his character prevailed, a conspiracy was formed for revolting to him ; but before it could be carried into effect, it was discovered ; and, by the satrap's order, the ringleaders were executed, and many of their adherents banished, Cyrus not only protected the fugitives, but besieged Miletus by land and sea ; and this new war furnished an additional pretence for levying troops.

Notwithstanding the character of frankness, honor, and strict regard for truth, which Cyrus generally supported, the candor of Xenophon, his friend and panegyrist, has not concealed from us that he could stoop to duplicity when the great interests of his ambition instigated. So far from acknowledging any purpose of disobedience to the head of the empire, he condescended to request from that brother, against whose throne and life his preparations were already directed, the royal authority for adding Ionia to his immediate government. The request was granted ; at the instance, it was said, of Parysatis, who pre-

Anab. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 8.

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served much influence with her elder son, while she incited the nefarious views of the younger against him. Concerning intrigues in the Persian court however we should perhaps allow our belief cautiously, even to Xenophon: but we may readily give him credit for that weakness of the government which, he affirms, induced the king to be pleased, rather than offended, at the private war between his brother and the satrap; inasmuch as, by consuming their means in the distant provinces, it might prevent disturbance from their ambition to the interior of the empire.

Anab. I. 1.
c. 1. s. 9.

Among the many Greeks admitted to the conversation and to the table of Cyrus, was Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian; who, after serving in the armies of his own commonwealth, through the Peloponnesian war, found himself, at the age of fifty, still uneasy in rest. Seeking opportunity for military employment, he thought he had discovered it in the Thracian Chersonese, where the Greek settlers were harassed by incursions of the neighbouring barbarians; and he persevered in representation and solicitation to the ephors till he obtained a commission for a command there. Hastening his departure, at Corinth an order of recal overtook him. The disappointment was more than he could bear; he resolved to disobey the revered scytale; and proceeded, in defiance of it, to act in pursuance of his commission received. For this he was, in absence, condemned to death; a sentence operating to his banishment for life.

I. 2. c. 6.
s. 2.

What fair hope now remained to Clearchus does not appear; but the need of military talents, continually and extensively occurring among the various warring commonwealths and scattered colonies of

the Greeks, always offered some prospect for adventurers of any considerable military reputation; and, in the moment, a still more inviting field, possibly always in his view, appeared in the court of Cyrus. Thither he went, and, under a forbidding outside, a surly countenance, a harsh voice, and rough manners, the prince, discovering in him a character he wanted, after short intercourse made him a present of ten thousand darics, near eight thousand pounds sterling.

Clearchus did not disappoint this magnificent generosity. Military command and military adventure were his supreme delight; and, in the circumstances of the age, a body of men under his orders was an estate. Employing therefore the whole of the prince's present in raising troops, he offered, as an individual adventurer, that protection to the Chersonesites which, as a general of the Lacedæmonian forces, he had been commissioned to give, but which the Lacedæmonian government, though claiming to be the protecting power of the Grecian name, had finally refused to afford. His service was accepted; and his success against the barbarians, together with the uncommon regularity and inoffensiveness of his troops in the friendly country, so gratified, not the Chersonesites only, but all the Hellespontine Greeks, that, while he generally found subsistence at the expense of the enemy, they provided large pay for his army by voluntary contribution. Hence, with a discipline severe sometimes to excess, he preserved the general attachment of those under him; and thus a body of troops was kept in the highest order, ready for the service of Cyrus.

- The circumstances of Thessaly afforded another

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opportunity. Aristippus, a Thessalian of eminence, probably banished by faction, had been admitted to the prince's familiarity. Returning afterward to his own country, and becoming head of his party, divisions were still such that civil war followed. Then Aristippus thought he might profit from that claim which the ancient doctrine of hospitality gave him upon the generosity of Cyrus. He requested levy-money for two thousand men, with pay for three months. Cyrus granted them for four thousand, and six months; only stipulating that without previous communication with him no accommodation should be concluded with the adverse party. Thus another body of troops, unnoticed, was maintained for Cyrus.

Proxenus, a Theban of the first rank and highest connexions, happy in his talents, cultivated under the celebrated Gorgias, of manners to win, and character to deserve esteem, dissatisfied with the state of things in his own city, passed, at the age of toward thirty, to the court of Cyrus, with the direct purpose of seeking employment, honor, and fortune; and, in Xenophon's phrase, of so associating with men in the highest situations that he might earn the means of doing, rather than lie under the necessity of receiving, favors. Recommended by such advantages Proxenus not only obtained the notice, but won the friendship of Cyrus; who commissioned him to raise a Grecian force, pretended for a purpose which the Persian court could not disapprove, the reduction of the rebellious Pisidians.

Thus engaged in the prince's service, it became the care of Proxenus to obtain in his foreign residence the society of a friend, of disposition, ac-

quirements, and pursuits congenial to his own. With Anab. 1. 3. c. 1. s. 4—7. this view he wrote to a young Athenian,¹ with whom he had long had intimacy, Xenophon son of Gryllus, a scholar of Socrates; warmly urging him to come and partake of the prince's favor, to which he engaged to introduce him. In the actual state of things at Athens enough might occur to disgust honest ambition. Xenophon therefore, little satisfied with any prospect there, accepted his friend's invitation; and to these circumstances we owe his beautiful narrative of the ensuing transactions, which remains, like the *Iliad*, the oldest and the model of its kind.²

For a Grecian land force Cyrus contented himself with what might be procured by negotiation with individuals and the allurements of pay. But he desired the co-operation of a Grecian fleet, which, in the existing circumstances of Greece, could be obtained only through favor of the Lacedæmonian government. By a confidential minister therefore, Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 1. s. 1. dispatched to Lacedæmon, he claimed a friendly return for his assistance in the war with Athens. The ephors, publicly acknowledging the justness of his claim, sent orders to Samius, then commanding on the Asiatic station, to join the prince's fleet, and follow the directions of his admiral, Tamos, an Egyptian.

^{1, 2} Two notes proposed to warrant the text, but not wanted for elucidation, are referred, on account of their length, to the end of the chapter.

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SECTION II.

March of Cyrus to Babylonia: battle of Cunaxa.

Preparation being completed, and the advantageous season for action approaching, all the Ionian garrisons were ordered to Sardis, and put under the command of Xenias, the Arcadian, commander of the Grecian guard which had attended Cyrus into Upper Asia. The other Grecian troops were directed to join; some at Sardis, some at places farther eastward. A very large army of Asiatics, whom the Greeks called collectively barbarians, was at the same time assembled. The pretence of these great preparations was to exterminate the rebellious Pisidians; and, in the moment, it sufficed for the troops. It could however no longer blind Tissaphernes; who, not choosing to trust others to report what he knew or suspected, set off, with all the speed that the way of travelling of an Eastern satrap would admit, with an escort of five hundred horse, to communicate personally with the king.

Xenoph.
Anab. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 4.

s. 5—9.
B. C. 401.
Ol. 94. 3.
April.

Meanwhile Cyrus marched from Sardis, with the forces already collected, by Colossæ to Celænæ in Phrygia, a large and populous town, where he halted thirty days. There he was joined by the last division of his Grecian forces, which now amounted to about eleven thousand heavy-armed, and two thousand targeteers. His Asiatics or barbarians were near a hundred thousand. Proceeding then northward he halted again at Peltæ. There he gave a very strong and gratifying mark of attention to the Greeks. It was the season of the Arcadian festival called Lycæa, whence the Romans had their Lupercalia. The Arcadians of the army were desirous to celebrate the

festival with games and all religious rites, after the manner of their own country. Not only he allowed all opportunity for this, but he paid them the compliment himself to attend.

In his great undertaking indeed every exertion of his talent for acquiring popularity was wanted. Either he had met with some great disappointment, of which we are uninformed, or he set out unprovided with the first requisite, money, to a degree far beyond what prudence could justify. Only fifty-two days had elapsed since the army moved from Sardis, when the pay of the Grecian forces was three months in arrear, and he was without means to furnish it. Discontent of course arose, and grew, insomuch that the soldiers would urge their clamorous demands, even to his very door. Much good sense, some experience, and earnest meditation on great designs, had taught Cyrus to respect men who must be instruments of those designs. Hence he had learned to check the impetuous passions, whose sallies had sometimes disgraced his earlier youth. He would himself often give a patient hearing to the soldiers: he would soothe them with expressions of sorrow for his present inability; he would cheer them with the prospect of better times, and with promises, in which his known generosity disposed them to confide; and he never failed to dismiss them hoping, and in some degree gratified.

It seems probable that Cyrus had been negotiating with Syennesis, who reigned over the rich maritime province of Cilicia, holding it, if we may use a modern term very nearly apposite, as a fief of the Persian empire. To pass from Lydia into Assyria, the immense ridge which under various names, Taurus, Caucasus, and others, extends from the south-western

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corner of Asia Minor to the Caspian sea, must necessarily be crossed; everywhere with much difficulty and danger to an army if an enemy opposed; but the nearest way and the best was through Cilicia. It was therefore of much importance to Cyrus to gain Syennesis to his interest; or, if that could not be, to deter opposition from him. But the situation of the Cilician prince was critical. Acceding to the requisition of Cyrus, he hazarded the charge of concurring in rebellion against the great king; refusing it, he might be overwhelmed by the prince's army before assistance from the king could arrive. Hence seem to have arisen the circumstances, of strange and mysterious appearance, which followed. Proceeding from Peltæ, the army encamped in the plain of Caystrus, near a large town whence it was supplied with provisions; but, no pay forthcoming, the discontent of the Greeks became such that their officers with difficulty kept them within any bounds. In this state of things the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of Syennesis, with a strong escort of horse, part Cilician, part Greeks of Aspendus, drew general attention; and shortly, to the surprise almost equally as to the gratification of the army, pay was issued for four months. The means were universally attributed to the Cilician princess.

Anab. l. 1.
c. 2. s. 12.

Orders being given for resuming the march, the Greeks now proceeded cheerfully. Epyaxa, with her escort, accompanied the army, moving as the Persian prince moved, and encamping as he encamped; not without insult to her fame from the licentious mouths of the soldiers. At Tyriæum, to gratify her, it was said, Cyrus reviewed his forces. The barbarian troops first marched by. Then Cyrus in an open, Epyaxa in a covered carriage, passed along the Grecian line

which was formed four deep; the soldiers uniformly armed and clothed, with brazen helmets, scarlet tunics, greaves, and burnished shields. Taking a station in front, Cyrus sent orders to advance with protended spears. The trumpet immediately giving the signal, the phalanx moved, and gradually quickening pace, at length advanced running, shouting at the same time aloud, in the usual measured way of the Greeks, widely different from the irregular clamors of the barbarians. Twelve thousand men, uniformly armed, exactly formed, moving regularly, and shouting regularly, as if one machine, were a sight so new to the Asiatics as to excite alarm with astonishment. Epyaxa, for quicker flight, quitted her cumbrous carriage, and every sutler ran from the camp. The Greeks were amused and flattered, and Cyrus was not anxious to conceal his satisfaction at the terror which they could thus easily excite among the Asiatics.

In three days then the army arrived at Iconium, the last town of Phrygia. Here it was on the border of the rebellious provinces, the pretended object of the expedition. Its force was much greater than the rebels could undertake to encounter. During five days' march through Lycaonia the Greeks had permission to plunder, and they met with no opposition, or none worth their historian's notice. In Lycaonia the Cilician princess took leave of Cyrus, to go by the nearest road across the mountains into her own country. In compliment, real or pretended, her escort was augmented with a body of Greeks, under the orders of Menon, a young Thessalian, who held the immediate command of the troops raised by Aristippus. The circumstances altogether seem to indicate that the object of her extraordinary visit had been political; to divert the Persian prince from his

Anab. I. 1.
c. 2. s. 19.

s. 20.

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purpose of passing through Cilicia; and that the hope, still entertained, of obtaining by negotiation what had been denied to the first solicitation, induced her to accompany his march so long. Cyrus however persevered in his intention, though in uncertainty whether Syennesis would not oppose his passing the mountains. The more important object therefore, in detaching Menon, was to open a communication with the fleet under Tamos and Samius, which had been ordered to the Cilician coast, and, by a force within the country, possessing that communication, to make the passage of the mountains, in all events, more secure for the body of the army.

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 20.
21.

Meanwhile the prince, moving still eastward through Cappadocia, in four days reached Dana, a large and populous town, whence a formed carriage-way, the best across the rugged ridge of Taurus, led directly to Tarsus, the Cilician capital; steep however in many parts, and commanded, so that a very small force might stop a large army. No intelligence had yet arrived from Menon, and report was circulated that Syennesis in person, with a powerful body of troops, had occupied the heights commanding the passage. During the halt, which these circumstances occasioned, two Persian officers of high rank were executed. Rumor went of a conspiracy; but the usual secrecy of a despotic administration denied all particulars to public knowledge.

After three days' delay the satisfactory intelligence arrived, that the passage of the mountains was open; that the detachment under Menon was already within the ridge; and, what had contributed not a little to deter the opposition meditated by Syennesis, that the fleet was on the coast. The highlands were accordingly traversed without opposition, and the army,

proceeding in four days above eighty miles, through a well watered, highly cultivated, and very fruitful vale, bounded by lofty mountains, arrived at Tarsus.

With surprise and regret it was found that this large and lately flourishing town had been plundered, and was nearly deserted: even the prince's palace had been stripped; and Syennesis, with the principal inhabitants, had withdrawn to a strong hold on the neighbouring mountains to avoid farther injury from Menon. Cyrus had not penetrated this young man's character through a fair exterior so happily as that of the veteran Clearchus under a forbidding aspect. Menon possessed very considerable talents, recommended by an elegant person and an engaging manner; but he had a most depraved mind, with an inordinate appetite for riches and pleasure, unrestrained by either fear or shame. In attributing this to him, says Xenophon, I give him but his well-known due. The alleged provocation for his violences at Tarsus was an attack among the defiles, in which a hundred Greeks had fallen. The loss had certainly been sustained; but the Cilicians averred that the intolerable rapines of Menon, as he traversed the country, had provoked the attack. Cyrus sent a message to Syennesis, requiring his attendance in Tarsus. The Cilician answered, 'That he never had appeared before a superior, nor would he now.' Epyaxa however interfering as mediatrix, Syennesis, after receiving solemn assurance of safety, obeyed the requisition. An exchange was then made of honors for money. Syennesis advanced a very large sum to Cyrus, and received, in return, says the historian, such gifts as are held honorable among princes; a horse with a golden bit, a chain of gold, bracelets, a golden battle-axe, a Persian robe, and a promise that his country

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 27.

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should be no farther plundered; and moreover that stolen slaves, wherever found, should be restored to their owners; the only reparation, apparently, ever proposed for the plunder of the capital.

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 3. s. 1.

Cyrus halted in Tarsus twenty days. In this leisure the Greeks observed among one another that the Pisidian mountains were now left far behind them; that the pretence of war there had evidently been a fallacy; and many circumstances gave to suspect that the prince's real design was against his brother's throne. Of the generals Clearchus only was in the secret; but the others were mostly ready to concur in a project which, with considerable danger indeed, held out the hope of immense reward. The soldiers however, for whom the allurements was not equal, were less disposed to the toil and the perils; and, when at length orders came for marching still eastward, they universally declared, it was for no such distant service they had engaged themselves, and they would go no farther. Clearchus immediately resorted to his usual rough means of compulsion; but they were no longer borne; the mutiny broke out with violence; stones were thrown, first at his sumpter horses, then at himself, and with difficulty he escaped alive.

Information of these circumstances gave Cyrus the deepest anxiety. He had already advanced too far to retreat with either honor or safety; and deprived of his regular infantry, his force would be too inferior for any reasonable hope of success against the myriads of the great king. But the able and experienced Clearchus did not so cease to trust in his own ability to sway the minds of men. He desired a meeting of his people, as in civil assembly, and they came quietly together. Addressing them in terms tending

s. 2—6.

only to reconciliation and the recovery of their confidence, they listened patiently. Protesting then that he would neither oppose nor desert them, he said, if they thought him unworthy any longer to command, he would obey. Not only his own people declared their attachment, but more than two thousand others, of the body drawn from the Ionian garrisons, hitherto under the Arcadian Xenias, and the troops raised for the siege of Miletus, under Pasion of Megara, now, without regarding any longer the orders of those generals, arranged themselves under the command of Clearchus.

SECT.
II.

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 3. s. 7.

But, in resolving to proceed no farther with Cyrus, the means of returning to Ionia had been little considered by the soldiers; how the passage of the mountains was to be secured, and how, without pay, subsistence was to be obtained. More meetings were held; various and contrary opinions were urged; and the perplexity was so skilfully managed by Clearchus and his confidential officers that, disagreeing on every other proposal, it was at length universally resolved to send Clearchus himself, with some others, to demand of the prince on what service he meant to employ them. Cyrus, being duly prepared by private communication, received the deputation graciously, and in answer said that, 'according to intelligence lately arrived, his enemy the satrap of Syria, Abrocomas, was encamped on the bank of the Euphrates, only twelve days' march from Tarsus. If he found him there, he meant to take vengeance on him; if not, he would there consult with them what measure should next be taken.'

This speech did not deceive the Greeks; but it might encourage, by showing them, as it strongly marks to posterity, the incoherent texture of the

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Anab. l. 1.
c. 3. s. 21.

Persian government, where the purpose of private war against the governor of a great province, so near the centre of the empire, might be boldly avowed by the governor of another province, still maintaining the pretence of allegiance to the throne. Their perplexity therefore not being in any degree relieved if they persisted in their first resolution, they presently came to a determination to profit as they might from the existing circumstances, and to use them for a pretence to demand an increase of pay rather than, by deserting the prince's service, to go without pay. Cyrus readily gratified them with the promise of an additional half daric monthly; their former monthly pay having been a daric, rather more than sixpence, daily.

c. 4. s. 1.
2. 3.

The march was now quietly resumed, and in five days the army reached Issus, a large and wealthy seaport near the eastern limit of Cilicia. The fleet was already arrived there, consisting of twenty-five Phœnician and thirty-five Grecian ships. The Egyptian Tamos commanded in chief. The Lacedæmonian admiral Pythagoras, who, according to the usual yearly change in the Lacedæmonian service, had superseded Samius, served under him. They brought an acceptable addition to the land force, seven hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Chiriso-phus, a Lacedæmonian. Another re-enforcement soon after arrived at Issus, small in itself, but, from the attending circumstances, highly gratifying to Cyrus. It consisted of about four hundred Grecian heavy-armed, who had been in the service of Abrocomas, satrap of Syria: so far did the Greeks now wander in quest of military pay, and so extensively were their valor and discipline in request. Whether the treatment they had met with disgusted, or the fame

c. 2. s. 21.
Xenoph.
Hel. l. 3.
c. 1. s. 1.

of the prince's liberality allured, all deserted the satrap, and offered themselves in a body to Cyrus; professing their readiness to march anywhere under his orders, though it should be against the king himself. SECT.
II.

Less than twenty miles beyond Issus eastward the ridge of Taurus meets the shore, so that a narrow way only, under lofty precipices against the sea, remains practicable for an army. Two fortresses commanded this pass; one on the Syrian side, garrisoned by the great king; the other on the Cilician side, held by the king of Cilicia; for so far the Cilician king was a sovereign. Opposition was expected here from Abrocomas, such as might prevent or very inconveniently delay the army's progress. Had such been found, it was proposed to transport the troops by sea to Phenicia. But the satrap, though said to have had three hundred thousand men under his command, left the narrow unguarded, and the army entered Syria unresisted. Anab. l. 1.
c. 4. s. 4.

The next halt was at Myriandrus, a Phenician seaport of considerable trade. There the Grecian generals Pasion and Xenias, without giving any notice of their purpose, embarked aboard a merchant-ship with their effects, and sailed for Greece. No cause for this desertion was known; unless that those of the troops formerly under their orders, which, on occasion of the mutiny at Tarsus, had seceded to Clearchus, remained still under that general, and that Cyrus had not interfered to require their return under obedience to their former commanders. The unceremonious departure of those generals however excited alarm among some, and indignation among most of the Greeks; and it gave great uneasiness, with very just cause, to Cyrus. In the necessity of courting, at the same time, and in the same camp, s. 5.
s. 6.
s. 7.

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the attachment of troops so differing in manners, sentiments, and prejudices, as the Greeks and Orientals, it would often be difficult to decide how to manage command, so as to offend neither the proud servility of these, nor the turbulent independency of the others. To carry an equal and steady discipline indeed would be scarcely possible; but Cyrus seems, in all his communication with the Greeks, to have shown a superior mind, and not least upon the present occasion. Calling together the generals, he said, ‘Pasion and Xenias had left him. It would ‘however be easy for his triremes to overtake their ‘heavy vessel, and bring them back, if such could be ‘his purpose. But they were free to go, with the ‘consciousness which must attend them that they ‘deserved worse of him than he of them. Their ‘wives and children, residing at Tralles, hostages at ‘his command, should also be restored to them: for ‘those who had once served him well should never ‘experience severity from him for merely quitting his ‘service.’

Anab. l. 1.
c. 4. s. 8.

s. 9.

His conduct altogether, very grateful to the Greeks, infused new alacrity among them, so that a general readiness appeared for proceeding still eastward. A fortnight’s march then brought the army to the large town of Thapsacus on the Euphrates. There Cyrus declared to the Grecian generals that his purpose was against his brother the great king, and desired them to communicate the information to the soldiers, and endeavour to engage their willing service. Long as this had been suspected, the communication, now at length made, was not well received. The soldiers accused their commanders of concealing from them a matter so interesting, which themselves had long known; though in reality Clearchus alone had been

s. 10. 11.

s. 12.

intrusted with the secret. Among various murmurs it was observed by some that, if they went on, they should deserve at least a gratuity equal to what those had received who, under the command of Xenias, had attended Cyrus when he went to visit the late king his father. These circumstances being reported to the prince, he immediately promised a gratuity, considerably exceeding the demand, to the amount of sixteen pounds sterling for every soldier arriving at Babylon, and their full pay besides till they should reach Ionia again.

SECT.
II.

Anab. l. 1.
c. 4. s. 13.

While some expressed themselves highly satisfied with so liberal a promise from one unaccustomed to fall short of his promises, others yet hesitated at the prospect of so hazardous an enterprise at such a distance from their own country, Menon had the address to persuade his people to earn the first favor of a generous prince, who, were they only true to him and to themselves, would be soon by far the greatest monarch in the world. Before the general resolution of the army could be collected Cyrus gave the word to march, and was obeyed. The Euphrates, whose occasional violence denied bridges, whose depth in that part very rarely admitted fording, and from whose banks all boats had been removed by the care of Abrocomas, happened to be then just fordable. Menon led through; his troops followed, and immediately began to encamp on the other side. An officer was presently dispatched to them with the prince's thanks, and assurance that it should be his care to deserve their thanks; with the emphatical expression added, that, if he failed, they should no longer call him Cyrus. The service was indeed very important, for the example was imme-

s. 14—17.

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diately decisive; the whole army crossed the river, and encamped on the left bank.

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 4. s. 18.
c. 5. s. 1.

s. 4.

s. 5. 6.

The Greeks being thus at length clearly engaged in war against the king, the army moved again, and in nine days reached the Mesopotamian desert; described by Xenophon, under the name of Arabia, level as the sea; not a tree to be seen; every shrub and herb, even to the very reeds, aromatic; but the principal produce wormwood: its birds and beasts, bustards and ostriches, antelopes and wild asses. Five days this dreary country was traversed, to Corsota, a large deserted town on the river Mascas; and there provisions were distributed for the formidable march of near three hundred miles,² through a still more barren region, to the gate, as it was called, of the fruitful Mesopotamia. Thirteen days were employed in this passage, in which corn failed the men, and forage the cattle, insomuch that many of the latter died. Some relief was at length obtained from a large town on the other side of the Euphrates; but, during the halt made for the purpose, a dissension arose among the Greeks which threatened the most fatal consequences. In the fear of giving umbrage Cyrus had allowed each Grecian general to retain the independent command of the troops which had been under his orders before they assembled; himself alone acting as immediate commander-in-chief of the Grecian forces. But a dispute arising between some

² Xenophon has given the measure in parasangs; but they were computed only, and of course uncertain. According to the common allowance of four miles to a parasang, the distance would be more than three hundred miles. Those who desire critical information concerning the geography of the Anabasis, will find advantage in consulting Forster's Dissertation annexed to Spelman's translation, and Vincent's Voyage of Nearchus.

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II.

of Menon's soldiers and those of Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general took upon himself to judge it, and ordered one of Menon's men to be whipped. It is, I believe, the first instance recorded of such a military punishment among the Greeks; unless the chastisement of Thersites by Ulysses, reported in the *Iliad*, might be considered as such. On the same day Clearchus, riding with a small escort through Menon's camp, was assaulted by the incensed comrades of the punished soldier, with such violence that his life was endangered. Escaping however to his own camp, his anger so overcame his prudence that he called his people to arms; and the fortunately ready intervention of Proxenus, with admonition and entreaty, judiciously supported by the sight of armed troops at hand, hardly restrained his fury. It gave time however for Cyrus himself to interfere. Hastening to the Grecian line, he addressed the generals with this remarkable admonition: 'Of the consequences of what you are about I am sure you are not aware. If you fight with one another, that very day I shall be cut off, and then your fate will not be distant. For this whole Asiatic army, if they see our affairs go ill, instantly will turn against us, and, in studious display of enmity to us, will even exceed the king's forces.' Clearchus felt the sensible, pathetic, and endearing rebuke, and quiet was restored in the Grecian camp.

The army marching again had already entered the fruitful Mesopotamia, called also Babylonia, when a letter was delivered to Cyrus, indicating a most dangerous treachery. Orontas, his kinsman, whom we have seen twice in arms against him, and still restored to favor and confidence, held a great command in the army. Apparently his extensive credit and in-

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 1.

c. 6. s. 1.
2. 3.

CHAP. fluence, and, amid the general deficiency of the
XXIII. Persian officers, his superior military reputation, made his assistance so desirable, and even necessary for the expedition, that much was knowingly hazarded to obtain it. The letter was from Orontas himself to the king, communicating intelligence, and promising service.

In this danger from his Persian followers we see a reason for the prince's attachment to his Greeks, perhaps not less weighty than that arising from his knowledge of their superiority as soldiers. From the moment they were decidedly engaged in the enterprise, their interest was much more inseparably blended with his than that of perhaps any of his Asiatics. Orontas therefore being arrested, and seven of the principal Persian officers summoned as a military council or court-martial to the prince's tent, three thousand Greeks were ordered on guard around, and Clearchus was called in to assist at the deliberation. Cyrus himself explained the prisoner's crimes, and all that he said was allowed by Orontas to be true. If the proceedings of a Persian military tribunal were not decided by any very well-regulated system of distributive justice we shall not wonder. But Cyrus seems to have been desirous to show that, not the uncereemonious decision only of a despotic government, but the fixed rules of a free people, would condemn Orontas. He called upon Clearchus first to declare his opinion. The inattention of the Spartan general to any principle, such as the fame of his republic for equal law might give to expect, and the declaration of his decision, on the contrary, by a rule of mere convenience, so adapted to purposes of tyranny that it might serve as a complete code of criminal jurisprudence for a Turkish bashaw, may

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 6. s. 4.

s. 6—9.

indeed excite surprise. ‘I think,’ said Clearchus, as the Athenian philosopher, without a comment, reports his speech, ‘that the prisoner deserves death, and I advise that it be inflicted; that so the necessity of constantly watching secret enemies may not prevent exertions for the advantage of our friends.’ But, whatever may be thought of Clearchus as a lawyer, he was undoubtedly a politician. His argument at once decided the court. Though some of the members were nearly related to the prisoner, all voted for his death. The prince himself pronounced condemnation. Orontas was then conducted to the tent of Artapatas. As he passed, an instance of the decency of Persian manners excited the admiration of the Greeks: though the sentence had been made public, yet all the crowd showed him the same reverence as when in the height of his power and most in favor with the prince. After entering the tent of Artapatas, he was never more seen, nor was it ever known to the Greeks by what kind of execution he died, or how his body was disposed of. The other circumstances were not denied to the public; and, as Clearchus related to his friends what passed in the prince’s tent, it comes to us from the pen of Xenophon with an authority seldom to be found for such transactions.

SECT.
II.

Anab. l. 1.
c. 6. s. 10.

s. 11.

s. 5.

c. 7. s. 1.
B. C. 401.
Ol. 94. 4.
Sept.

Treachery and sedition being thus checked, the army moved, and, after three days’ march in Baby-lonia, it was expected on the morrow to meet the king’s forces. The want of system in the command of the Grecian troops was now in some degree remedied. Cyrus directed that, for the order of battle, Clearchus should command the right wing, and Menon the left. Next morning some deserters bringing accounts, supposed more certain, of the enemy’s approach, Cyrus sent for the Greek generals

Anab. l. 1.
c. 7. s. 2.

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and lochages, and spoke to them in these remarkable terms:

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 3. 4.

‘ It was not, as you will readily suppose, in any want of your numbers to swell my army, that I engaged you in my service, but in the belief that you were much superior to far greater numbers of barbarians. What therefore I have now to desire of you is, that you show yourselves worthy of that freedom which you inherit, and for which I esteem you fortunate; and I profess to you that I should myself prefer that freedom to all I possess, or to much greater possessions held at the arbitrary will of another.

‘ For the battle we expect, it may be proper then to apprise you that the enemy’s multitude will appear formidable; that their shout of onset will be imposing; but, if you are firm against these, I am even ashamed to say what contemptible soldiers you will find my fellow-countrymen to be. You then only exerting yourselves as may be expected, I am confident of acquiring means equal to my wishes, to send those home the envy of their country, who may desire to return home; but I trust the far greater number of you will prefer the advantages which I shall have opportunity to offer in my service.’

s. 5. 6. 7.

Gaulites, a Samian, replied to this speech, declaring plainly the doubts of the army, both of the prince’s disposition and of his ability, whatever their services and his success might be, to perform such magnificent promises. But Gaulites was in the prince’s confidence;³ and Xenophon’s account altogether

³ Πιστὸς Κύρῳ.—*Cyros fidus*.—A man of fidelity to Cyrus. Spelman.

Thus the translators. But the different sense I have given, being, I think, unquestionably warranted by the original, I have

gives reason to suppose that his reply was preconcerted. It gave opportunity however for Cyrus, in a second speech, to remove all distrust, and he dismissed those first called, and others afterwards admitted, full of high hopes for themselves, and zeal for his service, which were communicated through the army. The transaction altogether shows that Cyrus had studied the Grecian character carefully and successfully.

SECT.
II.

The Grecian forces being thus prepared, (what passed in the Asiatic line, probably little known, is seldom noticed by Xenophon,) the whole army marched in order of battle. Only five miles onward, a wide and deep trench, extending above forty miles, had been formed purposely to obstruct the prince's progress. The canals, little distant, connecting the Euphrates and the Tigris, gave opportunity to float it, so as to form a strong line of defence to the country beyond. After so much expense and labor, in so advantageous and important a situation, strong opposition to the passage of that trench was expected. The tracks however only of a multitude of retreating men and horses were found there. Upon this occasion a remarkable instance occurred of Persian re-

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 11.
12. 13.

no doubt in preferring it. Yet it seems as if Spelman thought *πιστός* would bear no other sense than that expressed in his translation; for in another place he has given the same interpretation of the same word, where the context would lead to suppose it wholly unwarrantable. *Οἱ ἦσαν Κύρῳ πιστότατοι*, is said, by the historian, of men in the very act of a signal treachery. (Anab. 1. 2. c. 5. s. 9.) This Spelman translates, *who had shown the greatest fidelity to Cyrus*. It appears, I must own, to me not at all intended by the historian to give so honorable a testimony to such men, but on the contrary to show in a stronger light their base falsehood, by remarking that they had been much in the confidence of Cyrus.

CHAP.
XXIII.Anab. I. 1.
c. 7. c. 14.

spect for Grecian superstition; heightened however possibly by the existing urgency, which made the service of the Greeks so important. On the eleventh day, before the arrival of the army at the trench, an Ambraciot soothsayer, named Silanus, sacrificing, had boldly asserted, as what his skill in divination enabled him to foretel, that, within ten days, the king would not fight. This being reported to Cyrus, whether pleased with the prognostic itself, or only seconding the encouragement it might infuse into others, especially the Greeks, he answered, ‘Then he will not fight at all; and if the event justifies the prophecy, I will give the soothsayer ten talents.’ Mindful of his word, he accordingly sent for Silanus, and gave him three thousand darics; being, in Persian money, the full amount of ten Attic talents, and more than two thousand pounds sterling.

s. 15.

But, whatever credit might be really given to the Ambraciot, the total desertion of a defence, formed with so much labor and cost, led Cyrus and his principal advisers to believe that the king meant to avoid a battle. Next day therefore order was less diligently kept, and in the following morning, the prince himself quitting his horse for his chariot, the whole army assumed the improvident carelessness of a peaceful march; many of the soldiers, as the sun got high, to relieve themselves in the oppressive heat, committing their heavy armour to the waggons and sumpter-horses. The proposed day’s progress was nearly completed, when Patagyas, a Persian of rank, came urging his fainting horse’s speed, and, as he passed, calling out, in Persian to the Asiatics, in Greek to the Greeks, ‘that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle.’ Tumult pervaded the extensive line; all imagining the enemy would be

c. 8. s. 1.

s. 2.

upon them before they could be duly formed. Cyrus leaped from his chariot, armed himself, mounted his horse, and hastily issued his orders. SECT.
II.

The disposition for battle was nevertheless completed, midday passed, and no enemy appeared. Soon however, as the historian who was present describes it, a dust was observed in the distance, like a white cloud; and, after some time, a darkness spreading over the plain. Presently the glittering of the polished armour was seen, and the spears and the ranks became discernible. Cyrus rode himself to view the king's disposition, and then, coming to the Grecian line, by his interpreter ordered Clearchus to direct his march to the enemy's centre; 'for there,' he said, 'the king has his station; and nothing more 'is wanting to complete our business than to defeat 'that part of their army.'

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 8. s. 5.

Cyrus, little experienced in military command, seems to have wanted able advisers. Probably the jealousy of the Asiatics would not readily admit the association of Clearchus in their councils; and it was necessary for Cyrus, as far as possible, to avoid disgusting any of his followers. His Greeks were now about ten thousand four hundred heavy-armed, and two thousand four hundred targeteers: his Asiatics nearly a hundred thousand, in large proportion cavalry; and he had twenty chariots armed with scythes. The king's forces, according to the concurrent reports of deserters, likely however to be exaggerated, were nine hundred thousand; and his scythed chariots were a hundred and fifty. The Greeks held the right of the prince's army, with their right flank covered by the Euphrates. Clearchus, of a temper not readily to obey any orders against his own opinion, was perhaps displeased not to have

CHAP.
XXIII.Anab. I. 1.
c. 8. s. 9.

been consulted about the disposition for battle. He knew however that, though report might have amplified the king's numbers, they were certainly so superior to those of Cyrus as to outflank him by more than half his army. He saw the safety of those under him, his own credit, and perhaps the best prospect of final success to the prince's cause, in keeping his flank still covered by the river. Resolved therefore not to part with so important an advantage, he avoided a direct refusal of obedience to the prince's command, by answering, in general terms, 'that he would take care all should go well.'⁴

s. 10. 11.

Cyrus continued riding in front of the line, viewing every part; and as he again approached the Grecian phalanx, Xenophon rode toward him, and asked if he had any commands. 'Only,' said the prince, 'let the Greeks be informed that the sacrifices are all favorable.' At that instant a murmur through the Grecian ranks drew his attention, and he asked what it meant. Xenophon answered, that the officers were communicating a new word, given out for the occasion. 'What is it?' said Cyrus. 'Protecting Jupiter and Victory,' answered Xenophon. 'I accept the omen,' replied the prince, 'be it so;' and immediately rode away toward the centre of his army.

It was well known to the king's officers that no Asiatic infantry could withstand the Grecian phalanx, and that no Asiatic cavalry would dare to charge it. The proposed resource, in this decided inferiority of the troops, was to use the armed chariots as an

⁴ It is imposible to read Plutarch's criticism of the conduct of Clearchus (Plut. Artax. p. 1856.) without a smile at his presumptuous ignorance; or to observe his eulogy of Xenophon, and at the same time his inattention to him, without some wonder at his extreme carelessness.

artillery; and they were indeed formidable weapons, when their operations were duly guided.⁵ The horses, to force their way through protended spears, bore defensive armour:⁶ a parapet on the chariot protected the driver: scythes projecting, downward under the axle-tree, and obliquely from each end, were adapted to make havoc of whatever came in their course.

Tissaphernes, as, of the king's general officers, most acquainted with the Grecian military practice, was appointed to the command of the wing opposed to the Greeks. He was already within half a mile of their line when Cyrus left them. The Greeks, observing his approach, sang the pæan, advanced, and, quickening pace by degrees, at length ran in phalanx. The effect of this spirited movement was beyond expectation. The charge of the chariots, which alone would have been formidable, was obviated by it. For, the Persian infantry flying, without even discharging an effectual arrow, and the cavalry giving no support, the charioteers mostly quitted their carriages, and the rest drove away. A few of those tremendous wheeled weapons, deserted by their drivers, were borne by the frightened horses against the Grecian line, but none with any effect. Some, the horses stopping amazed, were taken, and some, pushing on with that heedless fury which fright often inspires, passed through openings made for them by the ready

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 3. s. 12.
13.

⁵ So we learn from Xenophon's account of their effect on another occasion. Hel. 1. 4. c. 1. s. 9.

⁶ In the passage referred to in the foregoing note we find mention of the defensive armour of the Persian scythed-chariot-horses, which does not occur in the account of the battle of Cunaxa; in which nevertheless troop-horses are mentioned bearing defensive armour, so that it cannot be doubted but the chariot-horses would be at least equally protected.

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discipline of the phalanx.⁷ The greater part, turning after their own troops, enhanced the alarm and hastened the flight, not without havoc of the disorderly bands. The Greeks, surprised at their easy victory, with a steady pace pursued.

Anab. l. 1.
c. 10. s. 5.

Tissaphernes, not of a temper to set the example, generally so necessary to produce bold exertion among Asiatic troops, and disappointed of the effect of his chariots, on which he had wholly depended for success against the Grecian phalanx, nevertheless formed hopes to gain, with little risk, the credit of some success against the Greeks, through his knowledge of the formation of their armies. Avoiding the heavy-armed, with his cavalry he charged the targeteers. But these opening, (for they were highly disciplined, and commanded by an able officer, Episthenes of Amphipolis,) the horse went through, and suffered from javelins in passing, without returning a wound. The attempt was not repeated; and thus a great victory, in all appearance, was obtained by the Greeks, almost without a battle; for a very few bowshot wounds only had been received in the left of the phalanx,⁸ and not a man was killed.

The decision had been so rapid that the centre of the armies was not yet engaged. In some leisure

⁷ This is the sense that Spelman, by a judicious and apparently well-founded correction, has given to the passage, which, in the printed copies of the Anabasis, is contradictory and absurd.

⁸ Ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκωνύμῳ τοξευθῆναι τις ἐλέγετο. Spelman has translated this as if Xenophon had meant precisely to say that only one man was wounded. It appears to me that Diodorus, who, with much valuable information interspersed in his work, was altogether a miserable historian, but a good grammarian, has better given the true meaning of the phrase: Τῶν δὲ Ἑλλήνων φασὶν ἀναιρεθῆναι μὲν οὐδένα, τρωθῆναι δὲ ὀλίγους. l. 14. s. 25.

therefore the success of the Greeks was observed by Cyrus and those about him, and so large a portion of the royal forces was seen to join in the flight that warm hopes were excited among all, and the ready flattery of some complimented the prince as already king. Cyrus however had a mind greater than to be so misled. Attentive to all points, he had now satisfied himself that the king was in the centre of his army, generally esteemed his regular post. This body extended beyond the extreme of the prince's left, and had in no degree partaken of the disorder of the wing under Tissaphernes. It had been the advice anxiously urged to Cyrus by the Grecian generals, who knew that on his life all their hopes depended, not to risk his person in action. Whether through vain glory, or false shame, or any just consideration of the importance of his example to Asiatic troops, he resolved not to shun danger, but rather to lead the way to daring exertion. He was however waiting steadily for opportunity, when that large part of the king's line which outflanked him wheeled to turn his flank. Cyrus then, with ready judgment, chose the moment of evolution to charge the guard of six thousand, which preceded the king. He routed them, and, according to report, he killed their commander, Artagerses, with his own hand. The king's immediate guard, and the king himself, were thus laid open to view. Stimulated by ambition and revenge at the sight, and flushed with success, he then forgot the duty of the general. While the greater part of his troops, heedless of order, pursued the fugitives, he with a small band made a furious charge, broke through to the king, rode at him with his javelin, and wounded him in the breast; but immediately received a wound in the face, and, being

SECT.
II.

Anab. I. 1.
c. 8. s. 15.

c. 7. s. 8.

c. 8. s. 17.

s. 18. 19.

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overpowered, was presently killed, with eight of his principal officers, who vainly exerted themselves in his defence. These circumstances, not within the means of Xenophon's personal knowledge, he has related on the authority of Ctesias, a Greek physician, then in the service of Artaxerxes, and employed to cure the wound received from Cyrus.

Anab. l. 1.
c. 10. s. 1.

The prince's head and right hand, cut off and carried about, announced his fate to both armies. The right wing and centre of the king's then advanced with alacrity. The left of the prince's, commanded by Ariæus, did not wait the assault. They fled, and all the Asiatic line followed the example; none stopping till they reached the preceding day's station. Their camp became the unresisting prey of the conqueror. A Milesian girl, of the prince's train, running almost naked from his pavilion, reached the Grecian camp, and was among the first to communicate alarm there. A Phocæan, who had been much in his favor, and who was admired for the extent of her knowledge and the elegance of her manners, even more than for her person, which still in declining youth was beautiful, remained the king's prisoner.⁹ The Milesian found protection from the bravery and skill in arms of the small number of her fellow-countrymen, left to guard their camp. It was presently attacked, and mostly plundered; for they were unequal to the defence of its extent; but at length they repulsed the pillagers with much slaughter.

s. 2.

s. 3.

Intelligence was carried nearly at the same time,

⁹ Their story may deserve this notice, not only as it assists to mark the manners of the times, but also as it marks the means occurring to the Greeks for knowing what they have related of the Persians, which some modern writers have over boldly, and with little examination, controverted.

to the king, that the Greeks had routed and were pursuing his left wing, and to the Greeks, that the king's forces were plundering their camp. Success and pursuit were leading them away from each other. Both turned; but the king, instead of meeting the Greeks, passed them. The Greeks then changed their front, so that the river might secure their rear. Upon this the king also changed his front, as if to meet them. The Greeks advanced, with confidence increased by the experience of the day, and they were not deceived; for, from a greater distance than the wing under Tissaphernes, the Persians now fled their assault. The Greeks pursued. On a hill overlooking a village not distant, a large body of the Persian cavalry checked its flight, and formed, as if resolved to maintain that advantageous ground. No Persian infantry then remained in sight; and while the Greeks halted to prepare for attacking the horse, these also fled and appeared no more.

SECT.
II.

Anab. l. 1.
c. 10.
s. 4. 6. 7.

s. 8. 9.

The sun was now setting, and the Greeks wondered that they had neither seen Cyrus, nor received orders from him; confident nevertheless that as, with their small numbers unsupported, they remained so completely masters of the field, after so little effort, and with almost no loss, he could be employed only by the consequences of victory. After some consultation whether they should send for their tents and necessities, they resolved rather to return to their camp. Reaching it about dark, they found it so far plundered and wasted that, after having all passed the day without refreshment, most were obliged to go to rest fasting, but still with the satisfactory hope that victory had been on their side complete.

l. 2.
c. 1. s. 1.

SECTION III.

Return of the Greeks: treaty with the king: march through Mesopotamia and Media: circumvention of the generals.

CHAP.
XXIII.

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 2.

At daybreak the generals met; still wondering that neither orders were come from Cyrus, nor intelligence. It was presently resolved to march in quest of him. By sunrise all was ready for moving, when the arrival of two officers, of high rank in the prince's Asiatic army, Glous, son of the Egyptian Tamos, admiral of the fleet, and Procles, descended from Demaratus, the banished king of Lacedæmon, who attended Xerxes into Greece, and whose family enjoyed hereditary emoluments and honors from the liberality of the Persian government, occasioned a pause. Now first the mortifying intelligence was communicated that Cyrus was no more. It was added that Ariæus had conducted the flying remains of the Asiatic army to the ground of the former encampment, where he would wait for the Greeks that day, but on the morrow would certainly proceed for Ionia.

Anab.
ibid. &
Hel. 1. 3.
c. 1. s. 4.

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 4.

Depressing as this was to the hopes of those who had thought fortune, far above any ordinary Grecian scale, already their own, from the bounty of a generous prince, raised by their services to the possession of almost countless wealth and boundless empire, still, looking to their own success, and to all appearances around, the Greeks would not immediately give up all their lofty expectations; and they thought they saw a resource in the situation of Ariæus himself, who had before him, on one side the fear of an ignominious death for his rebellion, on the other the empire, which the superiority of the Grecian arms

might give him. Menon, long connected by hospitality and familiar intercourse with Ariæus, offered himself for the negotiation; and Glous and Procles did not refuse to concur in it. At the desire of Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian Chirisophus was joined in the commission, and all presently departed together.

Meanwhile the victorious Greeks were reduced to the necessity of killing their baggage-cattle for food, and breaking up the empty and now useless waggons for fire, for which however, with some satisfaction, they also collected Persian arrows, darts, and wooden shields, innumera- bly scattered over the field of battle.

They were thus occupied when, about the middle of the forenoon, arrived some persons, of whom one was a Greek, demanding in the name of the king and of Tissaphernes to speak with the generals. The Greek was soon known to be Phalinus, who held a very honorable situation under the satrap, to which a reputation for military science had recommended him. Their message imported that the king required the Greeks to come and surrender their arms at his gate; and that on no other condition would he show them favor or mercy. Highly as their easy victory had given them to rate the power of their arms, this message threw a sudden damp on their spirits. They began to consider their total want of necessaries in their present situation, the length of hostile continent, rivers, mountains, and deserts to be crossed to reach their own country, the uncertainty of assistance from Ariæus, and, wholly destitute as they were of cavalry, the extreme difficulty of collecting provisions in an enemy's country, and the danger of retreat, even from an enemy who might not dare to face them. Such circumstances force away the veil with

Anab. l. 2.
c. 1. s. 6.

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which, in ordinary situations, men are enabled, as prudent advisers, to cover their sentiments. But the Arcadian Cleanor, eldest of the generals, could not repress his indignation. He sternly replied, they would die before they would surrender their arms. Some, on the contrary, showed signs of despondency; others cast about for new project. It was recollected that Egypt, in revolt, had been long resisting the Persian arms, and that some of the other distant provinces were rebellious: it was supposed the king might be glad of their service, and the greater part were inclined to offer it. The discussion was long. In the end, the necessity of decision and the impossibility of bringing opinions to agree, seem to have produced a general deference to the authority of Clearchus. Politic as bold, he answered in the name of all, thus laconically: 'We want our arms: if the king desires our friendship, for his service; if he means enmity, for our own safety.' Phalinus promised to report this answer faithfully, and then said he was farther directed to inform them, that while they remained in their present station the king would consider a truce as existing with them; any movement he should esteem a measure of hostility. Clearchus took upon himself immediately to reply for all: 'Be it so.' 'How then,' said Phalinus, 'truce or war?' 'Truce,' said Clearchus, 'if we stay, and war if we move;' nor would he give a more decisive answer.

Anab. l. 2.
c. 1. s. 14.
15.

c. 2. s. 1.

Soon after the departure of the king's deputies, Procles and Chirisophus returned, leaving Menon with Ariæus. They reported that Ariæus declined the offer of assistance for pretending to the Persian throne, alleging that his inferiority of birth to many among the Persians too effectually excluded him:

SECT.
III.Anab. I. 2.
c. 2. s. 2.

s. 3.

but that he was desirous to have the Greeks accompany his march back to Ionia, and he would therefore wait for them in his present camp the ensuing night, but would unfailingly proceed next morning. Sunset already approaching, quick decision was necessary. Some, vainly confident in their experience of superiority in the field, were now for pushing hostilities against the king. Clearchus, quick to repress equally rash or desponding counsel, evinced the folly of the proposal by telling them, ‘that the king, as he knew ‘by certain intelligence, had passed the Tigris, and ‘they were totally without means to follow him. ‘Want of provisions then denied their stay in their ‘present station; and, in fact, choice of measures ‘was out of question: nothing remained but to march ‘back to Ionia; which, though hazardous and difficult, was not impossible. Besides, the sacrifices ‘augured well to their return, and ill to every other ‘measure.’ This was a decisive argument. All yielded to it, and Clearchus took upon himself to issue orders for marching that evening. Neither commission nor election had given him authority over the other generals; but, in this hazardous crisis, all acquiesced under the evident superiority of his talents and experience.

The Greeks were now, according to Xenophon’s account, by the line of march, reputed the shortest and best, which they had pursued to Mesopotamia, near two thousand miles from Ephesus in Ionia, whither they wished to return, as the Grecian city, if not absolutely the nearest, yet the nearest that would afford them ready means to proceed all to their several homes, and perhaps the nearest that could be reached without even greater difficulties of way. This march had employed them ninety-three days, exclu-

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Anab. 1. 1.
c. 2. 8. 4.

sively of halting days.¹⁰ The order for moving decided that they were at war with the king. If then deserters could hope for any kind reception, the considerations urging to desert might be powerful. Accordingly three hundred foot, with forty horse, all Thracians, commanded by a Thracian named Miltocythes, and originally engaged in the service under Clearchus, deserted as soon as it was dark.

The rest of the army joined Ariæus about midnight. Immediately the principal officers went to the Persian general's tent, where the principal Persian officers were also assembled. Circumstances did not admit long consultation. The Greeks must necessarily submit themselves to the guidance of the Persians. The important object was to establish mutual confidence and good faith. For this purpose recourse was had to oaths, rendered more solemn and impressive by sacrifice. A boar, a bull, a wolf, and a ram were the victims, in whose mingled blood the Grecian officers dipped their swords, the Persians their javelins, as they severally swore mutual fidelity and

¹⁰ The learned author of the Geographical Dissertation annexed to Spelman's translation of the Anabasis has supposed some exaggeration in Xenophon's account of the distance; not without appearance of reason, if the ordinary calculation of the Persian parasang is applicable universally. I cannot however admit the learned author to have been equally a good judge with Xenophon of the space that an army, like that of Cyrus, was capable of marching in a day, in the countries which he traversed. I should rather suppose the parasang of the Anabasis generally a computed measure, and often decided, as now in many parts of Europe, rather by the time ordinarily employed in travelling than by any calculation of space. That Xenophon did not pretend to nice accuracy indeed appears from his omission every where to notice fractions of so large a measure as that, which the Greeks, as we write their word, called *parasanga*, the *fursang* of the modern East.

friendship. This ceremony being over, Ariæus observed that, to return the way they came, seventeen days' march through the desert, unprovided as they were, was impossible. He proposed therefore a more circuitous road, but through a plentiful country, and to begin with forced marches. Thus, he said, danger from the immensity of the king's numbers would be obviated: for with a great force he could not overtake them, with a small one he would not dare to attack them. The want of food then being among the most pressing considerations, he promised a plentiful supply at some villages which, if they moved at daybreak, they might reach by sunset.

Anab. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 5.

The Greeks assenting, the combined armies marched at daybreak. In the afternoon circumstances were observed, very unexpectedly indicating that the king's forces were near. Ariæus was alarmed. Clearchus, always more confident in his ability to resist or deter than to outmarch the king's troops, had nevertheless thought it prudent to avoid expressing any dissent from the measures proposed by Ariæus; yet, aware of the importance of supporting the opinion, universally spread, of the great superiority of the Grecian arms, he resolved carefully to avoid showing the least appearance of a desire to avoid action, and therefore continued his march directly to the villages. The king's officers, it appeared, had judged better than to propose resistance to him there. The villages, deserted by their inhabitants, had been stripped of everything portable; so that the Greeks, after having s. 8. passed the day fasting, were still without food.

Men worn with fatigue, want, and disappointment are prepared for alarm; and in the night a panic, and tumult, its consequence, pervaded the Grecian camp. Clearchus, after hasty inquiry into the cir-

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cumstances, sent for his herald. A loud voice for proclaiming orders was valued in Xenophon's days, it appears, equally as in Homer's; and, by that quality, Tolmides, an Elean, acquired fame under Clearchus, in the office in which Stentor became renowned under Agamemnon. The commanding voice of Tolmides having enforced silent attention, he proclaimed, in the name of the generals, that any person discovering who turned the ass among the arms¹¹ should be rewarded with a talent of silver, above two hundred pounds sterling. Nothing could either more readily, or more completely, convince the multitude that their alarm was vain, and their generals watchful. Accordingly by this expedient, in its simplicity even ridiculous, yet well deserving notice for its singular fitness to produce the effect in the moment so important, the tumult was presently calmed, and the night passed in quiet.

¹¹ A technical phrase, used by Xenophon here, induced me to look to the translators and commentators for confirmation or correction of the sense I attributed to it. Spelman disapproves, and I think justly, the translations of Leunclavius and Hutchinson; but I cannot accede to his interpretation; and even the other passages of Xenophon, which he quotes in confirmation, (Anab. l. 2. c. 4. s. 8. & l. 3. c. 1. s. 3.) are to me additional and powerful proof that he is wrong. To corroborate my opinion I would farther refer to a third passage, l. 3. c. 1. s. 22. What may, I think, clearly be gathered from all the passages put together, is, that there was a place in the Grecian camp, allotted for the collected arms; and, in front of it, a space analogous to the modern parade. The large shields and long spears of the Greeks would occupy much more room than our firelocks, and an ass driven among them in the night, whether sentries or a guard were or were not set over them, might likely enough give origin to tumult and alarm. Merely turning the animal 'into the quarter of the heavy-armed men' (as Spelman has, with at least unnecessary boldness, rendered the phrase *εἰς τὰ ὄπλα*) would not be in itself so likely to produce disturbance.

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III.

At daybreak Clearchus called to arms, and the judiciousness of his bold measure, pushing on his march towards the king's forces, became soon evident. No vestige of an enemy was to be seen, and the sun was scarcely risen, when persons came, in the king's name, not, as on the preceding day, demanding the surrender of arms, but proposing negotiation on equal terms. Clearchus was in the moment viewing his parade. Versed in the Asiatic temper, he commanded that the Persians should wait his leisure; and, not till he had arranged his army so as to give it the most imposing appearance, admitted them to speak to him in front of his line. They said they came empowered to communicate between the king and the Grecian generals. 'Go then,' said Clearchus, 'and tell the king, that we must fight before we treat; for we are without food; and among the Greeks it is held that to propose negotiation is mere insult from those who deny them food.'

Anab. l. 2.
c. 2. s. 9.
c. 3. s. 1.
2. 3.

Where the king was, the Greeks knew not, and they had no cavalry for exploring. The quick return however of the deputies, with an answer to the rough message, proved that he, or some great officer authorised to treat in his name, was not distant. They said that the king allowed the remonstrance of Clearchus to be just; by which apparently was meant, that it was consonant to the laws of hospitality, acknowledged among civilized nations, and which made indeed the best part of the ancient law of nations. A truce was then solemnly concluded, and guides were appointed to conduct the Grecian army where it might be supplied. The country traversed was so divided by deep canals that the army hardly could have forced its way. Some of these were passed on permanent bridges; some on palm-trees cut for the occasion.

s. 4.

s. 6.

Anab. 1. 2. It was indeed suspected to have been the purpose of
 c. 3. s. 8. the Persians to give every possible appearance of difficulty to the march. At length however the army
 s. 9. reached a village where its wants were supplied largely. Corn, dates, a wine drawn from the palm-tree, and a vinegar prepared from that wine afforded most advantageous refreshment to those who, in that sultry climate, during three days, had, some fasted, and the rest eaten only the flesh of animals worn with the service of the baggage.

s. 10. While the army halted here three days, everything, says Xenophon, seemed to promise peace and good faith. Nevertheless what he proceeds to report seems as if it might have warranted suspicion. Tissaphernes, with the brother of the reigning queen, and three other Persians of high rank, attended by a large train, came to confer with the generals.
 s. 11. Communicating by interpreters, Tissaphernes said, 'he was to demand, in the king's name, why the 'Greeks made war against him.' He professed, for himself, a regard for their nation, as a neighbour, accustomed to intercourse with them; and he recommended a conciliatory, by which he seems to have meant a submissive, answer; that might enable him to do them the good offices he wished, in the extreme difficulties in which he saw them involved.

s. 12. The Grecian generals withdrew awhile for consultation, and then Clearchus reported the answer agreed upon. 'In entering into the service of Cyrus,' he said, 'they had no thought of war against the king; but, on the contrary, supposed themselves 'serving him in serving the prince. Various policy 'had been used to allure them on into Assyria; and, 'when once engaged so far, choice was no longer in 'their power: not only gratitude for favors received,

‘ but the necessity of their situation bound them to
 ‘ the prince. Yet, whatever doubt might be enter-
 ‘ tained concerning their past views, it was evident
 ‘ they could now have no view to anything so de-
 ‘ sirable for them as to return peacefully home;
 ‘ prepared however always to revenge injuries, and
 ‘ always desirous, to the best of their power, to re-
 ‘ quite kindnesses.’

SECT.
 III.

The Persians departed to make their report; and on the third day Tissaphernes returned. If umbrage was taken at the unbending manner of Clearchus, it was not avowed. On the contrary, generosity and benignity, on the part of the Persian king, seemed marked in the treaty, quickly concluded. It was agreed, ‘ that the Greeks should be faithfully con-
 ‘ ducted home; that a market should be provided
 ‘ for them on the march; that, in failure of the
 ‘ market, they might take their own measures for
 ‘ supplying their reasonable wants; but, as in a
 ‘ friendly country, with the least possible injury to
 ‘ the inhabitants.’ Oaths were solemnly taken, and right hands mutually given, by Tissaphernes and the queen’s brother, on the king’s part, and by the generals and lochages, on the part of the Grecian army, in confirmation of this agreement. Tissaphernes then, in taking leave, informed the Greeks, that the king had conferred upon him the great command lately held by Cyrus. His journey would, on this account, he said, require the more preparation; but, with the least possible delay, he would rejoin them, and be himself the conductor of their march.

Anab. 1. 2.
 c. 3. s. 12.
 Hel. 1. 3.
 c. 1. s. 2.
 Anab. 1. 2.
 c. 5. s. 2.

Though the faithlessness of Tissaphernes had been abundantly proved, yet the Greeks had confidence in his interest to cultivate their friendship, and they

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Anab. l. 2.
c. 4. s. 1.
2. 3.

had also confidence in the honor of the Persian king. They moreover flattered themselves that, disappointed as their hopes of high fortune were, yet the dark prospect, which immediately succeeded, was entirely done away; that all the dangers of their expedition were ended; and that a secure return to their country and families, at least, would be their solace for past labors, perils, and apprehensions. It does not appear that, in the negotiation with the king, any notice was taken of Ariæus, though he held his ground of encampment near that of the Greeks. But in the mean time he negotiated for himself; and so successfully as to obtain his own complete pardon and that of his followers. Xenophon has not informed us that any faith, plighted or implied, was broken, either by him or by the Greeks; but there seems to have been, on their part, at least a deficiency of attention to him. Of course he neglected them; insomuch that public report first brought information, uncertain information, that his pardon was obtained. What we gain from the direct testimony of Xenophon is, that a coolness before unexperienced, from the Asiatic army toward the Grecian, followed the first rumors of that pardon; and that hence arose suspicion and much uneasiness among the Greeks, while, more than twenty days, they waited for Tissaphernes; insomuch that they urged their generals to stay no longer. Clearchus, himself unsatisfied, but provident of the distress they must incur, friendless, without guides, and deprived of the assistance of the cavalry under Ariæus, with difficulty persuaded them to acquiesce.

s. 4.

This brooding uneasiness was at length checked by the arrival of Tissaphernes, with Orontas, satrap

of Armenia, who had lately married the king's daughter, each commanding a numerous army.¹² All then again resumed the appearance of friendship and good faith on the part of the principal Persian officers. The united armies immediately moved for lower Asia: the Grecian market was regularly and plentifully supplied, and nothing occurred on which to found complaint. Suspicion nevertheless held among the Greeks, and the appearance of it among the Asiatics. The Greeks had their peculiar guides allotted for their march: they usually encamped three or four miles from the Asiatics; and all communication between the two nations was managed with the precautions usually taken between avowed enemies. Meanwhile it was observed that the forces under Ariæus encamped without any separation from those under the king's officers, or any precaution against them. No doubt was then any longer entertained that the report of his pardon was well founded, for it had not hitherto been confirmed, and hence the suspicion of the Greeks increased.

In three days the armies reached the Median wall, a prodigious fortified line, intended, like those of the Romans against the Picts, in our own island, or the far more stupendous work of the Chinese against the Tartars, to defend a whole country. It was built of brick, twenty feet in thickness, a hundred in height, and said to extend seventy miles. Animosity had now grown to such a height between the Greeks and

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 4. s. 6.

¹² Xenophon not informing, we can only guess that Orontas may have been son of the person, of the same name, executed in Syria for treachery to Cyrus; and that the satrapy of Armenia, and the king's daughter, may have been the recompense for the sufferings of the family.

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XXIII.

Asiatics that the foraging parties had more than once come to blows.

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 4. s. 7.

In two days more, after crossing two vast canals, the armies arrived at Sitace, a large town within two miles of the Tigris. Clearchus, uneasy at the growing dissensions, had nevertheless considered them hitherto as the mere effusions of national animosity, and the indiscretion of individuals in inferior stations. Here first the measures of the Persian generals gave him some alarm. It was afterward discovered to have been their concerted purpose to excite alarm, but from a motive not of enmity, but merely of jealousy. Sitace was situated in an island singularly fruitful, highly cultivated, and so defended by the surrounding waters of the river and canals that, as the numerous population consisted, in very large proportion, of unarmed slaves, if the Greeks, aware of its advantages, had chosen to establish themselves there, it was supposed they might have maintained the possession against the whole force of the empire.

s. 12. 13.

The Greeks however, having no such view, quietly crossed the Tigris next morning, under the guidance of their appointed conductors, on a bridge supported by thirty-seven boats. The apprehensions of the Persians being thus relieved, the suspicious conduct, to which they had given occasion, ceased.

s. 15.

Nothing remarkable occurred then during a march of four days, in which the boundary of Mesopotamia was crossed, and the armies, entering Media, soon reached Opis, a large town, where a numerous army, collected for the war with Cyrus, was waiting under the command of a bastard brother of the king. Beyond Opis they presently entered a desert, through which the march was prosecuted six days without any cultivated land in sight. They arrived then at some

villages belonging to Parysatis, the queen-mother, who, as the friend of Cyrus, seems to have been considered as the enemy of the king. Tissaphernes gratified the Greeks with permission to plunder her villages; expressly however reserving the slaves, perhaps the most valuable part of the moveable property, and possibly, excepting a few officers of the queen's, the only description of inhabitants. A march then followed, of five days more, through a desert, with the Tigris always near on the left; after which, the armies reaching a more plentiful country, watered by the Zabatas, a halt of three days was allowed for refreshment.

SECT.
III.

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 4. s. 16.

In this leisure, the mutual ill-will of the Greeks and Persians, more than ever showing itself, gave much uneasiness to Clearchus; who nevertheless, with the most attentive observation, could discover neither anything indicating that the Persian generals had any design against the Greeks, nor any probable cause for those pointed marks of jealousy among the Persians, without excepting the generals, which had principally occasioned the growing animosity of the Greeks against them. He was the more uneasy, because he was not without suspicion of treacherous conduct among some within his own army. Menon, intriguing, faithless, and ambitious in the highest degree, it was well known, ill brooked the superiority which the other generals readily allowed to the talents, experience, and years of Clearchus, and to the dignity of the Lacedæmonian name. Some practices for withdrawing the affection and respect of the army from Clearchus were notorious. Under these circumstances, the intimacy of Menon with Ariæus excited jealousy; which was enhanced by the knowledge that he had been introduced by Ariæus to

c. 5. s. 1. 2.

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XXIII.

Tisserphanes; what passed at the meeting remaining unknown.

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 5. s. 4.

Pressed by all these considerations, Clearchus resolved to desire a conference with Tissaphernes. The request was immediately granted. Clearchus was received with the utmost apparent cordiality. The satrap made the most specious profession of a desire, from political motives, to cultivate an interest with the Greeks. Clearchus gave him credit, and was altogether so satisfied with the explanation received that his only remaining anxiety was to be assured of the secret enemy who had excited the late misunderstanding. Tissaphernes promised that, if all the Grecian generals and lochages would come together to witness what passed, he would declare the calumniator. Clearchus assented: Tissaphernes asked him to supper. The circumstance of eating together was held, equally among the Greeks and Persians of old, as by the Arabs of modern times, to bind friendship by a sacred tie; and the evening passed with every appearance of mutual satisfaction.

s. 6.

c. 4. s. 3.

c. 5. s. 7.

Next morning Clearchus assembled the principal Grecian officers, and related his communication with the satrap. Objections were strongly stated to his proposal for risking all the generals and lochages together in the barbarian camp on the faith of a man of such experienced perfidy as Tissaphernes. Clearchus however so vehemently urged it, expressing such confidence, not in the satrap's character, but in the interest of the Persian court to cultivate the friendship of the Greeks, and such suspicion of those who should fear to undergo that test of their fidelity to the common cause of the Grecian army, that at length he prevailed. Four of the generals, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, went with him, and twenty

lochages, whom we may reckon of the rank of colonels, or, at least, of field officers. About two hundred inferior officers and soldiers, incited by curiosity, followed under pretence of marketing. On their arrival at Tissaphernes's tent the generals were immediately admitted; the others waited without. A signal was observed, on which the generals were seized, those without the tent, who had followed them, were massacred, and a body of horse, issuing from the camp, extended the slaughter to all belonging to the Grecian army, free and slave, that could be found about the plain.

What passed in the Persian camp was unknown in the Grecian, when the violence of the horse, clearly seen, excited alarm and astonishment. An Arcadian, of those who had followed the generals, escaping severely wounded, first gave intelligence of what had passed about the tent of Tissaphernes. All then ran to arms, expecting immediate assault upon the camp. Fortunately that was too bold a measure for those who directed the Persian operations. A brother of Tissaphernes, with Ariæus, Artaozus, and Mithridates, who had been of the most confidential friends of Cyrus, escorted by only about three hundred horse, approached, and communicated a requisition for the remaining generals and lochages to come out and receive a message from the king. The Lacedæmonian Chirisophus was accidentally absent with a foraging party. The Arcadians, Cleanor of Orchomenus, and Sophænetus of Stymphalus, alone of the generals remained within the camp. They obeyed the requisition so far as to go out; and Xenophon, anxious for news of his friend Proxenus, accompanied them; but they advanced cautiously, and stopped as soon as within hearing. Ariæus, then addressing them, said,

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that 'Clearchus, having been convicted of violating
' the treaty, to which he had sworn, had been justly
' punished with death: that Proxenus and Menon,
' who had informed against him, were treated with
' honor: but that the king required of the Greeks
' to surrender their arms, which were truly his, since
' they had belonged to Cyrus, his subject.'¹³

Cleanor, an honest old soldier, and no politician, without at all considering what the pressing interests of the moment required, uselessly vented his just indignation. 'Deceit,' he said, 'perjury, every crime and every baseness from Tissaphernes might have been expected, but from the friends of Cyrus not.' Ariæus, in reply, insisted upon the discovered treachery of Clearchus. Xenophon, without command, and without a character in the army but that of the friend of Proxenus, seeing apparently that no person in authority was capable of managing the conference to any advantage, ventured, in such pressing circumstances, to speak. 'Proxenus and Menon,' he said, 'it was observed by Ariæus, had deserved highly of the Persians. Those generals therefore should be immediately sent back to the Grecian camp, and their advice would decide what the Greeks should do.' The Persians appeared at a loss for reply to this proposition: they consulted long among them-

¹³ Τοῦ ἐκείνου δούλου. Spelman, translating this *his subject*, has nevertheless said in a note, 'literally, his slave.' Verbal criticism is not generally the historian's business, but where an important political distinction is in question, it may come essentially within his duty. The Greek word appropriated to signify strictly a slave, was ἀνδράποδον. Δοῦλος was of a more extensive signification, and we have no term exactly corresponding. It meant either a subject, or a servant; and as a slave is both a subject and a servant, slaves were included within its more extended meaning.

selves, and then, without giving any answer, withdrew to their own camp.

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III.

It seems to have been long unknown to the Greeks what was the fate of their generals; nor has Xenophon said how the account was at length obtained, which he has given as certain. But we have such assurance of persons of their nation being employed, in various ways, about the Persian court, and in the service of the satraps, that the easy possibility of just intelligence reaching them is obvious. According to Xenophon's report, the generals were all conducted alive into the king's presence, and, except Menon, all soon after beheaded; which among the Greeks and Persians, as with us, was esteemed the most honorable mode of execution. Menon was kept in wretched confinement a full year, and then executed as an ordinary malefactor.

Anab. 1. 2.
c. 6. s. 1.

s. 16.

This account of the conduct of the Persian government, resting on the authority of only one Grecian historian, may perhaps, to some, appear not to deserve full credit. But Xenophon is in himself no mean authority. Had his friend Proxenus survived, we might indeed have suspected him of some partiality. Had Clearchus survived, whom evidently he respected highly, we might have suspected him of some partiality. But, in fact, the more he could fix blame upon those who were gone, the more credit would attach to the principal survivors, and particularly to himself. In the progress of the narrative he strongly evinces his impartiality; and we find throughout such a consonancy to well-attested facts, and well-attested characters, national and individual, that, though possibly an honest Persian writer might have given a different color to some circumstances, the whole seems to have every claim to credit that such a narrative can in itself possess.

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Anab. I. 2.
c. 4. s. 2.

If then we seek the motives for conduct so nefarious and so base in the Persian government, we may perhaps find them in the principles of oriental policy, still in vigor in the same countries; or we may find them in the words attributed by Xenophon to the Greek soldiers, in their first uneasiness under the delay of their return, while they waited for Tissaphernes, after the conclusion of the treaty with them in the king's name: 'It is reasonable,' they said, 'to suppose, that our destruction must be beyond all things the king's wish; as a circumstance more than all others likely to deter the Greeks from future engagements, like ours, in conspiracy against his throne. It is indeed impossible he can be pleased that we should go to relate in Greece how our small force overcame his immense armies, at his very gates, and returned in scorn of his power.' It would however be likely to occur, in the Persian councils, that to attack the Greeks and Ariæus united must be hazardous; but to divide them would probably not be difficult. If Ariæus was to be punished, the Greeks must be gained; but if Ariæus might be pardoned, the Greeks might be destroyed. Possibly the interest that Ariæus possessed, or by intrigue found means to acquire, among men in power and confidence, more than any true policy, at length decided the resolution. But, from the moment that Ariæus obtained his pardon, the purpose of the Persian court seems to have been to lead the Greeks where the hazardous attempt to destroy them might be made with the least risk, especially to the capital and its immediate neighbourhood.

SECTION IV.

Return of the Greeks. Election of new generals; Grecian military law: passage of mount Taurus; march through Armenia: arrival at Trapezus.

In the Grecian army, collected from almost all the numerous little republics of the nation, the system of subordination was very incomplete. Every general held the independent command of the troops himself had raised; and no order of succession was established: but vacancies, through all the ranks, were to be supplied by election. Eight officers had borne the title of general; but only Clearchus had possessed the qualifications. In him alone was united extensive experience with great talents. Diligent in the care of an army, in quarters or in camp, and ready in every emergency of the field, he was truly a superior man: Xenophon has not scrupled to declare the others unequal to their situation.

SECT.
IV.

Anab. l. 2.
c. 6. s. 1—8.

c. 2. s. 3.

Called then by no positive duty, warranted by no acknowledged superiority, and diffident of themselves, the generals remaining in the camp took no lead, while dejection and dismay pervaded the army. On that evening, says the eyewitness historian, few attended the parade,¹⁴ few fires were lighted, many

l. 3. c. 1.
s. 3.

¹⁴ Ἐπὶ ἐν τὰ ὄπλα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἦλθον. This is evidently a military technical phrase. It indicates that in the ordinary practice of the Grecian service the soldiers were assembled ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα at least once a day. What the precise meaning of the phrase ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα was, we cannot know. It may have been a simple roll-call at the place where the arms were deposited: it may have been an inspection of arms: but it seems evidently to have been something like the modern parade. The reader disposed to critical inquiry on the subject may compare the passage with those quoted in note 11. of the preceding section. He may

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XXIII.Anab. I. 3.
c. 1. s. 4.

touched no food, many would not even go to their tents, but threw themselves on the ground where they happened to be, to pass a sleepless night, ruminating on their disconsolate circumstances. Xenophon at this time had no rank in the army: he was, according to his own phrase, neither officer nor soldier. Having gone, at the invitation of Proxenus, from Athens to Sardis, on his arrival he found the army on the point of marching eastward. He was immediately introduced to Cyrus, who, with condescending civility, joined his Theban friend in pressing him to accompany them in the expedition, then pretended against the Pisidians. When, at length in Cilicia, the real object was no longer doubted, Xenophon was one of the many, as himself confesses, who wished; but were ashamed, to withdraw themselves; and he proceeded with the army, merely as a volunteer, the friend of Proxenus. The duty of a soldier was however not new to him; as, in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, he was of age for that service from which no Athenian was exempted. If he had never held command, he had however been diligent in study to prepare himself for it, and he had made large use of great opportunities for observation.

s. 9. 10.

Under these circumstances, Xenophon partook largely in the grief and anxiety excited in the army by the circumvention of the generals, and by the manifestation of determined hostility, hostility knowing neither measure nor mercy, on the part of the Persians. Without duty himself, his attention was alive to observe what steps would be taken by the remaining generals; and with deep concern he saw that, instead of exertion increased, in proportion to

also consult Spelman; whose version of the passage however, and notes upon it, I must own I cannot approve.

the pressure of the occasion, their remissness amounted almost to a dereliction of command. Attack was universally expected with daylight; and yet no council held, no orders given, preparation of no kind made. From the common interests of the army his consideration then turned to that part of it with which he had been more particularly connected, and which, by the loss of his friend, remained without a head. Though holding no rank, he was, by no rule of Grecian service, excluded from aspiring to any rank. Circumstances not invited only, but pressed him to come forward: his youth alone deterred him. After much consideration and re-consideration, strongly impressed with the importance of decision, and still doubting, a dream at length, he has said, determined him. His works indeed abound with testimonies to his respect for the foreboding of dreams, and for the whole of the reputed science of augury. Roused then, according to his own report, by a dream, early in the night he sprang from his bed, and, in pursuance of the supposed admonition from a divine power, called together the lochages of the troops which had served under Proxenus. On their assembling he observed to them what remissness pervaded the army, without excepting the remaining generals; what imminent and extreme danger threatened; and how urgent the necessity for immediately choosing a successor to their own lost commander. For himself, he said, hitherto without a character in the army, in the present emergency he was ready to do his best in any situation, whether in command or in obedience, in which they might think he would be most useful: but with regard to the prospect before them, it depended upon themselves to make it good or bad; and, however just the melancholy, in the moment pervading

Anab. 1. 3.
C. 1. s. 11
—22.

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the army, he was confident that vigor and prudence united might bear them through all opposing difficulties. He then stated the grounds of his confidence, and, at the conclusion of his speech, the general wish was expressed, that Xenophon would take the command. One lochage only avowed his dissent; adding his opinion, that they ought at once to throw themselves on the king's mercy, as the only resource affording a reasonable hope. 'The king's mercy!' replied Xenophon indignantly, 'you may judge of it from the transactions of yesterday. Your own power to defend yourselves has never yet failed you. The man who can make so base a proposal, instead of holding command, should not be allowed even to bear arms: he is fit only to carry the baggage; he is a disgrace to the Grecian name.' 'He is no Greek,' replied immediately an Arcadian lochage, Agasias of Stymphalus; 'though his speech is Bœotian, I have seen his ears bored like a Lydian's.' The spirit of the meeting was roused; the lochage's ears were examined; they were found to be as Agasias said, and he was immediately deprived of his rank.

Beside what is more directly indicated, this remarkable transaction seems to offer, for the attentive observer, some curious information. How a Lacedæmonian army, or how an army of Athenian citizens was composed, is little marked by it; but birth, connexions, and education appear to have given great advantages in an army composed like that under Cyrus. Among the officers who served under Proxenus evidently none had those advantages in a degree to enable them to aspire to the chief command. Neither Xenophon nor any early writer has said it, and yet it seems clearly to result from Xenophon's

account, that his rank, derived from birth and connexions, at least approached that of his Theban friend. That the superiority of his talents and education alone would have procured him that instantaneous elevation, by the common voice of the officers, from a situation of no command, to the command of them all, appears unlikely. But where birth and connexions are evidently superior, the superiority of talents and education are less invidious. Deference, which would not be readily paid to either an accidental, or a natural, or an artificial superiority alone, will be more willingly conceded to the three united.

The appointment however of a head facilitated the means of united exertion to the officers of that division of the army; and this was an important step toward the restoration of order and energy through the whole. An immediate meeting of all the generals and lochages was desired, and, toward midnight, they assembled, in number about a hundred. Hieronymus of Elis, eldest lochage of the troops which had served under Proxenus, introduced Xenophon, as general elect of those troops; and, as the meeting had originated from them, it was Xenophon's part to open the business. He began, after some apology, with observing that, in the situation in which they stood, leaving the soldiers, without occupation, to ruminate upon what was alarming and disconsolate in their circumstances, could not but be in the highest degree dangerous: the animation necessary to carry them through the difficulties before them could be supported only by active employment. But the election of successors to the lost generals, he proceeded to say, should engage their first attention: till that was done, nothing could go forward with due regularity. He declared then his opinion, that confidence

Anab. l. 3.
c. l. s. 23.

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should be wholly refused to the Persians; and he concluded with explaining, in the same strain of encouraging eloquence, as before to the officers of Proxenus, his ground for hoping that vigorous exertion, united with prudent caution, would carry them happily and gloriously through the dangers at present so threatening. When he ended, the Lacedæmonian Chirisophus rising said, ‘He had before known no more of Xenophon than just that he was an Athenian; but he nevertheless entirely approved all the sentiments he had declared, and the propositions he had offered.’ This was decisive for the meeting, and they proceeded immediately to the election of generals. What interest or what views guided the choice does not appear. Timasion of Dardanum, in Troas, was substituted for Clearchus; Philesius and Xanthicles, Achæans, for Menon and Socrates; the body before under Agias was committed to the orders of Cleanor; and Xenophon was confirmed in the succession to Proxenus.

Anab. 1. 3.
c. 1. s. 32.

c. 2. s. 1—5. At daybreak the troops were assembled, and Chirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon successively addressed them. An accident, in itself even ridiculous, assisted not a little, through the importance attributed to it by Grecian superstition, to infuse encouragement. Xenophon was speaking of that favor from the gods which a righteous cause entitled them to hope for against a perjured enemy, when somebody sneezed. Immediately the general voice addressed ejaculations to protecting Jupiter, whose omen it was supposed to be.¹⁵ A sacrifice to the god was then

¹⁵ We should scarcely have looked to Greece for the origin of the popular practice in England, of exclaiming ‘God bless you!’ when a person sneezes. Popular customs indeed, often very ancient, often very widely diffused, often similar and yet of

proposed; a universal shout declared approbation; and the whole army, in one chorus, sang the pæan. SECT.
IV.

Thus was a turn fortunately given, through the army, from dismay and despondency to hope and cheerfulness. Among the arguments which the generals then gladly seized to improve the happy impression, one, which the circumstances offered, spoke home to the minds of soldiers, commonly little provident of distant good or evil, but intent upon present wants and near enjoyments. The means of many to profit from that market which, according to treaty, had been hitherto provided, were nearly exhausted; and all these heard with joy, that their swords might supply the deficiency of their purses; that, in the rich country they were to traverse, they might thenceforward take, as from enemies, whatever they could master. Nevertheless, it being highly expedient, as much as possible, to lighten the march, at the instance of Xenophon they cheerfully submitted to burn their waggons and tents. They heard the same young general with careful attention while he observed, that the enemy had just given them a lesson of the utmost importance, in showing that he dared not openly attack them till he had deprived them of their generals. Thus he had manifested his conviction of the inestimable value of the Grecian discipline; and hence it followed, that it behoved the army to be more strictly obedient, as it certainly was the duty of the generals to be more watchfully careful, than at any former time. It was then unanimously voted,

Anab. 1. 3.
c. 1. s. 13.
& c. 2. s. 12.

s. 17—20.

different origin, can seldom, with any certainty, be traced to their origin. Were it worth while however, it might perhaps be not difficult to show a probability that the custom of ejaculating a blessing on persons sneezing came to England from Greece.

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that any disobedience to lawful commands should be instantly punished, and that it should be the bounden duty of all present to support the commanding officer upon the spot in the infliction of punishment. This vote, and the want of such a vote, concur with all other remaining testimony to mark the deficiency of the Greek military penal law; which appears to have been, at the same time, very lax and very arbitrary.

To appoint a commander-in-chief seems to have been not in view. Xenophon evidently felt the ascendancy which eloquence, not least among his superior talents, gave him in the council of officers, or in the council of the army at large. As youngest among the generals, and still more perhaps, as an Athenian, he could not aspire to the ostensible command-in-chief; but by the lead which was conceded to his abilities in council he could in a great degree hold the effectual command. Others, conscious of deficiency, avoiding to urge advice, he recommended, That the order of march should be a hollow square, with the baggage, now reduced to a small compass, in the centre; that the leading division should be committed to Chirisophus, in virtue of his dignity as a Lacedæmonian; that Timasion with himself, the two youngest generals, should command the rear, and the older generals the flanks. This was approved and ratified.

Anab. 1. 3.
c. 3. s. 1.

Order and energy being thus restored to the army, the waggons and tents, with whatever baggage could by any means be spared, were burnt, conformably to the resolution taken. All was then arranged for the march, and the army was on the point of moving, when Mithridates, approaching with an escort of only thirty horse, desired to speak with the generals. His discourse began with expressions of apprehension for

himself, on account of his known attachment to Cyrus, and of friendship for the Greeks, undiminished by events; but the tenor of it soon showed that his purpose was to discover how far the Grecian generals were firm in any intention of opposition to the king; and to persuade them, if possible, quietly to surrender themselves. Suspicion being thus excited, and his attendants being carefully observed, there was seen among them a known confidant of Tissaphernes, upon which the conference was abruptly ended.

SECT.
IV.

Time however had been thus so wasted that it was mid-day before the Grecian army moved; and Mithridates appeared again soon after, at the head of about two hundred horse, with four hundred foot, slingers or bowmen. He approached as if his purpose was friendly; but presently a discharge of arrows and stones demonstrated his perfidy. His cavalry carried bows, which they discharged equally retreating as standing; and the Cretan bows in the Grecian army were found so inferior in length of shot as to be totally inefficacious. A pursuit, attempted by Xenophon, with the whole rear division, was equally bootless. The Greeks then marching reached a village, where they halted for the night. This had been their intention; but such annoyance was received, in so short a march, from so small a force, that despondency again pervaded the army.

Anab. 1. 3.
c. 3. s. 5—8.

The attempt to pursue, which had no other effect than to retard the progress of the army, and prolong the enemy's opportunity, was severely blamed by Chirisophus, and the other older generals. Xenophon acknowledged his error; 'whence however,' he said, 'advantage might be derived; for it marked the measures necessary for the future quiet of their progress. Pursuit with the heavy armed, and shots

s. 9—12.

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‘ from the Cretan bows, had been found equally un-
 ‘ availing. But there were Rhodians in the army,
 ‘ many of them, he understood, expert slingers, whose
 ‘ slings, formed to throw leaden bullets, would carry
 ‘ twice as far as the Persian, accommodated for stones
 ‘ as large as the hand could grasp. ‘ There were also
 ‘ horses, some his own, some which had belonged to
 ‘ Clearchus, and many employed in carrying the
 ‘ baggage. If the fittest among all these were mounted,
 ‘ by men practised in the cavalry service, possibly
 ‘ the enemy might hereafter be less secure in flight.’
 In pursuance of this admonition, a body of two hun-
 dred slingers was formed that evening; and next
 morning fifty horse were equipped, and put under the
 command of Lycius, an Athenian.

Anab. I. 3.
c. 3. s. 4.

During the night, Nicarchus, an Arcadian lo-
 chage, deserted, and carried about twenty men with
 him. Allurement, which the conferences had given
 opportunity for the Persians to offer, was supposed
 to have led to this. In consequence it was resolved
 by the generals to allow no more conferences, nor
 even to admit a message from the enemy; in the
 persuasion, derived from the various acts of treachery
 experienced, that their best security depended upon
 thus giving war its most hideous aspect, and offering
 themselves for its most cruel operation.

c. 4. s. 1—3.

Halting then a day to make the equipment of
 the cavalry and slingers more complete, they moved
 next morning earlier than usual. They had already
 crossed a bottom where they had expected attack,
 when Mithridates appeared on the height behind
 them, with about a thousand horse, and four thousand
 slingers and bowmen. According to accounts which
 Xenophon believed, he had promised Tissaphernes
 that, with this force, he would compel them to sur-

render. Why the Persians employed such small portions only of their numbers in these first assaults upon the Greeks, not directly stated by Xenophon, may be gathered from circumstances on various occasions related by him. The Grecian charge was so dreaded that it would probably not have been easy to lead their greatest multitudes near enough to the phalanx, even to use missile weapons with effect, unless the means of hasty retreat were obvious; which numbers would themselves impede. The purpose therefore being, by desultory annoyance, without the risk of a battle, to bring the Greeks to surrender, trial had been first made with a very small force; and the success had probably been beyond expectation. The inferiority of the Greek missile weapons, the inability of the heavy-armed for rapid pursuit, and the power of a very small Persian force to give great annoyance, had been so experienced that Mithridates, while he calculated his present numbers to be the best proportion for his purpose, might perhaps not unreasonably have supposed them equal to it. He had passed the bottom in pursuit of the Greeks, and was already within Persian bow-shot, when the newly-formed Grecian cavalry advanced against him. Contemptible as their numbers alone might have appeared, they were rendered formidable by the body of the targeteers following them running, and the whole heavy-armed phalanx moving steadily in support of these. The Persians took to inconsiderate flight; much slaughter was made of their infantry; and, what the Greeks appear to have esteemed a more important circumstance, eighteen horsemen, unable to disengage themselves from the bottom, were made prisoners. The march was then prosecuted without

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farther disturbance during that day, and the army took its quarters for the night in a large deserted town, which Xenophon calls Larissa, surrounded by a brick wall, twenty-five feet thick and a hundred high, raised on a basement of stone.¹⁶

Anab. I. 3.
c. 4. s. 6.

Next day, by a march of above twenty miles, the army reached another deserted town, surrounded by a still more extraordinary fortification. The wall, fifty feet thick, was a hundred and fifty feet high; of which the lower third was faced with squared stone; the rest was completed with brick. The circuit was above twenty miles; the name Mespila. Both these

¹⁶ The name of a town in Media, written exactly like the name of the principal city in Thessaly, a name familiar in Greece, has excited surprise and inquiry. The conjecture of Bochart, approved by Le Clerc, Hutchinson, and Spelman, is at least ingenious, and may be true. The name Larissa, though Greek in form, seems clearly not of Grecian origin. Strabo and Stephanus mention several towns, in different countries, which by the Greeks were called Larissa, but they make no mention of Larissa in Media. Bochart supposes that the town, to which Xenophon has here attributed that name, was the town spoken of by Moses, in Genesis (c. 10. v. 12.) where he says, *Asher built Resen, between Nineveh and Calah; the same is a great city.* The situation, he observes, as well as the size, agrees, and the change in the name was obvious for men catching Assyrian sounds with Grecian ears; for if the Greeks asked, of what town those were the ruins; an Assyrian might answer, *Le Resen*, of Resen. Many of the Greek names about the Archipelago have, in late ages, we know, been corrupted by a mistake exactly analogous.

Close to Larissa Xenophon describes a pyramid, very inferior in size to those remaining in Egypt, and differing much in proportions, being about one hundred feet square at the base, and two hundred high. The comparatively very small, but still really large and costly structure, the tomb of Caius Cestius, at Rome, approaches, in its proportions, to the character of the Median pyramid.

Median towns had been depopulated since the transfer of the empire to the Persians.¹⁷

SECT.
IV.

Appearances on the day following seemed to announce that, as the attempts with a small body to bring the Greeks to surrender had failed, it was resolved to exert against them the united strength of the formidable numbers which the Persian power could so readily command. A very large army came in sight, consisting of the troops of Ariæus, of Oron-tas, and of the king's natural brother, with a detachment of the king's own army under Tissaphernes, and the whole of the satrap's large escort of cavalry. They followed the march, and, pressing at the same time on the rear and both flanks, they plied missile weapons. But the Greeks had the satisfaction to find that they dared not charge with hand-arms;¹⁸ that the Rhodian slings carried farther than most of the Persian bows; and that the Greek bowmen, by using the Scythian manner of drawing (which Xenophon has not explained) could give superior efficacy

Anab. l. 3.
c. 4. s. 7.

s. 8.

¹⁷ The history of these countries is so uncertainly known that the attempt was equally vain to reconcile Xenophon's account of Larissa and Mespila with that which he gives, in the *Cyropædia*, of the peaceful succession of Cyrus to the Median kingdom, in right of his mother, or to draw from it any proof in favor of Herodotus, who says that he acquired Media by conquest. I will however just observe, that it may have been of importance to the Median monarchs to support, at a great expense, these towns, fortified, with such astonishing labor, on the border of the desert against Assyria, while Assyria was the most formidable neighbour to Media: and, when all was brought under one empire by Cyrus, the discontinuance merely of the former attention may have gone far to produce their fall.

¹⁸ This is the able general Lloyd's term for what, as he observes, the French, whose quaint phrases have been in such abundance aukwardly, ignorantly, and affectedly obtruded upon our military vocabulary, call *armes blanches*.

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Anab. I. 3.
c. 4.
s. 8—10.

to their shots. Nor had this been experienced long when Tissaphernes withdrew hastily to a safe distance, and his example was as a command to the whole army. The Persians, during the rest of the day, followed, without at all pressing the Greeks, and when these halted near some villages to encamp they retired.

The circumstances of this day seem to furnish the reason why the Persian generals chose, and judiciously chose, to send, at first, so small a portion of their numbers to harass the Grecian march. The Persian discipline was so deficient that increase of numbers did not give proportional increase of force. The thickened shower of missile weapons still fell with little effect among the loose order of the Greek light-armed; while these turned upon the Persians their own numberless arrows; and, in their crowded multitude, almost destitute of defensive armour, scarcely a shot failed of effect.

Fortunately for the Greeks, the Persians had so expected, by force or terror, to stop their march that scarcely any measures had been taken for, what would most effectually have stopped them, the removal of necessaries. In villages through which they had already passed prepared guts fit for slings had been found, and lead for bullets; and in those where they now arrived an abundant supply of corn. Halting there a day, they marched again on the morrow; when Tissaphernes again followed, watching opportunity of advantage, and endeavouring to harass; but from so safe a distance that little disturbance was given.

s. 11—14.

The remissness of the Persians afforded opportunity for the Greek generals to see, without in any considerable degree suffering from, the defects of their own order of march. They had found it subject

to dangerous hurry and derangement when, in presence of the enemy, bridges or any narrows were to be passed; an inconvenience which Xenophon's account shows to have arisen, in a great degree, from the deficiency of the Greek tactics of the age. The generals however took the best measure perhaps that their circumstances would admit for obviating ill consequences, by appointing a picket of six hundred men, formed in six divisions, whose office, on such occasions, was to protect the rear, and at other times to be ready for any emergency.¹⁹

¹⁹ The passage of Xenophon, here thus abbreviated, has puzzled translators, and exercised the ingenuity of critics, literary and military. No interpretation of it, that has fallen in my way, is at all satisfactory; but a correction of the text, proposed by Spelman, would remove the principal difficulty, with no more violence upon our present copies than the transposition of two words, λόχους and ἐνωμοτίας, putting each in the other's place. This correction has all probability in its favor, and, without it, no ingenuity of the critics, in my opinion, has relieved, or can relieve, the sentence from gross absurdity.

In the passage altogether, which is interesting for the military reader, Xenophon has described, in concise and general terms, adapted to those to whom the tactics of the age were familiar, a series of complex evolutions; the reduction of the hollow square (composed of about ten thousand men, encumbered with their baggage in the centre) to a column of various front, accommodated to the accidental circumstances of the narrow to be passed; the re-formation of the column into a hollow square; and the movements of a detached body, appointed to protect the general movements. We learn, from many passages of Thucydides and Xenophon, that the extension and reduction of the front of a body of heavy-armed infantry, formed in the usual way, in line or in phalanx, was frequently practised; and, though we have no precise information how it was performed, yet its being often done, without inconvenience, in the face of an enemy, sufficiently proves that the method was orderly and good. But it should seem that this method was not readily applicable to the hollow square. Xenophon's account most clearly shows that, when

Anab. 1. 3.
c. 4. s. 15.

In the next day's march, the fifth march and the seventh day after their separation from the Persians,

circumstances of the ground required the reduction of the front of the square, a regular method, at least such as the army in which he commanded could immediately practise, was wanting. When the circumstances of the ground would no longer allow the leading face of the square to hold its front entire, the centre led; and the wings, falling back irregularly, accordingly as they felt the pressure of the impediment, followed as they could, till the narrow was passed, and then ran up again, still irregularly, as opportunity offered, to form in line with the centre. For the flank faces the business was easy; they had only to incline inward, as they approached the narrow, so as to be either before or behind the baggage. The rear did exactly as the leading face; at least as far as the pursuing enemy would permit; but the evolution gave a pursuing enemy great opportunities. For the security of the Grecian heavy-armed, against either missile or hand weapons, depended much upon the 'array' (according to Milton's phrase) 'of serried shields,' which in the course of such evolutions would be long disordered, and the shield, for the time, almost a useless incumbrance.

With this previous explanation, and if Spelman's correction may be allowed, I am not without hope that the following translation of the passage in question may be found intelligible and just.

'The Greeks were now aware that the square is an inconvenient order of march when an enemy follows. For, when circumstances of the ground, or a bridge to be passed, compel to narrow the front, the wings, of necessity, bending, the heavy-armed are driven out of regular order; they march inconveniently; and being at the same time crowded, and their ranks and files disordered, they are incapable of efficacious action against an enemy. When the defile then is passed, and the wings open again to wheel into line, there is necessarily an interval in the centre, which is a discouraging circumstance to the soldier when the enemy follows; so that whenever a bridge or other narrow is to be passed, all are eager to be foremost, and hence increase of opportunity for the enemy. To remedy these inconveniences the generals formed a picket of six lochi, each of a hundred men, with proper officers. Whenever then occasion required that the wing should fall back, the picket had its post in the rear, to protect them during the

the Greeks were cheered with the sight of mountain-tops, rising above the horizon of that hitherto apparently endless plain over which they had been urging their wearisome way, under continual threats of attack from a pursuing cavalry, more numerous than their whole army. Ere long hills appeared, so far projected from the mountain bases that the army soon entered the winding of their valleys. But the Persian generals, aware that the opportunity for effective operation with their cavalry was gone, knew also the advantage to be derived from the highlands they were approaching. A large detachment of their foot-archers, men of the lowest rank, were sent forward to occupy the heights commanding the way; a guard of soldiers of superior degree attending, whose office was to enforce their exertion. Driven by stripes and the fear of death from the imperious band behind them, the Persian archers pressed in such numbers so close upon the Rhodian slingers and other Greek light-armed as to compel them to retire within the square, and then they exceedingly galled the whole

Anab.
l. 3. c. 4.
s. 16—19.

‘movement;’ (occupying the hollow between them while any remained;) ‘or’ (if the narrowness of the pass compelled the wings to close) ‘keeping clear beyond them to the rear. When, ‘as the ground then would allow, the wings wheeled up into ‘line, the picket again filled the opening. If it was small, the ‘picket was formed in column of enomoties; if larger, in column ‘of pentecostyes; if larger still, in column of lochi, so as always ‘to fill the interval. Thus there was no longer the former ‘fusion in passing defiles or bridges; the lochages’ (not, as Spelman has translated, *of these several companies*, but of the whole army) ‘leading their divisions in orderly succession; ‘and, if a body of heavy-armed was wanted to act anywhere ‘upon any occasion,’ (this I think to be clearly the meaning of εἰ που δέοι τι τῆς φάλαγγος, which Leunclavius has totally perverted by his translation, *si phalange opus esset*,) ‘these were ‘ready.’

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army. The deficiency however of spirit, discipline, and military science of the Persians afforded opportunity for the Grecian generals to end this annoyance. Though so inferior in force, they might always dare to detach. They sent therefore a body of targeteers to a height commanding that occupied by the enemy, and the very sight sufficed: archers, and those appointed to enforce their exertion, fled together. The march was then continued uninterrupted to a village, where fortunately was found a supply of wheat-meal and wine, with large store of barley, collected for the stables of the governor of the province. For the sake of the wounded they halted here three days; and on this occasion first we find mention of surgeons in the Grecian army: eight were, according to Xenophon's phrase, now appointed. It is indeed perhaps the first mention of army-surgeons by any extant Grecian writer since Homer, who has attributed very high value to the services, and very high honors to the persons, of the sons of Æsculapius, in the early age of the Trojan war.

Anab. l. 3.
c. 4. s. 20.

A more level country succeeded the first hills; and here the enemy renewed their desultory assaults, so as exceedingly to distress the Greeks, encumbered with their numerous wounded; insomuch that, after a short march, they halted at the first village. Encouraged thus, the Persian generals, who had never yet ventured to attack the Greeks in any station, resolved to attempt it here. Opportunity indeed must soon be seized, or the Greeks would be among mountains where, though not likely to find their own safety, they would be beyond the pursuit of the cavalry, without which the satraps and generals would not follow them. The credit therefore which these had promised themselves, from carrying all the

Grecian generals into the king's presence, would have been lost; and, as so much seems to have been completely expected from them, censure and deprivation of command might follow; seldom, under a despotic government, unattended with deprivation of life, and ruin to the whole family. But they found (it is the observation of Xenophon) a wide difference between annoying a line of march, and assaulting a station. They advanced indeed no nearer than to attack with missile weapons. In such a feeble mode, their numbers, little availing to themselves, gave greater opportunity to the enemy, and they were repulsed with such loss that the attempt was not repeated.

Nevertheless it behoved the Greek generals to take every measure for obviating, or evading, such annoyance to their march as that which they had last suffered. They had now learnt that the enemy were vehemently fearful of nightly assault; for which (it is again Xenophon's remark) a Persian army indeed was very ill accommodated. For its principal force consisted in cavalry, whose horses were always tied at night, and commonly shackled;²⁰ so that, on any call to arms, the soldier had to take off the shackles, to loosen the halter, to saddle²¹ and bridle the horse,

Anab. 1. 3.
c. 4. s. 21.

²⁰ The general want of tenacity in the soil, over the vast plains of Asia, refusing efficacy to the European method of Picketing, seems to have occasioned the common practice of Shackling.

²¹ Ἐπισάξαι. It has been generally supposed that a cloth or rug was all that the Greeks and Romans used, to relieve the seat on a horse's back. Whether anything like that heavy, awkward implement, the modern oriental saddle, was in use among the ancient Persians must be now so difficult to determine that, in the abundance of opportunity for noticing inaccuracies in D'Ablancourt's translation of the Anabasis, Spelman's

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c. 4. s. 22.
23.

and to put on his own corslet: things not all done with ready certainty in darkness and under alarm. It was therefore the practice of the Persian generals, in pursuing the Greeks, always to withdraw early in the afternoon, and to encamp not less than seven or eight miles from them. The Greek generals therefore waited for the afternoon before they would move; and, marching when they had assured themselves that the Persians were decidedly withdrawn for the night, they put such a distance between the armies that during the next two days they saw no enemy.

s. 24—30.

The Persian generals, though totally indisposed to daring measures, nevertheless retained their anxiety to strike some blow which might do them credit, before opportunity should be completely lost. Availing themselves of their knowledge of the country, they sent forward a considerable force; and, on the third day after the evening march, the Greeks were alarmed with the sight of a body of the enemy, on a height commanding the way they must pass, the army under Tissaphernes and Ariæus at the same time pressing on their rear. Quick decision was necessary. A body of targeteers, with three hundred chosen heavy-armed, under Xenophon, pushed for a summit commanding that occupied by the enemy. The Persian generals at the same time sent forward a detachment for the same purpose. Using the utmost exertion, the Greeks arrived first. The Persians on the lower height then immediately fled. Tissaphernes, finding his purpose thus baffled, presently changed the direction of his march; and the Greeks descended,

1. 3. c. 5.
s. 1.

censure on his use of the word *saddle*, in this passage, might well have been spared; especially as the word *housing*, which he has substituted, seems far from unobjectionable.

unmolested, into a vale, washed by the Tigris, rich in pasture, and abounding with villages. SECT.
IV.

Hitherto the Persian generals had avoided all waste of the country through which the Greeks directed their march. Here first villages were seen in flames. The Persian cavalry, by a circuitous road, entered the vale about the same time with the Greeks, cut off some of them, straggling after plunder, and set fire to the dwellings of the peaceful inhabitants. The Greeks however vindicated to themselves the possession of the villages at which they arrived first, with all their contents. Various valuable supplies were found in them, and much cattle in the adjoining fields; and the generals took occasion to encourage the troops with observing, that now the Persians evidently acknowledged their superiority, for they made war as if the country was no longer their own. Anab.
l. 3. c. 5.
s. 2—4.

Nevertheless new and pressing difficulties occurred. s. 5—12.
Hitherto the march had been prosecuted along the great road, the principal communication from Babylon to the northern provinces, and never far from the course of the Tigris. A new face of country now presented itself; they were arrived at the foot of that vast ridge which, under various names, stretches from the Ægean sea to the Caspian, and onward by the north of China to the Pacific ocean. The great northern road insinuated itself among the mountains. Two other great roads offered: one leading eastward to Ecbatana and Susa, the ordinary spring and summer residences of the great king; one westward, across the river, directly to Lydia and Ionia; apparently that by which Ariæus had proposed to march, had he not succeeded in his negotiation for peace and pardon. This was the desirable road for the Greeks. But the river was so deep that the longest spear, it

CHAP.
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was found, would not reach the bottom; and, could boats have been collected, or rafts formed, a large body of cavalry, seen on the farther bank, while the army under Tissaphernes watched their rear, would have made the passage next to impracticable. Mountain-precipices overhanging the eastern bank forbade even an attempt to seek a passage higher up. Under these circumstances, in a country of which the most slender report had never yet reached Greece, the generals had recourse to their prisoners. By these they were informed that the mountains before them were held by the Cardoos;²² a most fierce and warlike people; who, though surrounded by the dominions, had never owned the sovereignty, of the great king: that an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men had once been sent to reduce them, and the current report was, that not one of the number had ever returned: that nevertheless they sometimes were, by compact, upon good terms with the neighbouring satraps, who did not disdain to enter into treaty with them; and then communication

²² Καρδοῦχοι. From this people the modern Curdies seem to have derived their blood, their name, and their character; for which Volney and other travellers may be consulted. The last syllable of the name has apparently been added by the Greeks, as necessary for the inflexions of their language. The χ has been intended to represent an oriental guttural, alien to all English enunciation, and perhaps, like the French final *n*, rather a modification of the preceding vowel than a clearly distinct consonant. Thus a south Welshman, in pronouncing the British word *Wyn*, begins with a guttural sound, most nearly represented in English Orthography by the letter *g*, whence the word is written *Gwyn*; and a Spaniard, at least a Castilian, endeavouring to speak the English words *White*, *What*, *When*, pronounces nearly *Gwite*, *Gwat*, *Gwen*; which seems to have been also nearly the pronunciation of the old Lowland Scots, who often wrote *quh* for the English *wh*.

was open between their country and the Persian provinces: that beyond their mountains lay Armenia, an extensive and very plentiful country, whence communication was ready to all quarters.

SECT.
IV.

After every inquiry in their power, having weighed all circumstances, the Greek generals resolved to pursue their way into Armenia. The usual animosity of the Cardoos against the Persians, it was hoped, would dispose them to friendship with the enemies of the Persians. At least, annoyance from the Persian cavalry would be obviated; and it was indeed little likely that Tissaphernes would, with any part of his army, venture to pursue among the mountains. In the latter speculation they were not deceived. Tissaphernes immediately turned his march; probably thinking that, next to having the heads of the Grecian generals to lay before the king, the certainty of their being engaged among the Cardoo highlands was of all things most desirable for him: for, with little risk of contradiction, he might now make any report of his own prowess against them. Truth indeed, as the modern history of the East abundantly evinces, so hardly finds its way to a despotic throne that the base circumvention of the Grecian generals may very possibly have been totally disguised, and those unfortunate men may have been presented to Artaxerxes as prisoners of war, honorably made, proofs of the meritorious exertion of his victorious forces.²³

Much however as the Greeks had already given up of those conveniences for the long march to the

²³ Such a deception is perhaps more than untravelled Englishmen will readily conceive possible, much as many of them are disposed to revile every administration of their own country; but in the East it would appear familiar.

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XXIII.Anab.
I. 4. c. 1.

Ionian shore, which they might have preserved had the way been friendly, it became necessary now still farther to lighten their baggage. Slaves, a species of plunder unknown to modern European armies, were much coveted by the Grecian soldier. They required no cattle, like other plunder, to transport them; on the contrary, they served, as cattle, to transport other plunder. Since their breach with the Persians, the Greeks had collected numerous slaves, male and female. For the march over the mountains it was held requisite to abandon a large proportion of them. Accordingly the males were mostly dismissed, but discipline was not powerful enough to make the soldiers part with their women.

Advancing then among the mountains, they had the mortification to find every endeavour vain for bringing the fierce Cardoos to any accommodation. Obligated to fight their way, they encountered, with little remission, during seven days, far greater difficulties and dangers than had been experienced in the plains from the countless cavalry of the great king. Meanwhile from the chill of autumnal rains, frequent and heavy among the highlands, they suffered the more as it so quickly followed the heats of an Assyrian summer. The road, always through narrow defiles, often steep, was often commanded by precipices; whence, with no other weapons than rolling fragments of a rock, a few men might stop an army. But the Cardoos had other weapons. They gave extraordinary efficacy to their bowshots, by a method of drawing, assisted by the foot, by which they discharged arrows three feet long with such force as to pierce shields and corslets. The Cretan bowmen learnt from their enemies to improve their own practice, so as to be highly useful in this passage; but the Cardoo

arrows were so above proportion for their bows that they could use them only as darts. Nevertheless science and discipline, with superior defensive armour, enabled the Greeks everywhere to overbear opposition; and when they could reach the towns, which were numerous, and all unfortified, they found good houses and abundant provisions: for the Cardoos, in a rude style, lived well among their mountains.

SECT.
IV.

Anab. 1. 4.
c. 2. s. 14.

Compelled thus to fight their way, and to take by violence what they wanted, when at length they had completed the laborious and dangerous passage of the mountains, and the Armenian plain came in view, increased difficulty occurred. A deep and rapid river, washing the foot of the mountains, crossed the road. On the farther bank a Persian army appeared, prepared to dispute the passage. It was commanded by the satrap Orontas, who, by another road, had reached his satrapy before them. The Cardoos, with sharpened animosity, having followed their march, were gathered on the heights behind, ready, at the favorable moment, to fall upon their rear.

While the Greek generals were at the greatest loss to choose among the difficulties before them, a more favorable ford than that lying in the direct course of the great road was, by mere accident, discovered at no great distance, unguarded. Without hesitation they proceeded to profit from it, and the first division of the army had no sooner passed than the Persians began to fly. It appears probable that the satraps had promised themselves and their troops an easy victory over the small remains of the Grecian army which might escape, if indeed any should escape, the Cardoo arms. The sight of their numbers, not sensibly diminished, and the observation that the fierce highlanders feared to attack them, even with

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missile weapons, till more than half their force had crossed the river, seem together to have occasioned the panic which urged the whole Persian army to fly; and so profusely that the very small body of the Grecian cavalry pursuing, supported only by the targeteers, took a considerable part of the baggage. The rear division of the Greeks, which the Cardoos, watching the favorable moment, at length attacked, was commanded by Xenophon; who, in relating his precautions to evade, and his efforts to check, their assaults, confesses that their activity, boldness, and skill were highly distressing; and, though the loss altogether was not great, yet that they did more execution than all the satrap's army.

Anab. 1. 4.
c. 4. s. 1.

The hazardous passage of the mountains and the river being thus fortunately effected; one enemy, very formidable among the highlands, but wanting discipline for action in a plain, being left behind, and the other which in the plain should have been formidable, flying before them, the Greeks prosecuted their march sixteen or eighteen miles uninterrupted, over a fine champaign country, of gentle rise and fall, appearing singularly to invite habitation and cultivation, yet without a dwelling to be seen; all was waste, through the inability or neglect of the Persian government to protect its subjects against the inroads of the Cardoos. In the evening they reached a large village, where, to their great advantage, farther proofs of Persian supineness occurred. The satrap having a palace there, the place was less likely to be forgotten or neglected, and yet, as if purposely left for their present refreshment and future supply, they found provisions abounding.

Five days then they proceeded, expecting always opposition, but meeting none. On the sixth, arriving

at the river Teleboas, which divides Eastern from Western Armenia, they saw the farther bank occupied by an army commanded by Tiribazus, governor of the latter, who seemed prepared to dispute their entrance into his country. Soon however it became evident that the hope of success in open contest with the Grecian heavy-armed, which had been abandoned in the centre of the empire, under the monarch's eye, was not resumed in that distant province. A message of peace soon arrived from Tiribazus, with a proposal that, if they would abstain from useless devastation within his government, not only their passage should be unmolested, but they should be allowed to take necessary provisions. Such a proposal was accepted gladly, and a treaty, of which it was the basis, was quickly concluded.

The march of the next three days was then as through a friendly country; though Tiribazus followed with his army, at no great distance, watching their motions. But, in a small variation of latitude, mounting gradually from the burning flats of Mesopotamia, little raised above the Indian ocean's tide, to the lofty plains near which the Tigris and Euphrates have their sources, they experienced a violent change of climate; a change apparently unforeseen when, on the southern side of the mountains, they burnt their tents. While they slept, unsheltered, on the ground, so heavy a snow fell as to bury men and cattle. Wood fortunately abounded, with which they made large fires. Olive oil, which in Greece was commonly used to relieve the inconveniences equally of excessive cold and excessive heat, the severe winters of Armenia denied; but oils of bitter almonds, sesame, and turpentine supplied the deficiency; or, if these failed, the abundance of lard

Anab. I. 4.
c. 4. s. 4.

s. 7.

Anab. l. 4. was a resource, which the Greeks did not spurn at,
c. 4. s. 7. for copious unction of their whole bodies. In other points they were plentifully supplied; the Armenian villages abounding, not only with necessaries, but luxuries; not only with corn and meat, but variety of pulse, dried fruits, and wines old and flavored.

All circumstances considered, their condition seemed now even fortunate; when the necessity of dispensing with the regularity of a camp, for the sake of shelter among unfortified villages, produced an untoward change. The authority of the generals, scarcely sufficing always to enforce due order in the assembled army, could not enforce regular conduct in scattered quarters; and, against the faith of the treaty, some houses were, in mere wantonness, set on fire, at the time of marching in the morning, by those who had profited from their shelter during the night. This was probably among the circumstances
s. 11—13. which stimulated Tiribazus, instead of longer following the Greeks, to advance before them, and occupy the heights commanding a defile which they must pass. A prisoner fortunately gave information of this circumstance, and a disposition was made for driving the Persians from the commanding ground. The Persians however fled before assault reached them, leaving their camp, with the pavilion of Tiribazus, and all its furniture, the silver-footed bed, the table plate, and many of the household slaves, the easy prey of the victors. The regard for truth which Xenophon generally evinces, the candor with which he often declares the crimes of his fellow-countrymen, even those in which, as we shall find, he was compelled to take a leading part, justly entitle him to our general credit: yet it must be confessed that his narrative rather stammers here; and if Tiribazus was

perfidious, as Xenophon affirms, he certainly took his measures very ill.

SECT.
IV.

Thus easily as they disposed of the Persian forces that would have opposed them, the Greeks now found new and most formidable difficulties to encounter. In Eastern Armenia, according to the information which Xenophon obtained, they had crossed the Tigris near its source. They now approached the head of the Euphrates; and while winter still advanced, and they still gradually ascended to a higher level of ground, a very disadvantageous change of country occurred. For three days' march all was desert; the snow, generally six feet deep, had blotted out all roads: the north wind, always extremely sharp, often blew violently. Guides were procured from the villages without difficulty; but provisions failed, and wood became scarce. The Greeks, unpractised in such climates, seem not to have obtained information from the natives how to manage their fires, or to profit from the shelter which snow itself may afford. In traversing the snowy deserts of America, the first business, where it is proposed to halt for the night, is to clear a space for each fire, sufficient to contain the party that is to sleep around it. The snow then dissolves little, and the party rest on the ground, warmed by the fire, and sheltered from all wind. But the Greeks discovered the depth of the snow s. 5. only by its melting, where they made their fires on it; and on the snow itself they laid themselves to rest, exposed to the bitter blast. Marching, and thus halting, they suffered nearly alike. Some lost s. 9. 10. their toes, some their eyes; many slaves, and even some of the soldiers, died of cold and hunger. The baggage-cattle of course suffered, and many perished.

In this extraordinary country, in the latitude of

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XXIII.

Anab.

I. 4. c. 5.

s. 19—23.

c. 6. s. 1.

the finest climates, the rigor of an arctic winter drove the inhabitants to the resources which are familiar in Siberia and Tartary. They formed their houses under ground, where men and cattle herded together. Nevertheless the produce of the soil was not niggardly. The army, arriving at length at some villages, found provisions abounding; meat of various kinds, fowls, and wheaten bread. Wine, from the grape, either the climate, or the want of modern skill, denied; but the people consoled themselves with beer; which Xenophon commends, under the name of barley-wine; and altogether the change of condition was found so advantageous that he speaks of this as a land of luxury. Fortunately for the Greeks, the inhabitants, secluded from communication, believed their confident assertion, that they were the king's troops, and treated them with the utmost kindness and respect. Here therefore they rested eight days, to prepare for new fatigue.

During this halt Xenophon resided in the house of the chief officer or magistrate of one of the villages, with whose behaviour he was much satisfied. When the army moved again, this man was taken as a guide, and his son as a hostage for his fidelity. The march then being prosecuted three days, and no habitation seen, while men and cattle suffered much, Chrisophus, impatient, imputed to the guide the purpose of avoiding the villages; and, refusing credit to his assertion that the country necessarily to be traversed was uninhabited, in anger struck him. The man so felt the indignity that, though his son remained in the hands of the Greeks, he left them the following night, and was seen no more. Xenophon expresses himself much hurt by this Spartan brutality and its consequence. He adds however that it was

the only occasion, during the whole march, on which he had any difference with Chirisophus.

SECT.
IV.

Fortunately the river Phasis was not far off, and for seven days its course directed the way.²⁴ Diverging then for two days, the army reached the defiles leading from the lofty plains of Armenia to the lower country between the Caspian and Euxine seas. Here the warriors of three fierce tribes, the Phasians, Chalybs, and Taocs, none owning allegiance to the great king, were assembled to dispute the passage. Stratagem however, with superior arms and superior discipline, enabled the Greeks to force their way with little loss. The defiles being passed, opposition ceased; and, in the plain beyond, villages were found, abundantly stored with provisions for present supply. But, in a march of five days afterward, no food could be obtained: the Taocs had removed every thing to strong holds on the hills, and the Greeks were reduced to the sad necessity of adding slaughter to robbery for subsistence. It may indeed be feared that mild methods were not duly tried for bringing the rude people to an accommodation. One of their strong holds was stormed; and such was the abhorrence, among the unfortunate families who held it, of falling into the power of the Greeks that, when resistance was found vain, the women threw their own children down the steeps, and then, with the

B. C. 400.
Ol. 94. 3.
January.
Foster's
Diss.

Anab. I. 4.
c. 7. s. 1—9.

²⁴ The learned author of the Dissertation on the Geography of the Anabasis has supposed that the guide, who deserted, had purposely misled the Greeks, and that they continued long to wander out of their way. Xenophon furnishes no sufficient ground for such a supposition; and, on the contrary, the accounts of ancient and modern travellers seem to explain why an experienced, intelligent, and faithful guide would prefer a circuitous road. That of Tournefort, quoted in the next note, suffices to vindicate the probability of Xenophon's narrative.

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men, precipitated themselves. An Arcadian lochage, Æneas of Stymphalus, endeavouring to stop one whose dress seemed to mark superior rank, was dragged down the precipice with him, and they perished together.

Anab.

l. 4. c. 7.

s. 10—13.

s. 14.

The cattle, thus acquired, supported the Greeks in traversing, during seven days, the country of the Chalybs; a people distinguished, among the Asiatics, by their superior armour, adapted to close fight, and by their courage in using it. This people had removed every thing from the villages, and it was not till after proceeding four days through the more level territory of the Scythinians, that the Greeks found a supply. After four days' march again they arrived at Gymnias, a large and wealthy city. It is remarkable that only one town of such a description, Opis, on the river Phycus in Media, has occurred in the whole length of way from the border of Mesopotamia to this place. We read only of villages; meaning apparently towns inhabited solely by husbandmen, with the few artificers necessary to husbandry. Here fortunately was found a disposition to prefer peaceful accommodation to the chance of war. The chief, or governor, furnished the Greeks with a guide; and, by the same measure, relieved his people from guests whom they feared, and revenged them on neighbours whom they hated; for the guide, in pursuance of his instructions, conducted the Greeks through a country which he encouraged them to plunder, and even urged them to burn and destroy.

This man had engaged, at the peril of his life, to lead the army, in five days, within sight of the Euxine sea, and he made his word good. From a hill, in the course of the fifth day's march, it was distinctly seen.

s. 16—18.

The leading division immediately gave a shout of joy,

which was presently repeated by those next in the line; while the rear, ignorant of what the growing tumult meant, apprehended an enemy in front, and danger more than common. Pressing however forward, to give the assistance that might be wanting, they presently distinguished the reiteration of the cheering words 'the sea! the sea!' Joy then filled every eye, congratulations flowed from every lip; and, in the tumult of gladness, without waiting for orders or regular permission, all sedulously employed themselves in collecting stones, with which a large barrow was quickly raised, as a monument of the happy event. Want of generous gratitude was not among the national vices of the Greeks. The guide was liberally rewarded. A horse, a silver cup, a Persian dress were presented to him, with ten darics in money, and, at his particular request, many rings. He then pointed out a village at a distance, which would afford commodious quarters, gave directions for the way forward, through the country of the Macrons, and in the evening took his leave.

Anab. l. 4.
c. 7. s. 19.

Next day a circumstance occurred, in another manner indicating the approach of the army to the sphere of Grecian communication and commerce. While the advanced guard were felling some trees, to facilitate the passage of a river, a body of the Macrons approached to oppose it. Orders were not yet given for measures to force the way, when a targeteer of the Grecian army came to Xenophon, and told him 'he had overheard the enemy's conversation, 'and understood their language; in short, circumstances altogether gave him to believe theirs to be 'his native country; for, though long since free, he 'had originally been imported to Athens as a slave. 'If therefore he might be permitted, he would

c. 8. s. 1—6.

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‘speak to them.’ The Macrons readily listened to a man speaking their own language; and, being told that the Greeks desired their friendship, and were enemies to the king of Persia, they instantly laid aside all appearance of animosity. A treaty, presently concluded, was ratified by the exchange of a Grecian for a Macron spear, with invocations of their respective deities. The barbarians then assisted sedulously in felling trees and clearing the way, mixed without reserve in the Grecian camp, and in a march of three days through their country, providing the best market it could readily afford, conducted the army to the Colchian mountains.

Treaty with the Colchians being either neglected or unavailing, an effort of some difficulty and hazard here became necessary. But against superior arms and discipline, directed by superior science, the numbers and bravery of barbarians, though seconded by very advantageous ground, as usual failed; and, in two days more, the army reached the first great object of its wishes, a Grecian town, Trapezus, now vulgarly Trebizond, on the shore of the Euxine sea. At this place, a large and flourishing commercial settlement from Sinope, itself a colony from Miletus, they found that friendly reception which, from those claiming the same ancestry, speaking the same language, acknowledging the same religion, though unconnected in civil government, they had promised themselves. Here therefore, as for their first arrival in a territory intrinsically friendly, they performed sacrifices, vowed to the supposed guides of their march, Protecting Jupiter and Hercules. Games in the Grecian manner were added; horse-races, foot-races, wrestling, boxing, and the pancratium. Thus they proposed at the same time to celebrate their

Anab.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 7—17.

February.
Forster's
Diss.

Anab.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 18—21.

own adventure, to entertain their kind hosts, and to show farther their respect and gratitude to the gods.²⁵

SECT.
IV.

²⁵ The Greeks passed through Armenia in midwinter. Tournefort set out from Trebizond for Erzerum, the modern capital of Armenia, in the train of the bashaw of that place, toward midsummer. Even at that season the bashaw took a circuitous way, as the more commodious and less rugged. On the seventh of June nevertheless they passed over bare mountains, with snow on the ground; the cold severe; the fog so thick that they could not see one another four paces off; and even in the valley, in which they halted for the night, not a stick, nor even a cowslot, says Tournefort, was to be found to burn; even the bashaw could have no victuals dressed that day. From Trebizond thus far (a journey of five days) the country bore a near resemblance to the Alps and Pyrenees. Even in descending the mountains, on the southern side, the way was through narrow, barren, woodless valleys, inspiring, according to Tournefort's expression, nothing but melancholy. It was not till the tenth or eleventh day's march, in that favorable season, with all the advantages that a bashaw, going in peace to take possession of his government, could command, that they arrived among fertile fields, in which various grains were cultivated; and not till the twelfth day that they reached Erzerum. Snow had fallen at Erzerum on the first of June. At midsummer, for an hour after sunrise, the cold was so sharp there as to benumb the hands and incapacitate them for writing, though the midday heat was inconvenient, even to a Languedocian. Not a tree nor a bush was to be seen around Erzerum: fir, brought a two or three days' journey, was the only wood known for burning; the common fuel was cowdung; of the effect of which upon his victuals, and the smell everywhere, Tournefort vehemently complains. Voy. au Levant, Lettre 18.

According to the same respectable writer the shortest way from Erzerum to Trebizond, for a single man, in the favorable season, is only a five days' journey. But his account, and all accounts, show it likely that the direct way, from the Armenian plains to Trapezus, would have been impracticable for the Grecian army, and that it was necessary to diverge eastward. Georgia, though to the north, has a much milder climate, and supplies Armenia with fruits. It seems therefore every way

SECTION V.

Return of the Greeks. Transactions at Trapezus, Cerasus, (beneficial effect of Grecian superstition,) Cotyora, (spirit of Grecian military discipline,) Sinope, Heraclea, Port-Calpe.

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When once thus arrived on Grecian ground, it was not easy to persuade the multitude that any considerable dangers or difficulties could necessarily interfere with their progress to Greece. But their numbers, hitherto so important for their preservation, became now their hindrance. One or two, or perhaps a hundred, might readily have found conveyance by sea. But how, at Trapezus, vessels could be collected for transporting all, and how, in the interval, so large an addition to the population of a town with so small a territory, and so distant from friendly and civilized countries, could be subsisted, were matters apparently not within calculation. On the contrary, to pass by land, to any point of the connected line of Grecian colonies, for a small party was perhaps impossible; yet their united strength might probably command its way, though far through a hostile country, mountainous and difficult, with a few Grecian settlements only, at wide intervals, on the coast.

Anab. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 2. 3.

The soldiers however, alive to the impression of past fatigues and perils, were thoughtlessly eager for the passage by sea. 'I am tired,' said one, 'of eternally collecting my necessaries, walking, running, march-

probable that the guide, ill-treated by Chirisophus, executed his office faithfully and ably, while he remained with the army; conducting it by a circuitous indeed, but the most advantageous, and, at that season, perhaps even the only way.

‘ing in rank and file, mounting guard, and fighting. With the sea before us why should we not use the advantage, and proceed the rest of our way to Greece, like Ulysses, sleeping?’²⁶ This improvident speech was received with general applause; and Chirisophus, a well-meaning and zealous, but not an able officer, confirmed the impression, by exciting hope that he could give practicability to the proposal: ‘Anaxibius,’ he said ‘who, I am informed, now commands the Lacedæmonian fleet, is my friend, and if you will commission me, I think I can bring both transports to carry, and triremes to convoy you.’ This was decisive; the soldiers, who, in the deficiency of established subordination, had been summoned by their generals to common debate upon the occasion, immediately voted that Chirisophus should go without delay.

It remained then for Xenophon, the other generals little assisting in difficult circumstances, to provide that the army should have subsistence, and to preserve in it that order and discipline without which it would risk to become a nuisance to friends or a prey to enemies. Few had wherewithal to buy necessities in the Trapezuntine market, nor could the Trapezuntines furnish a market equal to the demand. To rob the neighbouring barbarians seemed the only resource; and, under sanction of the common Grecian tenet, that, against those to whom men are bound by no compact, they are by no moral or religious law forbidden any violence, it was put in practice without scruple; at the proposal of Xenophon himself, and under regulations of his proposal.

Anab. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 3.

Ch. 15. s. 4.
of this Hist.

²⁶ Referring to Homer’s description in the thirteenth book of the *Odyssey*, v. 116.

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Anab. I. 5.
c. 1. s. 11.

s. 12.

c. 2. s. 1.

c. 3. s. 2.

s. 3.

c. 1. s. 7. 8.

At first this nefarious expedient was successful; but repeated losses taught the barbarians to secure their property, and revenge themselves on the robbers. A marauding party, consisting of two lochi, was mostly cut off; Cleænetus, the commanding lochage, fell; and the slaughter was altogether greater perhaps than, in any one action, the army had yet suffered. Nothing was now any more to be found within distance, for completing the expedition in a day; for the guides furnished by the Trapezuntines, instructed in the considerations necessary for the welfare of their town, avoided the nearer tribes, whose friendship had been cultivated or was desirable, and led the parties to those more distant, who were either hostile, or whose disposition the Trapezuntines little regarded. Thus, without advancing, the Greeks were undergoing the fatigues and dangers of a march through an enemy's country. The necessity however was urgent for continuing the practice, and giving it, if possible, increased efficacy. Intelligence therefore being obtained of a strong hold in the mountains, where the tribe esteemed the most warlike of the coast had collected their cattle, Xenophon put himself at the head of half the army, and, not without hazard equal to any undergone in the whole expedition, stormed it, and led off the booty.

The store thus iniquitously acquired was nearly exhausted, and where to procure another supply nobody could tell, while the return of Chirisophus, and intelligence from him, remained equally in vain expected. Xenophon, always fearing that vessels for transporting so large an army could not be procured, had proposed sending requisitions to the Grecian towns on the coast to repair the roads communicating between them, for the purpose of facilitating the

SECT.
V.

march, if to march should at last become necessary; but the soldiers would not then hear of marching, or give their sanction to anything that might promote the purpose. Sending nevertheless of his own authority recommendation of the measure to the magistrates, with admonition of the inconvenience that might arise from the delay of so large an army in their narrow territories, his measure had extensively the desired effect. A proposal to press vessels for the transport-service having been better received by the army, a penteconter, borrowed from the Trapezuntines for the purpose, was committed to Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian. But this man, betraying the trust, sailed for the Hellespont, and left the deceived army to account to the Trapezuntines for the loss of their vessel. These nevertheless lent a triaconter, one of the smallest vessels used as ships of war by the Greeks, having only thirty oars. Poly- crates, an Athenian, appointed commander, was diligent and successful; many vessels were pressed, and the cargoes being landed at Trapezus were preserved for the owners.

Anab.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 6. 9. 10.

The evident necessity for moving was now become such that none any longer refused or hesitated. An estimate being made of what the vessels collected might carry, it was presently agreed that, under the two eldest generals, Philesius and Sophænetus, all who had passed their fortieth year should be indulged with conveyance by sea, together with the sick, the many women and children, and the heavy baggage; and that the rest should march by land. Through the fortunate precaution of Xenophon the road was already prepared. The marching and the navigating divisions then moved together, and, on the third day, met again at Cerasus, another settle-

s. 3.

Tournefort,
Voy. au
Levant,
lett. 17.

ment of the Sinopians, on the Euxine shore; the place to which Europe owes the cherry, the natural produce of the surrounding hills,—first carried to Italy by Lucullus, the Roman conqueror of the country, above three hundred and thirty years after the expedition of Cyrus, thence, within little more than a century, naturalized in Britain, and still, wherever it has spread, bearing in its name the memorial of its origin.

Anab. I. 5.
c. 3. s. 4.

On re-assembling at Cerasus the army was mustered, and the heavy-armed were found to be still eight thousand six hundred remaining out of about ten thousand. It is certainly matter for wonder, that no greater loss was suffered from the various enemies encountered; but what, with those who have the care of armies, infinitely more deserves consideration, is that, in such a service, without even ordinary conveniences, without tents, without stores, passing through changes of climate the most violent, though some had been frozen to death, scarcely any had perished by sickness.²⁷

²⁷ Xenophon's summary detail, if it may be so called, of the loss, is remarkable: Οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀπώλοντο ὑπὸ τε πολεμίων, καὶ χύονος, καὶ εἰ τις νόσφ, as if he was hardly certain that any had died of sickness. The passage may perhaps be most nearly translated thus: *The rest perished by enemies and snōw, and possibly a few by sickness.*

Since, by a wise and humane attention, the evil of that formerly dreadful scourge of the modern sea-service, the scurvy, has been obviated, the men employed in that service have been no more subject to mortality, or disability, from sickness, than those in the healthiest occupation of civil life ashore. In land warfare indeed circumstances frequently arise in which the health of the soldier cannot be provided for, as that of men ashipboard always may. But seeing sickness so greatly more prevalent in one service than in the other, may it not deserve consideration what are the circumstances, among those likely to

The delay at Trapezus had given opportunity to dispose advantageously of the slaves taken in the

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affect health, in which they do, but need not, differ; or need not in the degree in which they do? In looking to those circumstances then, two, much within the officer's power, are striking; the diet and the clothing. The seaman's diet, when aboard, is provided for him, and he has scarcely any choice: the soldier is often much at liberty about both meat and drink. On the contrary, for clothing, the seaman manages for himself; chooses, among what he possesses, what he would, on different occasions, wear, and how he would wear it; in hot or in cold, in wet or in dry weather, in action or in rest. The soldier is denied almost all choice: the admonition of his feelings, arising from the state of his body at the time, given by beneficent nature purposely to direct him, he is forbidden to obey. Young and old, of one constitution and another, all are compelled to follow the same regulations. Pliant youth readily accommodates itself so far as to bear what is, at first, severely adverse to the feelings, and may remain injurious to the constitution; especially tight ligatures, and the heat produced in hot weather by over thick or over close clothing; insomuch that, when the habit is fixed, it becomes even painful to dispense with the injurious pressure: which however surely cannot be advantageous preparation for winter duty, even in the climate of our own island, in its internal peace amid a warring world; and must be still more injurious on the continent for the mild winter campaigns of modern European warfare. If then, on severe service, indulgence is allowed, the habit of the parade and field of exercise is adverse to a just use of it: if the desire is not done away, the knowledge, which should have been the result of experience, will be wanting. For the soldier to take advantageous care of himself in clothing, as the seamen does, he must have the seamen's practice in that care.

The Greeks appear to have been limited by no regulations, either for clothing, as the soldier with us, or for diet, as the seaman; though, for one important circumstance of diet, they were limited by the fortunate ignorance, in their age, of spirituous liquors. In their case thus it might appear that the opportunity of choice, advantageous for clothing, was not generally injurious for diet; and it would follow that the denial of opportunity to consult feeling for clothing may reasonably be

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course of the march. It appears to have been a principal object of the traffic of these distant settlements, on barbarian shores, to supply Greece with slaves; and there seems too much reason to fear that, opportunity exciting cupidity, cattle and corn were not alone sought in the various excursions from Trapezus, but the wretched barbarians, when they could be caught, were themselves taken, and exposed in the Trapezuntine market. The spoil, which must have been mostly collected after the circumvention of the generals, was now of large amount, rising chiefly from the sale or ransom of prisoners. At Cerasus it was divided, and, according to custom, a tenth was committed to the generals, to be disposed of in offerings to the gods; principally to the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Diana.

Anab.
l. 5. c. 3.
s. 5—13.

As in approaching Greece apprehension of dangers and difficulties wore away, a carelessness, approaching to scorn, of discipline and subordination grew: the generals were regarded only as attention to them was necessary for either profit or safety. The eve of departure from Cerasus therefore, after a stay of ten days, was chosen by a profligate band, collected by a profligate lochage, for an attempt to plunder a village of friendly barbarians in the neighbourhood. Measures however were so ill taken that the outrage was successfully resisted, and the lochage himself killed, with many of his associates. But the barbarians, alarmed at their own success, sent three of their elders to

c. 7.
s. 9—15.

suspected to be, in our service, the injurious circumstance. Of modern physicians, some have attributed much importance to clothing: others appear to have slighted the consideration of it. Those who have attended armies on service, diligently adverting to all circumstances, will best know how to estimate its value, and to direct practice accordingly.

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Cerasus, to complain of the injury attempted against them, to deprecate revenge for the unpremeditated slaughter made in their necessary defence, and to offer, what they knew Grecian prejudices made important, the bodies of the slain for burial. The marching division of the army was already gone when they arrived; but, the Cerasuntines assuring them that the injurious attack had been the unapproved measure only of some worthless individuals, they would have followed by sea to the next Grecian town on the coast, rather than appear deficient in compliment and apology to the generals and army. Unfortunately the miscreants, who had fled from the victorious barbarians, were still in Cerasus. Learning what was going forward, and fearing just vengeance, their resource was to excite a tumult, in which the unfortunate elders were stoned to death; and, as an inflamed multitude is not guided by reason, passion took new objects, the generals themselves were alarmed, and some of the Cerasuntines perished before quiet could be restored.

These, the actions of a profligate few or an impassioned multitude, were disowned and reprobated by the generals, and, in any moment of reflection, by the greater part of the army; whose principles of humanity and morality nevertheless, as we become more acquainted with them, will not rise in our estimation. The marching division soon after entered a country of uncommonly rugged mountains, occupied by an independent horde, the Mosyneeks, with complexions singularly fair and manners singularly uncouth. The dissensions of this people among themselves principally facilitated the march: one tribe had no sooner resolved to oppose, than another became disposed to favor it. Thus, in a passage of eight

Anab.
l. 5. c. 4.
s. 1.

Anab. l. 5.
c. 5. s. 1.

days, the Greeks found means to obviate opposition. Equally unresisted, they crossed the still loftier mountains of the Chalybs, subjects of the Mosyneeks, and employed by them in working the steel, the valuable produce of their rugged soil. Descending then into the more champaign country of the Tibarenes, they were met by heralds, bearing presents, the pledges of hospitality. But peace here lost its charms. The generals themselves had observed from the heights, with longing eyes, that the villages of the Tibarenes were in assailable situations; and plunder and gratification to the dishonest desires of their troops were immediately proposed. The offered presents were therefore rejected; for acceptance would have engaged them in compact with the givers; and this would have engaged the gods in opposition to the robbery, for which, on the contrary, it was hoped to obtain divine approbation and favor. Sacrifice was accordingly resorted to, but the symptoms were adverse: more victims were immolated, but in vain. The augurs were unanimous in declaring that the gods totally disapproved war with the Tibarenes.

Between two writers, so near together in all other points as Thucydides and Xenophon, the difference appears extraordinary which we find in their manner of speaking of the religion of their age, and particularly of the reputed science of divination, which was so intimately connected with the religion. Thucydides, a man evidently of very serious and generally just thought on religious and moral subjects, has shown no faith in pretensions to prophecy, nor attributed any consequence to a sacrifice. On the contrary, Xenophon is found continually holding out the importance of various ceremonies, especially sacrifice, and avowing implicit credit in that science which

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pretended, from the symptoms of victims, from dreams, and from various occurrences in nature, to learn the will of the gods, and to foretel future events. It is hazardous to undertake to say for another what he thought, which he has not said, on a subject on which he has said much; but some passages in the writings of Xenophon seem to afford ground for supposing that a strong feeling of the want of that check upon the passions of men, which a sense of religion alone can ensure, and neither the religion nor the morality of his age offered, led him to value a superstition which might be employed for the most salutary purposes, and to carry the profession of his belief beyond the reality. On more than one occasion we find cause to suspect that he held and used influence among the prophets and augurs of the Cyrean army: and indeed if ever deceit for preventing evil might be allowed, it would do credit to the scholar of Socrates in the business of the Tibarenes; for apparently nothing but the advantage made of a salutary superstition could have preserved the property of that unoffending people from plunder, their persons from slavery, and probably many lives from slaughter. The augurs not preaching any purer morality than the army professed, not holding, as any general rule, 'that unoffending men might not, without offence to the gods, be plundered, enslaved, or murdered,' but merely insisting 'that the gods denied their approbation in the existing circumstances,' the presents of the Tibarenes were at length accepted. The army then proceeded peacefully through their country, and in two days arrived at Cotyora, a third Grecian colony from Sinope, with a port on the Euxine sea.

B. C. 400.
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Whether ill report had preceded them to Cotyora, or what else was the cause, they found there some-

CHAP.
XXIII.Anab. 1. 5.
c. 5. s. 5.
& seq.1. 6. c. 1.
s. 1.

thing very different from the hospitality expected, and hitherto experienced, from Grecian towns. Admission, even for their sick, was denied; a market, even without the walls, was refused. Plunder thus became a necessary resource; and the farms of the Cotyorites, and the villages of the neighbouring Paphlagonians, suffered. But the conduct of those who directed the counsels of the Cotyorites, in which the Sinopian superintendent held the lead, appears to have been remiss as it was illiberal. Without violence, as far as our information goes, the troops found opportunity to enter the town. To ensure the freedom of future ingress and egress, possession was taken of the gates, and quarters were required for the sick; but the rest of the army remained encamped without the walls, and no farther force was put upon the people. Information quickly communicated to Sinope brought a deputation thence to the army, and a friendly accommodation followed. It was agreed that the sick should remain in quarters, that a market should be provided, and that vessels should be furnished for transporting the army to Heraclea, the next Grecian town beyond Sinope, and the most easterly on the coast independent of that city: Heraclea was a colony from Megara.

1. 5. c. 6.
s. 3.

This arrangement fortunately prevented hostilities threatened between Greeks and Greeks, but did not enable the soldiers without money to profit from the market provided. Though the farms of the Cotyorites therefore were spared, plunder was continued among the Paphlagonian villages. But this was not tamely borne: not only stragglers from the camp were cut off, but nightly alarm was sometimes extended to the camp itself. During the awkward leisure, while the transports were waited for, inquiry

was made about the way by land through Paphlagonia: but reports were far from encouraging to attempt the march. Westward of Heraclea a very lofty range of mountains, extending far inland, ends in precipices against the sea. One only practicable road, through most hazardous defiles, traversed this range. Spacious plains followed, but intersected by four large rivers, of which the Halys and the Parthenius were not fordable. The country was united under one prince, who, with a hundred thousand men at his orders, his cavalry the best in Asia, had dared refuse obedience to the commands of the great king.

Such being the formidable obstacles to the passage by land, while means for procuring sufficient vessels for the transport by sea were yet doubtful, the successful example of those Greeks who, from small beginnings, had raised flourishing colonies on the Euxine shores engaged the consideration of Xenophon. What advantages would not be open for such a force as that of the Cyrean army, (for by that name it became now distinguished,) could its united exertions be directed to the establishment of a colony? Those whom home invited might easily find their passage by sea; the far greater number would probably still desire, indeed their wants would urge them, to join in promising adventure; and could they any other way end so advantageously, or so honorably, an expedition of much glory, but hitherto of little profit, as by extending the Grecian name and dominion in a new colony on the Euxine shore? Xenophon communicated his idea to the Ambraciot Silanus, the principal soothsayer of the army; but he was unfortunate in this communication. Silanus had preserved thus far, through all difficulties, the three thousand darics, presented to him by Cyrus for his fortunate prophecy, previous to

Anab.
l. 5. c. 6.
s. 7. 8.

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their meeting with the king's army in Mesopotamia, and he was beyond all things anxious to get them safe into his own country. A project therefore which tended directly to check the progress of the army toward Greece alarmed him: he communicated it to those who, he thought, would most zealously oppose it; and a very mischievous ferment ensued. The principal movers were the general Timasion, and a Bœotian lochage, named Thorax. The earnest purpose of Timasion, an exile from Dardanium in Troas, was to make the powerful army, in which he had been raised to so high a rank, instrumental to his restoration; and, to engage the general view that way, he proposed the plunder of the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus, of which the fertile region of Troas was only a small part, as the object that should attract attention. Thus, he said, the labors of the expedition would indeed be rewarded, and all go wealthy to their several homes. Thorax had been competitor with Xenophon for the command formerly held by Proxenus, and ever since had been attentive to opportunities for opposing his successful rival, and lessening his credit with the army. Timasion and Thorax thence were sedulous in exciting alarm among the Heracleots and Sinopians, readily jealous of a new establishment in their neighbourhood, so powerful as the Cyrean army might have made. Having assured themselves, as they thought, of support from those people, they made promises to the army which they found themselves unable to perform. Then becoming apprehensive of the army's indignation, they solicited accommodation with Xenophon, and themselves put forward a project for a settlement on the river Phasis in Colchis, at the eastern end of the Euxine, the scene of the celebrated fabulous adventure of the

golden fleece. This again excited the jealousy of Neon, who commanded for Chirisophus in his absence; and thus shortly the whole army became divided in views, and filled with most inconvenient jealousies.

In his account of this business it has been clearly the purpose of Xenophon to apologise for himself. Circumstances apparently would not allow him to speak the whole truth; but the project of colonization, evidently enough, was not popular in the army. The soldiers desired to become rich by a more compendious method than tilling an uncultivated country among barbarians; and, while their generals disagreed among themselves, they grew careless of their generals, and held their own assemblies to consider of putting forward their own projects.

Xenophon then took upon himself to call the army together. He explained his conduct and intentions - so as, according to his own report, to give general satisfaction. Encouraged then by finding himself so far successful, he proceeded to urge to consideration the dangers and the disgraces already incurred through deficiency of subordination. He related the transactions on their quitting Cerasus, the particulars of which were not generally known; and he called their attention to the portentous pollutions there incurred and hazarded. 'Greeks, their fellow-soldiers,' he observed, 'attempting a most unjustifiable outrage, had met a just fate. Barbarians, not only connected with them by friendly intercourse, but vested with the sacred character of heralds, had been wickedly murdered. That the corpses of their fellow-soldiers were at length obtained for burial they owed to the moderation of the barbarians together with their respect for religion, and to the kind interference of the injured Cerasuntines. Were enormities like

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‘ these permitted, instead of returning glorious to
 ‘ Greece, amid the applauses and caresses of their
 ‘ fellow-countrymen, if indeed their misconduct did
 ‘ not first bring destruction on them, they would be
 ‘ avoided, repelled, and detested, wherever they went
 ‘ or were heard of.’

Moved by this strong remonstrance, the army resolved, That all the late transactions should be taken into consideration, and that a better order of things should be enforced by the punishment of past irregularity. The lochages, as the intermediate order between the generals and the soldiers, were reckoned fittest to decide on the conduct of both, and the whole body of them was constituted a court-martial. After accusations against inferiors had been judged, the generals themselves were called to account. Sophænetus, Philesius, and Xanthicles had been, by a vote of the army, appointed commissioners for the care of the cargoes of the merchant-ships pressed at Trapezus, and goods had been missing. Sophænetus, for having refused the office, was fined ten mines, about thirty-five pounds; Philesius and Xanthicles, who had undertaken it, were fined twenty mines, about seventy pounds, each, the estimated value of the missing goods.²⁸ Accusation was then brought against Xenophon, for acting with injurious haughtiness in

²⁸ This I think the sense of the passage, which has however some difficulty. The editors have indeed supposed an omission in transcription. But it does not appear to me that Xenophon has, like his translators, Latin and English, imputed peculation to Philesius and Xanthicles. He merely says that they were fined to the amount of the deficiency, without declaring whether that deficiency was occasioned by their dishonesty, their negligence, or their inability. Indeed it would be a strange award to punish the man who had merely avoided an office, and not to punish those who had been guilty of peculation in an office; for if they were fined only to the amount of goods they had fraudulently taken, they were not punished.

command, and particularly for beating some soldiers. He acknowledged striking several for disorderly conduct; quitting their ranks, to run forward for plunder; endangering themselves and the whole army, by yielding to the impression of fatigue and cold while the enemy was pressing on the rear. But he insisted that he had punished none excepting when the good of all, and even their own good, required; he had given blows of the fist (for that is his expression) to save them from strokes of the enemy's weapons;²⁹ and those who were now so forward to complain, he was confident, would be mostly found such as Boiscus, the Thessalian boxer; who had been clamorous, on pretence of sickness, to have his shield carried for him, and now, unless report grossly belied him, had been waylaying and robbing many of the Cotyorites. If he had himself ever offended any of better character, they, he trusted, would recollect if any were indebted to him for benefits; if he had ever relieved any in cold, in want, in sickness, and in perils from the enemy; if, while he punished the disorderly, he was always ready, to the utmost of his power, to honor and reward the deserving. It sufficed to mention these things, and Xenophon was honorably acquitted.

Such detached and incidental information only, which, when collected, will give no system, is all that remains whence to gather an idea of Greek military law. In an army so formed as the Cyrean we may suppose the system less perfect than under the government of Lacedæmon, or even of Athens. But in Xenophon's account of this expedition we may perhaps more than elsewhere discover the general spirit of the military system of the age. What we

²⁹ "Επαισα πύξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχη ὑπὸ πολέμιων παίσιτο.

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find principally striking is that it was at the same time arbitrary and lax. We wonder to find those who, in civil government, were zealots for liberty, even to licentiousness, submit so readily, in military, to an undefined command. At the same time we may wonder, in a command so liable to interruption and control from an undefined right of resistance to injury, to find regularity and subordination nevertheless generally existing. Two motives however we may observe, comparatively little felt in modern European armies, powerfully and almost constantly operating upon the Greek; the hope of profit from the plunder of the enemy, and the fear of suffering from the enemy's revenge. Almost unceasing wars, within a narrow country, taught every Greek the value of military discipline. Alone he felt himself weak; in a phalanx he felt himself powerful: being weak, his lot would be death or slavery from the enemy; being strong, all the enemy's possessions would, in share, be his; a price even for the enemy's person, sold to slavery, would reward him for his submission to discipline. Discipline, in short, was preserved among the Greeks (the comparison appears degrading, but it is apposite) as among the smugglers with us; by a strong sense of a common interest in it. Strong acts of arbitrary power then are congenial and necessary to every simple government, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. Being therefore familiar to the Greeks in civil administration, they were easily borne in military.

Anab. 1. 5.
c. 5. s. 5.
1. 6. c. 1.
s. 8 9.

The army waited forty-five days at Cotyora for a sufficient number of vessels to take their whole number, and then proceeded for Sinope, a flourishing Grecian town, very advantageously situated on the Paphlagonian coast; the mother-city of Cotyora,

Cerasus, and Trapezus, which it held in dependency; itself a colony from Miletus. We cannot here but pay a tribute of admiration to the bold and successful adventure of a few Greeks who, wandering thus far from the soft climate of Ionia, could wrest, from one of the most powerful vassals of the Persian empire, a seaport and territory in the middle of his coast, and thence extend the Grecian name, in various settlements on barbarian shores, to such a distance. Arriving at Armene, one of the ports of Sinope, the army had the satisfaction to find Chirisophus, with some triremes, on his way to meet them. On landing they were greeted with a present of meal and wine from the Sinopians; much for that people to give, but far below their wants. They had hoped to have these more amply provided for by Chirisophus; but he brought them, from Anaxibius the Lacedæmonian admiral, only approbation and applause, with a promise that, as soon as they reached the shore of the Propontis, they should be taken into pay.

Hitherto to return home in safety had been the great object. Now, with a nearer view of its accomplishment, they began with more anxiety to consider how they should live at home; or how, before they yet returned, they might acquire means to live there in some credit and ease. Plunder was the mode which the principles and circumstances of the age so recommended that they thought they should be wanting to themselves if, before they separated, they did not use their united strength for the purpose. Where it should be exerted remained to be determined; and they began to consider that nothing was more necessary to success than unity of command. For a commander-in-chief then the general view was directed to Xenophon: many

Anab. l. 6.
c. 1. s. 11.

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Anab. 1. 6.
c. 1. s. 21.

officers conferred with him in private; and, though he declared his resolution to avoid the invidious honor, yet, when the army assembled to decide on the subject, he was proposed, and the nomination supported by a very large majority. He nevertheless persisted in refusing what, he confesses, very much allured his ambition. The state of Greece and the umbrage that would be taken by the Lacedæmonian government deterred him; but the army would not be satisfied with such an excuse; and he was obliged to recur to his common resource, the superstition of the age. Confirming his asseveration with an oath, by all the gods and goddesses, he said he had consulted the deity in sacrifices, whether it would be better for the army and himself that the command-in-chief should be conferred upon him; and the divine will was declared in the negative, in so clear a manner that the most inexperienced in augury could not mistake it.

s. 22.

Unable to resist such an argument the army then elected Chirisophus; who appears to have been not of shining talents, but a prudent and worthy man. He declared that, had their choice fallen on another, he should have submitted. On the acceptance of Xenophon's refusal nevertheless he congratulated both them and Xenophon; whose appointment, he said, could scarcely have been otherwise than unfortunate, on account of the ill offices done him with the admiral Anaxibius, by the unprincipled Dexippus, who had deserted with the penteconter from Trapezus. He then freely acknowledged that he had found his own interest with Anaxibius not such as he had hoped. His best exertions however should not be wanting to serve them in the honorable situation in which they

had placed him, and he meant to sail the next day for Heraclea. Accordingly, after a stay of only five days at Sinope, they embarked, and on the morrow reached Heraclea, a colony from Megara, flourishing in population and commerce. They were greeted, as at Sinope, with a present, the pledge of hospitality, from the Heracleots; and a present liberal and even magnificent for a state like theirs, a single city. It consisted of meal equal to that given by the Sinopians, a larger quantity of wine, and the valuable addition of twenty oxen and a hundred sheep.

SECT.
V.

Anab. 1. 6.
c. 1. s. 11.
c. 2. s. 1. 2.

It seems to have been the purpose of Chirisophus to check the project of robbery and plunder which had been cherished, and to conduct the army quietly to Byzantium, where he expected it would be immediately taken into Lacedæmonian pay. This however was not generally satisfactory; and some licentious spirits, foreseeing opposition to their views against the property of barbarians, and encouraged by a degree of contempt, which seems to have been general, for the abilities of Chirisophus, began to conceive more criminal designs. More than half the army were Arcadians or Achæans; and the generals, who had the particular command of those troops, not superior in abilities to Chirisophus, were far inferior in estimation, as their cities were in political consequence inferior to his. Hence opportunity occurred for some worthless officers, by indulging licence, and flattering with promises, to gain a leading influence among the troops. All were assembled to deliberate whether to proceed by land or sea; a measure indicating that either the authority committed to the commander-in-chief was very defective, or he doubted himself, and wanted talent for command. Lycon, an Achæan lochage, rose and said, 'It was matter of

s. 6.

s. 3.

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Anab. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 4.

s. 5.

s. 6.

s. 10.

‘wonder to him, that the generals did not think of measures for providing subsistence: what had been just received as a present would not last three days: in his opinion demand should be made upon the Heracleots for not less than three thousand Cyzicenes.’ The Cyzicene was a gold coin named from the Greek city of Cyzicus on the Propontis, in value about a guinea. This extortion seemed over-modest to others, who were for requiring a month’s pay, not less than ten thousand Cyzicenes. Presently it was voted that commissioners should be appointed to go into the city, and Chirisophus and Xenophon were named. Military authority seems to have ceased: the commander-in-chief could merely excuse himself from obeying the orders of the army, become a popular assembly; and Xenophon interfered no farther than to join with Chirisophus in a kind of protest, that no violence ought to be put upon a friendly Grecian city. Regardless of this protest, the troops appointed the Achæan Lycon, with two Arcadian officers, Callimachus and Agasias, to go as their deputies to the Heracleots. Lycon, according to report, was not sparing of threats to enforce the insolent demand. The Heracleots, with prudent calmness, answered, that they would consult upon it. The leisure, thus gained, they employed in bringing in their effects from the country, and they shut their gates and manned their walls.

The mutineer officers, disappointed by these measures, accused the generals of having caused the miscarriage, and persuaded the Arcadians and Achæans, to the number of four thousand five hundred, all heavy-armed, to separate themselves from the rest of the army. Electing then ten commanders, they negotiated with the Heracleots for transports to convey

them forward: and, anxiety for riddance of such inmates promoting the business, they were quickly supplied. In all haste then they sailed, eager to be foremost in plundering the Bithynian Thracians.

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Anab. I. 6.
c. 2. s. 11.
c. 3. s. 1.

Thus ended the command of Chirisophus, about the seventh day from his elevation. Vessels to carry the remainder of the army being evidently not to be procured, Xenophon offered to march, still under the Lacedæmonian general, to the Propontis. But Chirisophus, disgusted at what had happened, depressed, apparently, by sickness, and persuaded by some of his officers, who desired the exclusive advantage of vessels expected from Byzantium, declined the offer: he would take charge only of the small body particularly attached to him, consisting of about fourteen hundred Grecian heavy-armed, and the Thracian targeteers who had served under Clearchus, in number about seven hundred. There remained with Xenophon about seventeen hundred heavy-armed, three hundred targeteers, and forty horse, being the whole cavalry of the army.

c. 2. s. 7.

s. 8—11.

s. 10.

No Grecian town, no friendly people, was to be found between Heraclea and the Bosphorus; a distance in a right line of more than a hundred miles,³⁰ occupied by the Bythinians, a Thracian horde, the most inimical to the Greeks, and the most skilled in war of any barbarians of that continent. Chirisophus proceeded along the coast to an unoccupied harbour, about midway called Port-Calpe; thinking there to

c. 4. s. 1.

c. 3. s. 7.

³⁰ Τριήρους μὲν ἔστιν εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ Βυζαντίου κόπαις ἡμέρας μάλα μακρᾶς πλοῦς. This we should suppose could not be one hundred miles. Yet Arrian, in his Periplus, calls the distance one thousand six hundred and seventy stadia, which, at eight stadia to the mile, is more than two hundred miles; but probably Arrian reckoned the winding of the coast, which might be more than double the direct distance.

Anab. l. 6. c. 4. s. 8. meet the expected vessels. No occurrence disturbed the march; but, presently after his arrival, a fever ended the general's days.³¹

c. 3. s. 7. Xenophon took a more inland road; hoping by brisk progress, directly to Chalcedon, to arrive before the Bithynians could assemble in any great numbers to oppose him. But this hope was rendered vain by the diligence of the Arcadians in the execution of their project for marauding. Having landed by night at Porte-Calpe, they had proceeded immediately inland; and, dividing at daybreak, to fall at once upon several villages, they succeeded in their purpose of surprise: numbers of cattle were taken, and many slaves. Whether these were the slaves or the children of the Bithynians the historian has not specified, but they were probably both; for abundant testimony

Ch. 18. s. 4. of this Hist. concerning the manners of the Greeks gives to suppose that, upon such an occasion, free and bondmen, any that would fetch a price in the slavemarket, would be equally taken. Such being the ordinary Grecian practice we shall little wonder if the Bithynians earned the character, which report gained them, of singular cruelty to any Greeks who, by shipwreck or other accident, fell into their hands.

Anab. l. 6. c. 4. s. 1.

A hill had been agreed upon by the Arcadians where to reassemble. But the Bithynians meanwhile collecting in force pressed them so that while some joined with their booty, and some without, one party was entirely cut off, and of another only eight men escaped. The encouragement of success cooperating powerfully with the stimulation of resentment, the

c. 3. s. 4
—6.

³¹ According to Spelman, it was a medicine that killed Chirisophus; but I think the expression of Xenophon may be interpreted more favorably for the physician; and so Leunclavius, by his Latin version, appears to have thought.

numbers of the Bithynians increased rapidly; and the Arcadians, passing the night on the hill, found themselves in the morning surrounded and besieged. The Bithynian cavalry were numerous, the infantry all targeteers; while the Arcadians, all heavy-armed, open to annoyance from missile weapons, could not return a wound; and shortly they were excluded from their watering-place. Totally at a loss for measures, they proposed a treaty, and terms were agreed upon; but, the Bithynians refusing to give hostages, the Arcadians feared to trust them, and, in extreme anxiety, they passed a second night on the hill.

Xenophon meanwhile, pressing the march of his heavy-armed, employed his small body of cavalry in ranging the country, to collect intelligence and obviate surprise; and thus he obtained information of what had befallen the Arcadians. It was highly desirable, not only to relieve them, for the sake of many valuable officers and deserving soldiers, led unavoidably as the multitude had inclined, but to form a junction with them for the security of the farther march, which the alarm given to the country would make otherwise highly dangerous. In the deficiency of his force therefore Xenophon had recourse to stratagem. He directed his targeteers and horse, spreading from the heavy-armed, to set fire to everything combustible that fell in their way. Choosing his ground for the night on an eminence, whence the enemy's camp-fires were visible at the distance of about five miles, he caused numerous fires to be lighted, to give the appearance of extent to his camp, and, early in the night, all to be suddenly extinguished. Thus he hoped to encourage the Arcadians and alarm the Bithynians. At day-break he marched, proposing, by a sudden assault, to

SECT.
V.

Anab. 1. 6.
c. 3. s. 7.

s. 12.

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pierce the Bithynian line and join the Arcadians, who would co-operate on the other side. His stratagem took effect beyond his expectation: the Bithynians, fearful of nightly attack, withdrew silently. The Arcadians, finding themselves, with the dawn, at complete liberty, marched for Porte-Calpe; and when Xenophon's horse arrived at the hill some old men and women only were remaining, with a few sheep and oxen, part of the booty taken, which, in the haste of the troops to move, had been neglected. Xenophon followed to Port-Calpe. There, with the Arcadians, he found the forces which had marched under Chirisophus, but that general was already dead.

Anab. I. 6.
c. 4. s. 6.

Resting the next day, Xenophon prepared on the morrow,³² with the accustomed ceremony of sacrifice, for an inroad into the country to collect provisions: and he trusted that the alarm, which he had excited among the Bithynians, would not yet be subsided so far but that he might have leisure for burying the Arcadian slain. The symptoms of the victims being declared favorable, the Arcadians went out, under cover of his march, and themselves buried their dead; and in the evening all returned together to the camp. Misfortune and disgrace had now sufficiently excited disgust among the Arcadians toward those who had persuaded the secession, and prepared them for sober counsel. The older and more respectable of their

s. 7. 8.

³² Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο τῆς εἰς ταὐτὸ συνόδου.—Something seems wanting here; but the meaning is sufficiently decided by the expression, soon following, ἥδη γὰρ ἦσαν πεμπταῖοι, whence it appears that Leunclavius has translated well, and Spelman ill. The day next after the battle, in the Greek mode of expression, the *second day*, the Arcadians passed on the hill, the third they marched to Port-Calpe, the fourth they rested, and the fifth buried the slain. [The deficiency observed by Mr. Mitford has been supplied by Zeune on the authority of two MSS. He reads ὑστεραία ἡμ.]

officers therefore, Agasias of Stymphalus, Hieronymus of Elis, and some others, calling a meeting of the whole army, it was resolved that the former order of united strength, under the former generals, should be restored, and that in future it should be death to propose a division of the army.

But though union and subordination were thus renewed, some very inconvenient jealousies and suspicions remained among the soldiers. It was imagined that the generals, especially Xenophon, bent upon founding a colony, were desirous of delaying and impeding the return to Greece. The coast, from Heraclea to the Bosphorus, was yet wholly unoccupied by Greeks. Port-Calpe lay nearly midway. There a peninsular rock, with precipitous sides, containing room for the habitation of ten thousand men, commanding a plentiful fountain and a commodious harbour, was connected, by a narrow neck, with a great extent of fruitful country, abounding with well-inhabited villages, and bearing, even on the water's edge, a profusion of excellent ship-timber. The combination of advantages for a military and commercial settlement was uncommon. But the greater part of the soldiers having families or friends in Greece, whom they had left, not through want at home, but some urged by a disposition for adventure, others allured by the fame of advantages gained in the service of Cyrus, were now beyond all things anxious to return. The real difficulties however still opposing were not small. Could vessels have been procured, the passage to Byzantium was easy; but so much was not hoped for. Meanwhile they were without provisions; and to prevent them from collecting any from the country, and to check their march through it, the fierce and active Bithynians had been now joined by the well-

Anab.
l. 6. c. 4.
s. 2.—10.

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appointed cavalry of the satrap Pharnabazus. Under these circumstances the generals desired to place the incumbrances of the army in the peninsular rock of Calpe, where a small guard would secure them, while the most active of the troops might seek necessities for all. But the obvious advantages of the port and the adjoining territory, strengthening the suspicion entertained that the generals wanted to entrap them there, command and persuasion were equally ineffectual to induce the soldiers to pass the neck.³³

Under these difficulties, Xenophon recurred to his usual resource, the power of superstition over Grecian minds. We are equally with him, as with his master Socrates, at a loss to know what to think of their belief; but, notwithstanding the seriousness with which Xenophon continually speaks of his confidence in augury, and the pains he has taken frequently, and especially upon the present occasion, to justify his conduct under the declared will of the gods, his own account nevertheless appears clearly to indicate policy in all his measures. This at least seems certain, that no confidence in any symptom of the victims ever induced him to neglect any part of the duty of a general. Calling the army together he pointed out the impossibility of proceeding by sea, the difficulties and dangers of the march by land, and the absolute necessity of moving, which their pressing wants occasioned; and he concluded with proposing sacrifice, to learn whether the gods would favor their march.

Anab. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 16.

The Ambraciot Silanus having deserted the army at Heraclea to pass, with his three thousand darics, by sea to Greece, the Arcadian Arexion, his successor

³³ Spelman has satisfied himself here with translating unintelligibly what, in the original, seems indeed not by itself very clear, but yet sufficiently explained in the sequel.

in the dignity of chief prophet, presided at the sacred ceremony. He declared all the symptoms unfavorable, and the march was stopped for the day. Among the soldiers, hungry and dissatisfied, some, as Xenophon has candidly avowed, did not scruple to say that the prophet's declaration had been influenced by Xenophon. SECT.
V.

Informed of this, Xenophon caused proclamation to be made that sacrifice should be again offered on the morrow, when all prophets, if any were in the army, should attend, and any soldiers might be spectators. Many came; sacrifice was thrice repeated, and the symptoms always unfavorable. The disappointment was in some degree relieved by a report, said to have been communicated by a merchant-ship, passing along the coast, that Cleander, harmost of Byzantium, was coming, with triremes and transports. It was then more cheerfully resolved to wait the day; but still it was urged that sacrifice should be offered, to know if the gods would approve an inroad to collect provisions. Sacrifice, thrice again repeated, forbade this equally as the march. The soldiers thronged about Xenophon's tent, complaining of want of food; but he persisted in declaring he would undertake nothing with unfavorable omens. Anab. l. 6.
c. 4. s. 11.

On the next day sacrifice was again offered, the anxious soldiers crowded around, and the victims still forbade. The generals then agreed that the march was not to be undertaken. Assembling then the army, Xenophon spoke for them: 'Probably,' he said, 'the enemy were now collected in force, and for whatever purpose they moved it might be necessary to fight: if therefore the baggage were deposited in the strong post in the peninsula, and the march were managed in just preparation for action, possibly the' s. 12.

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'victims might favor the measure.' Here seems to appear some explanation of the mystery of Xenophon's conduct. At least his expression amounts to a declaration, afterward explicitly made,³⁴ that he thought the gods commonly favored human prudence, and would not give the reward of wisdom and just precaution to folly and rashness, or of diligence and vigor to remissness and sloth. Pressed however as the soldiers were by hunger, their jealousy of the purpose of the generals prevailed; they exclaimed against moving into the peninsula, and called for immediate sacrifice. Draft-oxen, alone to be found for victims, were immolated, but still the symptoms were adverse.

Anab. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 15.

The want of food now became severe. Neon, an Asinæan, (not a Lacedæmonian, but of those subjects of Lacedæmon who were included under the more comprehensive name of Laconians,) had been raised to the rank of general in the room of Chirisophus. Desirous of gratifying in his new command, he offered to lead any who would put themselves under him, notwithstanding any foreboding in the sacrifices, to plunder some villages to which an Heracleot, following the army, undertook to conduct. About two thousand turned out, with sacks, leathern bottles, and javelins. While dispersed among the villages for plunder they were attacked by a body of the satrap's cavalry: full five hundred were killed; a few reached the camp; the rest, assembling on a hill, defended themselves, but dared not move. In the whole expedition so great a loss had not been suffered from an enemy.

s. 18—20.

On the first intelligence of the event Xenophon assembled the army, and having sacrificed a draft-ox

³⁴ See forward, p. 262.; and Xen. Anab. 1. 6. c. 4. s. 2. 6. and 12.

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(it is to be presumed the symptoms were favorable, though he has omitted to say it) he marched with all under thirty years of age, and brought off the distressed party. The Bithynians however followed, occupied the thickets about the camp, and after dusk suddenly attacking the out-guards killed some, and drove the rest within the line. Great alarm ensued through the army; and though, by a proper disposition, immediate danger was soon obviated, no small despondency remained.

Thus at length the minds of the soldiers were sufficiently tamed, to obey the orders or take the advice of their generals. Next morning they submitted to be conducted into the peninsula, and an entrenchment, strengthened with a palisade, was made across the neck. Fortunately, on the same day, a vessel arrived from Heraclea with corn, wine, and live cattle, or, in the historian's phrase, victims.³⁵ Anab. l. 6.
c. 5, s. 1.

Early on the morrow Xenophon rose to sacrifice, and not only the prognostics, from the very first victim, were favorable, but, as the ceremony drew to a conclusion, the prophet Arexion saw an eagle portending good fortune. Immediately he exhorted Xenophon to march. The slaves, camp-followers, and baggage were left in the peninsula, with a guard, under the command of Neon, composed of all the soldiers who had exceeded their forty-fifth year: all the rest marched under Xenophon. s. 2. 3.

They had not proceeded two miles when they fell in with some scattered bodies of those slain in the last excursion. It was their first care to bury these as they advanced. Arriving about midday near the villages, they collected some necessaries, but avoided s. 4.
s. 5.

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XXIII.Anab. I. 6.
c. 5. s. 6.

s. 7. 8.

s. 9—13.

s. 16.

s. 17—23.

dispersing for plunder; and suddenly the enemy appeared in large force, upon some hills, not two miles off, Persian horse and Bithynian foot, checking their march upon discovering the Greeks, and forming in order of battle. Arexion immediately sacrificed, and the very first victim was favorable. Xenophon, knowing the temper of the enemy, thought it important immediately to march against them. While he was directing the reserve the head of the column halted at a deep glen,³⁶ crossing the way. The generals hesitated to pass it, with the enemy so near; and the Arcadian Sophænetus, oldest of those present, gave his opinion decidedly against the risk. Xenophon however, confident that it was safer to attack such an enemy, cavalry and targeteers, than to retreat before them, insisted upon going forward: ‘the victims had been all favorable,’ he said, ‘the omens all happy;’ and this argument enabled him to prevail.

Having passed the glen unmolested, apprehension changed into over-hardiness, and the targeteers ran forward, without orders. The Persian horse, with the crowd of Bithynian foot, met them with advantage of ground; put them to flight, followed toward the heavy-armed phalanx, which was advancing briskly, and approached with an appearance of firmness. But when the trumpet sounded, the pæan was

³⁶ Νάπος. I do not hesitate to thank Spelman for his explanation of this word, for which Strabo affords clear authority in his ninth book.—Πρόκειται δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἡ Κίρφης, κ. τ. λ. p. 640, vel 418. The Latin translators, satisfied with the word *saltus*, at least risk to mislead their readers. Xenophon has certainly meant to describe a valley, or glen; what in the provincial speech of the south of England is called a Bottom, in that of the north a Dene or a Gill; and the action of the horse shows that it was without wood, or very scantily wooded.

sung, and, with a shout, spears were presented, not waiting the charge, they turned and fled. Timasion, with the small body of Grecian horse, completely dispersed the left wing: but the right, pressed by no troops capable of rapid pursuit, collected again, and the phalanx was obliged to advance twice more to charge. Meanwhile the targeteers rallied, and exerting themselves against those whom the heavy-armed had thrown into confusion, the rout at length became complete; the enemy's horse flying from the Grecian foot, even down the steep sides of the glen, says the historian, as if horse were pursuing them. Raising their trophy then the Greeks returned, and about sunset reached their camp.

The advantage of Xenophon's policy became quickly manifest. An army of Persians and Bithynians differed widely from itself, encouraged by success or dejected by defeat. Directing their care to remove their property out of reach of those against whom they now despaired of defending it, they gave no more disturbance to the Greeks. Their families and more portable effects were carried up the country. Apparently the slaves employed in tillage, as well as the produce of tillage, were left; for parties, sent daily from the Grecian army, brought in corn, wine, pulse, and figs. The historian has not specified that this booty was, in any part, contribution by compact, obviating the destruction of farms and villages; but such profitable excursions could not be lasting without some moderation and method in plunder. We find however absolute freebooting (perhaps only against the more distant or refractory townships) not only was allowed, but regulated by a common vote of the army: when no military duty interfered, parties might maraud on their private account: when the generals directed an

Anab. l. 6.
c. 6. s. 1—3.

s. 2. & 15.

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expedition, the booty taken belonged to the common stock.

Anab. I. 6.
c. 6. s. 2. 3.

But the expectation of a profitable trade now brought supplies from the Grecian towns on the coast; a circumstance probably foreseen by Xenophon, so that there was a constant and plentiful market. Thus the army waited patiently for Cleander, who was expected from Byzantium. Meanwhile rumor having circulated of an intention to establish a colony at Port-Calpe, not only the Greek merchants were looking to it for new sources of commerce, but the nearest Bithynian tribes sent a deputation to Xenophon, inquiring upon what terms they might be received into friendship and alliance.

SECTION VI.

Return of the Greeks. Political state of Greece. Arrival of the Lacedæmonian governor of Byzantium at Port-Calpe: respect for Lacedæmonian officers. March of the army to Chrysopolis: arrival in Europe. Transactions at Byzantium. Despotism of Lacedæmonian officers.

The expedition of Cyrus and return of the Greeks, thus far, may seem little connected with any great political interest of the Greek nation; and yet for the pictures which Xenophon's account of it furnishes of the Grecian character, manners, religion, art of war, and military policy, for the information concerning Grecian colonies, maintaining themselves and flourishing, far from the mother-country, insulated among fierce and warlike barbarians, and perhaps yet more for the insight into the character and circumstances of that vast empire which had once nearly involved Greece in its growing vortex, and never ceased to be a formidable and interesting neighbour;

they would claim much consideration in Grecian history. But what has preceded is moreover an introduction hardly to be dispensed with for the sequel, where the connexion with the deepest interests of Greece becomes intimate.

The Lacedæmonian government being at this time arbiter of the Greek nation, or, according to the phrase of ancient writers, holding the empire of Greece, in the difficult management of that singular kind of imperial dominion no consideration perhaps was more important than that of the relation in which it stood, or might stand, with the Persian empire. Having taken part with Cyrus, first obscurely, but afterward openly, the result of that prince's enterprise must necessarily be looked for with anxiety; and his defeat and death, with the complete overthrow of his cause, and triumph of the royal arms, could not fail to be in a considerable degree alarming. They were alarming as the power of the Persian empire, undistracted by rebellions, was of itself formidable; but they were still more so as views adverse to the peace of Lacedæmon would be opened for that large part of the Greek nation itself which bore the Lacedæmonian supremacy not without extreme reluctance.

Nor would the return of the Cyrean Greek army, or the Ten-thousand, (the former name distinguishing it in its own day, the latter among posterity,) be indifferent to the Lacedæmonian government. Considering how that army was composed, though two Lacedæmonians had successively held the principal authority, yet its approach to states now under the Lacedæmonian dominion, and to Greece itself, with numbers so little diminished, and fame for its achievements great and singular, and views and disposition wholly

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unknown, would require some watching, as even an indispensable duty of a government looked to for the general protection of the nation. But the Lacedæmonian government, powerful abroad, was, through the contest of parties, as we have seen in treating of Athenian affairs, distracted and unsteady at home. The expectation of many in the Cyrean army, and especially of the late general Chirisophus, had been that, in consequence of the part taken in the cause of Cyrus, war could not fail between Lacedæmon and Persia; and hence the hope of being taken into the Lacedæmonian service, with the revived prospect of fortune. But this appears to have depended upon the turn of politics at Lacedæmon, and especially upon the decision whether Lysander's party or that of Pausanias should rule there. For though direct information of the domestic politics of that state rarely reaches us, yet the sequel will considerably confirm what preceding matters show probable, that Lysander's party could not persevere in the line taken when the Lacedæmonian government determined to support the rebellion of Cyrus, which was clearly making war with the king; and that, on the contrary, the party of Pausanias, perhaps always opposing that measure, but certainly strengthened by its failure, which would bring discredit on their opponents, proposed to strengthen themselves farther, and possibly also hoped to do their country the best service, by managing reconciliation, first with the western satraps, and then, through them, with the court of Susa itself. In this policy we find an important step had been already gained; for Pharnabazus, who ruled the north-western provinces of Lesser Asia, was among the actual allies of Lacedæmon.

Anab. l. 7.
init.

Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of

things when Cleander, harmost of Byzantium, so long looked for, at length arrived at Port Calpe; but, instead of the expected fleet, brought only two triremes, with not a single transport. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, who had deserted with the penteconter borrowed from the Trapezuntines, confident in his favor with Anaxibius and Cleander, and in the terror of the Lacedæmonian name, was restrained neither by fear nor shame from returning to the army he had so grossly injured; he came in Cleander's train. It happened that, when they landed, a large detachment was absent on an expedition; and some marauders, who thought the opportunity favorable for private plunder, were returning with a large number of sheep, stolen in the neighbourhood.³⁷ Falling in with Cleander, they feared they should lose their booty; but, knowing the character of Dexippus, they proposed to deliver the whole to him, to return them a part at his pleasure. Some other soldiers, accidentally witnesses of the transaction, remonstrating that the sheep were the common property of the army, Dexippus ordered them to disperse. The soldiers disregarding the commands of one so little entitled to respect, Dexippus hastened to Cleander, and telling his story uncontradicted, received an order in consequence of which he arrested a soldier of the lochus of the Arcadian Agasias. The lochage accidentally passing, rescued the man, con-

Anab. l. 6.
c. 6. s. 5.

³⁷ Σπράτευμα means here not *the army, exercitus*, simply, as Spelman and the Latin translators have turned it, but *agmen* or *exercitus qui in expeditionem educitur*, as Hederic has justly explained the word. The generals, it appears, were mostly present while the *σπράτευμα* was out. The ὄρος, mentioned in this passage, seems to be the hill, one end of which formed the peninsula, and the other stretched into the plain country, as described by Xenophon in his account of Port-Calpe, l. 6. c. 4. s. 3.

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XXIII.Anab. 1. 6.
c. 6. s. 6.

ceiving the interference of Dexippus to be grossly impertinent. A tumult ensued; the soldiers reviled Dexippus as a deserter and traitor: their passions warmed; they began to throw stones; and Cleander's seamen, and in the end Cleander himself, alarmed, ran toward the shore. Xenophon and the other generals presently interfering stopped the tumult and apologized for it; but Cleander, previously instigated by Dexippus, and now vexed at the fear he had shown, threatened to depart immediately, to proclaim the army enemies to Lacedæmon, and to send directions that no Grecian city should receive them: nor would he accept any apology less than the delivery of the soldier arrested, and the officer who released him.

To Greeks and freemen, who had been asserting the glory of the Grecian name at a distance before unthought-of for Grecian arms, who had been defying the power of the greatest monarch in the world in the very centre of his vast empire, this, from the governor of a little colony of their fellow-countrymen was a strange greeting, just as they were returning to their country, powerful still, they thought, while they held together, and respectable when they should separate. The generals, aware that the business might be serious, assembled the army. Some made light of Cleander and his threats: Xenophon addressed the assembly thus: 'Fellow-soldiers, we are 'already approaching the Grecian cities, and you 'know that the Lacedæmonians preside over Greece. 'Perhaps however you do not enough know that in 'every Grecian city the will of any Lacedæmonian 'suffices for any act of authority. Should Cleander 'then, who commands Byzantium, report us to the 'other governors as a lawless band, refractory against

‘ the authority of Lacedæmon, and, especially, should
 ‘ he find credit with Anaxibius, the commander-in-
 ‘ chief, it would be difficult for us equally to stay
 ‘ here or to go elsewhere. We must therefore ne-
 ‘ cessarily obey those, whatever they command, whom
 ‘ the cities whence we come obey. I therefore (for
 ‘ I understand Dexippus accuses me of persuading
 ‘ and supporting Agasias) will exonerate you from
 ‘ the imputation and its consequences by submitting
 ‘ myself to judgment; and I hold that all others
 ‘ accused ought equally to surrender themselves;
 ‘ that so you, justly expecting to receive credit and
 ‘ honor in your country, may not, on your return to
 ‘ it, be deprived of the common rights of Grecian
 ‘ citizens.’

Agasias, always attached to Xenophon, warmly ^{Anab.}
 exculpated him, and declared his readiness to sur- ^{l. 6. c. 6.}
 render himself. He requested only that some officers ^{s. 10. 11.}
 might be appointed to assist in his justification; and
 the choice being allowed him, he desired the generals.
 Accordingly these, with Agasias, and the man rescued ^{s. 12.}
 by Agasias, going to Cleander declared they came in
 pursuance of a common vote of the army to offer
 themselves, and all that army, or any member of it,
 to be judged by him, and disposed of at his dis-
 cretion.³⁸ This appears a complete acknowledgment
 of despotic authority over the Greek nation, not in
 one sovereign, but in every Spartan in office. Agasias
 then presented himself as the person who had rescued
 the soldier, alleging his knowledge of the soldier's ^{s. 13—15.}
 merit and of Dexippus's treachery, and declaring that
 he had no thought of resisting Cleander, or any whom
 he knew to act under his authority. Cleander how-

³⁸ These are strong terms, but they are faithful to the original
 of Xenophon, κρίναντα σεαυτὸν χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούληται.

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ever required that Agasias and the soldier should be left in custody; and, dismissing the generals, told them he should desire their attendance at the trial.

Anab. 1. 6.
c. 6. s. 16.

Xenophon, again assembling the army, recommended that a deputation, in the name of all, should request from Cleander the liberation of the prisoners. It was accordingly voted that the generals and lo-chages, with Dracontius a Spartan, and a few others selected for the occasion, should wait upon him. That formidable army, which had made the Persian monarch tremble on his throne, and traversed his empire in defiance of his force, then threw itself, by the voice of its favorite general, in these humble terms, on the mercy of a Lacedæmonian governor of a town in Thrace; out of his government, and supported, on the spot, by no greater force than the crews of two small ships:

s. 17.

‘The accused,’ said Xenophon, addressing Cleander, ‘are in your power; and the army submits them and itself to your discretion. Nevertheless it is the desire and prayer of all that they be not put to death, but restored to the army, with which their former merits have been great. Should this favor be obtained the army promises, if you will take the command, to show itself orderly and obedient, and able, the gods willing, to defy any enemy. It is indeed their earnest wish to serve under your immediate orders; that you may know, from experience, the comparative merits of Dexippus and all others, and reward every man according to his desert.’

Such submission (such servility it might perhaps on some occasions be called) at length satisfied Cleander. Wonder is apt to arise at testimonies like this concerning what, in ancient and modern times,

has been so much eulogized as Grecian liberty. But, however later authors may have extolled Greece as the favorite land of freedom, in the assertion and in the enjoyment of which it afforded example for all the world, yet we find the portrait there exhibited harmonizing with every account remaining from the incomparable writers who lived in the republican times: all show that the spirit of independency indeed ran high in Greece, and often produced actions most worthy of admiration; but that substantial freedom was little found there. And if, from what actually was, we turn to the observations and schemes of the ablest speculative men of the same ages, we find Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle unable to propose how Greece should be free. This then may be Xenophon's apology for the politics recommended in that work, so admired by the ancients, his *Cyropædia*. Fortunately for us, we derive from our forefathers incomparably better principles, with fair and glorious example of better practice.

Cleander, feeling enough his importance as a Lacedæmonian in office, had however liberality as well as talents. 'The conduct of the army,' he said, 'sufficiently confuted the report of its disaffection to Lacedæmon. The accused should be immediately restored, and he would not refuse the honorable office, offered him, of leading it to Greece.' Immediately he entered into a connexion of hospitality and friendship with Xenophon; but the sacrifices being, for three successive days, unpropitious, he assembled the generals, remitted the command into their hands, and, promising the army the best reception in his power on its arrival at Byzantium, after mutual compliments paid, he departed by sea.

Anab. l. 6.
c. 6. s. 18.

s. 19. 20.

s. 21.

The army then, marching under the former gene-

Anab. l. 6.
c. 6. s. 22.

als, traversed Bithynia unmolested; but, finding no plunder in the direct way, turned, and collected large booty of slaves and cattle. On the sixth day they arrived at Chrysopolis on the Bosporus, over-against Byzantium, where they were so among Grecian colonies that they might reckon themselves almost arrived in Greece.

The apprehension excited by the Cyrean army, emerging from barbarous countries, and approaching the western shore of Asia, was in some degree common to Greeks and Persians; and indeed the conduct of that army had afforded to both but too much ground. Pharnabazus especially was alarmed. Bithynia, one of the wilder provinces of his satrapy, having been already plundered, and his cavalry, assisting the people to protect their property, repeatedly fought and defeated, it was feared that the richer parts of his country might invite its next enterprise.

l. 7. c. 1.
s. 2. 3.

As an ally of Lacedæmon therefore he applied to Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, pressing earnestly for the removal of the Cyreans out of Asia. It seems probable that to these circumstances we should look for the considerations which determined Cleander to avoid the command after he had undertaken it, and leave the army to its own ways for the march to the Bosporus; and it may perhaps be suspected that the indications in the sacrifices were but artificial auxiliaries to his purpose. Apparently not averse to the politics of Lysander, he would perhaps gladly have commanded such an army as the Cyrean for war against Persia. To conciliate therefore, rather than offend it, would be his purpose; and he might be willing that it should commit the hostilities, possibly projected before he left it, which would provoke war, provided he incurred no blame.

But connexion with the opposite party in Lacedæmon is rather indicated in the conduct of Anaxibius; though with principles so loose that, where private gain was in view, party interests held no competition with it. In the moment he seems to have reckoned that, to make the most of his high command during the short remainder of its term, he should gratify the satrap. Accordingly, sending for the generals and lochages of the Cyrean army to Byzantium, he proposed its immediate passage to the European shore; offering pay for the whole to commence on its arrival. This having been, now for some time, the object of the best hope for the greater part, was acceded to with general joy. Xenophon had declared his purpose to sail immediately for Athens; but at the request of Anaxibius he held his command for the passage to Byzantium. There at length, finding themselves once more on European ground, and supposing themselves established in the service of the republic that commanded Greece, they felicitated themselves as if all difficulties were ended and they were already at home.

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 5.

No pay however had yet been issued when they were surprised with an order to assemble, out of the town, with arms and baggage, as for a march. Under much uneasiness, anxiety, and discontent this order was slowly obeyed. Nearly all however were assembled when Anaxibius came, and, calling together the generals and lochages, directed them 'to proceed to the Chersonese, where Cyniscus,' he said, 'the Lacedæmonian governor, would receive them into pay; and provisions for the way they might take from the Thracian villages.' The generals, surprised, yet obedient, began making the necessary inquiries concerning the roads, and the state of the

s. 8. 9.

CHAP.
XXIII.Anab. i. 7.
c. i. s. 10.

country to be passed. Meanwhile intelligence of the purpose getting among the soldiers, set them instantly in fury. Snatching their arms, some ran back toward the gate, and, upon its being shut against them, with vehement complaints of ill treatment, threatened to force it; others, running to the shore, found an easy passage over the mole into the town, where some of their comrades were yet loitering. Joined by these they forced the gate, and the whole army rushed in.

The utmost alarm and terror pervaded Byzantium. The agora was instantly deserted. Some of the inhabitants barricaded themselves in their houses, some fled aboard the ships; all apprehended the rapine and carnage usual in a place taken by storm. Anaxibius himself, running to the shore, passed in a fishing-boat to the citadel, and sent in haste to Chalcedon for a re-enforcement to the small garrison.

s. 12.

s. 14. 15.

The Cyrean generals themselves feared that, in the circumstances which the dishonest and weak policy of the Spartan commander-in-chief had superinduced, they should hardly be able to restrain the army from outrage. Xenophon, who had still attended at the particular request of Anaxibius, when he saw the gate forced, fearing for the town, for the army, and for his own character and safety, had pressed in with the soldiers. Quickly he engaged their attention. Crowding about him they said, 'Now, Xenophon, is the time to raise yourself and serve us: the army is at your devotion; and the city, and the fleet in the harbour, and all that both contain, are your own.' 'Right,' said Xenophon, 'but the first thing necessary is order among you. Form, as quickly as possible.' That called the Thracian square, where they happened to be, having space enough, he was instantly obeyed: the heavy-

armed formed in column, fifty deep; the targeteers ran to the flanks. Having thus checked thoughtless violence in the outset, Xenophon, in a soothing speech, represented to the army 'the iniquity and 'dishonor of injuring the Byzantines, who had never 'injured them, and the impossibility of resisting the 'power of Lacedæmon, which had subdued Athens, 'and now commanded Greece;' and in conclusion he recommended, 'that a deputation be sent to Anax-
Anab. l. 7. c. 1. s. 16—20.
 ibius, to assure him that they had returned into the 'town with no purpose of outrage, but certainly with 'the wish to obtain from him that assistance which 'he had promised: that should he still refuse it they 'were ready to march away at his order; but they 'were desirous of demonstrating that their obedience 'was willing, and that to beguile them was unnecessary.' The army was persuaded, and the de-
s. 21.
 putation was sent.

The circumstances, both of Greece and of the surrounding countries, offered numerous opportunities for adventurers, especially for military adventurers. There happened to be in Byzantium a Theban, named Cyratades, who professed the business of a general, ready to serve anywhere in the command of troops, for Greek cities or other nations. While the army was waiting this man came and proposed himself for their leader, undertaking to conduct them to profitable enterprise in Thrace, and, in the interval, to provide them subsistence from his private means. The mention at the same time of pay and plunder had excited attention, when the officers who were sent
s. 22.
 into the citadel returned with a message from Anax-ibius, assuring the army that they should have no cause to repent their moderation and obedience; that he would report to the Lacedæmonian government

CHAP.
XXIII.

their good conduct, and would consider by what means he might immediately serve them. Soothed thus by Anaxibius, and upon the point of losing Xenophon, who was still bent upon returning to Athens, officers and men acceded to the proposal of Cyratades. He promised that every necessary for setting out on their proposed expedition should be ready next morning; victuals, drink, victims, and a prophet, (it is Xenophon's list,) and upon this they quietly marched out of the town. They were no sooner gone than Anaxibius caused the gates to be locked, and proclamation to be made that, if any soldiers of the Cyrean army were any more found in Byzantium, they should be sold for slaves. Such was the treatment of this gallant army, on its first arrival in a European Greek city, from the commander-in-chief of the united forces of Greece.

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 24.

Xenophon (who had staid thus long at the particular request of Anaxibius) found himself, in return for his service in preserving the town from pillage and slaughter, banished in common with the whole army from its walls. Applying to Cleander, the governor, his host, he obtained, with some difficulty, permission to enter; but upon condition that he would sail with Anaxibius, who, on the approaching expiration of the term of his command, was to return to Greece.

s. 25.

Whether the policy of Anaxibius, or his own presumptuous folly, had urged Cyratades to an undertaking which could only involve him in immediate shame, (though it appears far more likely the former,) he was utterly unable to provide even one day's subsistence for the army. Its obedience therefore was instantly withdrawn from him, and the troops took quarters for themselves in the Thracian villages;

under what compact, or with what violence, we are uninformed. Xenophon only proceeds to observe that, none of the generals having influence enough to unite all in any settled design, the army wasted in inaction. Many of the soldiers sold their arms; some got their passage for Greece; some settled themselves in the Grecian towns on the Propontis. Anaxibius rejoiced in this decay of that once-powerful and proud army; less as he feared injury to any Grecian settlement, or to the Lacedæmonian authority, than as he hoped to be paid for gratifying the Persian satrap.

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 1. 2.

Apparently the Lacedæmonian government remained yet balancing what policy to follow toward Persia. But it seems likely that Lysander's party had communicated with the Cyreans, and encouraged hope of Lacedæmonian service for them through war in Asia. Thus the party of Pausanias, which still preponderated, would entertain the greater jealousy of them, and be more disposed to direct or approve the conduct of Anaxibius. That officer, quitting at length his command, took Xenophon with him for the voyage to Greece. He put into the port of Parium, near the northern entrance of the strait of the Hellespont, for the purpose of holding farther communication with Pharnabazus. But, without a character to win esteem, upon losing his power he could no longer command respect. The policy of Asiatic councils was now directed to cultivate the friendship of the superseding officers, Aristarchus, who had passed up the Propontis to take the government of Byzantium, and Polus, the new commander-in-chief, who was daily expected. The promise of Aristarchus was already engaged, that no disturbance

CHAP.
XXIII.Anab. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 5.

should be given by the Cyrean army to the Bithynian satrapy. Anaxibius then, no longer able to profit from service to his own party, seems to have proposed to earn credit with the opposite party by a very strong measure. He proposed to Xenophon to go to the army, and bring it over into Asia: offering a vessel for the passage, with orders that horses should be furnished for his use, and obedience paid to his commands. Xenophon, knowing, as he says, that, however the generals were divided, the soldiers would universally rejoice in the opportunity to make war in the rich satrapies of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, undertook the business. Being received by the army with all the joy he expected, he led it immediately to Perinthus, there to embark for Asia.

What really persuaded him to such a measure his necessarily cautious account does not explain. Possibly he had expectation, or possibly false information, of a change in the government of Lacedæmon. The conduct of Cleander seems to indicate such expectation. As soon as the controlling authority of Anaxibius was removed from Byzantium, with a just regard for humanity, for the Greek nation, and for his friendship contracted with Xenophon, he had been kindly attentive to all Cyrean soldiers in the place and neighbourhood, particularly directing quarters to be provided for the sick. On the contrary, one of the first measures of the new harmost of Byzantium, Aristarchus, was to order all Cyrean soldiers, that could be found in the town, to be arrested; and, in strict pursuance of the tyrannical edict of Anaxibius, he sold four hundred for slaves. Hearing then of the march of the army to Perinthus, he went thither with two triremes, and forbade its passage to Asia.

s. 7.

In vain Xenophon urged the authority of Anaxibius. From his own account seemingly he should have known that Anaxibius neither had authority, nor deserved influence. Aristarchus answered, that Anaxibius was no longer commander-in-chief; that he was himself governor there, and that he would sink any vessel attempting to transport troops to Asia. Next day he sent for the generals and lochages to attend him in Perinthus. They obeyed the summons; but, as they approached the town, intelligence was communicated to Xenophon that if he entered the walls he would be arrested, and either suffer on the spot, or be delivered to Pharnabazus. Under pretence of a sacrifice therefore he returned to the camp. The rest proceeding were not admitted to the presence of Aristarchus, but desired to attend again in the evening; and this confirmed Xenophon in the opinion that the information given him was well-founded.

To cross into Asia, in opposition to the Lacedæmonian commanders, would be neither easy to effect, nor safe if effected. In the Chersonese, whither Anaxibius had pointed their view, they would be as in a trap, under the power of the Lacedæmonian governor there; and, having experienced Spartan fraud, they feared Spartan policy. Thus, in the midst of flourishing Grecian settlements, and almost in Greece, the Cyreans, threatened on all sides, found themselves more at a loss which way to turn than when first deserted by their Persian allies, thousands of miles from home, in the middle of the hostile Persian empire.

SECTION VII.

Return of the Greeks. Circumstances of Thrace. Service of the army with a Thracian prince. Engagement of the army in the Lacedæmonian service: passage to Asia, and march to join the Lacedæmonian forces.

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XXIII.

The political state of the world, that arrangement which the wisdom of man can make for establishing the rights and restraining the misconduct of his own species, may appear, in modern times, defective enough; but, as far as we can look into antiquity, we find a state of things less harmonized and more precarious. Hence continual opportunity for profit to those who would make war their trade; and hence arose still a glimmering of hope for the Cyreans. The best market was generally found among the most polished and luxurious nations; and so, as civilization spread, the market was extended. Various circumstances, of late years, had led to increased intercourse of the Greeks with the Thracians, whence civilization gained among the latter. Long since, though spurning at all other trade, the Thracians would let their valor and skill in arms for hire: the progress then was easy, if need occurred, to hiring the service of others. A Thracian prince, Seuthes son of Mæsadæ, had solicited the service of the Cyreans. His immediate means of remuneration were small; but his promises, should success attend their exertions in his favor, were alluring. Seuthes was descended from Teres, that powerful chieftain who, as we have formerly seen, united under his dominion all the Thracian clans, from the Ægean to the Danube, and from the Euxine to the Strymon; whose son and

Anab. l. 7.
c. 1. s. 4.
c. 2. s. 6. 18.
s. 12.

Ch. 14. s. 2.
of this Hist.

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VII.

successor, Sitalces, married a Greek lady, and accepted the freedom of Athens; and whose grandson, Seuthes son of Sparadocus, the successor of Sitalces, married Stratonice, sister of Perdiccas king of Macedonia. The advantage of such connexions, added to that of dominion superior in extent, revenue, and military force to any other then in Europe, it might be expected would bring civilization into Thrace, and raise that country to a political importance equal to any then in the world. The splendor of the monarchy accordingly was increased by Seuthes son of Sparadocus; and no misfortune befel it of which Thucydides has left notice. But a nation is not so soon to be changed: the manners and prejudices of the Thracian people involved the princes in the national degradation, before the princes could effect any considerable improvement of the people. What were the convulsions that produced the decline of the Odrysian power we are not informed; but we learn from Xenophon that it had a rapid fall, and that the Thracians remained barbarians.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 97.Anab. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 18.

When the Cyrean army returned from the east Medocus reigned over the Odrysians; and, though very inferior to his predecessors, was the principal potentate of Thrace. His usual residence was at the distance of twelve days' journey, within land, from the Propontis. Mæsades had possessed a principality, apparently a subordinate principality, over three conquered tribes in the neighbourhood of Byzantium; but, in the decay of the Odrysian power, had been expelled by them, and died soon after. The successful revolvers maintained themselves in a wild sort of republican freedom, while Seuthes, the infant son of Mæsades, was kindly entertained by his sovereign and kinsman, Medocus. But the spirit of a Thracian

c. 3. s. 7.

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XXIII.Anab. l. 7.
c. 3. s. 18.

could not brook inactive dependency. On attaining manhood Seuthes requested of his protector that, instead of remaining a burthen upon his generosity, looking up to him like a dog, (his expression reported from his own mouth by Xenophon,) he might be allowed such force as could be spared him to attempt the recovery of his inheritance. A small body, horse and foot, was granted; and, from that time, Seuthes, unable to subdue the people, had however supported himself and his followers by plunder from his paternal principality.³⁹

³⁹ The genealogy of a chieftain of three small tribes of barbarians cannot be, in itself, very important; but, for the sake of high authority wantonly attacked, and of the consistency of history, which is liable to gross injury from hasty and unexamined surmises, especially of able commentators, I shall take some notice of that of Seuthes. With a mixture of rashness and carelessness, which one cannot but be surprised to find in him, Spelman would have Seuthes, mentioned by Xenophon as son of Mæsades, the same person with the Seuthes mentioned by Thucydides as son of Sparadocus. (See the second note of the sixth book, and the fifteenth note of the seventh book, of his translation of the Expedition of Cyrus.)

Among the Greeks, we know, as among the Welsh, the father's name served, in the want of a family name, to distinguish the individual from others of the same name, and was therefore, in describing persons, an object for careful attention. Sparadocus and Mæsades have no such resemblance as could occasion the mistake of one name for the other, by either author or transcriber; and the connexion of Thucydides and the communication of Xenophon with Thrace were such that deficient information cannot reasonably be imputed to either. Spelman has not undertaken to say which was mistaken; but, without the slightest reason alleged, his surmise necessarily attributes a mistake to one of them. If, instead of such able contemporary authors, who had such uncommon means of information, he had attributed such an error, even by a mere guess, to such a writer as Diodorus, who, according to Dodwell's phrase, confounded history some hundred years after, he would have been more excusable; unless evidence as clear, as what in this case he ought

Such was the state of things when the Cyrean army arrived at Chrysopolis. Before it crossed the strait, agents came from Seuthes to invite its service. The overtures, then rejected, but renewed when it

to have been aware of, contradicted the supposition. For, setting aside the distinction of the father's name, generally decisive for identification among the Greeks, or supposing one only to have been properly a name, and the other a title, (for sometimes the want of attention to such distinction perhaps may have produced some confusion of foreign names among Greek writers,) still, had Spelman taken the trouble to compare the history of the Seuthes mentioned by Thucydides with that of the Seuthes under whom Xenophon served, he would have seen that they could not be the same. Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, passed his youth with his uncle Sitalces; and, after long acting under him as his principal favorite, on his death succeeded to his extensive and powerful dominion. (Thucyd. l. 2. c. 101.) That dominion consisted of the chieftainship of the conquering clan, the Odrysians, which was the ancient inheritance of his family, with the paramount sovereignty over all the other Thracian tribes, acquired by the conquests of Teres; and the revenue of this large dominion, as Thucydides assures us, Seuthes himself improved. During his youth and after his accession therefore the Odrysian power was at its height. But Mæsadæ, father of Xenophon's Seuthes, was prince only of three conquered tribes, the Melandæpts, Thyns, and Thranipses, bordering on the Propontis, while Medocus reigned over the Odrysians. Xenophon expressly says it was in the decay of the Odrysian power that Mæsadæ was expelled by his subjects; and Seuthes, his son, was then under age, a mere boy; for so much not only is implied in the term *ὀρφανός*, (*pupillus*, as Leunclavius has rendered it,) but fully confirmed by the phrase that follows, *ἐπεὶ δὲ νεανίσκος ἐγενόμην*. This Seuthes was protected and educated by Medocus king of the Odrysians, and never himself pretended to the Odrysian throne, but was happy to recover his principality over the three tribes above-mentioned more than twenty years after Seuthes son of Sparadocus had succeeded his uncle Sitalces in the monarchy of Thrace. All this being clearly stated by the two able contemporary historians, without the least appearance of contradiction between them, Spelman's fancy, as unnecessary for any explanation as unfounded on any authority, seems unaccountable.

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XXIII.Anab. 1. 7.
c. 3. s. 6.

was driven from Byzantium, were, through disagreement among the generals, again fruitless. But now, when, disappointed in all other views, while the season (for it was mid-winter) denied the passage for such numbers to Greece, and the soldiers were without means for providing themselves in a friendly country, to go wherever an enemy to be plundered could be pointed out seemed the only resource for subsistence. Xenophon therefore resolved to postpone his return to Athens, and endeavour to serve the army by going himself to negotiate with Seuthes.

c. 2. s. 9.

s. 6.

The connexion of Neon, as an Asinæan, with Lacedæmon, had decided his politics. He had attached himself to Aristarchus, and seceding now from the army with about eight hundred men, he encamped apart. All the other generals approved the proposal of Xenophon, and each named a confidential officer to attend him. Xenophon, adding Polycrates, an Athenian lochage, as his own assistant, rode by night to a castle where Seuthes was then residing, scarcely eight miles from the camp. As they approached, many fires being seen, but no people, they imagined Seuthes had suddenly moved his residence. Presently

s. 10.

s. 11.

however the hum of voices was heard, and communication of signals distinguished. An interpreter soon advanced, and, after due explanation, an escort of two hundred targeteers coming conducted Xenophon with his attendants to the castle. Everything around, it was observed, marked extreme precaution against surprise. By the distant fires whatever approached was visible, while darkness involved the castle and its watch. The horses of a surrounding out-guard of cavalry, fed only by day, were kept bridled and ready for instantly mounting all night. It was requested of Xenophon that only two of his attendants

s. 12.

might enter with him. Such were the fears in which this prince habitually lived; the Thyn-Thracians, his revolted subjects, possessors of the country, being esteemed singularly expert and daring in nocturnal enterprise. Anab. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 13.

Xenophon with his two companions being introduced to the prince, horns of wine, according to the Thracian custom, were presented with the first salutation. After some conversation Xenophon desired that his other principal followers might be admitted; but, to obviate the prince's jealousy, directed that they should leave all weapons without. s. 16. Seuthes however exclaiming that he mistrusted no Athenian, that, s. 17. on the contrary, he considered all as his kinsmen and friends, the whole party was introduced. The prince's proposals were then declared. His purpose was to subdue the country, formerly subject to his father: with the Grecian army added to his own forces, he was confident, he said, it would be easy. For monthly s. 18—20. pay he offered a Cyzicene, about a guinea, to every soldier, two to the lochages, and four to the generals; a common proportion, it appears, for Grecian service. Protection, to those who might want it against the Lacedæmonians, at the motion of Xenophon he readily promised: and, as land was what a Thracian prince could perhaps of all things most cheaply give, he offered it in any quantity; but he also promised to make it valuable by adding oxen for cultivation, and a fortified sea-port for securely exporting the produce. To Xenophon in particular he promised Bisante, his best town on the coast, with the offer of his daughter in marriage, and assurance that, if Xenophon had a daughter, he would buy her, according to the Thracian custom.

The liberality of these promises seems so nearly to have approached extravagance that it might not

CHAP. unreasonably have excited suspicion. If Xenophon
 XXIII. however had any, he has not declared it. Right
 Anab. I. 7. hands were mutually given, and Xenophon with his
 c. 3. s. 1. followers returned to their camp before day. In the
 morning Aristarchus again sent for the generals, but
 they refused to go. The army being assembled, the
 s. 2. 3. proposal of Seuthes was explained, and joyfully ac-
 cepted: Neon and others from Aristarchus endea-
 voured to dissuade; holding out promises of advan-
 tage from the Lacedæmonian government for service
 in the Chersonese; but they were little heard.

Xenophon led, and the army marched. Before
 they advanced four miles Seuthes met them, and
 s. 4. took the office of guide. In the afternoon they
 reached some villages stored with provisions, where
 the soldiers were well supplied, while the generals
 s. 7—16. and lochages supped with the prince. The detail
 of this entertainment, the most curious of its kind
 remaining from antiquity, shows, among the Thra-
 cians, considerable resemblance to customs, yet com-
 mon, among the politest people of the East; and,
 among the Greeks, not that correctness of manners,
 though Xenophon himself is an exception, which
 s. 17. might be expected. At sunset, when, after a plenti-
 ful repast, the cup had sufficiently circulated, the
 Greeks arose, alleging the necessity of posting their
 night-guards and giving out the word. Their know-
 ledge of Thracian manners, and their observation of
 wine consumed, gave them to suppose that Seuthes
 would not rise sober; but, without any appearance of
 ebriety, he followed them, and proposed, by marching
 that night, to surprise the enemy, yet uninformed
 s. 18—20. of his increased strength. Much plunder he hoped
 might be taken, and many prisoners; which, as the
 Grecian towns of the neighbourhood afforded a

ready market for slaves, might be turned to good account. SECT. VII.

The Greeks approved, and at midnight the army marched. Not however till toward noon next day they reached the summit of a mountain-ridge, covered with deep snow, and descending unlooked-for into the plain beyond, they found the expected prey. About a thousand slaves were taken with two thousand head of neat, and ten thousand of smaller cattle. Anab. l. 7. c. 3. s. 21.

Next morning Seuthes burnt all the villages, proposing to bring the people to submission by the fear of losing their shelter and subsistence in the severity of winter. The booty was sent to be sold at Perinthus to provide pay for the army. s. 28. c. 4. s. 1.

In this country, in so southern a latitude, and only two days' march from the sea, a heavy snow falling, the cold was so intense that water froze as it was carried from the spring, and even the wine in the vessels became ice. The Greeks had not so profited from experience in Armenia and Pontus but that, with their short cloaks and bare thighs, they suffered severely: some, frost-bitten, lost ears and noses. Then they discovered the advantage of the Thracian military dress, which at first had appeared uncouth: foxskin caps covering the ears, cloaks reaching below the knee, and warm covering for the horsemen's legs, protected Seuthes's troops against the inconveniences of weather, to which their constitutions also were, by yearly practice, more hardened. s. 2.

In such a season however the Thyns, driven from their villages to seek refuge among the mountains, could not but be distressed. Finding themselves unable to resist the destruction threatened to all their valleys, they sent proposals of submission, and re- s. 8. 9.

Anab. 1. 7. requested Xenophon's mediation in their favor. A
 c. 4. s. perfidious attack on the Grecian quarters followed;
 10—15. and particularly against Xenophon's. It was however
 s. 16. successfully resisted, and the forces of Seuthes being
 greatly increased by Odrysian volunteers, the Thyns
 threw themselves on his mercy. The Thracian prince
 paid the compliment to Xenophon to offer him any
 revenge he might choose for the perfidy which had
 been directed against his life. Xenophon answered
 that, if he desired revenge, he should have it abund-
 antly, in the change of the condition of the people
 from independency to subjection under despotic au-
 thority.⁴⁰ Xenophon, it appears, knew how to value
 freedom; but was not nicely scrupulous of supporting
 the cause of despotism.

c. 5. s. 1—9. Seuthes, having thus recovered his patrimony,
 found himself, within the short space of two months,

⁴⁰ Εἰ οὗτοι δοῦλοι ἔσονται ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων.—If these people
 were, instead of freemen, to become slaves. Spelman. This
 does not duly convey to English readers the sense of the original.
 The word δοῦλος was not confined to the strict meaning of *slave*
 with us: for this the Greeks used the term ἀνδράποδον; the
 other applied to any who lived under a despotic government.
 Thus Xenophon makes Cyrus call himself δοῦλος; and that sub-
 jection to Lacedæmon, under which the Thirty proposed to
 govern Athens, is termed by Isocrates and Lysias δουλεία and
 δουλεύειν. Isocr. Areop. p. 140. v. 2. & Lys. περὶ τῆς Εὐανδρ.
 δοκιμ. p. 177. vel 804. But Lysias calls his manufacturer slaves
 ἀνδράποδα. Adv. Eratosth. p. 388. If we sometimes apply the
 term *slave* to the subjects of arbitrary governments, it is by a
 rhetorical licence, and not in the sober language of historical
 narrative: we do not consider a Chinese mandareen, a Turkish
 bashaw, or a Spanish grandee as the same description of person
 with a West Indian slave; nor would the Greeks have called
 Cyrus ἀνδράποδον, though he might call himself δοῦλος. Xeno-
 phon (de rep. Ath. c. 1. s. 11.) uses the expression of δουλεύειν
 ἀνδραπόδοις—meaning that the Athenian people were subservient
 to their slaves, not slaves to them.

from a wandering freebooter, become prince of a considerable territory. His army was increased not only with the strength of the conquered people, but with numerous Odrysians, whom success allured to his standard. To the north of Byzantium, bordering on the Euxine sea, lived a Thracian horde who had never owned the dominion of Mæsadès, but, having been formerly subdued by Teres, had since asserted independency. Seuthes marched against these, and quickly compelled them to become his tributaries. Turning then southward again, his Thracian numbers now considerably exceeding the Greeks, they together approached the Propontis and encamped near Selymbria. It is remarkable that, in this winter campaign, in so severe a climate, against an enemy much overpowered indeed, but singularly expert and enterprising in desultory war, not a Greek was lost.

Active and bold, national characteristics of a Thracian, Seuthes had no great understanding and no clear honor. Mean deception however and gross dishonesty seem to have been less his own purpose than what he was led to by a profligate Greek, Heraclides of Maronea, who had acquired his confidence, and was one of his principal counsellors before the Cyrean army entered into his service. This man, having succeeded in the endeavour to excite apprehension and dislike of Xenophon, instigated the prince, who now no longer wanted the service of the Grecian army, to refuse the arrear of pay, when a small part only, of what by agreement was due, had yet been issued. He failed in an endeavour to divide the generals; but discontent grew among the soldiers, while all Xenophon's applications for the pay owing were answered with evasion.

Anab. 1. 7. In this state of things, while, on one side, Seuthes
 c. 5. s. 9. was surrounded by his numerous Thracian forces, strong in cavalry, of which the Greeks were destitute, on the other, judging from past transactions, no degree of enmity was not to be apprehended from the all-powerful officers of Sparta, difficulty and danger seemed again accumulating against the unfortunate Cyreans, and particularly against Xenophon. An event, no longer expected, relieved them. The Lacedæmonian government had resolved upon war with Persia; and thus the Cyrean army, before an object of jealousy, now would be a valuable acquisition. Accordingly two Lacedæmonian officers, Charminus and Polynices, came to Selymbria, authorized to engage them, at the same pay promised by Seuthes, to go to that most inviting of all fields for military service, the rich satrapy of Tissaphernes. The proposal
 c. 6. s. 1. was joyfully received; and the more, as, beside other advantages, the commanding interference of Lacedæmon, it was now hoped, would obtain the arrear of pay due from the Thracian prince. But Seuthes was governed by a few interested counsellors: and it was not till the army was sent to live at free quarters in some villages which he had given to one of the chief of them, that an interview, desired by Xenophon and long evaded, was at length obtained. An
 s. 7. Odrysian, who assisted at the conference, with generous indignation declared his shame of that officer's conduct. His great sovereign Medocus, he said, he was sure would not approve such base dishonesty, nor give any support to those who could be guilty of it. Seuthes excused himself, disavowing knowledge of the circumstances, and laying the blame on his Greek counsellor Heraclides. Payment was then made, in the manner of the country. A single talent
 s. 29.
 c. 7. s. 6.

was all that could be obtained in money: six hundred oxen, four thousand sheep, and a hundred and twenty slaves were given for the remainder due. The disposal of these, for the benefit of the army, was dexterously referred by Xénophon, as a compliment, to the Lacedæmonians Charminus and Polynices, who incurred no small blame in the conduct of the invidious business. Anab. l. 7.
c. 7. s. 31.

The army then crossed to Lampsacus, where two Lacedæmonian officers arrived soon after with pay, which was immediately issued for the march to ensue. The plain of Troy, mount Ida, Antandrus, and the vale of Thebe, were then traversed, in the way to Pergamus in the vale of Caicus. There a circumstance occurred, in itself, and in Xenophon's manner of relating it, strongly characterizing the times. Generally earnest in inculcating humanity and liberality, and studious to demonstrate his own disinterestedness, the soldier-philosopher nevertheless, without any apparent compunction, gives a detailed account of a nocturnal expedition, which he undertook with a few favorite officers, to surprise a wealthy Persian with his family, in a castle at some distance in the vale. A Grecian family of rank in Pergamus had suggested the measure, apparently to share in the spoil. The prophet, employed to sacrifice on the occasion, declared, from the symptoms of the victims, that the gods approved and would favor the robbery. Resistance nevertheless was found so much more vigorous than expected that the party was obliged to retreat, with many wounds, and considerable risk of being all cut off. A feigned movement, with the whole army, induced the Persian to leave his castle. The attempt being then renewed, the castle was taken, with his wife, children, slaves, horses, and all s. 34.
c. 8. s. 1. 3.
s. 6.
s. 12.

Anab. 1. 7. his effects. The capture was so considerable that
 c. 8. s. 13. Xenophon's share enabled him, according to his own
 phrase, to confer benefits; though before so distressed
 s. 3. as to be reduced, at Lampsacus, to sell his horse for
 fifty darics, about thirty-five guineas. The army re-
 turned to Pergamus, there to wait the orders of the
 Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief.

NOTES from the End of the First Section of the
 Twenty-third Chapter.

¹ It seems a whimsical circumstance that, among other writers, Spelman, the applauded translator, and Hutchinson, the able editor of the *Anabasis*, have concurred in the fancy to contradict or explain away their author's own account of his own age; and, without apparent purpose, but to establish a calculation of their own, founded upon authority so dubious and so deficient that, even were there nothing on the other side, it could scarcely prove anything. Lucian, in his treatise on *Long Life*, says that Xenophon passed the age of ninety years; without adding when he was born or when he died. Diogenes Laertius says that he died in the first year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad; without adding at what age. Strabo (l. 9. p. 618.) has related that he fought at the battle of Delium, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. But Athenæus has shown, from Plato, that this could not be; * and indeed the story altogether is so nearly absurd that we may wonder rather that Strabo should have related it, than that Diogenes should have copied it from him. Diogenes is not famous for accuracy any more than for judgment. So Spelman professes to rest on Lucian's account; which, he says, he sees no reason to disbelieve. Nor have I been able to discover reason to disbelieve; for it really affirms no more than that Xenophon lived to the age of more than ninety; which is in itself possible, and contradicted by none. But Xenophon's own account, equally uncontradicted by all ancient writers, appears to me to deserve the first credit. He has indeed not stated his own age precisely; but he has marked it, I think clearly, within two or three years; and so the learned and ingenious friend of Spelman has thought, the author of the

[* 'I have found nothing stated, on the authority of Plato, in Athenæus, to this purpose.' Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 89.]

Geographical Dissertation annexed to his translation of the Anabasis. Spelman and Hutchinson, putting together the accounts of Lucian and Diogenes, (for neither alone will at all serve their purpose,) reckon Xenophon near fifty when he engaged with Cyrus: the author of the Geographical Dissertation supposes him only five-and-twenty. If Xenophon's own account of himself deserve any credit, and if it ought not to be tortured to a meaning to which it cannot, without torture, be brought, he was certainly under thirty. The matter is not important; but having taken the pains, perhaps more than it was worth, to examine it, I will not deny the reader who may have curiosity for it, the benefit, if he can draw any, from my trouble.

NOTE
ON S. I.

Among the first occasions on which the name of Xenophon occurs in the Anabasis, (l. 2. c. 1. s. 10.) he is addressed with the appellation of *Νεανίσκε*, which Spelman observes, however ill it might apply to one near fifty, must be translated *Young man*. Now it happens that we have information from Xenophon himself, to what age a man might properly be called *Νέος*. The question occurs in his Memorials of Socrates, (l. 1. c. 2. s. 35.) and thirty is there named as its utmost term, and rather beyond the age to which it was ordinarily given. *Νεανίσκος* then, a diminutive from *Νέος*, would not be commonly applied to a more advanced age. As the titles *Νέος* and *Νεανίσκος* * are more than once in the Anabasis given to Xenophon, this alone seems pretty strong proof that he was under thirty. But there is besides in the Anabasis what appears to me complete confirmation of it; for Proxenus, it is there positively said, was about thirty when he was put to death, or when the army was deprived of his services. Xenophon, when he first conceived the idea of offering himself for successor to Proxenus in command, was deterred by the consideration of his youth; which seems decisively to mark that he was younger than Proxenus, and consequently under thirty. This indeed is testimony so nearly direct that it has evidently staggered Spelman; who nevertheless has been so resolved to abide by his deduction

[* 'I find no passage in the Anabasis in which these terms are so applied. ' In the only passage quoted (ii. l. 13.) it will be found on referring to the ' edition of Schneider (who has restored the true reading) that the text was corrupt, and that the term *νεανίσκος* is there applied, not to Xenophon, but to ' another person. See Schneid. ad Anab. ii. l. 12. Weiske Xenoph. tom. iii. ' p. 313.' Clinton, *ibid*.

Though Mr. Clinton points out these mistakes, he previously admits that Mr. Mitford has in other respects successfully combated Spelman.]

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from Lucian and Diogenes that, rather than allow his author to give evidence against it, he has chosen to mis-translate him, and even to risk contradictions. *What age do I wait for?* is his very just version of Xenophon's words, when hesitating whether to offer himself for the command; words certainly bearing no very evident sense if they did not imply that he apprehended objection would be taken to his youth. In answer then to this objection Xenophon proceeds thus: Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἐτι πρεσβύτερος ἔσομαι, ἐὰν τήμερον προδῶ ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς πολεμίοις. (Anab. 1. 3. c. 1. s. 10.) *If I abandon myself to the enemy this day* (so Spelman turns the passage) *I shall never live to see another.* It cannot be said, in excuse for the miserable insipidity of this version, that it is literal. A literal translation would here not only give the sense more exactly, but even more spiritedly: *I shall never be older,* (replying to his own question, 'What age do I wait for?') *if to-day I betray myself to the enemy;* meaning, *if through false delicacy, in consideration of my youth, I omit that exertion by which I and the army with me might be saved from the enemy.*

Another passage soon follows, to the same purpose, of which Spelman has very ingeniously given a literal translation, with a sense completely dubious. When actually offering himself for the command, Xenophon apologizes for his youth thus: Εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς τάττετέ με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἡγουῖμαι ἐρύκειν ἀπ' ἑμαντοῦ τὰ κακά. *If you appoint me to be your leader* (says Spelman's translation) *I shall not excuse myself by reason of my age, but think myself even in the vigor of it to repel an injury.* It is obvious that this might come either from a man too old or from one too young for the office. To fix the sense therefore the reader is referred, by a note, to the translator's former notice of Xenophon's age. Spelman seems to have been so aware of the absurdity of stating that fifty was an age either too early, or too advanced, for a man to undertake the office of general, that he chose rather to refer the reader to a former discussion than to shock him with the direct mention, in this place, of the result of it. Leunclavius has translated the passage very differently, and I think very properly, thus: *Si me ducis munere fungi jubetis, ætatis excusatione nequaquam utar; sed adolescentiæ vigorem ad propulsandum mala mihi profuturum arbitror.* We find that Clearchus, who is represented as a general of most vigorous exertion, was fifty; and Cleanor was older. If Xenophon was near fifty, he would not have said, 'What age do I wait for?' The whole of the apology for his age, whether as sup-

posing him too old or too young, would have been absurd. But every mention of him with any implication of his age, throughout the *Anabasis*, shows him to have been much younger. A few weeks before his appointment to the command he was addressed with the appellation of *Νεανίσκος*, *Youth*. After his appointment, we are informed, (1. 3. c. 2. s. 25.) Timasion and he were the two youngest of the generals. If he was too old, how improper must have been the choice of the others! But, in the various actions that followed, we find him always taking, mentioning it also as becoming him, that more active duty which, in the Grecian service, was appropriated to the youthful. Supposing him between twenty-five and thirty, the interpretation, where he speaks of himself, is always obvious, and all is consistent; but supposing him fifty, or near it, even the forced interpretation of Spelman is full of contradiction and absurdity.

If then I cannot commend the judgment, the accuracy, or the fairness of Spelman, in forming and supporting his opinion of Xenophon's age, I can still less be satisfied with the more direct and less qualified contradiction of his author, in the account which, in his Introduction, he has given of the Lacedæmonian Clearchus. Totally neglecting Xenophon's short but clear history of the principal circumstances of that general's life, he has trusted implicitly to the very different account of Diodorus Siculus, 'who, beside the character he has deservedly obtained,' he says, 'for fidelity and exactness, had the advantage of living many centuries nearer the transactions he recounts, than those who differ from him in chronology.' This seems really a curious reason for preferring the account of Diodorus, who lived full three centuries after Clearchus, to that of Xenophon, who served under him, and cannot but have known intimately, if not Clearchus himself, yet many who must have known him intimately. As to the character which Diodorus has deservedly obtained for fidelity and exactness, those who know him best, I fear, will be most inclined to join with the penetrating, judicious, and diligent Henry Dodwell; who, compelled, by the pursuit he was engaged in, to study him closely, and indignant at length at the incessancy of his vexatious inaccuracies, calls him, *imperitus historiarum variarum epocharumque* commissor *Diodorus*. (Chron. Xenoph. ad ann. A. C. 396.)

It is an unpleasant task, which the writer of Grecian history cannot always decline, to decry the general authority of those on whom he must sometimes rest for authority; if he would vindicate historical sincerity, it is indispensable. Plutarch, living more

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than four centuries after Xenophon, and more than one after Diodorus, has chosen to contradict the accounts of both. Instead of a condemned exile as Xenophon, or a rebel, as Diodorus reports Clearchus to have been, Plutarch affirms that he had a regular commission from the Lacedæmonian government to serve under Cyrus. (Plut. vit. Artaxer. p. 1854.) It is evident from the whole tenor of Xenophon's narrative, the only connected and consistent narrative remaining of the transactions of the age, that this could not have been. Let those who, in respect for any reputation which Plutarch may have gained among literary men little conversant with the world, would put his authority in any competition with Xenophon's, but look to the puerility and absurdity of the account he has given of the communication between Cyrus and the Lacedæmonian government, previous to the expedition; and, if they desire a sample of his carelessness, let them compare his praise of Xenophon, in his account of the battle of Cunaxa, with his continual and unqualified contradictions of Xenophon.

² The account of the expedition of Cyrus and of the return of the Greeks, remaining to us with the title of *Kύρου Ἀνάβασις*, having passed, apparently without question, among the ancients for the work of the Socratic Xenophon, from his own age downward, it cannot but seem strange that any doubt about it should have gained in modern times. Nevertheless, such a doubt, excited by a passage in the work itself, having been cherished by men eminent among the learned, some notice of it may be necessary here.

In Xenophon's Grecian Annals the tenor of the narration required some account of the expedition of Cyrus and the return of the Grecian army; but, instead of giving any, the author has referred his reader to an account which he attributes to Themistogenes of Syracuse. This at first sight will of course give to suppose that an account written by a Syracusan, named Themistogenes, was then extant; but it can at no rate prove that the work now extant on the subject, which always passed among the ancients for Xenophon's, was written, not by Xenophon, but by Themistogenes. It is however remarkable that, from the age of Xenophon to that of Suidas, no mention occurs, in any remaining work, of such an author as Themistogenes; while we find an extraordinary assemblage, of names the most eminent in literature, bearing testimony to the extant *Anabasis*

as the work of Xenophon. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Strabo, Cicero, Laertius, Lucian, Ælian, Hesychius, Pollux, Harpocration, Ammonius, are enumerated by Hutchinson: to these, I think, should be added Demetrius Phalereus, or the author of the work attributed to him, Arrian, (*de Exp. Alex.* l. 1. c. 12.) Plutarch, and Longinus; and when, in an age comparatively modern, the collector Suidas chose to controvert this weight of evidence, he has offered no argument but a reference to the works of Xenophon, which all those authors had read and could understand at least as well as he.

Why then, it will of course occur to ask, did Xenophon, in his Grecian Annals, refer to the work of Themistogenes? Plutarch, in his treatise on the Glory of the Athenians, has accounted for it thus: 'Xenophon,' he says, 'was a subject of history for himself. But when he published his narrative of his own achievements in military command, he ascribed it to Themistogenes of Syracuse; giving away thus the literary reputation to arise from the work, that he might the better establish the credit of the facts related.'

This explanation, though I allow it credit as far as it goes, is however not by itself completely satisfactory. Nevertheless I think whoever reads the *Anabasis*, attending, at the same time, to the general history of the age, may draw, from the two, what is wanting to complete it. He cannot fail to observe, that it has been a principal purpose of the author of the *Anabasis* to apologize for the conduct of Xenophon. In the latter part of the work the narrative is constantly accompanied with a studied defence of his conduct; in which both the circumstances that produced his banishment from Athens, and whatever might give umbrage or excite jealousy against him in Lacedæmon, have been carefully considered. But there are passages in the work, speeches of Xenophon himself on delicate occasions, particularly his communication with Cleander the Lacedæmonian general, related in the sixth book, which could be known only from himself or from Cleander. That these have not been forgeries of Themistogenes is evident from the testimony of Xenophon himself, who refers to the work, which he ascribes to Themistogenes, with entire satisfaction.

One then of these three conclusions must follow: either, first, the narrative of Themistogenes, if such ever existed, had not in it that apology for Xenophon which we find interwoven in the *Anabasis* transmitted to us as Xenophon's, and consequently was a different work; or, secondly, Themistogenes wrote under the

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direction of Xenophon; or, thirdly, Xenophon wrote the extant *Anabasis*, and, for reasons which those acquainted with the circumstances of his life, and the history of the times, will have no difficulty to conceive may have been powerful, chose that, on its first publication, it should pass under another's name. The latter has been the belief of all antiquity; and indeed, had it not been fully known that the ascription of the *Anabasis* to Themistogenes was a fiction, the concurrence of all antiquity, in stripping that author of his just fame, so completely that, from Xenophon himself to Suidas, he is never once named as a writer of merit in any work remaining, while in so many the *Anabasis* is mentioned as the work of Xenophon, would be, if at all credible, certainly the most extraordinary circumstance in the history of letters.

For the political and military historian the important result of what has here been stated is that, under every consideration, the facts reported in the *Anabasis* have the full authority of Xenophon. For myself, I will venture to add, I see no glimpse of reasonable doubt that Xenophon was the writer.

CHAPTER XXIV.

History of Lacedæmon from the restoration of the Athenian democracy, and affairs of the Greeks in Asia from the renewal of war between Lacedæmon and Persia, to the renewal of war within Greece.

SECTION I.

War resolved by Lacedæmon against Persia: Thimbron commander-in-chief: joined by the Cyrean Greek forces. Liberality of the Persian government. Dercyllidas commander-in-chief: truce with the satrap of Lydia, and war with the satrap of Bithynia. Mania, satrapess of Æolia: successes of Dercyllidas in Æolia. Winter operations in Bithynia. Protection given to the Chersonese. Prosperity of the Grecian colonies. Ill-judged orders from Lacedæmon. Danger of the Grecian colonies. Treaty concluded between Dercyllidas and Tissaphernes for the complete emancipation of the Asian Greeks from Persian dominion.

WHEN the Lacedæmonians put an end to the Athenian empire they vindicated to themselves the sovereignty of the islands and of the European cities; they placed their own governors, with the title of harmost, in Byzantium and in the Chersonese; but they neither claimed any dominion on the continent of Asia, nor asserted the freedom of the Grecian republics there: the allegiance of the Asian Greeks was transferred from the Athenian people to the Persian king; and, under him, to the satraps, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes.

SECT.
I.

Xenoph.
Hel. 1. 3.
c. 1. s. 2.

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We have seen that, among the Greeks of Asia, Cyrus was popular, and Tissaphernes unpopular; insomuch that by a kind of rebellion against the satrap, the Ionians had attached themselves to the prince. The event therefore of the expedition against the king, and the appointment of Tissaphernes to the great command which Cyrus had held, could not but be highly alarming to them. But, on the other hand, the glorious retreat of the Greeks who had accompanied the prince, and the clear evidence which their return in safety bore to the superiority of the Grecian arms, afforded ground of encouragement. If the patronage of Lacedæmon could be obtained, whose councils commanded the united arms of Greece, little, it was hoped, would be to be apprehended from the satrap's vengeance. Refusing therefore to acknowledge his authority, the Ionians sent ministers to Lacedæmon to solicit protection.

The Lacedæmonian government, less expecting friendship from the king and from Tissaphernes on account of their connexion with Cyrus, and valuing it less as the fame of the actions of the Cyrean army taught to despise their enmity, resolved that the Ionians should be protected. Possibly circumstances at home might contribute to this determination. It might be desirable to employ a part of their people on foreign service; and for service against an enemy so famed for wealth, and so little for bravery and military skill, volunteers would be numerous among the poor commonwealths of Peloponnesus. Four thousand men were required from the allies. Only one thousand were added from Lacedæmon; and they were all of those called neodamodes; who, owing their elevation from the condition of slaves into the rank of citizens to the necessities of war, were, on

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 3.
c. 1. s. 3.

B. C. 400.
ending, or
399, begin-
ning.
Ol. 95. 1.

the return of peace, looked upon with so invidious an eye, that occasion for sending them on foreign service would be acceptable, both to the government and to themselves. Cavalry was very desirable for war in Asia: but the utmost force that Peloponnesus could raise was very small; and the principal citizens of the wealthiest republics, who alone composed it, would not be the most willing partakers in distant adventure. Application was therefore made to Athens; where recent disorders, extreme political jealousy, and a total want of protection against any momentary caprice of the people, made the situation of men of rank and fortune so precarious that the offer of pay for three hundred horse found ready acceptance there. Thimbron was appointed commander-in-chief in Asia, with the title of harmost.

SECT.
I.

Arriving in Ionia with his European forces early in spring, Thimbron circulated a requisition for an apportionment of troops from every Grecian city in Asia; where, says Xenophon, at that time, all obeyed whatever a Lacedæmonian commanded. The Cyreans, under Xenophon, had been already engaged for the service, and were marching to join the Lacedæmonian army. Meanwhile, though his force was considerable, Thimbron feared to traverse the open country in presence of the Persian cavalry, and thought it well if he could afford, to the country around posts which he could securely occupy, some protection against its ravages. The junction of the Cyreans however gave him so decided a superiority that many towns, before awed by the Persian power, with ready zeal now opened their gates to him.

B. C. 399.
Ol. 95. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Four persons, whose circumstances deserve notice, took this opportunity for embracing the Grecian cause; Eurysthenes and Procles, descendants of

Xenoph.
Hel. l. 3.
c. 1. s. 4.

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Demaratus, the exiled king of Lacedæmon who attended Xerxes into Greece, and Gorgion and Gongylus, descended from the Eretrian Gongylus, who, by his conduct also during the Persian invasion, had merited banishment from his country and favor with the Persian monarch. The lordship of the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, and Halisarnia, given to Demaratus, and of Gambrium, Palægambrium, Myrina, and Grynium, to Gongylus, remained to their posterity. These gifts, from the Persian king, seem to have had much of the nature of fiefs in the Gothic kingdoms.¹ It would have been a gratification, at least to our curiosity, had Xenophon been fuller in explanation on the subject. From their attachment to the cause of Cyrus, and consequent dread of the king's vengeance, apparently arose the revolt of those Grecian subjects of the Persian empire, which otherwise would mark gross ingratitude to a beneficent government. For the testimony here given by Xenophon, remarkably corresponding with all remaining from Herodotus and Thucydides, strongly confirms, what has been heretofore observed, that there was uncommon liberality in the despotism of the Persian empire. Public faith was kept; property was not without security; it was not there, as under the present wonderfully barbarian government of the same fine country, a crime to be rich. Large estates, given even to foreigners, passed to their late posterity; and, instead of the tyranny which now depopulates towns and provinces, and against which the remaining subjects recur to the patronage of some foreign ambassador, the Persian government so extended liberal protection to all that Grecian cities could prefer the

¹ In the Anabasis Procles is called ἀρχων, chief, or lord, of Teuthrania. Anab. l. 2. c. 1. s. 3.

dominion of the Persian king to that of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian commonwealths, and flourish under it. SECT.
I.

But the Persian government, though generally mild and liberal, had been, since the reign of Xerxes, always weak, and verging to dissolution. The Lacedæmonian general Thimbron, who, with comparatively a small force, had been making conquests against it, showed no considerable abilities in the field, and in camp and in quarters his discipline was very deficient. The allies suffered from the licentiousness of his army; and complaints were in consequence so urged at Lacedæmon that, on the expiration of his year, he was sentenced to banishment. Xenoph.
Hel. i. 3.
c. 1. s. 5. 6.

Dercyllidas, who succeeded him, was more equal to a great and difficult command. Having already served in Asia, under Lysander, he knew the characters of the two satraps, who divided between them, in almost independent sovereignty, the dominion of the western provinces. The instructions of the ephors directed him to lead the army into Caria, the hereditary government of Tissaphernes. But the desire of revenging a disgrace he had formerly incurred, when harried by Abydus, in consequence of an accusation from Pharnabazus, assisted at least, according to the contemporary historian, his friend, in determining him to act otherwise. He negotiated with Tissaphernes; and that dastardly satrap, ill-disposed toward Pharnabazus, and always readier for negotiation than battle, instead of exerting the great power B. C. 399.*
Ol. 95. 2.
Xen. Hel.
i. 3. c. 1.
s. 6. 7. 8.

[* B. C. 399. 'Dercyllidas supersedes Thimbron: Xenoph. Hel. iii. 1. 8. 'Before the conclusion of the war in Elis: Ib. iii. 2. 21.—which ended in this 'year: Hel. iii. 2. 30. τοῦ δ' ἐπὶ ντος θέρου πέμψας Θρασυδαῖος ἐς Λακεδαίμονα 'ἐνεχώρησε σφᾶς τὸ τεῖχος περιελεῖν. Pausan. iii. 8. 2. τρίτῳ δὲ ἔτει τοῦ 'πολέμου—οἱ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Θράσυδρος (sic) συγχωροῦσι τοῦ ἄσπεως καταβρίψαι τὸ 'τεῖχος.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 90.]

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with which he was vested for the general defence of the empire, bargained for a particular peace for his own provinces, and consented that the Grecian arms should, without opposition from him, be carried into the Bithynian satrapy. Dercyllidas, having thus provided for the safety of the rich fields of Ionia, which would otherwise have been liable, in his absence, to suffer from the Persian cavalry, hastened his march northward; and, in the length of way from Caria to the borders of Æolia, he maintained an exactness of discipline that gained him the greater credit with the allies as it was contrasted with the licentiousness from which the country had suffered while Thimbron commanded.

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 3.
c. 1. s. 8. 9.

The circumstances of Æolia might reasonably have invited the attention of the general, though revenge had not instigated. According to that liberal policy, more than once already noticed as ordinary among the Persians, Pharnabazus had appointed Zenis, a Greek of Dardanum, to be governor, or, according to Xenophon's phrase, satrap, of that fine country, so interesting, in earliest history, as the kingdom of Priam, and the seat of the Trojan war. Zenis died young, leaving a widow, Mania, also a Dardanian. This extraordinary woman solicited the succession to her late husband's command; and supported her solicitations with presents so agreeable to the satrap's fancy, and proofs so pregnant of her own talents and spirit, that she obtained her suit. Being accordingly vested with the government she did not disappoint, but, on the contrary, far exceeded, the satrap's expectation. None of his governors collected and remitted the revenue more regularly; none accompanied the remittance with presents more acceptable; none, when he made his progress through his satrapy, received him with

s. 10.

SECT.
I.

such elegant magnificence, or entertained him so agreeably. These were a woman's merits, but she united with them manly virtues. In the frequency of disaffection and revolt among the Persian provinces no disturbance happened under her government. She not only held all in due obedience, but, raising a body of Grecian mercenaries, she reduced the maritime towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, which had hitherto resisted the Persian dominion. Herself attended the sieges; viewing the operations from her chariot, and by praises and presents judiciously bestowed she excited such emulation that her army acquired repute superior to any other body of mercenaries in Asia. Pharnabazus requiring troops for suppressing the incursions of the rebellious Mysians and Pisidians, she attended in person. In consequence of her able conduct and high reputation, he always treated her with great respect, and sometimes even desired her assistance in his council.

Mania was another Artemisia; and the weighty authority of Xenophon for the history of the Dardanian satrapess not a little supports the account given by Herodotus of the Halicarnassian queen. But, though Mania could govern provinces and conduct armies, yet, amid the encouragement which the gross defects, both of Grecian and Persian government, offered for daring villany, she could not secure herself against domestic treachery. Scarcely had she passed her fortieth year when she was murdered in her palace by Midias, who had married her daughter. But a single murder would not answer the execrable villain's purpose. Her son, a most promising youth of seventeen, was cut off. The assassin had then the impudence to ask of the satrap the succession to the government held by the deceased Mania, supporting

Ch. 8. s. 5.
of this Hist.Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 11.

s. 12.

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his solicitation by large presents. But he seems to have founded his hopes on a knowledge rather of the general temper and practice of the Persian great than of the particular character of Pharnabazus. He, with a generous indignation, refused the presents, and declared he would not live unless he could revenge Mania. Midias prepared to support himself by force or intrigue, as circumstances might direct. He had secured Gergis and Scepsis, fortified towns in which Mania's treasures were deposited: but the other towns of the province, with one consent, refusing to acknowledge his authority, adhered to Pharnabazus.

Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 1.
s. 13.

Dercyllidas arrived upon the borders in this critical conjuncture. The satrap was unprepared; the Lacedæmonian name was popular; and the towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, in one day opened their gates. A declaration was then circulated, that the purpose of Dercyllidas and the Lacedæmonian government was to give perfect independency to the Æolian cities; desiring only alliance defensive and offensive, with quarters for the army within their walls whenever it might become requisite in that service whose object was the common liberty of all Grecian people. The garrisons were composed mostly of Greeks; attached to Mania, but indifferent to the interest of Pharnabazus.² The towns of Neandrus, Ilium, and Cocylus acceded to the Spartan general's invitation. Hope of large reward for his

s. 11—16.

² Καὶ γὰρ οἱ φρουροῦντες Ἕλληνες ἐν αὐταῖς (ταῖς πόλεσιν), ἐπεὶ ἡ Μανία ἀπέθανεν, οὐ πᾶν τι καλῶς περιείποντο.—*Quia post mortem Maniæ, præsidarii Græci non admodum erga eos (cives urbium prædict.) rectè se gesserant.* I have no scruple in giving the very different interpretation in the text. Smith, whose version differs here from both, is far from compensating, in his Xenophon as in his Thucydides, for extreme inelegance by a general exactness of literal translation.

fidelity induced the governor of Cebren to adhere to the satrap; but, upon the approach of the army, the people soon compelled him to surrender.

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Dercyllidas then marched toward Scepsis. The assassin Midias, fearful, at the same time, of the Spartan general, the Persian satrap, and the Scepsian citizens, conceived his best hope to lie in accommodation with the former. He proposed a conference, to which Dercyllidas consented, and, ten principal men, of different cities, being sent to him as hostages, he went to the Grecian camp. Desiring to know upon what conditions he might be admitted to friendship and alliance, Dercyllidas answered, upon condition of allowing freedom and independency to the towns in which he had garrisons. But the march to Scepsis was not interrupted. Dercyllidas entered the town unopposed, ordered the garrison to quit the citadel, and then, assembling the people, directed them to assume the government as became Greeks and freemen. He then proceeded to Gergis, taking Midias with him. Intelligence of his liberality to the Scepsians had prepared his reception, and Midias acquiesced. Acquitting himself then of that miscreant, by restoring all his private property, with liberal allowance for all his claims, he seized the wealth of Mania, as now belonging to the satrap, the common enemy; and it was his boast, a grateful boast to the army, that he had enriched the military chest with a twelvemonth's pay for eight thousand men.

Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 1.
s. 17.

Having thus, according to Xenophon's expression, in eight days, taken nine cities, (that is, having recovered from the Persian dominion nine towns accustomed each to its separate and independent government, except as it might be occasionally compelled

c. 2. s. 1.

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to obey the commands of a master,) it became the consideration of Dercyllidas how to preserve their territories against the ravages of the Persian cavalry, without burthening the people by quartering his army among them. Against their walls he little feared the efforts of Persian arms. He was more apprehensive of the licentiousness, difficult to control, of a republican army in quarters, and of complaints at Lacedæmon, like those which had driven his predecessor into exile. He sent proposals of truce therefore to Pharnabazus. That generous satrap, unassisted from the capital of the empire, and deserted and betrayed by the great neighbouring officer, whose more peculiar duty it was to afford him assistance, readily accepted them. Xenophon indeed says, that he was little disturbed with the loss of Æolia; esteeming that province, under Lacedæmonian protection, while he had himself peace with Lacedæmon, rather a useful barrier against other enemies. The meaning of this apparently is to be collected only from what follows. The Bithynians, though as tributary subjects of the empire he had assisted them against the Cyrean army, were always licentious, sometimes perhaps rebellious, and they frequently carried hostile depredation among the more peaceful and settled inhabitants of his satrapy. Among these people Dercyllidas resolved to take his winter quarters, as in a hostile territory, and Pharnabazus expressed no dissatisfaction.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 2.

That country must be naturally very productive in which, under the management of such a people as those Bithynians who have been on a former occasion described, an army, powerful enough to overbear opposition, could supply itself by plunder through the winter, plentifully, and without hazard. That

the army of Dercyllidas did so we are assured by Xenophon, who seems to have subsisted from that plunder much to his own satisfaction. Such successful freebooting allured a body of Odrysians, subjects of Seuthes, from European Thrace. Two hundred horse and three hundred targeteers³ came as allies of Lacedæmon to re-enforce Dercyllidas. They took their station between two and three miles from the Grecian army, and, throwing up a slight fortification, requested a Grecian guard for it, to enable them to maraud in greater force. Dercyllidas allowing them two hundred heavy-armed, they exerted themselves in depredation with such skilful diligence that shortly their camp was filled with booty, a large portion of which consisted of prisoners, whom they proposed to sell for slaves.

The Bithynians, unable or fearful to resist these plunderers, were however attentive to their motions; and having observed the smallness of their camp, and learnt the amount of its guard, resolved to take opportunity of their absence for attacking it. Assembling accordingly in great numbers, horse and foot, and watching the march of the Odrysians to a sufficient distance, they made their assault. Their missile weapons so reached every part of the small enclosure that the Greeks were unable to withstand them. Fifteen only made their way through the irregular assailants, and reached their own camp; the rest were killed. The Bithynians then broke into the Odrysian camp, recovered their prisoners and effects, killed all the tent-keepers,⁴ and retired

³ Error may perhaps reasonably be suspected in these numbers. They seem too scanty for what we shall find was effected; especially if we compare it with what the Cyreans suffered in the same country.

⁴ Σκηνοφύλακες.

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so rapidly that the Greek army, marching as soon as intelligence of the assault reached them, found nothing but naked corpses.

The funeral ceremony of their dead occupied the Odrysians on their return. It was graced with games, as among the Greeks of Homer's age; but the favorite game of the Odrysians, less known to the father of poetry, was the simple horserace. Large quantities of wine were also drunk over the graves; a practice spread, perhaps among descendants of the Odrysians, over the distant island of Britain, and preserved to this day equally among the rugged mountains of Scotland, farthest north, and on the soft hills of Wight, severed by the tide from the southern coast. Providing then for the future security of their camp, by pitching it close to the Grecian, the Odrysians no longer contented themselves with plunder, but carried revenge by fire and sword extensively through Bithynia.

B. C. 397.
Ol. 95. 3.
[B. C. 398.
Cl.]

In spring Dercyllidas led the army to Lampsacus. He had carried command in a manner so superior to his predecessor that, instead of complaint, report had been transmitted to Lacedæmon so favorable that, against the general rule, he was continued a second year in his situation. In Lampsacus he found commissioners sent to notify that honor to him, and to communicate the commendations of the ephors to the army; particularly for its regular and inoffensive conduct among the allied cities. They came authorized moreover to inspect the state both of the army and of the allies. Dercyllidas gladly forwarded them to witness the peace and prosperity which Æolis and Ionia enjoyed under his superintendency, and to hear the grateful testimonies of a happy people to his ability, probity, and diligence.

Since he had been in Asia Dercyllidas had fought

no great battle, nor taken any town by assault; but, in an army which, under his predecessor, had been so lawless as to be a terror more to friends than enemies, he had restored exact discipline, and yet was the favorite of that army. With that army then he had awed the two great satraps, each commanding a province equal to a powerful kingdom, and both together acting under the mightiest empire in the world; so that, after having given independency and security to the long line of Ionian and Æolian colonies, he could direct his views another way for the benefit of the Grecian name.

SECT.
I.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 6.

The Thracian Chersonese, once the principality of the renowned Miltiades, lately, in large proportion the property of another great and singular character, Alcibiades, and by its fertility, its many harbours, and its advantageous situation for trade, always a great object for industrious adventurers from Greece, was however always subject to dreadful incursions from the wild hordes of Thracians, who made it their glory to live by rapine. Alcibiades, maintaining a military force for the defence of his property, and extending the advantage of its protection to the Grecian settlers generally, seems to have held a degree of dominion among them. Perhaps Clearchus, forbidden, as we have seen, by the Lacedæmonian administration, but enabled, by the bounty of Cyrus, to become their next protector, aspired to similar dominion. Before the return of the Cyrean army however the Lacedæmonian administration had so far directed their attention to the Chersonese as to have sent a governor thither, with their usual title of harmost; but, either he had been withdrawn, or the force intrusted to him, or his ability to use it, was deficient; for the Thracian inroads were renewed,

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 7. 8.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 39.

and so successfully that the Chersonesites, in a petition to Lacedæmon for protection, declared that, unless it were granted, they must abandon the country. Dercyllidas, informed of this, before orders could come to himself from Lacedæmon, or another could be sent with the commission, resolved to execute the service. He sent to Pharnabazus a proposal for prolonging the existing truce, which was immediately accepted; and, having so far provided tranquillity for Asia, he transported his army to the European shore. Immediately he visited the Thracian prince Seuthes, by whom he was very hospitably entertained; and having arranged, apparently to his satisfaction, those matters in which his commonwealth and that prince had a common concern, he marched to the Chersonese. There he employed his army, not in plunder and destruction, but in raising a rampart across the isthmus, to secure the peace of the rich country and industrious people within. The isthmus is only four miles over; the peninsula contained eleven considerable towns, many harbours, rich land under various cultivation, arable, vineyard, fruit-plantations, spacious pastures adapted to every kind of cattle, and still considerable tracts which might be allotted to new colonists. The possessors of this valuable territory were unequal to its defence; because, for its cultivation, they used principally the industry of slaves, whom they dared not trust with arms. The work of Dercyllidas enabled them to become their own protectors. Begun in spring, it was completed before autumn,⁵ and the army was reconveyed into Asia. Dercyllidas then made a progress through the Asiatic cities, to inspect the state of things, and had

B. C. 397.
Ol. 95. $\frac{3}{4}$.
[B. C. 398.
Cl.]
Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
9.

⁵ Πρὸ ὁπώρας.

the satisfaction to find everywhere peace, prosperity, and general content. SECT.
I.

A single exception will deserve notice, as it tends to illustrate the political circumstances of the country, and manners resulting from them. With governments so imperfect, and territories so narrow, as those of the Grecian republics, so liable to intestine commotion, so open to foreign attack, peace and civil order could be secure only under the strong control of a superintending power, which had been lodged, fortunately, for a time in honest and able hands. Thus the condition of the Asian Greeks, in the confession of that honest eulogist of democracy, Herodotus, was improved by their reduction under the Persian empire, after their rebellion against the first Darius. In the want of such a superintending power faction had now expelled a number of Chians from their island. Men driven from their homes and possessions to vagrancy, beggary, and starving, sometimes in numbers amounting almost to half the free population of a republic, would be likely to resort to violent expedients. The first thing to look out for was subsistence; and, while necessity drove, allurements sometimes invited to marauding as a profession. The Chian exiles seized Atarneus, a strong post on the continent, over-against their island; and the produce of the rich Ionian fields, cultivated by unarmed slaves for unwarlike masters, became in large proportion theirs. When Dercyllidas came to the protection of the Ionians, the Chian exiles had collected provisions for eight months. He formed the blockade of their hold, too strong for the art of attack of that age to reduce by any other mode of siege. While their provisions served, they resisted; and then, by their submission, the tranquillity of Ionia and Æolia became complete.

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XXIV.Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 2.
s. 10.B. C. 396.
Ol. 95. 4.
Spring.
[B. C. 397.
Cl.]

But, while the cities of those provinces, prospering and happy, and administering each its own affairs under the able and benign superintendency of Dercyllidas, enjoyed, for the present, the blessings of freedom, those of Caria had to complain that their interests had been neglected, that they had been disappointed even of a promised relief, and that the treaty, concluded with Tissaphernes, was an express compact for their continuance in subjection to a foreign dominion. The sea being open to them, they could communicate with Lacedæmon, and they sent to request that their situation might not be overlooked by the vindicators of the liberties of Greece. Were the Lacedæmonian arms carried into Caria, they said, Tissaphernes, to save his own large property there, would readily grant the independency, so necessary to their happiness, and so desirable for the glory of the Grecian, and especially of the Lacedæmonian name. The ephors seem too lightly to have yielded to their arguments, without communication with their able commander, or with any others duly acquainted with the circumstances of Asia. They sent orders for war to be carried into Caria; for the army under Dercyllidas to march thither; and for the fleet, then commanded by Pharax, to co-operate with it.

The first effect of these ill-concerted measures appears to have been to produce, or at least to hasten, a union between the two satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; whose long variance had, in no small degree, contributed to those great successes which the Greeks, with a force otherwise inadequate to contention with the Persian empire, had been enabled to obtain. Pharnabazus, unsupported by the court of Susa, and basely deserted, or worse than deserted, by Tissaphernes, his immediate superior in command,

had acquiesced under the loss of *Æolia*. But, as soon as the threatened attack of *Caria* afforded a probability that *Tissaphernes* would be disposed to change his conduct, *Pharnabazus* went to him, and declared his readiness to co-operate zealously in measures for driving the Greeks out of *Asia*. This proposal, to which the jealousy and pusillanimity of *Tissaphernes* otherwise would scarcely have listened, was made acceptable by the indiscreet violence of the Spartan government. The two satraps went together into *Caria*, and, having arranged matters for the defence of that country, returned to take the command of an army which threatened *Ionia* with destruction.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 11.

Ibid.
Diod.
l. 14. c. 40.

Dercyllidas was already marching for *Caria*, when information reached him that all his hitherto successful labors for the welfare of the colonies were upon the point of being rendered utterly vain. He consulted *Pharax*, and they ventured together to disobey their ill-judged instructions. Returning hastily northward, *Dercyllidas* met intelligence that the satraps had already entered the *Ephesian* territory. He was pushing his march through the rich vale of the *Mæander*, in whose luxuriant soil the growth of corn commonly exceeds a man's height, when some of his advanced guard, mounting on some tombs by the road-side, (for the road-side was the place of burial among Greeks as well as Romans,) discovered the Persian army in order of battle. Immediately he gave orders for forming; but, while he attended the sacrifice which the *Lacedæmonians* held indispensable before action, numbers of his *Asian* Greeks left their arms in the corn, and fled; and it became evident that his dependence must be upon his small force of European troops alone.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 12.

B. C. 396.
Ol. 95. 4.
May ending, or June beginning.
[B. C. 397. Cl.]

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 13.

In these alarming circumstances the interested

Xenoph.
Hel. i. 3.
c. 2. s. 14.

pusillanimity of Tissaphernes relieved him. Pharnabazus was desirous of engaging; but Tissaphernes, already more than half satisfied, since his property in Caria was no longer in immediate danger, would first try the effect of a conference. A herald was accordingly sent to the Grecian general. Dercyllidas, anxious to prevent observation of the state of his army, advanced with a chosen escort. Such then being the circumstances that both parties were desirous to avoid a battle, it was presently agreed, that the Greek army should march to Leucophrys, the Persian to Tralles, and that a place should be appointed where the generals should next day meet. The conference being held accordingly, Dercyllidas insisted on the simple proposition, 'that all Grecian cities should be independent.' To this the satraps consented, with the conditions, 'that the Grecian army should quit the king's territory,' (by which seems to have been meant Asia, including the Grecian colonies,) 'and that the Lacedæmonian governors should quit the Grecian towns.' Upon these terms a truce was concluded, to hold till the pleasure of the king and of the Lacedæmonian government could be known.

s. 15.

This was the first treaty, reported on any authentic or even probable testimony, by which, since the early times of the Lydian monarchy, it was provided that the Asian Greeks should be completely emancipated from foreign dominion. All the Ionian and Æolian cities, it appears, thus gained immediate enjoyment of independency in peace: the Carian seem to have waited the confirmation of the treaty by the king of Persia and the Lacedæmonian government. But it was a quiet revolution: no great battle gave it splendor; none of those striking events attended which

invite the attention of the writer in proportion as they are fitted to impress the fancy of the reader. It forms nevertheless a memorable and interesting era in Grecian history; and the fame of Dercyllidas, less brilliant, but far purer, than that of most of the great men of Greece, though, being recorded by the pen of Xenophon, it is indeed secured against perishing, yet deserves to have been more generally and more pointedly noticed, than we find it, by writers whose theme has been Grecian history, or panegyric of the Grecian character.⁶

We have from Diodorus an account, which may ^{Diod. l. 14. c. 39.} deserve notice, of the manner in which the affairs of Lacedæmon were administered, in its colony of the Trachinian Heraclea. It was when Dercyllidas was sent to command in Asia that the superintendency of Heraclea was committed to Herippidas. The colony, in the usual way of the Grecian cities, had been distracted by faction. Herippidas summoned a general assembly, in which persons of all parties met; apparently in some confidence that the representative of the presiding commonwealth of Greece would administer justice in mercy to all. But he took a more summary method for restoring quiet than could easily consist with justice. Surrounding the place of meeting with an armed force, he seized five hundred of those supposed adverse to the Lacedæ-

⁶ —Πρότερον δὲ διὰ Θίμβρωνος, εἴτα διὰ Δερκυλίδου πολεμοῦντες (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι), οὐδὲν δὲ πράττοντες ἀξιόλογον.—Plut. vit. Artax. p. 1867. t. 3. Plutarch had either forgotten what he had read in Xenophon, or, with his usual deficiency of judgment in military and political affairs, very much mis-estimated the merit of Dercyllidas; and modern historians seem to have neglected the informed and able contemporary, who was a witness to the fact, to follow the speculator of some centuries after.

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monian interest, or to the interest of that party in Lacedæmon with which he was connected, and they were all put to death. We shall give credit to report from Diodorus, always in proportion to its consonance with the accounts of writers of best judgment, contemporary, or most nearly so, with the transactions; and his account here is but too much in consonance with all that we learn on best authority. After this military execution upon an unresisting people, Herippidas marched against the rude inhabitants of the neighbouring highlands of Cæta, who had rebelled against the Lacedæmonian sovereignty. He was so successful as to compel the whole free population to emigrate. They withdrew first into Thessaly, but afterward removed into Bœotia; invited by circumstances not specified to us, yet among which may be reckoned a disposition adverse to Lacedæmon in the leading party there, and the purpose of acquiring strength to resist Lacedæmon.)

SECTION II.

War of Lacedæmon and Elis. Death of Agis, king of Lacedæmon, and succession of Agesilaus. Sedition in Lacedæmon.

Formerly the institutions of Lycurgus had sufficed to enforce very generally among the Lacedæmonians that modesty in command which, united with dignity of manner, contempt of wealth, and superiority in military and political knowledge, induced the Grecian republics, conscious of the necessity for general quiet of admitting some superintending power, to yield a willing obedience to them. But, in the long and wide course of the Peloponnesian war, communication with strangers, unavoidably much greater than the

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II.

institutions of Lycurgus would approve, together with the necessity of raising and employing a public revenue, far greater than ever entered into the legislator's contemplation, had altered and corrupted Spartan manners; so that, when the war was at length concluded so happily in their favor, they were no longer capable of bearing their high fortune. We have seen, in the account of Xenophon, their friend and panegyrist, what plenitude of power their officers in transmarine commands assumed, and with what haughty tyranny they exercised it. Unquestionably it must have been far other conduct that established that reputation of Lacedæmon, which had led united Greece to refuse obedience to any but a Lacedæmonian commander, even in naval war against the Persians, though Lacedæmon contributed so very small a proportion to the national fleet; which led the rich Sicilian cities to union under a Lacedæmonian general, bringing no force with him but the splendor of the Lacedæmonian name; it must have been far other conduct which, at the Olympian and other national meetings, as Isocrates says, made every Lacedæmonian more an object of general curiosity and admiration than the victors in the games; which in short established, through the Greek nation, a respect for the Lacedæmonian character, such as never perhaps was paid to that of any other people.

Ch. 8. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Ch. 18.
s. 5—8. of
this Hist.

Isocr.
Archid.
p. 76. t. 2.

Of the circumstances which, so soon after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, introduced discord again among the Grecian cities, and excited opposition to Lacedæmon where it might least have been expected, our information is very defective. From the following occurrences only we gather, in some degree, the cause of that disgust and alienation which we have already seen manifested in the conduct of

Ch. 21. s. 3.
of this Hist.

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Thebes and Corinth. Thebes claimed sovereignty over the other towns of Bœotia. Lacedæmon favored the claim of those towns to be independent of Thebes, with the purpose of holding them in dependence upon herself. Perhaps some haughty and ungracious interference of Lacedæmon, raising extensive dissatisfaction in Thebes, had afforded that advantage to the democratical leaders which enabled them to gain the ascendant over the aristocratical party, always in some degree the Lacedæmonian party, and so long the ruling party in that city. The success of the democratical party in Thebes would of course raise hope and energy in that of Corinth, which always held friendly communication with the democratical state of Argos. It seems to have been with the support of Argos and Thebes that democracy gained ascendancy in Corinth; insomuch that the two cities which had been the principal allies of Lacedæmon, throughout the Peloponnesian war, became alienated almost immediately after its conclusion.

But Lacedæmon itself was distracted by faction, and its administration consequently unsteady. So much is clearly indicated by the circumstances which led to the restoration of the Athenian democracy; and hence, while among the Asiatic cities, as Xenophon says, every one obeyed whatever any Lacedæmonian commanded, the cities of Greece ventured resistance to the most formal orders of the Lacedæmonian government. It does not appear that any measures were immediately taken, in resentment, either for the protection afforded by Thebes to Athenian fugitives, of the party most inimical to Lacedæmon, or for the refusal of both Thebes and Corinth to obey requisitions which the treaty of confederacy authorized. A nearer interest, or one which more

affected the feelings of the Lacedæmonian people, drew their attention. SECT.
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In that system, if it may be so called, by which the various members of the Greek nation were in some degree held together, we find a strange mixture of undefined, and sometimes repugnant claims, more or less generally admitted. While the Lacedæmonians presided, with authority far too little defined, over the political and military affairs of Greece, the Eleans asserted a prescriptive right to a kind of religious supremacy, also too little defined; universally allowed nevertheless, in a certain degree, but, like the Lacedæmonian supremacy, not always to the extent to which the claimants pretended. In the schism of Peloponnesus, which occurred during the Peloponnesian war, we have seen the imperial state of Lacedæmon summoned to the Elean tribunal, as one of our corporations might be summoned to our courts at Westminster; a fine imposed, its citizens interdicted the common games and sacrifices of the nation, an opprobrious punishment publicly inflicted upon an aged and respectable Spartan, who, but by implication, offended against the Elean decrees; and, finally, these measures supported by avowed hostilities, and alliance with the enemies of Sparta. The necessity of the times induced the Lacedæmonians to make peace with these affronts unrevenged; but their smothered resentment had been revived and increased by what they esteemed a new dignity. Before the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, Agis king of Lacedæmon had been sent, in pursuance of a supposed prophetic direction, to perform a sacrifice to Jupiter at Olympia. The Eleans forbade the ceremony, alleging that, according to ancient law, no oracle should be consulted for success in wars between

Xen. Hel.
c. 1. 3. c. 2.
s. 16.

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Greeks and Greeks, and they would allow no prayer for victory in such a war. There is a beneficence, a liberal and extended patriotism in this idea, so consonant to the spirit with which Iphitus is said to have founded the Olympian festival, and so opposite to the tenets afterward generally prevailing in Greece, that they seem to mark the law for ancient and genuine. The Lacedæmonians however were not the less offended with the Eleans for bringing forward, upon such an occasion, what, if those maxims only were considered which had prevailed through succeeding ages, it must be confessed would carry much the appearance of a complete novelty.

Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 2.
s. 17.

The judgment passed against the Lacedæmonians and the fine imposed, the interdiction of the games, the punishment of Lichas, the confederacy with Athens and Argos, the hostilities ensuing, and finally the refusal of permission for sacrifice at Olympia, are stated by the contemporary historian, as the motives which disposed the Lacedæmonians to war. We gather from him however that others existed; the democratical party at this time governed Elis, and Elis held many towns of Elea in subjection. The Lacedæmonians did not absolutely require oligarchy in every state of Greece; for they had lately permitted the restoration of democracy in Athens; and even their own government had a mixture of democracy: but they always beheld, with peculiar jealousy, dominion exercised by a democratical commonwealth. Urged then at the same time by resentment for past insults, and consideration of a present political interest, the ephors assembled the people, and it was decreed,

B. C. 396.7
Ol. 95. 2.
[B. C. 401.
Cl.]

7. Diodorus ascribes the beginning of the Elean war to the third year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, B. C. 401. Dodwell

historian's single word may be explained, 'should be compelled to a conduct better regulated by prudence and modesty.'⁸

In pursuance of this resolution, ministers were sent to Elis with a declaration 'That the Lacedæmonians deemed it just and proper that the towns held in subjection by the Eleans be restored to independency.' The Eleans, alleging the right of conquest, refused to resign their sovereignty; and upon this the ephors ordered the king, Agis, to march into their country. The usual ravage of Grecian armies presently followed, but an earthquake, imagined a divine admonition, alarming the aged prince and his superstitious people, they retired out of Elea, and the troops were dismissed to their several homes.

Whether as marking the favor of the gods or the weakness of their enemies, this conduct greatly encouraged the Eleans. In either view it improved the hope of gaining to their cause many Grecian states, known to be disaffected toward Lacedæmon. But if the Lacedæmonian sovereignty was tyrannical, theirs apparently was not less so; and while they were cherishing the hope of foreign assistance, they did not take wiser precautions than other Grecian states for securing the attachment of their subjects. In the next spring Agis again entered Elea with an army

places it in the fourth. But it appears to me that Dodwell is thus inconsistent with Xenophon, and even with himself. For the Elean war was concluded early in the third year after its commencement. The death of Agis followed in the same summer; and it does not appear, nor does Dodwell say, that there was any considerable interval before the determination in favor of Agesilaus, of whose succession he says, 'Hoc certe hujus Olympiadis xcv. anno 4.;' that is, after Midsummer, B. C. 397. [See p. 326.]

⁸ Σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς.

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Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 2.
s. 19.

to which all the allies had contributed, excepting Corinth and Bœotia. Immediately Lepreum revolted to him; Macistus and Epitalium quickly followed the example; and these were imitated, as he advanced into the country, by Leprine, Amphidolia, and Marganeæ. In this defection of their towns, the Eleans were utterly unable to face the Lacedæmonian army in the field. Agis proceeded unopposed to Olympia and sacrificed, now unforbidden, on the altar of Jupiter. The territories of the revolting towns of course had been spared; but rapine and devastation marked the way from Olympia to Elis, whither the king next directed his march. Nor did the country suffer only from the conquering army. The opportunity of freebooting invited the neighbouring Arcadians and Achæans; and slaves and cattle and corn were carried off to such an amount that all the markets of Peloponnesus were glutted with Elean plunder. It was supposed that Agis would not, rather than that he could not, take Elis itself, which was unfortified. After destroying many fair buildings of the outskirts he proceeded to Cyllene, the principal sea-port of the Eleans, and ravage was extended from the mountains to the sea.

s. 20.

Occasion has already frequently occurred to remark, that scarcely any misfortune could befall a Grecian state which would not bring advantage, or at least the hope of advantage, to some considerable portion of its subjects. The aristocratical party in Elis, oppressed by the demagogue Thrasydæus, looked to the present sufferings of their country as the means of relief; but with no better consideration of any political or moral principle than might have guided the wildest savages, or the most profligate among the lowest populace in civilized nations. They proposed

to assassinate Thrasydæus, with a few of his confidential friends; and then, in the name of the commonwealth, to open a negotiation with Lacedæmon. The people, they trusted, deprived of their leader, and dreading the arms of the Lacedæmonians, would acquiesce; and thus the principal power in the state would of course come into their hands. The plot failed through a mistake, by which another was murdered for Thrasydæus. The people however, supposing their favorite killed, rested in silent dejection: but, while the conspirators were arming, and stationing their party, the demagogue awoke, where drunkenness and supervening sleep had overnight checked his way. The people immediately flocked about him; a battle followed, and the conspirators, overpowered, fled to the Lacedæmonian camp.

The conduct of the war was such as we have so often seen in Greece. When plunder no longer remained to employ the Lacedæmonian army profitably, Agis marched home, leaving only a garrison in Epitalium on the Alpheus, where he established the Elean fugitives. Hence rapine was occasionally prosecuted through the autumn and winter. Elis could not, like Athens, support itself under the continual ravage of its territory. In spring therefore Thrasydæus opened a negotiation with Lacedæmon, and at once offered the independency of all the towns over which the Eleans claimed sovereignty by right of conquest; proposing only to keep Epium, whose territory they had purchased from the inhabitants for thirty talents fairly paid. The Lacedæmonians however, considering, or affecting to consider, the purchase as forced, required that Epium should be free like the rest. The disposition thus apparent in the Lacedæmonians to depress Elis encouraged the

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 21.

B. C. 397.
Ol. 95. 3.
[B. C. 399.
Cl. See p.
303.]

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 2.
s. 22.

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villagers of the Pisan territory to assert their claim to the superintendency of the Olympian temple, violently taken from their ancestors, as they contended, by the Eleans, when their city was destroyed. But, whatever might have been the ancient right, the Lacedæmonian administration, thinking those uneducated pretenders unfit for an office of much solemnity and dignity in the eyes of all Greece, would not interfere. Upon the condition therefore that every town of Elea should be, as a free republic, a separate member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, which was, in effect, to be subjects of Lacedæmon, peace was made; and Elis, according to the Lacedæmonian decree preceding the war, humbled and chastened, was itself also restored to its place in that confederacy.

The imputation of impiety, under which the Lacedæmonians began the war, perhaps urged them to a more ostentatious display of respect for the gods at the end of it. Agis himself was deputed to offer, at Delphi, the tenth of the spoil. In his return, he was taken ill at Heræa, and he died soon after his arrival at Lacedæmon. In the magnificence of his funeral the Lacedæmonians probably meant also to exhibit their own piety, as well as to testify their opinion of the deceased prince's merit. They failed however in their estimate of the prevailing prejudices of the Grecian people. Honor to the gods indeed was supposed to be best shown, and religion principally to consist, in pompous processions and expensive spectacles; but general opinion condemned the splendor of the funeral of Agis, as

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 3.
s. 1.

B. C. 397:
Ol. 95. 4.
After Mid-
summer.
[B. C. 398.
Cl.*]

[* Mr. Clinton computes that Agis commenced his reign early in the year B. C. 426. Fasti Hellen. p. 211. col. 2. and that he reigned twenty-eight years, p. 212. col. 2.]

greater than could become the most illustrious mortal. SECT.
II.

Circumstances occurring since the Peloponnesian war have not shown the Spartan constitution very well adapted to extensive empire; and those brought forward by the death of Agis will not give any very favorable impression of its interior system. Agis left a reputed son, Leotychides, whom however he had been known to disown; and even his queen Timæa was reported to have declared that her adulterous commerce with Alcibiades had given birth to the child. Against the claim of this dubious prince, Agesilaus, half-brother of Agis, (the latter being son of Archidamus by Lamprido, the former by Eupolia,) had the support of Lysander, the conqueror of Athens, who stood at the head of a powerful party. Agesilaus, many years younger than Agis, and yet in the vigor of youth,⁹ was lame. The partizans of Leotychides hence took occasion to urge, against his pretension, the authority of an ancient oracle, which admonished the Lacedæmonians ‘to beware of halting royalty.’ Lysander answered this objection to his friend by a different interpretation of the oracle. Such absurdity, he insisted, was not intended by the god as to admonish men to provide that a man should never be lame; the purpose of the divine admonition was to guard the succession in the posterity of Hercules; and then only royalty would truly halt when a man not of the royal line should ascend the throne. When we find a discussion of such importance related by the pen of Xenophon, and when we know that two at least of the persons interested, Agesilaus and Lysander, were

Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 3.
s. 2.
Plut. vit.
Ages. init.

⁹ Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. Xen. Agesil. init.

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able and great men, we should impute perhaps to change of circumstances and manners the difficulty we have to discover any dignity, almost any decency, or even common sense, in the proceedings. Leaving them therefore for readers whom curiosity may induce to consult the contemporary historian, suffice it here to say that, by the votes of the general assembly of the Lacedæmonians, it was decided that Agesilaus should reign.

Athens, in the age of which we are treating, is nearly as well known to us as our own country, two hundred years ago. The remaining works of historians, orators, lawyers, poets, and philosophers give almost every information we could desire. But about Lacedæmon we are much in the dark. The Lacedæmonians wrote no books, published no speeches, discountenanced the residence of foreigners among them, and made secrecy in matters of government a maxim, not only of their policy, but of their religion. We know the Lacedæmonians therefore almost only in foreign command. With the prerogatives of their kings, which were principally exercised in foreign command, we are well acquainted; but of the proper authority of the ephors, of the senate, of the people, of the lesser assembly, composed apparently of the citizens of Lacedæmon only, of the greater assembly, in which all Laconians, by themselves or deputies, seem to have had voices, we learn little. Something of the state of parties becomes occasionally discovered through its connexion with foreign politics. But internal transactions, gradual revolutions in laws, manners, and politics, and those deviations from the system of Lycurgus which length of time and great changes in the circumstances of the commonwealth had produced, conquests, foreign connexions, exten-

sive power, more extensive influence, the various communication of the people, in command and in negotiation, in war and in peace, the avowed introduction of public wealth for the maintenance of fleets and armies, the surreptitious acquisitions of individuals by the various means which foreign service afforded, and, what was not least in importance, the accumulation of property in the hands of individual citizens through inheritance from females, of all these matters we have but very obscure information. All accounts of the system of Lycurgus indicate that he allowed no distinction of rank or privileges but from age or merit. But, in the course of centuries, a very material distinction had arisen. The families peculiarly named Spartans, and distinguished also by the title of PEERS,¹⁰ had engrossed almost the whole power of the commonwealth. The rest of the people, included under the general name of Lacedæmonians, or the still more extensive appellation of Lacons or Laconians, including the Priæcians, were never admitted to the higher offices, civil or military. So early as the age of Xerxes we find a great distinction; for, in the army which fought under Pausanias, at the celebrated battle of Plataea, every Spartan was attended by seven Helots, every other Lacedæmonian by only one. The Spartans in that army were, according to Herodotus, five thousand, and the Lacedæmonians only an equal number. But, never admitting any new associates to their order, as Spartan families became extinct their numbers lessened, and in Xenophon's time were so reduced that, in Sparta itself, they were but a small part of the population; or at least of the numbers occasionally assembled there.

Herodotus,
l. 9. c. 29.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 3.
s. 5.

¹⁰ Τῶν Ὀμοίων. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 3. s. 5.

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It is however evident, from all accounts of Lacedæmonian affairs, that, from the age of Lycurgus till toward the period to which we are now arrived, the distinction of ranks in Lacedæmon was less invidious than in any other Grecian state: the whole body of the people was better amalgamated; and the factions, known by several names, yet marking nearly the same distinctions, the rich and the poor, the nobles and the commons, the few and the many, which divided every other Grecian republic, are there little heard of.¹¹ But it appears that even the ephors, a magistracy said to have been originally established to watch and

¹¹ It by no means however follows that slaves, or those known of servile origin, were admitted, as Barthelemi pretends, (c. 42. p. 103. vol. 4. ed. 8^o.) to the first honors of the state. The attention with which Barthelemi has studied the able writers of the republican times should have sufficed to make him distrust the assertion of so late an author as Ælian, not made in the clearest terms, that Callicratidas, Gylippus, and Lysander were of neodamode families. From the contemporary writers it very sufficiently appears that, in their age, none such could arrive at the high stations which they filled. Though occasion has occurred to mention the matter in a former note, (ch. 20. sect. 2. note 4.) yet, as Barthelemi's authority is esteemed high, it may not be superfluous to add here some observations. Herodotus has commemorated the first strangers known to have been admitted to the privileges of Spartans; and it was not forty years after that Cleandridas, father of Gylippus, occupied the exalted office of regent. Gylippus himself was chosen for the Sicilian command, not more for his abilities than for his rank. His known dignity of Spartan blood was the very circumstance proposed to induce the deference of the Sicilians to his authority; and, for Lysander, Barthelemi himself has in another place taken the account of Plutarch, who says he was of a Heraclidean family. (Anach. v. 4. p. 285.) Barthelemi is in general little careful to distinguish the different practices of distant ages, when the Grecian cities were in widely different circumstances; and he quotes, with far too much indifference, the highest authorities and the lowest, Thucydides, Xenophon, Isocrates, and Hesychius, Julius Pollux, or Suidas.

protect the rights of the people at large, were always appointed from among the Spartans only. And it seems probable that, after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when, through the vast acquisition of power made by Lacedæmon, new and great temptations offered for coveting high office, while at the same time the services of the body of the people were less necessary to those in authority, the Spartans, or peers, began to set a wider distinction between themselves and others, to assume authority with less reserve, and exercise it with less discretion.

Agésilas had not yet been a year on the throne when the invidious distinctions, which had been growing in the Lacedæmonian state, and the impolitic conduct of those peculiarly called Spartans, gave rise to a plot for a complete change of government, for the accomplishment of which kings, ephors, and senate were to be assassinated. The leader, Cinadon, a young man, already placed, by birth and talents, above the crowd, was indignant to be excluded, by arbitrary distinctions, from the possibility of still advancing himself. To engage those of his own rank in his views it was his practice to desire them to count the Spartans in the full agora. They would be, beside the kings, the ephors, and the senate, perhaps forty, while the Lacedæmonians, ruled by these, and denied the means of admission to high office, were more than four thousand. He desired them then to advert to the state of the towns and villages of Laconia; and in each they would find one master, and many friends: apparently meaning one Spartan magistrate, with many Laconians, like themselves, excluded from Spartan honors. All the Helots, all the newly-admitted citizens, the lower people of the capital, and the people of the provincial towns universally, he proceeded, would be of their party;

Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 3.
s. 6.

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for all these, it was known, whenever the subject occurred in conversation, were unable to conceal their detestation of the Spartans.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 3.
s. 8. 9. 10.

This conspiracy being indicated by one of the associates, the ephors were so doubtful of the disposition of the people of Sparta itself that they feared to apprehend Cinadon there: they feared to summon even the lesser assembly. Consulting only with some of the senators, they sent Cinadon, on pretence of public service, with a small command, to the frontiers. There he was arrested, and the names of his principal accomplices being drawn from him, their persons were secured before any discovery was suspected. Cinadon being asked what was his object in the plot, answered, 'Not to be inferior to others in Lacedæmon.' He was executed, together with his principal accomplices, with torture and public ignominy. Sedition was thus daunted, and the Spartans, or peers, retained the enjoyment of their exclusive privileges. The means of Xenophon, through his intimacy with Agesilaus and many other Spartans of high rank, to obtain a knowledge of these circumstances, give an authenticity to his detail of them which, in the scantiness of our information concerning the interior transactions of Sparta, make it highly valuable.

s. 11.

SECTION III.

Lacedæmonian government of subject-allies. Insult from Thebes. War renewed with Persia. First campaign of Agesilaus in Asia. Preparations for the second campaign. Battle of the Pactolus. Death of Tissaphernes. Weakness of the Persian government.

Domestic disturbance was thus fortunately obviated, when very serious alarm arose from a foreign quarter. A Syracusan, named Herodas, arrived at Lacedæmon

from Phenicia, with intelligence of great preparations in the ports of that country. Many triremes were equipping, many building, many arriving from other maritime provinces of the Persian empire. Rumor went that a fleet of three hundred was to be formed; where to be employed nobody knew; but, among orders coming from various great officers, some were from Tissaphernes: whence suspicion arose that Greece, or some of the Grecian settlements, were in view. Herodas, whom mercantile business only had led to Phenicia, anxious to communicate intelligence probably so important to the common welfare of the Greek nation, had taken his departure in the first ship.

This communication made much impression at Lacedæmon. No assurance had yet been received that the treaty, concluded with Tissaphernes by Dercyllidas, had been ratified by the king, or would be ratified. Indeed it could not be supposed very acceptable to him or to his council; and the satrap's faithlessness had been abundantly experienced. There was therefore ample reason to apprehend that the Greek nation, and especially the Asiatic colonies, were the objects of the great armament preparing in the Phenician ports. For the colonies the danger was the greater because, since the departure of Dercyllidas, all there had gone into disorder. Immediately on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, democratical government had been everywhere abolished by Lysander; who established in every city a council of only ten men, in whose hands he placed the supreme authority. Should entire credit be given to the invective of Athenian orators, it was a most oppressive and degrading tyranny that was universally exercised by those oligarchies. Some exagge-

B. C. 397.
Ol. 95. 4.
Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 4.
s. 1.

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ration in their pictures however we may reasonably suppose; and yet the tenor of Grecian history, and many facts reported by Xenophon, too well warrant the belief that, under such governments, unless when power committed to the liberality of a Dercyllidas controlled them, oppression, and gross oppression, would be not uncommon. The Spartan administration nevertheless did not refuse attention to the complaints of the people. Their measures show indeed more liberality than wisdom. Hastily undertaking to legislate for a country with which they were unacquainted, together with the abolition of the Council of Ten, they directed, in general terms, the restoration of the old constitution. Every city was at once torn by the utmost violence of faction. Democracy, such as it had subsisted under the supremacy of Athens, was nowhere completely restored, but universal anarchy ensued.

Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 4.
s. 2. 7.

Confusion thus pervading the subject states, and apprehension of an enemy, so powerful as the Persian empire, agitating Lacedæmon, a congress of the confederacy was summoned. Hostilities had of late years been frequent with one or other of the bordering satraps; but it was long since the force of the Persian empire, united under the direction of its head, had been exerted against Greece, always divided within itself. These were circumstances in which such a man as Lysander would come forward advantageously. Taking a leading part in debate, he was successful in his endeavours to obviate alarm. 'Of the superiority of the Greeks by sea,' he said, 'there could be no reasonable doubt; and of what they were capable by land, against the Persian empire, the late return of the Cyrean army very sufficiently demonstrated. With regard to the disturb-

ances among the Asian Greek cities, it was obvious that a reversal of the measures, which had occasioned the present confusion, would of course restore the former order. He could not hesitate therefore to declare his opinion that the large part of the Greek nation there looking to Lacedæmon for protection, and, for the sake of protection, readily admitting her supremacy, that large part, a kind of outwork necessary to the security of Greece itself, ought to be protected.' Since Leotychides, who, with Xanthippus father of Pericles, defeated the army of Xerxes at Mycale, a Spartan king had never crossed the Ægean. Agesilaus, incited by Lysander, now offered himself for the command. He required only thirty Spartans, with two thousand neodamode Lacedæmonians, and six thousand heavy-armed of the allies. His offer encouraged the assembly; the expedition was voted.

Xenophon reports of Agesilaus that, by courting equally ephors, senate, and people, and seeming always anxious to defer to their authority, he obtained a more commanding influence, and more real power, than any of his predecessors for a long time had enjoyed. It seems to have been in pursuance of this policy that he desired the attendance of thirty Spartans. Ten we have seen appointed to attend Agis in an expedition against the Argives, as a controlling council; and this check upon the military authority of the kings, once established, would not be readily remitted. By desiring thirty instead of ten, Agesilaus seemed to pay a compliment to the body of the peers, while he really diminished the consequence of each individual of his council, and perhaps made it easier for himself to rule the whole.

He was not equally happy in his speculations in

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foreign as in domestic politics, or perhaps he neglected them. An occurrence of a strange nature, far from clearly accounted for by the contemporary historian his friend, foreboded ill to the peace of Greece, while he embarked for Asia. Geræstus in Eubœa was the appointed port where the troops were to assemble. In his way thither, attended by a small escort only, he went to the port of Aulis in Bœotia; and, on account of the fame of that place for the sacrifice of Agamemnon, and the departure of the united forces of Greece for the Trojan war, he made a point of sacrificing there. He was already in the middle of the ceremony when the Bœotarchs, at the head of a considerable force of horse, interfered, rudely scattered the offering from the altar, and peremptorily forbade the sacrifice. Agesilaus, surprised and incensed, but unable to resist, imprecated the vengeance of the gods upon the Bœotians for the impious violence. Possibly the Bœotians may have esteemed the attempt of the Spartan king an impious intrusion. Evidently he had been deficient in precaution, and they appear to have been brutal, either in insult or in resentment. In the moment nothing seems to have followed: Agesilaus proceeded to Geræstus, whence he conducted his armament safely to Ephesus: but the remoter consequences, as we shall see, were deeply unfortunate to Bœotia and to Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel.

I. 3. c. 4.

s. 5.

B.C. 396.¹²

Ol. 98. 4.

Novem. or

Decem.

The arrival of the Spartan king, with a Grecian army, in Asia, could not but alarm the satraps there. Tissaphernes sent a deputation to inquire the cause of

¹² We are frequently missing, in Xenophon, the convenient accuracy of Thucydides in marking times and seasons; and Dodwell has not been fortunate in his endeavours to explain the difficulties occurring about the period of the commands of Der-

a measure which so strongly implied a disposition [B.C. 396.*
not to abide by the treaty concluded with Dercylli-
Cl.]

cyllidas and Agesilaus. In assigning the arrival of Agesilaus in Asia to the conclusion of the year B. C. 396. he says,— ‘Hoc ‘nempe arctè cohæret cum historiâ Dercyllidæ.’ It certainly does not cohere. Under the administration of Dercyllidas the Asian Greek cities singularly flourished in peace and concord. (Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 2. s. 7. 9.) But, before the expedition of Agesilaus was thought of, all was already confusion there through the removal of the councils of Ten (c. 4. s. 2. and 7.). Dodwell seems totally to have overlooked this latter circumstance; and so has attributed the congress at Sparta, which decreed the expedition of Agesilaus, to the same year B. C. 397. to which he has given the progress of Dercyllidas and of the Spartan ministers through the Asiatic cities, when they were found so peaceful and flourishing. Having then attributed the resolution taken in Greece, for war with Asia under Agesilaus, to the year 397., he attributes the treaty of peace made by Dercyllidas to the following year B. C. 396., and the arrival of Agesilaus in Asia to the conclusion of the same year 396. Here evidently all is not consistent. I have however been unable, with the leisure I could give to the subject, and perhaps should be unable at any rate, to accommodate the dates of these transactions perfectly to one another, and to preceding and following events; and I have therefore thought it best, with this admonition to the reader, generally to give Dodwell’s dates in the margin. The reader best acquainted with his labors will probably be most ready to excuse my failure, in the investigation of a labyrinth in which his learning, ingenuity, and diligence, directed to that as his principal object, have been bewildered. [One great source of error in the statement of Dodwell, with which Mr. Mitford is here dissatisfied, is pointed out below, p. 343. Dodwell’s arrangement of the times of Agesilaus and Dercyllidas is with great acuteness examined and confuted by Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 274—276.]

[* ‘Agesilaus passes with an army from Aulis to Ephesus. Plut. Ages. c. 6. 7. Xen. Hel. III. 4, 3. Apparently in the spring. *First Campaign of Agesilaus in Asia*: described by Plut. Ages. c. 7—9. and by Xenophon Hel. III. 4, 5—15. It began with a truce of three months with Tissaphernes: Xen. Hel. III. 4, 6. Agesil. c. 1—10. and ended with his wintering at Ephesus. Xen. Hel. III. 4, 15. 16. Agesil. c. 1. 23—26.’ Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* under the year B. C. 396.]

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Xen. Hel.
& Ages.

1. 3. c. 4.
s. 6.

das. Agesilaus replied, that his purpose was not to disturb the peace of the king of Persia's dominions, but only to assure the independency of the Grecian cities in Asia. Tissaphernes answered, that he was himself still desirous of peace, upon the terms already settled; nor did he suppose the king averse; and he therefore desired time to send to Susa, before any hostilities should take place. Agesilaus, who seems not to have been commissioned by the Spartan government for any purpose of conquest, but only to enforce the honorable terms of peace already concluded upon, acceded to the satrap's proposal. Dercyllidas, who was among his officers, was sent with two others to the satrap's court, and a truce was concluded for three months. Tissaphernes, wholly unscrupulous, had no sooner sworn to the treaty than he took measures for hastening the arrival of troops, which might enable him to break it. This became known to Agesilaus, who nevertheless resolved to abide strictly by the compact made.

s. 7. &
Plut. Ages.

Among the thirty Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, was his friend Lysander. Agesilaus himself was yet little known among the Asian Greeks. The reputation therefore of Lysander, high, while he held command among them, and since so greatly increased by the conquest of Athens, drew the attention of all. The violence of party, and the disordered state of the governments, gave occasion for various representation, remonstrance, solicitation, and intrigue. All were anxious to obtain the interest of Lysander with the king; and such was the consequent attendance upon him that it appeared, says the historian, as if Lysander had been king, and Agesilaus a private person.

The umbrage likely to be taken, at a superiority

so pointedly attributed to him, was first manifested Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 4. s. 8. & Plut. Ages. by his colleagues of the Thirty; satisfied with their situation of counsellors to the king, but ill bearing to be considered as attendants upon one of their own body. At their instigation at length, Agesilaus began to show his dissatisfaction, by constantly denying the suits of those who came recommended by Lysander. Whether that officer had before been unbecomingly assuming does not appear; but the affront, now put upon him, he bore with becoming moderation. Gently dismissing the crowd of followers who used officiously to attend him, he told all who solicited his interest that his interference would only injure their cause. With the united respect and frankness, due to a king and a friend, he then opened Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 4. s. 9. himself to Agesilaus; expressed his regret that he could no longer be useful in his present situation; requested that he might be sent on any duty where he might equally avoid giving umbrage and incurring disgrace; and promised that, to the best of his ability, s. 10. it should be faithfully performed.

Agesilaus did not deny this petition; and Lysander, being sent to take the Hellespontine command, found an early opportunity to do a service highly acceptable to him. Spithridates, a Persian of rank, thought himself injured by Pharnabazus. The bond of connexion between the government of Susa and the great men of the distant provinces, lax before the expedition of Cyrus, had been still weakened by that event. The address of Lysander therefore sufficed to persuade Spithridates to renounce a government which gave no security to its faithful servants, and pass over to the Greeks with his family and effects, and two hundred horse under his command. Accordingly, leaving these under the pro-

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tection of Lysander in Cyzicus, Spithridates proceeded with his eldest son to wait upon Agesilaus in Ionia. The visit was, on many accounts, highly gratifying to that prince, and, among other matters, for the information gained concerning the country under the government of Pharnabazus.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 4.
s. 11.
B. C. 395.
Ol. 96. $\frac{1}{2}$.
[B. C. 396.
CL.]

Tissaphernes only waited to be assured of the approach of the troops, particularly cavalry, which he expected from the interior provinces, and then sent a declaration to Agesilaus that, 'unless the European forces were immediately withdrawn from Asia, he and all who adhered to him must expect the vengeance of the great king.' Not only the deputies from the Asiatic cities were alarmed, but the officers of the army, and even the Lacedæmonians, could not without uneasiness compare the smallness of their force with the numbers reported of the enemy. Agesilaus however was not unprepared for this demonstration of the satrap's falsehood. Receiving the communication with cheerfulness, he bade the Persian ministers tell their master, 'that he thanked him for making the gods avengers of perjury, enemies to the Persian and friends to the Grecian cause.' Instantly he dispatched notices for the Ionian, Æolian, and Hellespontine forces to join him; issued orders for the troops with him to prepare for marching; and to indicate that he meant not to await attack, but to carry the war where he knew the satrap's interested feelings would be most vulnerable, he sent requisitions for the towns on the way to Caria to prepare markets for the army.

Xen. Hel.
ibid. &
Agesil.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 4.
s. 12.

Tissaphernes, informed of these dispositions, directed his measures, not to the prosecution of the great interests of the empire, but to the preservation of his own large property in Caria. That mountain-

ous province being unfit for the action of horse, he sent thither almost the whole of his infantry. Descending then with his numerous cavalry into the vale of the Mæander, he hoped, with that alone, to trample in dust the Grecian army before it could reach the highlands. Agesilaus was aware that, in the plain, he must suffer in contest with the Persian horse. As soon therefore as he was assured that his feint had fixed the attention of the satrap to the southward, he directed his own march the contrary way. Thus he joined more readily, and without opposition, the forces from the northern colonies, among whom were the Cyrean troops; and falling, wholly unexpected, upon the satrapy of Pharnabazus, the country was plundered without resistance, the towns yielded as he approached, and he enriched his army with a very great booty. Encouraged thus he approached Dascylium, the satrap's residence; but there he experienced how formidable the Persian cavalry were still capable of being. His small force of horse, preceding the march of the infantry, met nearly an equal force of the enemy's horse. Immediately the Greeks formed in line, four deep. Unlike the desultory manner of the modern Asiatics, the Persians charged in column, only twelve in front. Every Grecian lance opposed to them was broken; and twelve men, with two horses, were slain. The Greeks so felt their inferiority that they immediately retreated. Fortunately the heavy-armed, under Agesilaus, were near enough to give them security. Modern tacticians generally hold the charge of cavalry in column absurd. The fact only is here given as it is related by the soldier-historian. The account however, it should be observed, is among the numerous instances of candid confession which entitle Xeno-

Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 4.
s. 20.

s. 14.

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XXIV.

phon to our credit when he relates the successes of the Greeks, and diminish, though certainly they cannot entirely remove, our regret, that we have no Persian accounts to confront with the Grecian.

Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 4.
s. 15.

Agesilaus, prudent as brave, saw quickly what was to be done. On the morrow after the action of the cavalry the entrails of the victims in the sacrifice were found imperfect. This passed for an admonition from the gods to proceed no farther, and Agesilaus immediately directed his march back toward the coast; aware, says the historian, in phrase pretty strongly implying that the omen had been preconcerted, of the impossibility of acting in the plains without a sufficient force of horse. Fortunately winter was approaching, when annoyance to the Grecian territories from the enemy's powerful cavalry was less to be apprehended.

Against the ensuing campaign Agesilaus took measures for being better provided. Requisitions were sent for the wealthy, in every Grecian city of Asia, to prepare themselves for that service which the Grecian political institutions imposed, at the same time, as an honor and a tax. Those requisitions were however accompanied with notice that, instead of personal attendance, able substitutes, well mounted and well armed, would be accepted; and the levies were completed, says Xenophon, with a diligence and dispatch, as if every noble and wealthy Ionian thought he was hiring a man to die for him.

s. 16.

B. C. 394.

Ol. 96. 2.

[B. C. 395.*
Cl.]

Early in spring Agesilaus assembled his whole force in Ephesus, and there bestowed attention, more than was usual among the generals of that age, in

[* ' Agesilaus prepares for his *Second Campaign* in Asia, ἐπειδὴ ἔαρ ὑπέφαινε.

' Xen. Hel. III. 4, 16. About the same time, (that is, in the *spring*,) the first year of his command expires: Hel. III. 4, 20. He gains a victory near Sardis.

preparing his troops for service. Commonly among the Greeks, the soldier's arms were what his means enabled, or his zeal in the cause and regard for his own safety induced him to procure; his discipline was what the institutions of his commonwealth required of all its subjects; occasionally improved, through the same motives which excited care in the choice of arms. The man unprovided with the armour and unacquainted with the discipline of the heavy-armed was cast among the ignobler crowd of the light-armed: his pay, if any, was inferior; he had no allowance for a servant; if a prisoner, he was neglected; if killed, unnumbered. But, serving among the heavy-armed, in proportion as his armour was imperfect, and his personal skill deficient, his danger in action was greater. Agesilaus however would not trust the service of his country, and his own glory, to the various effect of such considerations upon the various tempers of men. Heavy-armed, middle-armed, bowmen, and cavalry were all severally called out to exercise: emulation was excited by the institution of prizes for those who excelled; arms were examined; artizans and traders were invited and encouraged; the agora of Ephesus was crowded with horses and warlike implements of every kind; and the city, says the soldier-historian who was present, seemed a laboratory of war.¹³

Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 4.
s. 17.

Amid these military cares the attention of Age-

¹ Hel. III. 4, 21—24. Tithraustes sent to supersede Tissaphernes. 4, 25.

² Mission of Timocrates into Greece: III. 5, 1—3. Agesilaus, ἄμα μετωπῶρα, penetrates into Phrygia and Paphlagonia. Hel. IV. 1, 1—3.

³ Dodwell Ann. Xen. p. 249. supposes the *spring* spoken of Hel. III. 4, 16, to be the *spring* of that summer in which the battle of Coronea was fought; and contracts the operations of *two* years into *one*. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. under the year B. C. 395.]

¹³ Πολέμου ἐργαστήριον.

CHAP.
XXIV.Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 4.
s. 18.

Agasilas to acts of religion contributed to infuse, at the same time, confidence and a spirit of order among his troops. It was his common practice to lead the way from the field of exercise to the temple of Diana, where those who had gained prizes offered their chaplets, the honorary part of their reward, to the goddess. 'And what,' proceeds the historian, 'may not be hoped from an army dutiful to the gods, diligent in military exercises, and zealous in subordination?'

s. 19.
& Agesil.

Another measure of the Spartan prince to excite confidence among his troops, consonant as doubtless it was to the manners esteemed best in that age, and accordingly mentioned by Xenophon, not only without reprobation, but among things praiseworthy, will be otherwise thought of by the better-taught humanity of modern times. Among the prisoners at Ephesus, taken in the Persian provinces by those freebooters who, in the deficiency of law and government, made their livelihood by such violences,¹⁴ were some of wealthy families and higher rank; accustomed, says the historian, to ride in carriages, and unaccustomed to toil. These Agesilaus ordered to be exposed naked for public sale by the common crier. Unpractised in those naked exercises, in which the bodies of men of all ranks among the Greeks became embrowned, their skins were white, their limbs delicate, they appeared incapable of activity or labour, and the Greek soldiers drew the conclusion that they should have no more to apprehend in battle from such men than from so many women.

s. 20.
B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. $\frac{2}{3}$.

According to the usual rotation in the Lacedæmonian service, when the first year of the command

¹⁴ Ὑπὸ τῶν λεπτῶν ἀλικομένων.

of Agesilaus was completed, Lysander and the rest of the Thirty returned home, and were succeeded in their situation by an equal number of other Spartans. Among these the king was to distribute the commands under him at his discretion. The cavalry accordingly he committed to Xenocles; the Lacedæmonian neodamodes to Scythes; to Herippidas the Cyreans; and the Asian Greeks to Migdon. He then notified his intention to march directly into the richest of the enemy's country, in defence of which the utmost exertion was to be expected, and he therefore admonished all to be prepared in body and mind accordingly.

The wily yet weak Tissaphernes was again deceived through his very fear of deception. Being informed of the notice given in public orders by the Spartan king, he thought it a feint, like that of the former year; and, supposing Caria so much more certainly now the real as it was less the pretended object, he again sent his infantry thither, and again encamped with his formidable cavalry in the vale of Mæander. Agesilaus, in precise conformity to his declared intention; marched into the Sardian territory, and, three days unopposed, his army collected plunder on all sides.

On the fourth day the followers of the Grecian camp were dispersed for booty about the rich banks of the Pactolus, when a body of Persian cavalry suddenly came upon them and killed several. Agesilaus ordering his horse to their relief, the whole Persian army appeared, forming in order of battle. The ground was not favorable for engaging so superior a body of cavalry; but the whole Grecian force was collected, and the Persian infantry absent. Agesilaus therefore resolved to use the opportunity. He ordered

[B. C. 395.
Spring. Cl.
See p. 342.]

Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 4.
s. 21.

s. 22.

s. 23.

CHAP.
XXIV.Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 4.
s. 24.

his horse, with assurance of being supported, to charge: he commanded his middle-armed to follow running; and he led his phalanx with a brisk yet steady pace after them. The Persians repelled¹⁵ the Grecian cavalry; but the sight of the middle-armed, followed by the formidable array of the phalanx, dismayed them; they turned, and presently fled. Some, entangled in the course of the Pactolus, were killed or made prisoners. Against the rest the pursuit of the Greeks was little destructive: but it gave them possession of the Persian camp. The middle-armed, as would be likely, says the historian, immediately fell to plunder. But Agesilaus disappointed their rapacity by surrounding the camp with his more regular troops; and, enclosing thus together friends and foes, he ensured the just distribution of a very great booty. Many camels, an animal then little known in Greece, being carried thither by Agesilaus in his return, were much noticed among the trophies that distinguished this victory.

s. 25.
& Agesil.

Intelligence of the event excited great alarm in Sardis, and vehement complaint against the satrap. He was in his palace there when the misfortune happened which his presence with the army, and the animation he might have infused by sharing its dangers, it was held, ought to have prevented. The alarm was quickly enhanced, and the complaint sharpened, by the appearance of the Grecian army before the walls, and by the plunder and destruction around. The Spartan king endeavoured to increase the disorder by a proclamation, declaring himself the friend and protector of freedom, ready to contest in arms the right of any who claimed to hold Asia in sub-

Agesil.

¹⁵ So much, I think, is implied in the word ἐδέξαντο, used both in the Hellenics and in the Agesilaus.

jection. It does not appear that any important desertion followed: but great alarm was communicated, even to the distant court of Persia, insomuch that the ruin of Tissaphernes was in consequence resolved upon. According to the manner nearly of the Turkish empire at this day, Tithraustes came to Sardis, commissioned from the king, at the same time to supersede and to behead him. Such was the end of that worthless satrap; who, in a long course of years, had such various transactions with the Greeks. His sovereigns, and their subjects committed to his government, both had undoubtedly enough to complain of him; yet, as far as the Greeks were interested in his character, his weakness and cowardice seem to have been more beneficial to them than his profligacy was injurious.¹⁶

The first act of the government of Tithraustes, after the execution of his predecessor, marks a weakness in the Persian empire which, notwithstanding the many instances that have occurred, still appears surprising. When, in the distant provinces, private interest or private animosity had led the late satrap to measures directly opposite to what the service of his sovereign required, we see only a common consequence of weak government. But the new viceroy came immediately commissioned from the supreme council of the empire, and yet did not come to revenge

¹⁶ Cornelius Nepos, in his life of Conon, says that Tissaphernes rebelled, and that his death was the just punishment for that crime: but the biographer abounds with instances of carelessness, and of a deficient judgment, which led him sometimes, even in contradiction to the best authorities, to report utter improbabilities. Indeed many of the lives ascribed to him bear much the appearance of juvenile exercises; the works of a youth of talent, in a course of Greek reading, practising Latin composition.

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the injuries of the Persian subjects, or repair the disgraces of the Persian arms, suffered in the invasion of the empire from the forces of a little distant republic. He entered immediately into negotiation with Agesilaus; rather apologized for past measures, laying the blame upon his predecessor; observed that justice was now executed upon that worthless officer; and protested that the king his master desired no other than that the Grecian cities in Asia should be free; paying the ancient tribute or rent for their lands, which had always been confessedly held of his empire; and that, upon these conditions only, he expected that the European troops should be withdrawn. Agesilaus professed himself willing to treat, but without authority to conclude. Tithraustes desired that authority might be sent for, and, in the mean time, that hostilities against his satrapy at least might cease: 'Consider Pharnabazus,' he said, 'still as your enemy, and invade his territory; but for myself, I have a fair claim to be treated as the friend of the Greeks, having done them justice against him who was the principal author of their wrongs.' This submissive language from the lieutenant of the great king was followed by what still more marks the consciousness of utter inability, in the administration of the empire, to extend from the capital to the distant provinces the energy necessary to hold all united in just obedience and under due protection. Agesilaus did not scruple to require, as the price of truce with one satrapy, to be paid the expense of carrying war into another; and to this apparently strange proposal the new satrap acceded: thirty talents, above six thousand pounds sterling, were paid, expressly to defray the expense of the Grecian

army's march into the Bithynian satrapy.¹⁷ Examples of a policy somewhat similar perhaps may be found in the modern history of Turkey. Of the fact however we cannot reasonably doubt; for Xenophon, holding his command in the Cyrean troops, and intimate with Agesilaus, was in a situation certainly to know what he related; and his zeal for the glory of his friend and patron would not lead him designedly to exaggerate the satrap's folly, or the weakness of the Persian empire.

The views of Agesilaus, in the early part of his command, appear to have been moderate. He would have been contented with the glory of giving independency to the Greeks of Asia, and peace to those of Europe. But experience of the ease with which greater advantages and higher fame might be acquired seems to have excited his ambition. Possibly however he may have found good reason to believe that moderation was not so safe as on a transient view it might appear. He may have thought, and perhaps justly, that there could be no security for peace but in the enemy's inability to make successful war. Possibly he may have known some cause, not likely to be lasting, for the new satrap's submissive conduct, apparently so unbecoming the officer of a great empire in so great a command; and he may have been influenced by the consideration that, if Tithraustes was not as faithless as Tissaphernes, an early successor might be so. Meanwhile the success of his friends at home, in managing his political interests, was encouragement to follow the path of ambition. A commission arrived, putting the fleet

Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 4.
s. 26.

¹⁷ The satrapy of Pharnabazus appears to have been variously called the Bithynian, the Phrygian, the Hellespontine, or of Dascylis or Dascylium, the satrap's principal residence.

CHAP.
XXIV.Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 4.
s. 27.

under his command, equally with the land forces, and authorizing him to appoint the admiral. He proceeded immediately to use this new power with a view not to peace, unless as it might follow farther success in war. He communicated to all the towns of the coast and islands his wish to have his naval force increased: leaving it to themselves to decide what ships they would add to their squadrons. Agesilaus was popular; the war was popular; to many it had been lucrative; and, the zeal of wealthy individuals vying with that of communities, the fleet was strengthened with a hundred and twenty new triremes. In the appointment of his admiral Agesilaus allowed his partiality for a friend and kinsman to lead him to injudicious choice. Superseding Pharax, who had done considerable services, he committed the important command to Pisander, his queen's brother; a man of approved courage and clear honor, but unversed in naval affairs.

SECTION IV.

Mission of Timocrates into Greece from the satrap of Lydia: bribery of the democratical leaders in the Grecian republics: enmity excited against Lacedæmon: war between Phocis and Locris, leading to war between Lacedæmon and Thebes: Athens gained to the Theban alliance: invasion of Bœotia: death of Lysander: prosecution and flight of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. $\frac{2}{3}$.
Xen. Hel.
I. 3. c. 5.
s. 1.
[B. C. 395.
CL]

These preparations, demonstrating that the Lacedæmonian king had neither peace nor any little object in view, alarmed Tithraustes. The military of the Persian empire was weak, but its wealth was powerful. Means to be informed of the state of Greece, of the dissensions among its little republics, one with another

and each within itself, of the violence of party in all, and, what was most important, of the extensive dislike to the Lacedæmonian supremacy, and the growing jealousy of the Lacedæmonian power, were open to the satrap. A Persian versed enough in Grecian politics and Grecian manners to manage an intriguing negotiation among the Grecian republics probably was not to be found. Tithraustes therefore employed a Greek, Timocrates of Rhodes. The general purpose of his mission was to conciliate to the Persian interests the leading men of every republic where he could find opportunity, directing his view particularly to those cities where aversion toward Lacedæmon was known most to prevail. Among means, bribery was much depended upon; a political engine of great efficacy, though it had not then, as our moral poet has observed, that facility of operation which modern refinements in commerce have given it. Paper-credit was unknown: Timocrates was necessarily to be encumbered with gold.¹⁸ In the poverty of the Grecian republics however, about twelve thousand pounds sterling, ably and faithfully distributed, was sufficient to make a great change in the political face of the country.¹⁹ Xenophon has not

¹⁸ Blest paper credit ! last and best supply !
That lends Corruption lighter wings to fly !
Gold, imp'd by thee, can compass hardest things,
Can pocket states, can fetch and carry kings ;
A single leaf shall waft an army o'er,
Or ship off senates to a distant shore ;
A leaf, like Sibyl's, scatter to and fro
Our fates and fortunes, as the winds shall blow :
Pregnant with thousands flits the scrap unseen,
And, silent, sells a king or buys a queen.

Pope's Moral Essays, ep. 3.

¹⁹ Whether Xenophon was or was not exactly informed of the sum which Timocrates brought and distributed, though it is reasonable to suppose he had some good ground for his

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Xen. Hel.
1. 3. c. 5.
s. 2.

scrupled to name the party-leaders, in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, who partook of it. If we may trust his impartiality in speaking of his fellow-countrymen, the Athenians, clear of that baseness, were led only by ambition, and the hope of recovering their lost pre-eminence in Greece, to desire a confederacy against Lacedæmon.

Ibid.

But, whatever the operations of secret intrigue might be, the result became quickly evident. The general assemblies in the several cities resounded with invectives against Lacedæmonian tyranny. 'Since ' the conclusion of the twenty-seven years' war,' it was asked, 'and the overthrow of the tyrannous ' dominion of Athens, what benefit has accrued to ' Greece from the transfer of empire to Lacedæmon? ' Of what command, what honor, what revenue have ' the allies been allowed to participate? those allies ' who so zealously shared all labors, all dangers, all ' expenses. On the contrary, adding indignity to ' injury, have not the Lacedæmonians sent Helots, ' with their title of harmost, to govern Grecian ' republics, and conducted themselves, in all respects, ' as if they claimed to be masters of their free con- ' federates?' The apprehensions, the indignation, and the animosity of the many were thus extensively excited. But a pretence for hostility was yet wanting; for the Lacedæmonian government, however its officers, or however itself might be occasionally oppressive, had scrupulously avoided any direct breach of those treaties by which the Grecian republics were united under its supremacy. And it is to be observed that those called Helots, to whom foreign command

s. 3.

positive assertion, he was however competent to judge whether the sum he has named was probably equal to the effect ascribed to it.

was committed, were not persons actually in the condition of slaves. They were indeed probably new citizens, those called neodamodes, raised from the condition of slaves; but of Grecian blood, as old and perhaps as pure as any in the country. The reproach however might assist the general effect. But the Thebans were the ingenious politicians who devised the provocation which actually led to a renewal of the miseries of a general war in Greece; likely, through obvious circumstances, to superinduce general ruin or universal subjection, though the foreign power then most formidable failed of the requisite energy, and it was beyond the ken of the clearest human foresight to discover where the overwhelming might was at length to arise.

The borders of Phocis and the Opuntian Locris were in one part disputed.²⁰ Androclidas, one of those popular leaders in Thebes, whom Xenophon has not scrupled to name as a partaker in the Persian gold, persuaded the Locrians to raise contributions on the doubtful land. The Phocians, precisely as Androclidas expected and desired, immediately made reprisals. For this aggression against the allies of Thebes, as the party affected to call it, it was then not difficult to excite the Theban multitude against the Phocians. Accordingly Phocis was invaded and plundered. Unable to contend with Thebes, and still more with Thebes and Locris united, the Phocians

Xen. Hel.

l. 3. c. 5.

s. 3.

Diod. l. 14.

c. 82.

90 - - - - - Οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις προεσῴτες—πείθουσι Λόκρους τοὺς Ὀπουντίους ἐκ τῆς ἀμφιστετησίμου χώρας Φωκεῦσί τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς χρήματα τελέσαι.—*Thebanæ civitatis principes—Locris Opuntiis persuadent ut ex agro inter Phocenses et Thebanos controverso pecunias penderent.* It is clear, from what follows in the next section, that the translation here is wrong: ἑαυτοῖς means not the Thebans, but the Locrians.

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Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 5.
s. 5. 6. 7.

sent ministers to Lacedæmon, claiming that protection to which they were entitled, as members of the confederacy in which the greater part of Greece was united. The Spartans rejoiced in the fair pretence, thus afforded, for repressing by arms the injurious insolence of Thebes. The success of Agesilaus against the Persian empire elated them; no other commotion within Greece interfered; and the cause appeared so just that they thought they might depend upon the willing support of the confederacy. War was accordingly resolved; the forces of the confederacy were summoned, and orders were issued for a Lacedæmonian army to march.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. $\frac{2}{3}$.
[B. C. 395.
Cl. See p.
356.]

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 5.
s. 7.

s. 8.

Thebes being thus engaged in a contest very unequal, unless powerful support could be obtained, its leaders, little known by name in history, but evidently able, daring men, possibly true to their party, but scrupulous of nothing for party-purposes, directed their view to Athens. They knew that a disposition hostile to Lacedæmon was extensive there; but they knew moreover that a warm sense of many and severe injuries, received from the Thebans, was also strongly impressed. Ministers were therefore sent, instructed to soothe, flatter, and incite the Athenians. Careless themselves of the general welfare of Greece, and believing that a majority in Athens would postpone it to the separate interest of their own city, or of their party, they held out the probability of gaining the alliance of the Persian king, now decidedly the enemy of Lacedæmon, which, they said, would ensure success; and they did not even scruple to propose the recovery of that dominion to Athens, which she had formerly held over so many Grecian states, as an object which ought to decide the Athenians in their favor. Thrasybulus, it appears,

countenanced their measure. It coincided with his interest as head of the democratical party in Athens; and probably he had his particular connexions with the democratical leaders in Thebes. Under such circumstances the proposal was carried in the Athenian assembly for joining in the war with Thebes against Lacedæmon.

SECT.
IV.

Xen. Hæcl.
l. 3. c. 5.
s. 9.

The interest of Lysander, still powerful at Sparta, is likely to have contributed to the resolution for war with Thebes. He was immediately appointed to an important command, for which the popularity of his character seems to have concurred with the superiority of his abilities and experience to render him peculiarly qualified. Going into Phocis he assembled, according to his instructions, the Phocian, Cætan, Hera-cleot, Malian, and Ænian forces. Marching directly to Orchomenus, where the supremacy affected by Thebes was borne with reluctance, the gates, after short negotiation, were opened to him as a protector, the vindicator of Bœotian freedom. Strengthened then by the Orchomenian troops he proceeded to Haliartus, where, according to a concerted plan, Pausanias king of Lacedæmon was to meet him on an appointed day with the army from Peloponnesus. Pausanias failed him. Nevertheless approaching the place, and obtaining a conference with the leading people, he would have prevailed there, as at Orchomenus, had not the exertions of some Thebans present, not without difficulty, prevented.

s. 6. 7.

s. 10. 11.

Informed of the loss of one city and the danger of another, the Thebans marched in haste against Lysander. Whether that able general was surprised by their rapidity, or his past successes led him to confide too much in his own ability, in the zeal and discipline of his troops, and in the deficiency of the enemy,

s. 12.

[B.C. 395.* under the walls of Haliartus, which he was preparing to assault, he was overpowered and killed. His army fled; but, quickly reaching the neighbouring highlands, turned upon the pursuers, and with advantage of ground, and an artillery which that ground afforded, fragments of rock rolled down upon the compact body of the heavy-armed, while the heights gave superior effect also to other weapons, the enemy were at length compelled to retreat with considerable loss.

The Thebans erected their trophy at that gate of Haliartus near which they had been conquerors, and Lysander had fallen; yet they were not a little dejected by the final event of the day. The morrow however showed how important the life of one man may be: Orchomenians, Malians, Ænians, Hera-cleots, Cætæans, and Phocians, though victorious, having lost the leader who united all, and in whom all confided, hastened to their several homes, and the army was no more. Then the Thebans were again elated, and their success appeared important. But when, soon after, Pausanias arrived in their territory, with his powerful army from Peloponnesus, alarm and dejection anew pervaded them. The arrival of the Athenian forces, on the following day, restored animation; and when it was observed that the measures of Pausanias indicated no ability, no vigor, then security and presumption afresh prevailed.

It has been observed, upon some occasion in modern times, that, when a commander desires to avoid fighting, he calls a council of war; and this, in ancient as in modern ages, might arise either from cowardice, or from conscious deficiency of ability, or

[* 'Lysander is slain at Haliartus in the thirtieth year—ἔτει τριακοστῇ—after the battle of Delium: Plutarch. Lysand. c. 29.: consequently in the year 'of Diophantus.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 94.]

from a view to the interest of a party: nor would it, in ancient, any more than in modern ages, be always easy to ascertain which was the prevailing motive. The business of recovering, for burial, the bodies of Lysander and those who fell with him, a rite which Grecian superstition made so important, necessarily engaged the attention of Pausanias. To consult whether a battle should be fought, or a truce solicited, not the polemarchs and lochages only, but all the pentecosters of the army were assembled. It was observed that the army was very deficient of the strength proposed; Corinth had refused its troops, and the re-enforcement expected with Lysander was dispersed; that the allies serving were not zealous in the cause; that the enemy was very superior in cavalry; and that even a victory would scarcely enable them to accomplish their purpose of recovering the bodies, lying within reach of missile weapons from the towers of Haliartus. It was accordingly resolved to solicit a truce. The Thebans, elated, refused to grant it but upon condition that the army should immediately quit Bœotia. This humiliating condition was accepted, and then the dead were restored. Pausanias and those about him appeared satisfied: but, whatever might be their sentiments or their views, the army felt its disgrace; and the uneasiness was enhanced by the contumelious behaviour of the Thebans, who, in attending its retreat, pursued with blows any who deviated from the strict line of the highway.

The conduct of Pausanias would appear, at home, the more inexcusable, on being compared with that of Lysander, when it was observed what one did, in the command of a few troops of the northern allies, with what the other did not, at the head of a Peloponnesian army. Being capitally prosecuted, Pau-

SECT.
IV.

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 5.
s. 15.

s. 16.

s. 17.

s. 18.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 90.

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sanias fled to Tegea; and to avoid the consequence of the sentence, in his absence pronounced against him, he passed his remaining days in banishment.

Corn. Nep.
& Plut. v.
Lys.

We find attributed to Lysander, by the later ancient writers, whom the modern have mostly followed, a conduct very different from that indicated by the contemporary historian; in foreign command a revolting haughtiness, an injurious and selfish tyranny; at home, a plot for a revolution, through which he proposed to become sovereign of Lacedæmon and of all Greece. His influence, it is said, was exerted, and his intrigues directed, to procure a decree of the Lacedæmonians in general assembly for abolishing the hereditary right to the throne in the posterity of Hercules, and laying open the succession to all Spartans, at the choice of the people; trusting in his own popularity for a certain preference. Considering the contemporary historian's connexion with Agesilaus and the family of Agesilaus, it must appear extraordinary that even the first imputation, if founded, and most unaccountable that the latter, should wholly have escaped that historian's notice. In gathering the conduct and characters of eminent men from ancient authors, we find occasion continually to beware how far party-spirit may have directed the contemporary, and a deference to party-writers, the later pens; and, fortunately, not seldom the result itself furnishes assistance for detection. So here the sense which the party in opposition to Lysander entertained of his popularity at home could hardly be more strongly shown than by the imputation of such a purpose as that ascribed to him, to be prosecuted in such a manner, which clearly implies corroboration of Xenophon's account of his popularity both in Asia and in northern Greece. Indeed the

manner in which the friend of the king of Sparta and of his family, objects of the pretended plot, has borne testimony to Lysander's merits, is really creditable at the same time to Lysander, Agesilaus, and Xenophon; and the total failure of notice of such a plot, both in the Hellenics and the Agesilaus, seems enough to indicate that the tale originated in party invective only, to which both Agesilaus and Xenophon disdained to give any countenance.

SECT.
V.

SECTION V.

Plan of Agesilaus for dismembering the Persian empire: alliance of the prince of Paphlagonia with Lacedæmon: winter campaign in Bithynia: conference between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus.

While the flame of internal war was thus rekindled in Greece, and Lacedæmon, ruled by the ephors, was rapidly losing her consideration and influence there, Agesilaus had been successfully prosecuting a plan of operations against Persia, the best calculated of any known to have been ever formed, for promoting, not merely the interest of Lacedæmon, or even of Greece alone, but the common good of a much larger portion of mankind. Stimulated, no doubt, by the love of glory, but allured by no vain, interested, destructive project of conquest, he proposed to dismember the Persian empire, leaving the separated parts free. The philosopher, his friend and historian, gives him the entire credit of this wise and liberal policy. None before Agesilaus, he says, ever thought of so depriving the Persian king of his provinces as not to bring ruin upon the people. But the revolt of Cyrus, which had led Lacedæmon, lately the ally, to become the

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 2.
[B. C. 395.
Cl. See p.
342.]

Xen. Ages.
c. 7. s. 7.

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enemy of the king, had at the same time prepared matters for this great design, pointed out the means of execution, and demonstrated the probability of success. A shock had been given to the fidelity of the great vassals in the distant provinces; and the exigency which had compelled the Greeks, who accompanied Cyrus, to fight their way from the centre to the extremity, had afforded sure ground for calculating the force necessary to attack it. The revolt of Spithridates was then an important point already gained: it gave not only hope of farther defection, but means to procure it. Cotys, or Corylas,²¹ king of Paphlagonia, a tributary of the Persian empire, had not concurred in the rebellion of Cyrus, yet, on receiving summons from the king to join the royal army with his forces, had refused obedience. Probably the fear of vengeance would make the Lacedæmonian alliance acceptable to him, and Spithridates undertook to manage the negotiation. Meanwhile Egypt, long since in revolt, remained unsubdued.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 1.
s. 1. 2.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 3.
[B. C. 395.
Cl. See p.
342.]

It does not appear that Agesilaus was aware of the intrigues which Tithraustes was carrying on in Greece when, in pursuance of his engagement with him, early in autumn he quitted the Lydian and entered the Bithynian satrapy. No due preparation had been made by Pharnabazus to defend the country. In the field no opposition was attempted; and, as the Grecian army proceeded toward Paphlagonia, some towns voluntarily surrendered, some were taken by assault, and waste and plunder were extensive. The negotiation with Cotys meanwhile proceeded successfully. Agesilaus was met by that prince on the border of

²¹ Cotys is the name we find in our copies of Xenophon's Hellenics, as well as of Diodorus and Plutarch; but in our copies of Xenophon's Anabasis it is written Corylas.

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V.

his territory, and a treaty of alliance with the Lacedæmonian commonwealth was concluded. Agesilaus, much gratified with the event, at the same time to strengthen the union with Cotys and to reward Spitridates, proposed a marriage, which was presently agreed upon, between the Paphlagonian prince and the Persian nobleman's daughter. But, in the deficiency of accommodations in the intervening country, the young lady could not travel into Paphlagonia from Cyzicus, where her father had left her, before the following spring. Agesilaus gratified all parties by ordering a trireme of his fleet, with a Spartan commander, to convey her to the Paphlagonian coast.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 1.
s. 3—7.

s. 8.

We have had many occasions to observe how economically, in the scantiness of their public revenues, the Greeks commonly made war. For an army far from home it was particularly desirable to find winter-quarters in the enemy's country. Having acquired the important re-enforcement of a thousand Paphlagonian horse and two thousand targeteers, Agesilaus resolved to march to Dascylium, the capital of the Bithynian satrapy, and with the plunder of its rich territory to subsist and reward his army. The territory of Dascylium was the inherited property of Pharnabazus. His palace was sumptuous, and surrounded with every appendage of convenience and delight. Xenophon, himself both a sportsman and a farmer, has particularly noticed the inclosed parks and open chases, abounding with game of every kind, the river stored with fish, the many large villages and well-cultivated farms, with a numerous population, unaccustomed to see or to apprehend an enemy. The satrap being without infantry which he could oppose to the Grecian phalanx, his own and his people's property became the prey of the invaders.

Ibid.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 1.
s. 9.

All the care and foresight of Agesilaus were however insufficient to guard against the effects of the contempt, naturally growing, for an enemy so apparently helpless; while Pharnabazus, without troops for steady defence, had however those with which he could strike a sudden blow; and he wanted neither activity nor spirit to direct and lead their exertions. A body from the Grecian army, sent to collect provisions, was wandering carelessly after plunder, when the satrap came upon them with a small body of horse and two scythe-armed chariots. The Greeks had notice of his approach timely enough to assemble to the number of seven hundred. Pharnabazus, though his cavalry were only four hundred, did not hesitate to attack them. At the battle of Cunaxa the charge of a hundred and fifty scythe-armed chariots had been directed against ten thousand Greeks in phalanx, without any effect. Two only now, probably under bolder guidance, threw seven hundred into confusion; and a vigorous charge of the cavalry immediately following completed the rout. A hundred were killed; and flight would have saved few of the rest, had not Agesilaus, with the main body of the army, been fortunately near enough to give them protection.

s. 11.

This action, honorable to Pharnabazus and encouraging to his troops, was however scarcely a step towards relief from circumstances highly distressing. He was constantly watching with his cavalry to give protection to his property and people against detachments and marauders from the Grecian army; but, through fear of nightly attack, which an army of cavalry was little fit to resist, he dared rest nowhere. Moving therefore daily, he was always anxious to keep it unknown where he meant at night to encamp

or take his quarters. But precaution, which might have sufficed against the Greeks, did not suffice against the knowledge of the country, and the means for procuring intelligence which Spithridates possessed. Within three days after the surprise and defeat of the Grecian detachment Spithridates obtained information that the satrap was at Cava, a large village about twenty miles from the Grecian camp. He communicated with the Spartan Herippidas, who commanded the Cyrean troops; a man covetous of fame, and always eager for enterprise; and Herippidas requested of Agesilaus permission to attempt the surprise of the satrap in his quarters; desiring for the purpose two thousand heavy-armed, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry with that under Spithridates, and as many of the Greeks as would be volunteers on the occasion. Agesilaus consented: the preparatory sacrifice was performed, and the augur declared that success was portended. The detachment was ordered to assemble at the close of evening in front of the camp. But darkness, and the want of those convenient and cheap materials for writing, with which, in modern times, the lowest officer so readily forms his roll, gave opportunity for evasion, and not half the proposed number of any of the troops appeared. Fear of derision nevertheless stimulating, Herippidas resolved to proceed, and Spithridates did not shrink from the undertaking.

Marching accordingly, they reached Cava before day, and, with the first dawn, assaulted and presently carried the principal outguard. The whole Persian army instantly fled, and the camp was taken. Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were hasty in appropriating its contents. The satrap's baggage, a multitude of slaves, and numerous beasts of burthen for

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 1.
s. 10.

s. 11.

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accompanying the rapid marches of the cavalry with accommodations for the satrap and his train, fell into their hands. Herippidas, anxious to get credit for the amount of the capture, as well as to do justice to himself and his detachment, stationed his Greek troops so as to intercept those who bore and drove the plunder, and he put all in charge of the common prize-sellers of the army.²² This measure, in itself apparently right, he seems to have made wrong by the Spartan roughness, by the too little condescension for Asiatic prejudices, with which he carried it into execution. The Paphlagonians were disgusted, as if they had received a gross injury; and Spithridates so resented what he considered as a disgracing insult that, on the following night, he left the army, and led away the Paphlagonians with him. Going to Sardis he surrendered himself with them to Ariæus, in whom, as having himself borne arms against the king, they expected the readier disposition to excuse their desertion. No event, during his command in Asia, gave Agesilaus so much uneasiness.

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 1.
s. 12.

The hope of an acquisition however, that would much more than compensate the loss thus sustained, about the same time presented itself. Apollophanes, a Greek of Cyzicus, who had been long connected by hospitality with Pharnabazus, was at this time living as a guest with Agesilaus. He proposed to negotiate an interview between the satrap and the Lacedæmonian king, and he succeeded. A place was appointed in the open air. Agesilaus, attended by his thirty Spartans, arrived first; and, finding some green-sward, all with Spartan simplicity seated themselves on it. Presently Pharnabazus came, gorgeously habited, and attended by a numerous

s. 13

²² Λαφυροπῶλαι.

SECT.
V.

train, who proceeded sedulously to spread fine carpets and place soft cushions, after the Persian fashion. The sight of the Spartan king struck him with a generous shame: he ordered away all the apparatus of luxury, and, in emulation of the simplicity which he admired, would seat himself on the ground. The customary salutation having passed, Pharnabazus offered his right hand, which Agesilaus with his right hand received; after which the satrap, as the elder, says the historian, began the conference. Mentioning the alliance he formerly had with Lacedæmon, and the important services he had rendered that state in the war with Athens, he proceeded to say, ‘None could accuse him of double-dealing like Tissaphernes: yet his recompense was the destruction of his property, with such distress to himself that he could not command a supper from his own estate, unless, like the dogs, he could pick up crumbs left by the Greeks. If then,’ he added, ‘I am ignorant of what is just and sacred, I wish you to teach me how this can be consistent with generosity and gratitude.’

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 1.
s. 14.

The Thirty felt the reproach²³ in respectful silence. Agesilaus, after some pause, answered: ‘Nothing is better known, among the customs of the Greeks, than the sacred respect in which the laws of hospitality are held: yet, when war arises between Grecian states, our obligation to our country so supercedes what we owe to any individual, that we hold it a duty even to kill, if we meet them in battle, those to whom we are pledged in hospitality. Instantly therefore as the king of Persia became the

s. 15. &
Plut. Ages.

²³ This interpretation of Xenophon’s words, in the Hellenics, is warranted by Plutarch, in his Life of Agesilaus, v. 2. p. 1100. ed. H. Steph.

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XXIV.

‘ enemy of our country, the duty became imposed
 ‘ upon us to treat as enemies whoever owns allegiance
 ‘ to him. With regard to yourself, as an individual,
 ‘ there is nothing we should more value than your
 ‘ friendship; but the means of our possessing it rests
 ‘ not with us but with you. Far be it from me to
 ‘ propose to you the change of subjection to Persia
 ‘ for subjection to Greece. Better things are before
 ‘ you: to own no subjection, to worship no master.
 ‘ Nor is it freedom with indigence (though I esteem
 ‘ freedom beyond all riches) that I would recommend;
 ‘ but, on the contrary, to hold your present large
 ‘ and rich command in independency; and, forming
 ‘ alliance with us, to make additions to it by con-
 ‘ quest, not to increase the king’s dominion but your
 ‘ own.’

Xen. Hel.
 l. 4. c. 1.
 s. 16.

Pharnabazus replied: ‘ I will answer you candidly.
 ‘ I do not reckon myself so bound to Artaxerxes but
 ‘ that, were he to supersede me in the command I
 ‘ hold under him, and require me to obey another,
 ‘ I might be induced to renounce my subjection to
 ‘ him, and become your ally. But while he con-
 ‘ tinues to trust me, you may depend upon it (and
 ‘ all men of honor, I am confident, will approve my
 ‘ conduct) I shall continue to defend the charge
 ‘ committed to me to the utmost of my ability.’
 Struck with the satrap’s generous frankness, Agesi-
 laus took his hand and said, ‘ With those noble sen-
 ‘ timents much I wish you could become our friend.
 ‘ Of this however be assured; my army shall quit
 ‘ your territory without delay; and while the war
 ‘ lasts, if there is another object for our arms, you
 ‘ and yours shall remain unmolested.’

s. 18.

The conference here ending, Pharnabazus mounted
 his horse. As he rode away, his son, running to

SECT.
V.

Agesilaus, said, 'I pledge myself in hospitality to you.' 'I accept the pledge,' answered the king. 'Remember then,' replied the youth, and presented a finely-wrought javelin. Looking around for something to return, Agesilaus observed furniture, of singular elegance, on a horse of one of his attendants. This he directed to be put upon the youth's horse, who immediately mounted and pursued his father.

Such, equally among Persians and Greeks, were relics yet existing of the manners of the heroic ages. The progress of civilization and government, among either people indeed, had not superseded the need of the ancient hospitality. Not long after, in the absence of Pharnabazus, his brother usurped for a time the satrapy; and his son, compelled to seek safety in flight, passing into Greece, was very kindly entertained by Agesilaus.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 1.
s. 19.

In conformity with his word given, Agesilaus immediately led his army out of Bithynia, where however, according to his first purpose, he had subsisted it nearly through the winter, at the satrap's expense. Moving westward, he encamped in the vale of Thebe; and, spring now approaching,²⁴ he sent requisitions

s. 20.

²⁴ Σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ ἔαρ* ὑπέφαιεν. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. s. 20. The first words of the same chapter mention the preceding autumn. Yet Dodwell has chosen to conclude his account of the year B. C. 394. with the assertion—'Ver ergo illud, cujus mentio apud Xen., in Asiâ non vidit Agesilaus.' Dodwell's fondness for investigation and disquisition seems to have led him to give more than a just attention, upon some occasions, to authors whom, on others, he reviles in very unqualified terms; and, at the same time, rather arrogantly to contradict the able contemporary historian, who cannot but have known whether it was spring or autumn when he himself, accompanying Agesi-

[* This is the spring of B. C. 394. Dodwell's error about the spring of B. C. 395. (mentioned by Xenophon Hel. iii. 4. 16.) has been already shown; p. 343.]

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for new levies, from all the Grecian settlements, to join him there. At the head of a very powerful army, he proposed then to direct his march eastward, beyond the satrapies both of Tithraustes and Pharnabazus. He had seen by how loose a tie the distant members of the empire were connected with the government in the capital. He knew, by the most unequivocal proof, from the return of the Cyrean Greeks, how weak the empire was, even at the centre: he had already proved the superiority of his military force to anything likely to be opposed to him; and he concluded that the country, in whatever extent he could put it behind him, would be, if not conquered for Lacedæmon or for Greece, yet effectually separated from the Persian dominion.

laus, left Asia. But, in the necessity under which I find myself to declare sometimes my dissatisfaction with Dodwell, I desire always to acknowledge high obligation to him; and, if I sometimes leave, without complete correction, errors which I have thought it due from me to point out, I must, for excuse, desire to refer to a former note, the 12th of the 24th chapter.

CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of Greece, and transactions of the Greeks in Asia, from the establishment of the general confederacy against Lacedæmon to the treaty between Lacedæmon and Persia, and the re-establishment of the Lacedæmonian power in Greece, through the general peace dictated in the king of Persia's name, commonly called the peace of Antalcidas.

SECTION I.

Confederacy in Greece against Lacedæmon: recal of Agesilaus from Asia: proposed invasion of Laconia: battle of Corinth: march of Agesilaus to Greece. Summary view of the history of Cyprus: Evagoras prince of Salamis: connexion of Salamis with Athens. Combination in Asia against Lacedæmon: fleet under Conon: defeat of the Lacedæmonian fleet near Cnidus. Victory of Agesilaus near Coronea. Successes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and downfall of the Lacedæmonian dominion in Asia.

WHILE the Lacedæmonian king was thus busied in preparation for enterprise in Asia, seeming to give fair promise of conquest the most glorious, and a revolution among the greatest known in the annals of the world, a storm gathered within Greece, threatening to overwhelm Lacedæmon itself. The accession of Athens to the Bœotian alliance was but the beginning of a confederacy, more formidable than had yet been formed, of Grecian powers against a Grecian power. Athens led Argos into it, and Argos Corinth, now, under sway of the democratical

SECT.
I.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 3.
Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 2.
s. 1.
Diodorus,
l. 14. c. 83.

CHAP.
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party, closely connected with Argos. The influence of Athens and Corinth together then engaged Acarnania, Ambracia, Leucadia, part of Thessaly, all Eubœa, and the populous towns of Chalcidice in Thrace. Body, and form, and means of energy were given to the confederacy by the establishment of a congress of deputies from every state at Corinth.¹ Instead of allowing, according to the old system, the dangerous supremacy of any one republic, it seems to have been proposed that such a congress of deputies from all should regulate the common concerns of the Greek nation. The idea was good, but the detail of the plan was defective. A combination of numerous republics, not enforced by some one power pervading the whole, but dependent upon the varying interests of parties in the moment prevailing in each, was far too frail to be lasting; and, not committing even executive government to one person, or one simply constituted council, its energy would be very uncertain. It was nevertheless, in the moment, highly formidable to Lacedæmon. The alarm was heightened by the rumors circulated of Persian money distributed among men of most influence in the hostile states, and the expectation that, while Persia was pressed by the Lacedæmonian arms, that kind of assistance, which Persia could best give and the Greeks most needed, would not be wanting to the new confederacy. Not only the supremacy of

Xen. Hel.
I. 4. c. 2.
s. 1.

¹ Diodorus here has a merit which I have pleasure in noticing. He has been fortunate in the selection of his author, whoever he was, from whom he has given a clear though succinct account of the forming of this confederacy; which Xenophon's Hellenics, evidently in many respects an unfinished work, would not readily furnish; and yet the account of Diodorus not only is in perfect consonance with Xenophon's, but, in almost every particular, somewhere confirmed by it.

Lacedæmon, so in appearance established over Greece by the event of the Peloponnesian war, was pressingly threatened, but, by the connexion of two of the most powerful states of Peloponnesus itself with the hostile confederacy, even the security of Laconia was endangered. Nor had the superior abilities, which such a crisis required, been anywhere conspicuous in Sparta since the loss of Lysander. Those who now directed public affairs tottered in their lofty situation : at the head of the politics of Greece, where they should have held the balance of surrounding nations, they were unable to hold that of their own commonwealth. Feeling urgently the need of both support and guidance, they dispatched a requisition for Agesilaus to return, with the utmost speed, to relieve his threatened country.

Agesilaus was enjoying in Asia honors and power and hope of glory, such as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. Added to the great authority of a Lacedæmonian king in foreign command, his popularity, among the Asiatic Grecian cities, was beyond anything before known; for, having found them, says Xenophon, all miserably distracted by parties, he composed the differences of all, and established everywhere peace, and the present effect at least of concord, without executions or expulsions. He was then at the head of an army such as no Greek had ever commanded out of Greece; and he had before him a field, the most inviting that human ambition could easily imagine. Nothing therefore could be more mortifying than the summons to quit this splendid situation, with all the alluring views attending, to return to the condition of a Lacedæmonian king at home, under the immediate control of the ephors. It is implied, even by his panegyrist, that all his

Xen. Ages.
c. 1. s. 37.

Ibid. &

Hel. 1. 4.
c. 2. s. 2.

united patriotism and magnanimity were wanting for the resolution to obey. Immediately however assembling the allies, he explained his country's and his own necessities, adding assurances that he should never forget his obligations to the Asian Greeks; and that, should the event in Europe be prosperous, he would not fail to return, and use his best ability in the prosecution of measures which might most conduce to their welfare. Affection for the chief whom they were going to lose, co-operating with the change from high hopes to the fear of a great reverse, threw the assembly into tears. They proceeded however immediately to a unanimous vote, that succours for Lacedæmon, from all the Asian Greek cities, should attend Agesilaus into Europe; and that, should the hoped-for success follow, those troops should return under his command to prosecute the war in Asia.

s. 3. 4.

Two cares principally engaged Agesilaus before his departure; to provide security for the Asian Greeks in his absence, and to have a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. For the former purpose, naming Euxenus to preside, with the title of harmost, he placed a body of four thousand men under his orders. With the latter view, he proposed prizes for the cities which should furnish the best troops; and for commanders of mercenaries, horse, heavy-armed, bow-men, and targeteers, whose bands should be the best chosen, best appointed, and best disciplined. The prizes were mostly arms, elegantly wrought; but, for higher merit, or the merit of those of higher rank, there were some golden crowns; and Xenophon mentions it, as a large sum for the occasion, that the expense amounted to four talents, less than a thousand pounds sterling. Three

Lacedæmonians, with one officer from each Asiatic city, were named for judges; but the decision, or the declaration of it, was judiciously referred to the arrival of the army in the Thracian Chersonese. SECT.
I.

Unable as the leading men in the Lacedæmonian administration were, either to conduct a war against the powerful confederacy formed against them, or, upon any tolerable terms, to prevent it, the recall of Agesilaus seems to have been a necessary measure.

The army assembled by their enemies was such as had not often been seen in wars within Greece. Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 2.
s. 10.

Argus furnished seven thousand heavy-armed; Athens had already recovered strength to send six thousand, and add six hundred horse; Bœotia, Corinth, Eubœa, and Locris, made the whole of the army twenty-four thousand heavy-armed, with above fifteen hundred cavalry; to which was added a large body of the best light-armed of Greece, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians, and Malians. The fighting men of all descriptions must have amounted to fifty thousand.

The avowed purpose was to invade Laconia. ‘The Lacedæmonian state,’ said the Corinthian Timolaus, in a debate on the plan of operations, ‘resembles a river, which, near the source, is easily forded, but the farther it flows, other streams joining, the depth and power of the current increases. Thus the Lacedæmonians always march from home with their own troops only; but as they proceed, being re-enforced from other cities, their army swells and grows formidable. I hold it therefore advisable to attack them, if possible, in Lacedæmon itself; otherwise, the nearer to Lacedæmon the better.’ s. 7.
s. 6.

Against so powerful a league, the allies, whom the Lacedæmonians could now command, were principally from the smaller Grecian cities, and none be-

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 2.
s. 9.

yond Peloponnesus. Marching themselves six thousand foot and six hundred horse, and being joined by the Mantineans and Tegeans, whose numbers are not reported, they were farther re-enforced by no more than seven thousand five hundred heavy-armed, from Epidaurus, Hermione, Træzen, Sicyon, Achaia, and Elea. Aristodemus, of the blood royal, as regent, commanded for the king, Agesipolis, yet a boy.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. $\frac{3}{2}$.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 2.
s. 7.

Circumstances commonly occur to render confederate armies less efficacious, in proportion to their strength, than those under a single authority. A dispute about the command-in-chief, with some difference of opinion about their order of battle, some of the generals being for deeper, others for more extended phalanges, gave opportunity for the Lacedæmonians to collect their forces, and march far beyond their own frontier, so as to meet the enemy near Corinth. In the account of the preparatory sacrifices there drops from Xenophon a remarkable confession, that those ceremonies were sometimes engines of policy. While the Bæotians, he says, held the left of their army, they were in no haste to engage; but, as soon as they had prevailed to have their situation in the line changed, so that the Athenians would be opposed to the Lacedæmonians, and themselves to the Achæans, then they declared that the symptoms of the victims were favorable. They saved themselves perhaps some slaughter by this disingenuous artifice. In the battle which ensued the Achæans fled, and all the allies of Lacedæmon equally yielded to those opposed to them. But the Athenians were defeated with considerable slaughter; and the superior discipline of the Lacedæmonians so prevailed against superior numbers that, with the loss of only eight of their own body,

s. 11.

they remained finally masters of the field; in which, if we may trust Xenophon's panegyric of Agesilaus for what he has omitted to state in his general history, no less than ten thousand of the confederate army fell. Probably however, though the Lacedæmonians themselves suffered little, their allies suffered much; for the victory seems to have been little farther decisive than to prevent the invasion of Peloponnesus.

SECT.
I.

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 3.
s. 1.

Meanwhile Agesilaus was hastening his march from Asia. He crossed the Hellespont about the middle of July. At Amphipolis he met Dercyllidas, who had been sent to inform him of the victory obtained near Corinth. Immediately he forwarded that able and popular officer into Asia, to communicate the grateful news among the Grecian cities there, and to prepare them for his early return, of which there seemed now fair promise.

Dodwell
Chron. Xen.

Through Thrace and Macedonia the country was friendly, or feared to avow hostility. Thessaly, inimically disposed, and powerful through population and wealth resulting from the natural productiveness of the soil, was however too ill-governed to give any systematical opposition. The defiles of the mountains against Macedonia, where a small force might efficaciously oppose a large one, seem to have been left open. But the influence of the principal towns, Larissa, Cranone, Scotusa, and Pharsalus, in close alliance with the Bœotians, decided the rest, and as the Lacedæmonian army crossed the plain a body of horse, raised from the whole province, infested the march. It was singularly gratifying to Agesilaus that, with his horse, promiscuously collected, and entirely formed by himself, supporting it judiciously

Xen. Hel.
1. 4 c. 3.
s. 2.

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 3.
s. 3. 4.

with his infantry, he defeated and dispersed the Thessalian, the most celebrated cavalry of Greece.

On the day after this success he reached the highlands of Phthia; and thence the country was friendly quite to the border of Bœotia. But there news met him, unwelcome for the public, unwelcome on his private account, and such as instantly almost to blot out his once bright prospect, which, as the historian, his friend and the companion of his march, shows, he had thus far been fondly cherishing, of conquest in Asia, and glory over the world. While the misconduct of the Lacedæmonian administration had excited a confederacy within Greece, which proposed to overwhelm Lacedæmon by superiority of land force, and, with that view, to carry war directly into Laconia, a hostile navy had arisen in another quarter, powerful enough to have already deprived her, by one blow, of her new dominion of the sea. The train of circumstances which had produced this event, though memorials fail for a complete investigation of it, will require some attention.

Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

We have seen Cyprus, at a very early age, from a Phenician, become a Grecian island, and Salamis the first Grecian city founded there. We have then ob-

Ch. 6. s. 2.

served the Cyprian Greeks yielding to the Persian power, which the greatest kingdoms around them had been resisting in vain; and yet, not long after, a petty prince of Salamis, incited by the revolt of the

Ch. 7. s. 2.

Greeks of Asia Minor, and encouraged by the advantage of insular situation and the inexperience of the Persians in maritime affairs, rebelling against the Persian dominion, and extending his authority over almost all Cyprus. With the reduction of the Asian Greeks however Cyprus fell again under Persian

sovereignty; and then probably the Phenician interest in the island would receive countenance in opposition to the Greek. Nevertheless a Grecian prince of Salamis sent his tributary squadron to swell the immense armament of Xerxes, intended for the conquest of Europe; and his brother was among the prisoners made by the confederated Greeks, in their first action with the Persian fleet.

SECT.
I.

Ch. 8. s. 4.
of this Hist.

The ruin of the marine, the inertness of the court, and the distraction in the councils of Persia, which followed, would afford opportunity and temptation for the Cypriots, beyond other subjects of the empire, again to revolt; and the Persian interest, and the Greek, and the Phenician, and the tyrannic, and the oligarchal, and the democratical, would be likely to fall into various contest. Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of things which first invited Athenian ambition to direct its view to Cyprus, when the Athenian navy, rising on the ruins of the Persian, was extending dominion for Athens on all sides, under the first administration of Pericles. This view, quickly diverted to other objects, was however, after a change in the Athenian administration, resumed; and Cimon, as we have seen, died in command in Cyprus. The policy of Athens would of course propose to hold dominion, there as elsewhere, through support given to the democratical interest. But after the death of Cimon wars in Greece so engaged the Athenian government as to prevent the extension of any considerable exertion to such a distance; and the Cyprian cities were mostly governed by their several princes or tyrants,² under the paramount sovereignty of Persia.

Ch. 12. s. 2.

s. 4.

² Κατὰ πόλεις ἐτυραννοῦντο οἱ Κύπριοι. Strab. l. 14. p. 684.

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The liberal policy however of the Persian government did not yet deny princely honors and power, in small dominions within its empire, even to Greeks. Toward the beginning³ of the Peloponnesian war a Greek was reigning in Salamis. But the inhabitants of that city being a mixed people, opportunity was open for the ambition of Phenicians, who would be not unlikely to win favor with the satraps, or even with the court, against the Greeks. A Tyrian, thus finding means to expel the Grecian prince, obtained the patronage of the Persian government in the dominion which he seized. After some years however a conspiracy, among his own people, ended his reign and life together. His successor, also a Tyrian, proposed to secure himself by the severities common in such revolutions. Numbers were banished, or fled to avoid greater evil; and the Tyrian's oppression was such that a large proportion, even of the Phenician citizens, became adverse to him. Among the fugitive Greeks was Evagoras, a youth who claimed descent from the ancient princes of Salamis, of the race of Teucer. Informed of the state of things, this young man formed the bold resolution, with only about fifty fellow-sufferers in exile, devoted to his cause, to attempt the recovery of what he claimed as his paternal principality. From Soli in Cilicia, their place of refuge, they passed to the Cyprian shore, and proceeded to Salamis by night. Knowing the place well, they forced a small gate, probably as in peace, unguarded, marched directly to the palace, and, after a severe conflict, overcoming the tyrant's guard, while the people mostly

Isocr. Evag.
p. 286. 288.
& 290.

³ The time is so far decided by the circumstance, mentioned by Isocrates, that it was before the birth of Evagoras, afterward prince of Salamis. Isocr. Evag. p. 282. t. 2.

kept aloof, they remained masters of the city, and Evagoras resumed the sovereignty.

SECT.
I.

This little revolution, in a distant island, became, through a chain of events out of all human foresight, a principal source of great revolutions in Greece. How Evagoras obtained the favor or obviated the resentment of Persia ; whether he was ever acknowledged by the court ; or by what satrap, careless of the administration of the head of the empire, he may have been patronized, we have no information. His character has been transmitted, in elegant panegyric, as among the most perfect known to history, but of his conduct little remains recorded. Evidently however his situation, in his new eminence, was precarious. Protection from the Persian court to its most faithful, or even its most favorite, distant vassals, was little to be depended upon. The welfare of a prince of Salamis must rest on his own energies, accommodated to circumstances more immediately about him ; those in his own city, in the other cities of his island, in the nearest satrapies of the continent, and in the more powerful republics of the nation of which he boasted to be, and of which his city was a colony.

Isocr. Evag.

In this state of things it was a great advantage for Evagoras that friendly communication was of standing beyond memory between his city and Athens ; whether maintained from the original founding of the colony, or produced by the necessities or advantages of commerce, and only assisted by the idea of fellowship in blood between the people. The facility however for supplies of corn, which Cyprus could furnish, was a benefit resulting from alliance with its principal city, to which the Athenian many would readily attribute value ; and, on the other hand, alliance with the most powerful maritime state of the age was highly

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important for Evagoras. Hence an extraordinary intimacy grew between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis, (for that was the title which Evagoras commonly bore among the Greeks,) inso-much that the tyrant was associated among the Athenian citizens.⁴ Nevertheless, while his able policy enabled him to hold the favor of the Athenian many, he did not scruple to cherish those of their best citizens whom they expelled from their community. Exiles, from any part of Greece, but especially from Athens, bringing character and means of livelihood, or talents which might make them worth their livelihood, found certain favor at Salamis. So it appears from Isocrates; and we have corresponding testimony from Andocides, the companion in youth of Alcibiades, who himself experienced in banishment the friendly hospitality of Evagoras.

Isocr.
Evag.
p. 302.

Andoc. de
myst. & de
red.

Such nearly is the amount of what may be gathered concerning the state of the Salaminian principality; when, in the ruin of Athens, impending from the defeat of Ægospotami, Conon fled thither with eight triremes, saved from the general destruction of the fleet. Conon had previous acquaintance with Evagoras; and eight triremes at his orders, equipped and ably manned, would enable him, in seeking refuge, to offer important service. Nor were naval force and military science all that he carried with him: versed in political business, he was moreover practised in communication with Persian satraps; whence he was peculiarly qualified for a service perhaps beyond all

⁴ It is remarkable enough that Isocrates, living under a democracy, and the eulogist of democracy, mentions it, to the praise of Evagoras, that he acquired the TYRANNY, *Τύραννον αὐτὸν τῆς πόλεως κατέσχευεν*, and presently after, that he acquired it righteously, *κτησάμενος ὁσίως*.

others important to Evagoras. Congenial character then and mutual need produced that friendship between Evagoras and Conon which Isocrates has celebrated. The Athenian refugee became the most confidential minister of the Cyprian prince, or rather his associate in enterprise. Undertaking negotiation with Pharnabazus, he conciliated that satrap's friendship for Evagoras; which so availed him that, without resentment from the court, or opposition from other satraps, he could add several towns of the island to his dominion. Some he gained by negotiation and the credit of his just administration: but against some he used arms. Meanwhile he greatly improved the city of Salamis itself: forming a port and wharfs; inviting commerce and population, and providing security by new fortifications. To his territory at the same time he gave increased value by encouraging cultivation, and he added to the public strength by building ships of war, and establishing discipline among his people.⁵

While Agesilaus was threatening the conquest of Asia, and Pharnabazus, having obtained, in a manner from his generosity and mercy, a respite from the pressure upon himself, was nevertheless apprehensive

⁵ Nepos and Diodorus report that Conon went to the Persian court, where he managed negotiation with great ability and success, according to one, for Pharnabazus, according to the other, for Evagoras. Whether those writers have taken some loose expressions of earlier authors, concerning negotiation with Persia, as indicating that Conon went to the residence of the great king, Babylon or Susa, the omission of both the contemporary historian and the contemporary orator, the panegyrist of Evagoras and Conon, to make any mention of so remarkable and important a fact cannot but excite, at least, a doubt if Conon went any further to negotiate than the court of the satrap Pharnabazus.

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Isocr. Evag.
p. 304. 306.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 6.

Xen. ut sup.
Isocr.
Evag.
p. 306.

that his satrapy, separated from the body of the empire, might become dependent upon the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, Conon suggested that the progress of the Lacedæmonian arms, which seemed irresistible by land, would be most readily and efficaciously checked by a diversion by sea. A considerable fleet of Phenician ships was at the satrap's orders: Evagoras had a fleet which might co-operate with it; the Athenian interest, still considerable in the island and Asiatic Grecian cities, would favor the purpose; and Conon himself had consideration among those cities, and especially among their seamen. Even before Agesilaus left Asia, a project, founded on these suggestions, seems to have been in forwardness. Soon after his departure, through the combined exertions of Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, a fleet very superior to the Lacedæmonian was assembled; and the generous Pharnabazus formed the resolution, extraordinary for a Persian satrap, to take the nominal command in person, having the good sense apparently to leave the effective command to the superior abilities and experience of Conon. Near Cnidus they met the Lacedæmonian fleet, and the brave but inexperienced Pisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus, would not avoid a battle. Conon and Evagoras led the Grecian force against him: Pharnabazus took the particular command of the Phenician, forming a second line. The Grecian force alone, according to report, though Xenophon does not speak of it as certain,⁶ outnumbered the Lacedæmonian fleet. The allies in the left of the Lacedæmonian line,

⁶ According to Diodorus, the whole force under Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon little exceeded ninety triremes, and the Lacedæmonian fleet was of eighty-five. We commonly find contemporary, and especially military writers, speaking with

alarmed at the view of the enemy's great superiority, presently fled. Pisander was then quickly overpowered. His galley being driven on the Cnidian shore, the crew mostly escaped; but, refusing himself to quit his ship, he was killed aboard. The victory of Conon was complete: according to Diodorus fifty ships were taken.⁷

SECT.
1.

Diod. l. 14.
p. 441.

Such was the disastrous event, the news of which met Agesilaus on his arrival on the confines of Bœotia. The first information struck him with extreme anguish and dejection. Presently however the consideration occurring how disadvantageous, in the existing circumstances, the communication of it might be, he had command enough of himself to check all appearance of his feelings. His army consisted mostly of volunteers, attached indeed to his character, but more to his good fortune; and bound, as by no necessity, so by no very firm principle, to partake in expected distress. With such an army he was to meet, within a few days, the combined forces of one of the most powerful confederacies ever formed in Greece. To support, or, if possible, raise, the confidence and zeal of his troops, though by a device of efficacy to be of short duration, might be greatly important. He therefore directed report to be authoritatively circulated that Pisander, though at the expense of his life, had gained a complete victory; and, to give sanction to the story, he caused the

most diffidence of the strength of armies, and even of the strength of fleets, which is far more easily ascertained.

⁷ Diodorus, or perhaps rather his transcriber, calls the Lacedæmonian commander Periarchus. Xenophon was too much in the way of things to be misinformed of the commander's name on so remarkable an occasion, and the correctness of his transcriber is confirmed by our copies of Plutarch. Vit. Agesil. p. 1102. t. 2. ed. H. Steph.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 3.
s. 9.

ceremony of the evangelical sacrifice to be performed; and distributed the offered oxen among the soldiers.

s. 8.

Resuming then his march, in the vale of Coronea he met the confederate army, consisting of the flower of the Bœotian, Athenian, Argive, Corinthian, Eubœan, Locrian, and Ænian forces. Expecting this formidable assemblage, he had been attentive to all opportunity for acquiring addition to his own strength. Some he had gained from the Grecian towns on his march through Thrace. On the Bœotian border he was joined by the strength of Phocis, and also of the Bœotian Orchomenus, always inimical to Thebes. A Lacedæmonian mora had been sent from Peloponnesus to re-enforce him, with half a mora which had

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 9.
& 10.

been in garrison in Orchomenus. The numbers of the two armies were thus nearly equal: but the Asiatic Grecian troops, which made a large part of that under Agesilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. It was in the spirit of the institutions of Lycurgus that Agesilaus, otherwise simple, even as a Spartan, in his dress and manner, paid much attention to what our great dramatic poet has called 'the pomp and circumstance of war'; aware how much it attaches the general mind, gives the soldier to be satisfied with himself, and binds his fancy to the service he is engaged in. Scarlet or crimson appears to have been a common uniform of the Greeks, and the army of Agesilaus appeared, in Xenophon's phrase, all brass and scarlet.

According to the usual manner of war among the Greeks, when the armies approached a battle soon followed. On the present occasion both quitted advantageous ground; Agesilaus moving from the bank of the Cephissus, and the confederates from the roots of Helicon, to meet in a plain. Perfect silence was

observed by both armies till within nearly a furlong of each other, when the confederates gave the military shout, and advanced running. At a somewhat smaller distance the opposite army ran to meet the charge. The Lacedæmonians, on its right, where Agesilaus took post, instantly overthrew the Argives, their immediate opponents, who, scarcely waiting the assault, fled toward Helicon. The Cýreans supported in Greece the reputation they had acquired in Asia; and were so emulated by the Ionians, Æolians, and Hellespontines, from whom less was expected, that, all coming to push of spear together, they compelled the centre of the confederate army to retreat. The victory seemed so decided that some of the Asiatics were for paying Agesilaus the usual compliment of crowning on the occasion; when information was brought him, that the Thebans had routed the Orchomenians, who held the extreme of his left wing, and had penetrated to the baggage. Immediately changing his front, he proceeded toward them. The Thebans perceived they were cut off from their allies, who had already fled far from the field. It was a common practice of the Thebans to charge in column, directing their assault, not against the whole, but a chosen point of the enemy's line. Thus they had gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. To such a formation their able leaders had recourse now; resolving upon the bold attempt to pierce the line of the conquering Lacedæmonians; not any longer with the hope of victory, but with the view to join their defeated allies in retreat. Xenophon praises the bravery, evidently not without meaning some reflection on the judgment, of Agesilaus; who chose to engage them, he says, front to front, when, if he had opened

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 3.
s. 9. 10.

s. 11.

Ch. 16. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 3.
s. 12.

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his line and given them passage, their flanks and rear would have been exposed to him.⁸ A most fierce conflict ensued. Shield pressed against shield, stroke was returned for stroke; amid wounds and death no clamor was heard; neither, says the historian, who accompanied the Spartan king, was there complete silence, for the mutterings of rage were mixed with the din of weapons.⁹ The perseverance, the discipline, and the skill in arms of the Thebans were such, and such the force of their solid column, that, after many had fallen, a part actually pierced the Lacedæmonian line, and reached the highlands of Helicon; but the greater part, compelled to retreat, were mostly put to the sword.

Xen. Hel.
I. 4. c. 3.
s. 13.

In this obstinate action Agesilaus was severely wounded. His attendants were bearing him from the field when a party of horse came to ask orders concerning about eighty Thebans, who, with their arms, had reached a temple. Mindful, amid his suffering, of respect due to the deity, he commanded that liberty should be granted to them to pass unhurt, whithersoever they pleased. In the philosopher-historian's manner of relating this anecdote is implied that, among the Greeks, in such circumstances, revenge would have prompted an ordinary mind; and, even in Agesilaus, the generous action is attributed, not to humanity, but to superstition; not to an opinion of the deity's regard for mercy and charity among men, but to the fear, unless it were rather the desire of inculcating the fear, of his resentment for

⁸ So even in his Agesilaus: c. 2. s. 12.

⁹ It is implied in the account of Xenophon that he was present, though, perhaps for political reasons, he has avoided speaking of himself. Plutarch expressly says that he was in the action—*παρῆν αὐτὸς τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ συναγωνιζόμενος*. Agesil. v. 2. p. 1106.

any want of respectful attention to himself. When pursuit ended, the victorious army anxiously employed itself in dragging the enemy's slain within its own lines: a remarkable testimony, from the same great writer, to the prevalence still, in a degree that may surprise us, of that barbarism in war, which in Homer's description is striking, though in his age less a matter for wonder. Xen. Ages. c. 2. s. 15.

Next morning early the troops were ordered to parade with arms, all wearing chaplets. Agesilaus himself being unable to attend, the polemarch Gylis commanded at the ceremony of raising the trophy; which was performed with all the music of the army playing, and every circumstance of pomp, that might most inspire, among the soldiery, alacrity and self-satisfaction. Why then no measures were taken to profit from the advantages, which victory apparently should have laid open, is not shown. The Thebans sending, in usual form, for permission to bury their dead, a truce was granted them, evidently for a longer time than, for that purpose alone, could be wanted. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian army withdrew into Phocis, a country friendly or neutral, to perform a ceremony to which Grecian superstition indeed attached much importance, the dedication of the tenth of the spoil collected by Agesilaus in his Asiatic command. It amounted to a hundred talents; perhaps something more than twenty thousand pounds. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 3. s. 14.

After this second triumphal rite the army, committed to the orders of Gylis, proceeded into the neighbouring hostile province of Ozolian Locris, where the object seems to have been little more than to collect plunder, which, according to the Grecian manner, might serve the soldiers instead of pay. Corn, goods, whatever the rapacious troops could find in s. 15. 16.

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the villages, were taken. The Locrians, unable to prevent the injury, did nevertheless what they best could to revenge it. Occupying the defiles which, in returning into Phocis, were necessarily to be re-passed, they gave such annoyance that Gylis was provoked to take the command of a select body in pursuit of them. Entangled among the mountains, he was himself killed, and the whole party would have been cut off, had not the officers left with the command of the main body brought seasonable relief. Agesilaus, still from his wounds unfit for fatigue, passed by sea to Laconia, and the army was distributed in quarters.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 1.

If any other writer gave any authority for the supposition, we might suspect that Xenophon's account of the battle of Coronea was written under the influence of partiality for his friend and patron, and that the victory was less complete than he has described it.¹⁰ Yet we are not without information of circumstances which may have given occasion for the line of conduct which Agesilaus pursued. The defeat of Cnidus produced a great and rapid revolution in Asiatic Greece. The small islands of Cos and Nisyra obeyed the first summons of the victors. The news alone sufficed to diffuse instant ferment over the rich and populous island of Chios. The democratical party took arms; the Lacedæmonian troops were expelled; and a message was sent to Conon, proposing a renewal of the old alliance with Athens. The

Diod. l. 14.
c. 85.

¹⁰ Plutarch is warm in zeal for the fame of his fellow-countrymen the Bœotians, yet he admits the victory of Agesilaus; and indeed it seems pretty evident that he had no account to follow but Xenophon's, or none more to his purpose; unless for some circumstances little important, for which he quotes no authority, and which are of very doubtful aspect.

SECT.
I.

powerful city of Mitylene in Lesbos, and, on the continent, Erythræ, with the still more important city of Ephesus, followed the example. Pharnabazus and Conon did not neglect encouragement for a disposition so favorable. Coasting northward, they sent requisitions to the Greek cities, both of the continent and the islands, for the Lacedæmonian governors to be sent away, but with promises that no citadels should be fortified to awe them, nor any violence put upon their municipal government. The liberal characters of the Persian satrap and the Athenian admiral procuring credit to the promises, the requisitions were obeyed with alacrity; and thus the fabric of the Lacedæmonian empire, seemingly so established by the event of the Peloponnesian war, and since so extended by the ability of the commanders in Asia, was in large proportion almost instantly overthrown. Most of the principal officers, and many inferior men, of the numerous Asiatic troops under Agesilaus, would be deeply interested in this revolution. The principal sources of pay for all would cease; and hence the plain of Coronea seems to have been the last field of fame for the Cyreans. We find no mention of them afterward from Xenophon: apparent proof that their following fortunes were not brilliant; not such as he could have any satisfaction in reporting. Probably they dispersed, some to their homes, some to seek new service, and never more assembled.

 Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 8.
s. 1. 2.

One superior man, Dercyllidas, preserved yet a relic of the Lacedæmonian empire in Asia. He was in Abydus when Pharnabazus and Conon passed along the coast; and the Abydenes, attached by his popular manners, and confident in his integrity and ability, were to be shaken neither by threats nor promises. Abydus became in consequence the refuge of the ex-

s. 4. 5.

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XXV.

pelled governors and their partizans. Strength thus collected, and credit gained, enabled Dercyllidas to prevent a meditated revolt in the neighbouring city of Sestus, on the European shore. But he could not preserve the other towns of the Chersonese, or give security to the colonists, who had settled in that fruitful country under the authority of the Lacedæmonian government. All were compelled to abandon their lands; and it was only within the walls of Sestus and Abydus that he could give present security to their persons and effects, with some faint hope of a settlement somewhere, at some future time, under Lacedæmonian protection. The satrap and the Athenian admiral endeavoured, by threats, by waste of lands, and by interception of maritime commerce, to bring Abydus to submission; but winter approaching, and the Abydenes continuing firm, they gave up the point, and directed their attention to increase their naval force for the operations of the following spring.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 6.

SECTION II.

Evils of the Grecian political system. Sedition of Corinth. Singular union of Corinth with Argos. Successes of the Lacedæmonian general, Praxitas, near Corinth.

The event of the Peloponnesian war, which placed the Lacedæmonian state decidedly at the head of the affairs of Greece, gave also, in the moment, a decided superiority to the aristocratical cause throughout the nation. But in the very establishment of that reign of aristocracy, the materials of a new revolution seem to have been prepared. Almost immediately the democratical interest gained the superiority in Thebes, where, for a long course of years, it had been held

in subjection. Unnoticed by historians as any result of that revolution in Thebes has been, it has been nevertheless evidently the leading step to some of the most important occurrences in Grecian history. The establishment of democracy there gave the first means for the restoration of democracy, which quickly followed in Athens. Corinth had long been closely connected with Thebes; and the growing jealousy of the Lacedæmonian power not only strengthened the bonds of friendship, but led both states to a connexion with Athens, to which they had lately been virulent enemies. Argos, always democratical, and the most ancient, most constant, and most determined of all the enemies of Lacedæmon, had for those very reasons commonly been the ally of Athens, and had always held communication with the democratical parties in Thebes and Corinth: so that, when Thebes and Corinth became democratical, the political connexion of Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and Argos was in a manner already formed. Thus, within a very short time after the triumph of the aristocratical interest, which the event of the Peloponnesian war produced, democracy was again approaching to preponderancy among the Grecian republics.

We have already had too many occasions to observe that, while Greece afforded the most sublime instances of virtue in individuals, extensive patriotism, political virtue pervading a people, was not more common there than elsewhere; but, on the contrary, political crimes, most atrocious crimes, abounded; the unavoidable consequences of a political system in which, through want of a just gradation of ranks, and amalgamation of interests, one portion of the people was, by political necessity, the enemy of another; and party-spirit was stimulated by those all-involving interests and dangers, which allowed none either to

CHAP.
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Pind.
Ol. 13.
Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

choose privacy, or to be, in a public situation, assured of the next day's fate. Notwithstanding that well-poised constitution and equal law, or, in the expressive language of Greece, that eunomy of the Corinthian state, which Pindar has apparently with justice celebrated, Corinth was not secure against those effects of sedition under which, during ages of her own prosperity, she had seen so many other Grecian cities suffering the direst calamities. Indeed no small state, the territory of a single city, can have the security of a large one, like the modern European kingdoms, against sedition within, any more than against war from without. In extensive territory distance gives leisure and opportunity for virtue and prudence, in one part, to obviate the measures of villany or madness in another. But, in a small state, a spark excited, if not extinguished in a moment, will, in the next moment, involve all in flame. Hence arose a supposed necessity, a most unfortunate necessity, could it be real, for not only indulgence, but encouragement, to individuals to assume public justice into their own hands, and assassination became dignified with the title of tyrannicide: a resource in its nature so repugnant to all civil security that, if it be allowed upon principle, any momentary good which it may possibly produce cannot fail to be followed by far greater and more lasting evil.

The Corinthian constitution, though evidently one of the best of Greece, if the ease of its subjects and security of person and property be the test of merit, neither excited the attention of foreigners, like the Lacedæmonian, by its pointed singularities, nor was blazoned, like the Athenian, through the superior talents of its own historians and orators. Corinth figured as an important member of the Grecian political system, but its particular history little en-

gaged curiosity; and thus we remain uninformed of what may have deserved to be known, the circumstances of that revolution by which the supreme power passed from the aristocracy, which had held it so long, and generally exercised it so ably. It seems very soon to have followed the revolution of the same kind in Thebes; the particulars of which are equally unrecorded. Possibly a general jealousy of Lacedæmon may have forced the leading men to consent to a connexion of the republic with the democratical states of Argos, Thebes, and Athens; and then that connexion itself would tend to give the democratical party the superiority against them.

Events adverse for the public are always favorable for the party in opposition to the existing administration. The defeat at Coronea would shake the democratical leaders in Corinth. A momentary relief would then come to them from the dismissal of the army of Agesilaus, which ensued. But presently new difficulties occurred. Sicyon remaining attached to Lacedæmon, a Lacedæmonian force was stationed there, with the double purpose of protecting the place and its territory, and keeping the war distant from Laconia. On the other hand, possession of the isthmus being a great point for both parties, troops were sent from Athens, Bœotia, and Argos, to assist the Corinthians in holding it. Thus the Corinthian territory became the seat of a winter war, which not a little pressed the Corinthian people, while their allies were quiet in their homes. Under these circumstances it became easy for the aristocratical chiefs to persuade the multitude that they had been misled; that their true interest would have kept them steady in their old alliance, the alliance of their forefathers, with Lacedæmon. Such is the nature of confede-

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 1.

CHAP. racies: each member, as it becomes pressed, grows
XXV. regardless of the common good, and attentive only
to its own.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 2.

B. C. 394.¹¹
Ol. 96. 3.
End of Au-
tumn or be-
ginning of
Winter.
[B. C. 393.
Cl.]

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 3.

The democratical leaders were aware of their danger, and not scrupulous about means of prevention. Xenophon, upon this occasion, does not spare his fellow-countrymen; he accuses the Athenian administration, together with the Bæotian and Argive, of being accomplices in the horrid plot. A time appropriated to religious solemnity, when it is esteemed decent, says the historian, to avoid the execution even of condemned malefactors, the last day of the Euclean festival, was chosen for a massacre; because then, all the people of all ranks being assembled in places of public resort, the business might be more readily and completely performed. A signal was given, and, in the agora, the execution began. Many were put to death before they had the least apprehension of danger; some in circle conversing, some engaged with the spectacles of the theatre, some even sitting in the office of judges. The rest fled to the nearest altars and images of the gods; but the assailing party, regardless of those salutary laws of superstition which even philosophy would approve as a check upon ruthless violence, killed them even in the most sacred places; so that amid the carnage a scene of impiety and scandal was exhibited, uncommon even in the fury of Greek sedition.

s. 4.

Those who fell in this massacre were mostly elders, of the principal families. Pasimelus, one of the chiefs

¹¹ Xenophon has by no means clearly marked this date. The mention of a Corinthian festival has principally furnished the clue for the industrious acuteness of Dodwell in the investigation of it.

SECT.
II.

of the youth, having some suspicion of what was intended, had assembled the younger of the aristocratical party in another part of the city. Surprised there by the outcry, and presently farther alarmed by the sight of some flying toward them for refuge, all ran to the Acrocorinthus; and overthrowing a body of Argives who, with a few Corinthians, opposed them, got possession of the fortress. Fortune could scarcely have given them a more desirable possession: yet an accident, the most insignificant, induced them presently to abandon it. They were consulting on measures to be taken, when from a column, near them, the capital fell; and, the cause of the accident not being obvious, it was taken for a portentous prodigy. Recourse was immediately had to sacrifice; and the augurs, from observation of the entrails, declared it advisable to quit the place. Political wisdom evidently was not upon this occasion the moving spring. A Themistocles, a Lysander, perhaps a Xenophon, would have proved the augurs mistaken. Utterly at a loss what to do and where to go, the fugitives, obedient to the expounders of occult science, hastened down the mountain, without any other hope than to find safety in exile. Dismay had sped them beyond the Corinthian border, when the lamentations of their mothers, the persuasion of their friends, and assurances of personal safety, given upon oath by some of the chiefs of the democratical party, induced them to return into the city.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 5.

The democratical leaders had now taken measures which they thought might suffice, without more murder, to establish the interest of their party. They had united their state in one commonwealth with Argos, thrown down the boundary-stones which marked the separation of the territories, abolished

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the Corinthian assemblies, and every characteristic of a distinct government, annulled even the name of Corinthians, and declared by law, solemnly decreed and proclaimed, that the two people were thenceforward to be all Argives. This is a singular phenomenon in Grecian history. A league between two cities, so close as to establish a kind of fraternity, we may have observed elsewhere:¹² the removal of the people of one town to establish them as citizens of another, we have also seen practised; but a union, such that one was lost in the other, or even that two should form but one state, with one republican government common to both, has not before occurred. To judge of the merit of the plan, our information of particulars is too defective; nor have we the opinion of Xenophon delivered in a manner at all satisfactory. Justly indignant at the crimes of those who carried the measure, feeling perhaps for persons known to him, who perished by it, and not wholly free from the prejudices of party, as a political project he has altogether slighted it; and it was too transitory to afford proof of its merit in practice.

The returned fugitives found their persons indeed safe, but their condition very much lowered. Their opponents held the sovereign power:¹³ they were themselves lost, in a city which, says the historian, was no longer Corinth but Argos. They were allowed the privileges of Argive citizens, or rather they were obliged to become members of the Argive

¹² Such a league, we learn, existed between the neighbouring cities of Chalcis and Eretria, in Eubœa; and something of the same kind between towns so far distant from each other as the Asiatic and the Italian and Sicilian Greek.

¹³ The expression of Xenophon is remarkable, 'Ορῶντες δὲ τοὺς τυραννεύοντας, κ. τ. λ.: and the whole passage is in terms not to be exactly rendered in modern language.

commonwealth; a privilege which they were very far from desiring; for with it they found themselves of less consideration, in their altered country, than many foreigners. In the true spirit of Grecian patriotism, narrow but ardent, they thought life, continues the historian, contemptible upon such terms; and they resolved (for, though frightened by the falling of a stone, they were brave men) that, at any risk, their country, which had been Corinth from earliest times, should still be Corinth.¹⁴ In the true spirit of Grecian love of liberty they resolved that Corinth should again be free. Personal freedom, as far as appears, themselves with all Corinthian citizens enjoyed; but Xenophon, swayed by party-prejudice, seems to have thought, with them, that association in civil rights, with the people of another free commonwealth, was a freedom not to be endured. To purify the city from the pollution of murderers, another of their resolutions, would have been of less questionable rectitude, had the means by which they proposed to accomplish it been unexceptionable. With all these ideas together their minds were highly heated: in-
somuch that, in their doubt of being able to accomplish their purpose, they could find gratification in the thought, as the contemporary historian assures us, that, ‘should their best endeavours fail, yet, in ‘pursuit of the greatest blessings, they should obtain ‘the most glorious of deaths.’

Thus prepared for bold exertion, Pasimelus and Alcimenes, young men of the first consideration in their party, undertook to communicate with Praxitas,

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 7.

¹⁴ - - - - τὴν πατρίδα, ὥσπερ ἦν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, Κόρινθον ποιεῖσαι, κ. τ. λ. It is difficult, in rendering this passage in modern language, to avoid an air of ridicule, which however Xenophon has certainly not intended.

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XXV.

the Lacedæmonian commander at Sicyon. To avoid observation and inquiry from the guards at the gates, they made their way out of the city by a gully, the course of a winter torrent, which interrupted the continuity of the wall; and they proposed to Praxitas to introduce a body of troops within that fortification, which, like the famous long walls of Athens, secured the communication of Corinth with its port of Lechæum. For the execution of their purpose they chose a night on which they were intrusted, by the existing administration of their country, with the guard of one of the gates of the long walls. Praxitas, at the head of a Lacedæmonian mora, with the whole strength of Sicyon and about a hundred and fifty Corinthian refugees, entered without opposition. Expecting however to be quickly attacked by superior numbers, he set immediately to raise works, which might enable him to maintain his ground till re-enforcement could reach him: for, on one side, Corinth was filled with a military people, strengthened by a body of mercenaries; and, on the other, Lechæum was held by a Bœotian garrison; nor was it doubted but the force of Argos would hasten to relieve the new member of the Argive commonwealth.

That day however, and the next, Praxitas held his situation unmolested; but, on the following morning, a body of Argives being arrived, Corinth poured out its force to attack him. We learn from Thucydides that, in his time, the general reputation of the Peloponnesian troops was superior to that of any others known. This reputation, it appears, was not lost when Cyrus raised his army to march against Artaxerxes. In the wars however which arose within Greece, after the conclusion of that distinguished by the name of the Peloponnesian, we find very great

difference among the Peloponnesian troops; a difference which could arise only from the different attention given to military discipline and military exercises, and the different manner in which such attention was enforced by the political institutions of the several republics. The Sicyonians, long allies of Lacedæmon, and continually serving with the Lacedæmonian forces, could not want means to know the Lacedæmonian discipline; yet their military was nevertheless held in contempt; and, in the battle within the long walls of Corinth, they proved the justice of the general opinion. Being attacked by the Argives, they yielded to the first onset; and, flying through their own entrenched camp, those who escaped the swords of the pursuing enemy were stopped only by the sea. Pisimachus, who commanded a small force of Lacedæmonian cavalry, was witness to this defeat. Either the nature of the ground forbade, or, through his ignorance of a service less cultivated by the Lacedæmonians, he saw no opportunity for bringing horse into action; and yet, indignant at the defeat of his friends, he resolved to act. Dismounting, he persuaded, for it seems he could not command, some of his cavalry to follow him. The method of our dragoons not being within their practice, they fastened their horses to some trees which happened to be near, and the small shields they carried on horseback not being fit for engaging with heavy-armed infantry, they supplied themselves with those of the slain and flying Sicyonians. Thus accoutred they marched against the Argives, who, seeing the Sicyonian mark, an *ess*, on their shields, little regarded their approach. Pasimachus, observing this, is reported to have said, using the common Lacedæmonian oath, ‘By the twin-gods, Argives,

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 10.

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XXV.

‘these esses shall deceive you.’ With the valor of a true Spartan soldier, but not with the just discretion of an officer, rushing then to the assault of numbers too superior, he was killed with most of his band.¹⁵

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 10.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed, having defeated the Corinthians and mercenaries, and committed pursuit to the Corinthian refugees, turned to engage the Argives. These, who so despised the Sicyonians, were so alarmed, in the midst of victory, by the approach of the Lacedæmonians, that, to regain communication with the city, as the means of support and shelter, they lost all other consideration. Hastening to pass that dreaded enemy, they exposed their right flank; of all things, in the ancient practice of war, the most dangerous; because the shield, so important for the soldier’s protection, became inefficient. The Lacedæmonians did not neglect the advantageous opportunity. The Argives, suffering in their defenceless flank, still pushed for the city-gate; but, before they could reach it, were met by the Corinthian refugees, returning from pursuit. This, checking their way, completed their consternation. The Corinthians in the city, fearing to open a gate, afforded them no other refuge than by ladders let down from the walls. The slaughter ensuing was

s. 12.

¹⁵ The speech of Pasimachus, in the original, forces itself the more upon notice by something of a whimsical effect, arising from the Lacedæmonian dialect, in which it is reported: *Ναὶ τὼ σὼ, Ἀργεῖοι, ψεύσει ὕμμε τὰ σίγματα ταῦτα*. Beside the general peculiarities of the Doric dialect, the Lacedæmonians, as appears fully in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, commonly pronounced Σ for Θ. The effect altogether would perhaps be most nearly imitated in English, by giving the speech in the Low-land Scottish dialect, and adding the change of S for Th: ‘By ‘se twain-gods, Argives, sese esses,’ &c.

such, that, says the historian, as corn, or billets, or stones are often seen, so the bodies lay in heaps. SECT. III.
 Praxitas then led his victorious troops to the assault of Lechæum, and added the Bœotian garrison there to the number slain.

The success of the Lacedæmonian arms was thus complete, and the dead, with the usual ceremonies, had been already restored, when the forces of the Peloponnesian allies of Lacedæmon arrived. Praxitas employed them in making a breach in the Corinthian long walls, sufficient for the convenient passage of an army: he then assaulted and took Sidus and Crommyon on the isthmus, and he fortified Epiïcia. Placing garrisons in all those places, by which he secured the command of the isthmus, he dismissed the rest of his army, and returned himself to Lacedæmon. Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 4. s. 13.

SECTION III.

Invasion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. Restoration of the long walls of Athens. Seafight in the Corinthian Gulf.

By the victories of Corinth and Coronea the force of the formidable confederacy formed against Lacedæmon had been broken; and, by the recent successes of Praxitas, the command of the isthmus being recovered, means were again open for carrying war against the enemies of Lacedæmon beyond the peninsula. Instead therefore of any longer dreading invasion at home, Lacedæmon should have been again formidable to her enemies. But that policy, by which she had profited in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, was now turned against herself: the wealth of Persia supported her foes; her command of the sea was already gone; and her armies, which

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should have carried vengeance against her most distant foes, were necessary at home, and yet unequal to the protection of her own coast.

Whatever personal esteem Pharnabazus might have for Agesilaus, he was highly exasperated against the Lacedæmonian government. Of a temper to feel the disgrace of the condition of a fugitive, to which, in the sight of all his dependents, and to the knowledge of the Persian court, he had been reduced, he was anxious to recover his honor, as he had been to vindicate his property. During winter therefore he was diligent in adding to the number of his ships, and in raising a force of Grecian mercenaries; the only troops that could be effectually opposed to Greeks; and he resolved to carry war, in person, to the coast of Laconia, where no Persian had ever yet appeared in arms.

Xen. Hel.
I. 4. c. 8.
s. 6. 7.

B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 3.

In pursuance of this resolution, embarking, in spring, with the Athenian Conon for his vice-admiral, he sailed among the islands of the Ægean; and, from the Ionian shore to Melos, all submitted. Proceeding then directly to the Laconian coast, he had the satisfaction to make good his landing on it near Pheræ, and to ravage unresisted the country around. Re-embarking before the Lacedæmonians could come in force against him, he repeated his debarkations in various parts for plunder, and always with success. Under the able advice of Conon, he did not loiter on a coast where rocks and tempests and want were to be apprehended not less than an enemy whom he well knew to be formidable. He crossed to the island of Cythera, which in the early part of the Peloponnesian war had been conquered by the unfortunate Nicias. Being without strong places, it yielded without resistance; and, in the idea

that it might be made a useful acquisition, a garrison was placed there, under Nicophebus, an Athenian. The satrap then directed his course to the Corinthian isthmus, where the congress of the confederacy was assembled. There he had opportunity to communicate with the leading men, and with them he concerted measures for the prosecution of the war against Lacedæmon. Leaving then a sum of money for its support, he returned with his fleet to Asia.

SECT.
III.

While the impression of satisfaction with his successful expedition, in which he had earned a glory so new to a Persian satrap, was fresh in the mind of Pharnabazus, Conon took the favoring opportunity for obtaining some most important advantages for his country. A man of courage and honor, the satrap was no deep politician. He felt keenly the injuries he had suffered from the overbearing power of Lacedæmon, commanding at once the naval and military force of Greece: but the expense of maintaining the fleet, by which he had delivered, and in some degree revenged, himself, pressed upon his treasury.

It was therefore a grateful proposal, which Conon made, to transfer a large share of that burthen to the Athenian commonwealth; urging however that, to enable Athens to bear it, two things were necessary; first, that the tribute from the islands, by which Athens had formerly maintained her navy, should be restored, the combined fleet enforcing regular payment; and then, that her long walls, so essential to her security against the overbearing ambition of Lacedæmon, should be rebuilt. The liberality of Pharnabazus granted all that Conon demanded. He allowed the fleet to be employed in re-establishing the claim of Athens to contributions for the support of her navy; he allowed the crews to be employed in

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 9. 10.
Diod. l. 14.

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working upon the long walls; he gave a large sum of money toward the expense, and he sent masons and mechanics to assist in the work. Neighbouring states, which had the democratical interest at heart, added their voluntary aid; and it is remarkable that among the most zealous and liberal were the Bœotians, lately the most vehement enemies of Athens, remorselessly urgent for its destruction. But so it was among the warring interests of parties, in the little republics of Greece: walls, connecting the capital with its ports, were esteemed the bulwark of the democratical, and the bane of the oligarchal cause. From the moment therefore when the revolution in Bœotian politics took place, whereby the democratical became the ruling interest, it became most the object of the leading men to restore what their predecessors in administration thought they had the greatest interest in destroying.

Thus Conon, thirteen years after his flight from his country's ruin, had the singular good fortune and glory to return, with the present of a fleet and fortifications, in short of dignity, power, and dominion in his hand. The gratitude of the Athenian people was shown in honors, we are told, of the highest kind, conferred upon Conon, and his friend and patron the virtuous tyrant of Salamis; of which however we find nothing specified but their portraits in marble, placed by the side of the statue of the Preserving Jupiter; in memorial, says the contemporary rhetorician, of the greatness of their services, and of their friendship for one-another. Of any gratitude shown by the Athenian people to the generous satrap we have no information. Possibly the prejudices of the age would not allow them to a barbarian, of whatever merit, of the same kind as to

Evagoras; who, though a tyrant, was a Greek, and an Athenian citizen.

SECT.
IV.

While the satrap's money thus laid anew the foundation of naval power for the Athenian commonwealth, it enabled the Corinthians to maintain a fleet for the security of their own gulf. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, utterly unable to oppose the fleet which, under Conon, commanded the eastern seas, equipped however a squadron to dispute the western with the Corinthians, and give protection to the Achæans, and others their allies in those parts. Coming to action with the Corinthian fleet, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Polemarchus, was killed, and Pollis, the next officer, wounded; but Taleutias, brother of Agesilaus, arriving with a re-enforcing squadron, the Corinthians avoided farther action, and the Lacedæmonians commanded the gulf.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 11.

SECTION IV.

Improvement of the Grecian art of war by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Affairs of Phlius. Causes of failing energy of Lacedæmon. Successes of Iphicrates in Peloponnesus. Antalcidas ambassador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the satrap of Lydia. Expeditions of Agesilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. Isthmian games. Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian mora. Farther successes of Iphicrates.

The Athenian forces had shared in the loss of two great battles, and in one of them had suffered considerably, but the Athenian territory remained yet unhurt by the war. The Lacedæmonians however commanding both the isthmus of Corinth and the gulf, the passage to Attica was easy for them; and, while the restoration of the long walls would

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of course excite their jealousy, the ravage of Laconia by Conon could not but have excited a desire of revenge. It was therefore much an object for the Athenians to keep the Lacedæmonians employed within their own peninsula. After the victories of Agesilaus and Praxitas it might indeed appear rash to send a land force to make war in Peloponnesus; but Athens, fertile in great talents, had a general formed for the peculiar circumstances of the existing occasion.

Iphicrates was the author of a system of tactics new among the Greeks. The phalanx, almost irresistible where it could exert its force, was cumbersome in evolution, unfit for mountainous or woody countries, incapable of rapid motion, either in pursuit or retreat. Its character is marked in a saying reported of Iphicrates. Comparing an army with the human body, the general, he said, was as the head, the light-armed as the hands, the cavalry as the feet, and the phalanx as the chest and shoulders. Of course he considered the Peloponnesian army, notwithstanding the general superiority of the heavy-armed, as very defective; for its light-armed were mere untrained or ill-trained slaves; and the cavalry generally deficient, both in number and discipline. Indeed, among the Greeks, cavalry was of little use but in pursuit, except against the light-armed; no body of horse daring to charge a phalanx; and hence the cavalry was compared to the feet. Under this view of things Iphicrates directed his attention to improve what he called the hands of the army. Athens had always had bowmen superior to the Peloponnesian, and had often profited from that superiority. Iphicrates conceived that great advantage might be drawn from an improved discipline of

the middle-armed or targeteers, who to the agility of the light-armed might unite some degree of the force of the phalanx. Indeed how much practice, in any of the three styles of discipline, was necessary to excellence, we may gather in some degree from Xenophon; where he observes that even a Spartan would not, with target and dart, engage a Thracian armed in the same manner, any more than the Thracian would, with shield and spear, engage any Greek practised in the discipline of the heavy-armed.

SECT.
IV.

Xen. Mem.
Socr.

Circumstances which brought forward for historical notice the little republic of Phlius, previously obscure among the complicated politics and wars of Greece, opened also the first field of fame for Iphicrates and his new system. Phlius was a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy when the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party were expelled. According to the general course of things in Greece, it was to be expected that Phlius would then renounce the Lacedæmonian alliance, and engage in the new confederacy of Bœotia, Athens, and Argos. But an inveterate hatred, a kind of horror of the Argives, pervaded all parties in Phlius: insomuch that it was resolved, with all the forbidding circumstances attending, to endeavour to preserve the connexion of the commonwealth with Lacedæmon. In other times probably, spurning at the proposal, the Lacedæmonian government would have commanded those who ruled in Phlius to restore the exiles: but, in the existing situation of affairs, Lacedæmon no longer held her former imperious tone; and, though the Phlians carried their avowal of jealousy so far as to refuse, in any case, to admit Lacedæmonian troops within their walls, their offered friendship was not slighted.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 15.

CHAP.
XXV.

The preference thus given by a democratical party to the Lacedæmonian alliance was a disappointment to the democratical confederacy, which excited revenge; and the central situation of Phlius, between Argolis, Corinthia, Sicyonia, and Arcadia, gave that little state an importance which urged attention. Accordingly Iphicrates led his targeteers into Phliasia, and marked his way with ravage. His purpose was to provoke pursuit, and lead the Phliasians into an ambuscade. He succeeded; and so large a proportion of their small force heavy-armed fell that the survivors thought themselves unequal, not only to the protection of their fields, but even to the defence of their walls. Pressed then by distress and danger, they were induced so far to remit their former jealousy as to request from Lacedæmon a protecting force, and even to put their citadel into the power of a Spartan governor. The trust was executed with fidelity, and even with scrupulous delicacy; for, when the Phliasians, after arranging their affairs, thought themselves again equal to their own protection, the Lacedæmonian government, in withdrawing the garrison, avoided even to mention a restoration of the exiles. The conduct was liberal and wise; worthy of Agesilaus, if he was the mover; but the Lacedæmonian administration cannot deserve quite so much credit for it as if they had been less under the pressure of difficult circumstances.

B. C. 393.
OL 96 $\frac{3}{4}$.

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 4.
s. 16.

After his success in Phliasia Iphicrates overran great part of Arcadia; and such was the new terror of his targeteers that even the Arcadian heavy-armed feared to quit their towns. The Lacedæmonians however were not to be so daunted. Iphicrates falling in with a body of them, his targeteers, according to their usual method, after throwing their javelins,

retreated to avoid stationary action. But the Lacedæmonians pursuing, such was the practised vigor of some of their younger men, with their full armour they overtook and killed some of the targeteers, and made some prisoners. After this experience, it was with difficulty that the targeteers could be led within dart's throw of any Lacedæmonian forces. Iphicrates nevertheless taught them still to support their reputation against other troops; insomuch that, near Lechæum, he defeated a body of Mantinean heavy-armed. Thus, says the contemporary historian, the Lacedæmonians, who held the targeteers in contempt, found reason to hold their own allies in still greater contempt; and it became a common sarcasm among them, that the allies were afraid of the targeteers as children of hobgoblins.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 4.
s. 17.

Notwithstanding the employment thus found for the Lacedæmonians by Iphicrates, the Athenians were still uneasy under the apprehension of a renewal of those evils which had been experienced in the frequent invasions of their country during the Peloponnesian war. They were therefore anxious to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the command of the isthmus, and with this view it was resolved to restore the long walls of Corinth. Accordingly the whole force of the commonwealth marched to support a body of workmen so numerous that the restoration of the western wall was completed in a few days. A good defence being thus gained on the side of Sicyon, the enemy's principal garrison in those parts, they proceeded with the eastern wall more leisurely.

In tracing, with the able contemporary historian, the events which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia and his victory in Bœotia, some wonder is

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apt to arise at the little exertion or little means, at the confined action and narrow views, of that seemingly formidable commonwealth, which, after the Peloponnesian war, completely commanded Greece, and not only threatened Persia, but was actually carrying conquest far into Asia. To her land force no misfortune had happened. On the contrary, before Agesilaus returned, a victory had checked the exertions of her enemies in Greece. He then brought to her assistance a powerful army of veterans, formed in various service, and he gained a victory on his arrival. This was followed by success under Praxitas, which secured the way for carrying invasion into the territories of any of the hostile republics. No use appears to have been made of these advantages. One defeat at sea had deprived Lacedæmon of her transmarine dominion, and three victories by land did not give her quiet within her own peninsula. From the course of Xenophon's narrative however may be gathered that two powerful causes for this apparent inertness and real inefficiency existed; the diminution of pecuniary resources, through the loss of the Asiatic dominion, and the disaffection of the Laconian subjects to the Spartan government. Means failed for putting the Asiatic army any more in action, and the measures of government for external exertion were cramped by the necessity of watching the disposition to revolt at home. Xenophon, on account of his connexion with the Spartan government, has spoken always with delicacy and reserve on both topics, yet he has not wholly omitted to throw light on them.

Humbled then and distressed, by land and by sea, abroad and at home, pressed and at a loss for measures, while his adversaries the Athenians were

recovering extensive dominion, the Lacedæmonians turned their thoughts to a reconciliation with Persia. They had experienced the advantage of the Persian alliance when they possessed it; they now felt its pressure against them; and they perceived that, contemptible as the military of the empire was become, yet, in the divided state of Greece, the Persian king, or even a satrap, by the force of money alone, employing Greeks against Greeks, could decide the balance between their republics. They had moreover had large opportunity to know that the councils of the Persian empire had scarcely more energy than its arms; so that, in the looseness of the connexion of the distant members with the head and with one another, means for negotiation and intrigue were almost always open. In the present moment Pharnabazus was highly incensed against them; and his resentment had afforded opportunity for the able admiral and minister of Athens to attach him to the Athenian interest. But the new satrap of Lydia, Tiribazus, had no cause of personal animosity, perhaps no principle of political enmity, toward them; and, to judge from past experience, the very attachment of one satrap to the Athenian might incline the other to the Lacedæmonian cause.

These considerations urging, Antalcidas was sent ambassador to Sardis. The Athenians, alarmed at this, sent also an embassy, at the head of which was Canon, accompanied by ministers from Bœotia, Corinth, and Argos. Antalcidas represented, that ‘the support, given by Pharnabazus to the Athenians, went far beyond what a just consideration of the interest of the Persian empire would allow: that, on the contrary, the terms of peace which, on the part of Lacedæmon, he was commissioned to ro-

B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 3.
Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 12. 14.

s. 13.

CHAP.
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‘ pose, could not fail of being agreeable to the king.
‘ The Lacedæmonians would no longer dispute the
‘ king’s sovereignty over the Grecian cities in Asia;
‘ and, for the islands and the European Greek cities,
‘ they only desired complete independency. Were
‘ then no sovereignty of one Grecian city over an-
‘ other allowed, it would be impossible for any to
‘ carry hostilities with any efficacy against the king;
‘ so that the expense of maintaining a fleet for the
‘ Athenians, and of making war upon the Lacedæ-
‘ monians, might be equally spared.’

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 15.

Tiribazus was pleased with this proposal, but the Athenian, Bœotian, and Argive ministers could not be brought to consent to a peace upon such terms. Under the stipulation for the independency of all Grecian states, the Athenians feared to lose the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus, their ancient possession, the Thebans their command over the Bœotian cities, and the Argives their new connexion with Corinth. As far therefore as peace was the object, the negotiation failed. But Antalcidas nevertheless carried a great point for his country; for he gained Tiribazus, who, scrupling to conclude an alliance with Lacedæmon without express authority from his court, secretly furnished money for the equipment of a Lacedæmonian fleet, imprisoned Conon on pretence of injurious conduct toward the king, and went himself to Susa, to solicit authority for the measures he desired to pursue.

s. 19.

While Antalcidas was thus successfully negotiating at Sardis, the Lacedæmonian administration, stimulated by the depredations of Iphicrates in various parts of Peloponnesus, and alarmed by the restoration of the long walls of Corinth, resolved at length to put Agesilaus again at the head of an army, and

appoint his brother Teleutias to co-operate with him in naval command. Quickly all Argolis was ravaged; and, the attention of the confederates being thus called to that country, Agesilaus suddenly crossed the mountains, while Teleutias conducted a squadron of twelve ships up the Saronic gulf, and not only the unfinished long walls of Corinth but also the naval arsenal were taken. The expedition was ably conducted, and the success important; yet, under the deficient administration of Lacedæmon, the blow was not followed: the forces of the allies were dismissed, and Agesilaus led the Lacedæmonians home to celebrate the Hyacinthian festival.

SECT.
IV.

Xen. *ibid.*
& Agesil.
c. 2. s. 17.

In the whole conduct of this war we find nothing like that greatness of design which might have been expected, could Agesilaus have directed measures. It was evidently a war of the ephors, and the king was merely the general, acting under their orders. In the ensuing spring he was directed again to put himself at the head of the army.¹⁶ The refugee Corinthians had communicated information that Corinth was principally subsisted from a stock of cattle, collected at an obscure port of the Corinthian territory on the Saronic gulf, of the same name with the celebrated harbour of Athens, Piræus. To deprive the enemy of that supply was thought an object for an expedition which the king should command. After events more adapted to engage and fill the mind, these little transactions are apt to appear uninteresting. They are nevertheless important, as they

B. C. 392.
Ol. 96. 4.
Xen. *Hell.*
l. 4. c. 5.
s. 1.

¹⁶ Neither season nor year is specified here by Xenophon; but the industrious acuteness of Dodwell, indignant at the evident confusion of Diodorus, has endeavoured to ascertain the dates from the mention of the Isthmian festival in the Hellenics of Xenophon, and of the Hyacinthian in the Agesilaus.

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XXV.

are connected with great revolutions that followed, links in the great chain of events; and sometimes as they afford information, the clearest and the most impressive, of the religion, politics, warfare, and manners of this interesting age.

Ch. 19. s. 2.
of this Hist.

The time selected for the expedition was that of the Isthmian games; which, in the Peloponnesian war, we have seen, diffused a temporary peace around them; insomuch that, amid designs and preparations on both sides avowedly the most hostile, the Athenians could safely trust their persons in the power of the Corinthians, then the most virulent of their enemies. But the same superstition, which at that time ensured the observation of the armistice, now provoked to interrupt the sacred season with hostility. Corinth, by fiction of policy being now Argos, Corinthians and Argives indifferently, but all with the name of Argives, presided at the ceremony, and performed the prescribed sacrifice to Neptune. This the Corinthian refugees held to be a portentous pollution. They claimed themselves to be the Corinthian commonwealth, the exclusive privilege and exclusive duty of whose members it was to officiate in that solemnity. The Lacedæmonians approving their claim, Agesilaus led his army directly to the isthmus. The Argives were not prepared against attack, nor even against surprise. They fled on the first alarm; yet not so timely but, as they hurried along the road by Cenchrea, they were seen by the Lacedæmonians from the heights above, and might have been overtaken, but Agesilaus would not allow pursuit. So little indeed was the approach of an enemy apprehended that the victim was left ready slain, and the preparations complete for the feast which should have followed. Agesilaus put his Corinthian friends

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 5.
s. 2.

in possession of these, and remained three days, while the sacrifices and games were performed under their presidency. Xenophon mentions, as a circumstance interesting to the Greeks, that after his departure the Argives caused the solemnity to be repeated in all its parts; so that some of the games were twice performed, and the same conquerors in some of them were twice proclaimed.

On the fourth day Agesilaus led his army to the Corinthian Piræus. There he found a large force so strongly posted, with Iphicrates commanding, that, in doubt of the success of an assault, he recurred to stratagem. Spreading report that Corinth was to be betrayed to him, he decamped suddenly and directed his march thither. The Corinthian administration were so little secure of their own people that, in great alarm, they sent for Iphicrates to come and save Corinth. That active general, ready at the call, with his light targeteers passed the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed in the night. Agesilaus, informed of this, returned at day-break to Piræus, and occupied the commanding heights. Upon this the troops remaining there, together with all the men, women, and slaves of the place, took sanctuary in a neighbouring temple of Juno, and soon after surrendered themselves to the mercy of Agesilaus. His generosity was not conspicuous upon the occasion; perhaps it was not at his command: those accused as accomplices in the massacre at Corinth were given up to the refugees: the rest, men, women, goods, everything included in the capture, were sold.

The terror of the arms of Agesilaus, probably however not unassisted by some intelligence or some apprehension of the success of Antalcidas in negotiation, brought ministers to the Lacedæmonian camp

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 5.
s. 3.

s. 9.

s. 5.

s. 6.

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from several of the hostile states, and particularly the Bœotian, to know upon what terms peace might be expected. These ministers were waiting the king's leisure, while, with designed ostentation, he was reviewing his captives and other booty, when a messenger arrived with intelligence of a disaster to the Lacedæmonian arms, which checked both their desire of peace, and his means to command it.

Xen. Hel.
I. 4. c. 5.
s. 11.

It was a custom from very early ages, and supposed of divine origin, that the Laconians of the town of Amyclæa, on whatsoever public service employed abroad, should return home to sing the pæan at the Hyacinthian festival. The season being at hand, Agesilaus, in marching for Piræus, had left all the Amyclæans of the army in Lechæum; directing the polemarch, who commanded the garrison there, to provide for the security of their return to Laconia. The polemarch, zealous in the execution of what was esteemed a sacred duty, committed the defence of Lechæum to the troops of the allies, while, with a mora of Lacedæmonian infantry, consisting of about six hundred men, and another of cavalry, probably a much smaller number, he marched to escort the Amyclæans. He took the road to Sicyon, not as the direct way to Lacedæmon, but as the readiest to get beyond danger from the enemy in Corinth, and to have a friendly line of country afterward to traverse, with a fresh escort, if it should be necessary. Having passed Corinth without molestation, and proceeded within four miles of Sicyon, he committed the Amyclæans to the charge of the cavalry, directing the commanding officer¹⁷ to accompany them as far as they should themselves desire, and then press his

s. 12.

¹⁷ His Athenian military title would have been *Hipparch*, but the Lacedæmonian was *Hipparmost*; which assists to prove

way back to overtake the infantry in their return to Lechæum. He knew that the force in Corinth was large; but the late successes of the Lacedæmonian arms had inspired confidence, and he thought none would dare to attack a body of Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.

Unfortunately for the Lacedæmonian cause, that very stratagem which gave Agesilaus easy possession of Piræus had considerably increased the force in Corinth, and at the same time sent thither a general not likely to miss an opportunity for striking a blow. Iphicrates was there with his targeteers; and Callias son of Hipponicus, chief of the Daduchian family,¹⁸ commanded a body of Athenian heavy-armed. They observed the polemarch returning, without cavalry and without light troops, and they led out their forces. Having preconcerted measures, Callias kept aloof, while the targeteers hung on the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonian column, directing their missile weapons at the undefended parts of the heavy-armed soldier's body. The polemarch continued his march under the annoyance, till several were wounded and some fell. He then ordered those within ten years after boyhood, perhaps those under four and twenty, to assault and pursue.¹⁹ This, a common expedient of the Grecian heavy-

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 5.
s. 15.

that *Harmost* may properly be rendered *Commander*, or *Governor*.

¹⁸ For this ch. 22. s. 2. of this Hist. may be seen.

¹⁹ Τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἡένης. The exact value of this expression, which occurs more than once in Xenophon, is, I think, not satisfactorily ascertained. According to Plutarch, the Lacedæmonian ἡένη, boyhood, seems to have ended at the age of twelve years, after which, to the age of nineteen, the Lacedæmonian youths were called Eirens. Thus the pursuers would have been those only between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two. [See vol. v. p. 47.]

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armed when unsupported by cavalry or light troops, had succeeded, as we have seen, once, even against Iphicrates: but to such an officer every loss was a profitable lesson, and the expedient succeeded no more. His targeteers, superior both in arms and discipline to any before known, evaded the pursuit of the Spartan youth, encumbered with their heavy-armour, turned upon them if they scattered, overtook them when they retreated, wounded many, killed some, and compelled the rest to rejoin the main body, upon which then, more daringly than before, they renewed their attacks. The polemarch was thus provoked to order all under thirty to assault. In retreating again more fell than after the former charge. Already the most active and daring soldiers were mostly killed or wounded when the horse joined. These were ordered to charge, and the younger men of the infantry with them. The cavalry service appears to have been ill-cultivated among the Lacedæmonians. Xenophon blames the conduct of their horse on this day. Instead of pushing the pursuit of the retreating targeteers they carefully kept even front with their infantry, halted when they halted, and retreated when they retreated. Immediately as they turned the targeteers turned, and horse and foot together suffered from their missile weapons. Another charge was then made; but in the same manner, and with no better success. As their numbers were thus reduced, their efforts slackened, and those of the enemy grew more spirited. Distressed and at a loss at length for measures, they halted on a small eminence, about two furlongs from the sea, and two miles from Lechæum. Thence, while suffering from missile weapons, and unable to return a blow, they saw, on one side, boats from Lechæum

intended to relieve them, on the other, the Athenian heavy-armed approaching to attack them. Upon this they took to flight. The horse escaped to Lechæum. Of the infantry, who mostly made for the sea, scarcely any survived.²⁰

Agesilaus, upon being informed of this disaster, seized his spear, and, not waiting to communicate with the enemy's ministers, who were attending, assembled all his officers. Having given his orders, he marched immediately with a chosen body, leaving the rest to follow after refreshment taken. He had already entered the vale of Lechæum when messengers met him, with information that the bodies of the slain were in the possession of their friends. Upon this he returned to Piræus, and next day, says the historian, with a simplicity which may excite a smile, he sold the prisoners.

This misfortune to the Lacedæmonian arms had an effect approaching that of the capture of Sphacteria, in the Peloponnesian war. It did not indeed give equal advantage to the enemy, because no prisoners were made. The loss in slain was very inferior even to what many of the little Grecian republics had often suffered; but it made great impression upon the Lacedæmonians, because, says the historian, they were unaccustomed to such blows; and, as Plutarch well remarks for readers less familiar with the ideas of the times, it was an unheard-of disaster, and esteemed

Xen. Hcl.
l. 4. c. 5.
s. 10.
Plut. Ages.

²⁰ Xenophon here says the killed, in all, were about two hundred and fifty. He had before said that the infantry were, in all, six hundred, and that those carried off by the shield-bearers, (*ὑπασπισταί*), before the first assault upon the targeteers, were all that were *really* saved, *μόνοι τῆς μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν*. It looks as if two hundred and fifty were the number admitted by the Lacedæmonians, but that the historian knew the real number to have been greater.

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a portentous event, that heavy-armed should be defeated by targeteers, and Lacedæmonians by mercenaries. A deep grief therefore, as the contemporary historian proceeds, pervaded the army: only, according to their great lawgiver's precept, the sons, fathers, and brothers of the slain, as sharers in glory earned through their family misfortune, ostentatiously exhibited a joy which among other people might have been esteemed indecent on the occasion. The

Corn. Nep.
v. Iphicr.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 5.
s. 9.

s. 10.

reputation accruing to Iphicrates was great throughout Greece, and the enemies of Lacedæmon were not a little encouraged. The Bœotian ministers, attending in the camp of Agesilaus, being sent for to declare the object of their mission, did not even mention peace, but only requested free passage to communicate with their troops in Corinth. Agesilaus knew that what they now wanted was to get information of the amount of the late success. Next day therefore, marching toward Corinth, he took them in his train, and allowed them a view of the trophy raised by their friends, which he would not permit his own troops to remove; but if olive, vine, or other valuable tree had escaped former ravage, he ordered it to be destroyed. Having made them spectators of this insult, to show that he could still command the country, he sent them, not into Corinth, but across the sea to Creusis, to relate in Bœotia all they had seen. Such at this time was the distraction of Greece within itself.

s. 18.

Here however ended exertion. Placing a complete mora in Lechæum, and taking with him the small relics of the mora which had suffered, Agesilaus marched for Lacedæmon. His anxiety to conceal from the friendly towns, in which he was to take quarters by the way, the amount of a loss apparently

so little considerable, is remarkable. He was careful to enter them all as late in the evening, and quit them as early in the morning, as with any convenience might be; and, finding the soldiers hurt with expectation that the Mantineans would take a malignant joy in their disaster, though he moved from Orchomenus at daybreak, and did not reach Mantinea till dark, he would not halt there, but still proceeded to the next town.

Xenophon has not said whether this retreat of the army was a measure of Agesilaus or of the ephors, or what necessity induced it. If not necessary, it appears an imprudent measure. Iphicrates presently took Sidus, Crommyon, and CEnoe; the two former garrisoned by Praxitas, the latter by Agesilaus himself. Thus all the territory northward and eastward was recovered for the Corinthians of the city, and the Lacedæmonians no longer commanded the isthmus. For the rest of the year operations were reduced to excursions for plunder, chiefly by those Corinthians of the Lacedæmonian party who had taken refuge in Sicyon. Since the misfortune of the Lacedæmonian mora, not daring to move far by land, they directed their little expeditions by water, whithersoever they had best hope of seizing, still only on the territory of their city, with least danger, any small booty that might contribute to their subsistence.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 5.
s. 19.

SECTION V.

Unsteadiness of the Persian government: war renewed by Lacedæmon against Persia: Thimbron commander-in-chief. Expedition into Acarnania under Agesilaus; into Argolis under Agesipolis.

During all this year the great fleet collected by Pharnabazus and Conon seems to have remained

B. C. 392.
Ol. 99. 4.

CHAP.
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inactive. Possibly, since the negotiation of Antalcidas, the imprisonment of Conon, and the resolution of Tiribazus to apply in person to the court of Susa, the Hellespontine satrap may have been cautious of taking a decided part: perhaps he may have been without an officer to whose ability or fidelity he would trust such a command. There was however evidently no steady policy in the Persian councils: nothing of that great design for establishing a commanding influence in Greece which later writers have fancied in them. Struthas, who, in the absence of Tiribazus, was appointed to the Lydian satrapy, instigated by consideration of injuries the king's territories had borne from the Lacedæmonians, (possibly his own property had suffered, or his family had been insulted,) warmly favored the confederacy now at war with them.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 17.

Ibid. &
Diodorus,
l. 14. c. 100.

The Lacedæmonian administration then, by what good policy prompted it is difficult to discover, renewed hostilities against Persia. The reappointment of Thimbron to a command, in which he had already shown himself deficient, strengthens the probability that the Lacedæmonian councils were at this time ill-directed; and the slighting manner, in which Xenophon repeatedly mentions that officer, enough marks that he was not chosen by Agesilaus. Thimbron had some success in plundering the Persian possessions in the rich vale of the Mæander; but he did not establish a better reputation for military ability than in his former command. Courage he possessed: but, though a Spartan, he was a man of pleasure; indulgent to his soldiers, careless of those for whose protection he and his soldiers were sent. Courage may be even mischievous in a general with deficient abilities. It led Thimbron to extravagant contempt of an enemy not incapable of profiting from his error. Struthas, having observed the hasty and careless

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 8. &
c. 2. s. 6.
& l. 4. c. 5.
s. 22.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 17.

s. 22.

manner in which he often led small bodies to action or pursuit, sent a few horse to plunder the Grecian possessions in the neighbourhood. Thimbron was sitting at table with the celebrated musician Thersander when intelligence came that the enemy he despised was thus insulting him. Immediately he rose; and Thersander, expert in martial exercises, and an emulator of Spartan prowess, followed him. In his usual manner, without any previous care to have troops in readiness, Thimbron hastened, with the first he could collect, to chastise the plunderers. Struthas presently appeared with a large body of horse in good order: the Greeks were overpowered, and Thimbron and Thersander were killed. The rest of the Grecian army, advancing too late to support their improvident general, were then charged and broken. A few saved themselves in the neighbouring friendly towns; but the greater part fell by the swords of the conquering Persians.

This serious check stopped, for a time, that apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia which had followed the recal of Agesilaus. Meanwhile, in Europe, some accidental circumstances, and not any great design, led or rather forced them to carry their arms beyond Peloponnesus.

Such was the unfortunate implication of interests in the Grecian political system that, unable ever or anywhere to give peace, which was its object, that system had a constant tendency to spread the flames of war. Calydon, a principal town of Ætolia, had renounced its connexion with the body of the Ætolian people, and made itself a member of the Achæan people, on the other side of the Corinthian gulf. We find here again something like that fiction of policy by which we have lately observed Corinth be-

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 6.
s. 1.

CHAP.
XXV.

come a part of Argos. The Achæans however found the acquisition inconvenient; for, to preserve it, they were obliged to keep a body of forces in Calydon, and sustain a war with the Ætoliens.

Ch. 15. s. 6.
of this Hist.

We have formerly seen the Acarnanians, after a course of successful warfare, generous at the same time and prudent in granting terms of peace to their defeated neighbours. From that period they had passed more than fifty years in so fortunate an obscurity as to offer, for the historian's notice, neither crime nor misfortune. They were now led again to step forward on the field of fame. The Ætoliens, anxious to recover Calydon, and unable with their own force, solicited and obtained the good offices of their allies of Acarnania. The Acarnanians had alliance with the Athenians and Bœotians, who readily contributed assistance against allies of Lacedæmon. Thus the Achæans became so pressed as to be unable to preserve Calydon, unless they also could obtain assistance. They applied of course to Lacedæmon; but they found the Lacedæmonian administration little disposed to send a force beyond Peloponnesus. Thinking themselves ill used, they remonstrated warmly. 'Wherever the Lacedæmonians required their services,' they said, 'they always marched on the first summons; and, without reciprocal assistance in need, they could no longer abide by a confederacy, the terms of which were so unequal. Instead of any more sending forces to serve in the Lacedæmonian armies, they must necessarily employ their whole strength against their own particular enemies, or make a separate peace upon the best terms they could obtain.'

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 6.
s. 2.

s. 3. 4.

This remonstrance had the desired effect; and the abilities of Agesilaus were in consequence to be em-

played in a war whose object was that the people of the obscure town of Calydon should be members of that branch of the Greek nation called Achæans, and no longer of that called Ætolians. He led into Acarnania two moras of Lacedæmonians, with the whole strength of Achaia, and the contingents of all the other allies. No force that the Acarnanians could raise was able to oppose him in the field. Terms of peace, which he offered, being refused, he made complete destruction of the country as he went, but he advanced only ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians were thus encouraged to bring their cattle, which had been driven far among the mountains, back again toward their best pastures, and to return themselves to the tillage of great part of their lands. Agesilaus obtaining intelligence that almost the whole stock of the country, with numerous attending slaves, was collected on the borders of a lake about twenty miles from his camp, by a hasty march came upon it by surprise, and took almost all.

SECT.
V.

[B. C. 391.
Cl.]

Xen. Hel.
I. 4. c. 6.
s. 6.

The proposed business of the next day was to give rest to his troops, while he sold his captives to the slave-merchants, the common attendants of a Grecian army. Meanwhile the Acarnanians assembled in great numbers on the heights around his camp. Less practised than the Peloponnesians in the discipline of the heavy-armed, the Acarnanians were remarkable, through Greece, for their expertness in the use of missile weapons; and they so annoyed the army of Agesilaus within its lines that they compelled him, when evening was already approaching, to move his camp to ground less commanded. After this experience he was anxious, on the following day, to regain the plain. But he found the heights commanding his way occupied; and the activity of his

s. 7.

s. 11.

CHAP.
XXV.

younger soldiers was in vain exerted to repel or deter the assaults, made or threatened from them. His small body of cavalry was equally inefficient on ground so hilly and rough. Thus, through the usual deficiency of a Peloponnesian army in light troops and cavalry, he was in no small danger from an enemy, who, in any number, would not stand the assault of almost the smallest detachment that he could send against them. Fortunately he discovered a better passage which, though guarded by the Acarnanian heavy-armed, he resolved to force; and, not without difficulty, principally arising from the annoyance of missile weapons, he succeeded.

Regaining thus at length the plain, he extended ravage on all sides. To gratify the Achæans he assaulted some towns, but without success. Autumn then advancing, he proposed to quit the country. The Achæans, dissatisfied that not a single town had been gained either by force or persuasion, urged him to stay, so long at least as to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing their winter grain. Such, in the deficiency of means for the attack of walls, was, yet in that age, among the modes of reducing an enemy to terms. Agesilaus however replied, ‘that they ‘mistook their interest; for he intended to return ‘next summer; and the enemy’s solicitude for peace ‘would be exactly proportioned to their fear of the ‘destruction of a plentiful harvest.’

To regain Peloponnesus then for winter quarters was a business not without difficulty and danger. The command of the isthmus was lost, as we have seen, in the autumn of the former year, by the retreat of Agesilaus himself, after his success at the Corinthian Piræus, and the unfortunate action which took place at the same time near Lechæum. An

Athenian squadron, commanding the western seas, watched the passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus. No alternative remained but to march through the hostile country of Ætolia; a country so strong by nature that, says the historian, neither a great nor a small force can traverse it against the good will of the warlike inhabitants. Agesilaus was skilful and fortunate enough to induce them to acquiesce, by holding out the hope of recovering Naupactus, so long held by the Messenians.

In the following spring the army was reassembled. The Acarnanians, informed of this, began to consider, says again the historian, that as they had no sea-ports through which to obtain supplies, the destruction of their harvest would produce all the evils of a blockade of their towns. They sent therefore ministers to Lacedæmon, and a treaty was concluded which established for them with the Achæans peace, and with the Lacedæmonians that kind of alliance, familiar among the Greeks, by which the forces of the inferior people were to march at the command of the superior. The Acarnanians however, being not likely to be zealous allies, the principal point gained, by success in this little war, was the prevention of the secession of Achaia from the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

This however was the more important, as an enemy already existed, within Peloponnesus, so powerful as to make it dangerous for the Lacedæmonians to send any large proportion of their forces beyond the peninsula: Attica and Bœotia had been secure through their alliance with Argos. It was resolved therefore now to carry an expedition into Argolis itself; and the young king Agesipolis, son of Pausanias, just of age, and highly ambitious of distinction, was appointed to the command.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 6.
s. 14.

B. C. 390.
Ol. 97. 3.
Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 7.
s. 1.

s. 2. 5.

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The army was ready to march, and the border-passing sacrifice had been declared propitious, when a herald arrived from Argos with a proposal of truce. The superstition of the young king, or of his council, was alarmed; insomuch that he went to Olympia to learn, from the oracle of Jupiter, if he might religiously refuse a truce insidiously proposed: for it was notorious that no sincere desire of peace had prompted the Argives, but the mere purpose of averting an invasion which, with their single strength, they could not oppose, and of which intelligence had reached them too late to call in their allies. The god signified that the truce, iniquitously offered, might be religiously refused. Not even thus satisfied, Agesipolis proceeded to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, 'If he was of the same opinion with his father.' Such, precisely, is the philosopher-historian's expression. But this transaction, whatever may appear ridiculous in it, shows the value of that union in religion which obtained through the Greek nation. It was a beneficent superstition that could occasion but a pause about prosecuting the ravages of war, and generally ensure opportunity for treating about peace.

Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 7:
s. 3.

Apollo however confirmed the opinion of Jupiter. Agesipolis then hastened to Phlius, where he found his army assembled, and he marched immediately, by the way of Nemea, into the vale of Argos. On the first evening, during the usual libations after supper, an earthquake was felt. The Lacedæmonians, taking it as a favorable omen, sang the pæan to Neptune, the supposed author of earthquakes; but the allies were alarmed; and, in justification of their fears, they observed that Agis, upon a similar occasion, had withdrawn his army from Elea. Agesipolis however ably refuted their construction of the omen: 'Had they been but about to enter the enemy's territory,' he

Ch. 24. s. 2.
of this Hist.

said, 'the earthquake would have indicated the god's prohibition of the measure: being already entered, it declared his approbation.'

SECT.
VI.

The terrors of the army being thus quieted, a sacrifice was performed to Neptune, and then ravage was carried to the very gates of Argos; which the Argives feared to open even to admit a body of Bœotian horse coming to their assistance; who would have been destroyed, as they stuck, in the historian's phrase, like bats under the battlements, had not the Cretan bowmen of the Lacedæmonian army been accidentally absent. After plunder and destruction widely spread, the symptoms in a sacrifice deterred the proposed fortifying of a post in the country, and Agesipolis, returning home with his booty, dismissed his army.

SECTION VI.

Affairs of Rhodes: Diphridas commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia; succeeded by Teleutias. An Athenian fleet sent to Asia under Thrasybulus: Asiatic and Thracian dominion recovered to Athens. Death of Thrasybulus and Conon. Anaxibius commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia, Iphicrates of the Athenians: defeat and death of Anaxibius.

The destruction of the army under Thimbron, while the abilities of Agesilaus were confined to the Acarnanian war, had checked the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia. Sedition, arising from the incompatibility of interest of the wealthy and the poor, that great mover of Grecian domestic politics, again drew the attention of the Lacedæmonian government thither, and Asia was an inviting field for those who could obtain commands.

B. C. 391.
Ol. 97. $\frac{1}{2}$.

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XXV.

That civil order, or, in one word of his own close and expressive language, better painting his object, that eunomy, which Strabo admired in the island of Rhodes when, in common with all surrounding countries, it held its government under patronage of the Roman empire, did not at this time flourish there. The rich and the poor could not agree upon a form of government which might enable them to hold their fine island in independency, though no foreign power offered them violence. Incapable of coalescing, and each beyond all things decided against submission to the other, each solicited subjection to a foreign authority. After the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war the many had for some time rested under the government of the few, the party everywhere patronized by the conquering people. But, when the Lacedæmonian interest in Asia was suddenly overthrown, when Athens again became a name among the Grecian powers, and an Athenian admiral commanded the seas, whether from ambition of chiefs or sufferings of the people, or both together, civil contest arose; the democratical party, forming connexion with Athens, obtained the superiority; and all the men of higher rank were expelled. Lacedæmon, of course, became their refuge. The Lacedæmonian administration thought it important to prevent such an accession as that of all Rhodes to the Athenian dominion; and so little was apprehended from the fleet lately so formidable under Conon that eight triremes were supposed sufficient for the purpose. But the intelligence, on which this judgment was formed, appears to have been very defective; for the Rhodians themselves possessed twice the number of ships of war; so that the Lacedæmonian squadron, having reached the port of Cnidus,

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 20.

B. C. 391.
Ol. 97. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 21.

without an object to which its strength was equal, remained mostly there. SECT.
VI.

When it was resolved, at Lacedæmon, to keep a squadron on the Asiatic station, it was resolved also to send an officer to take the command by land in Asia Minor, who might collect the broken relics of Thimbron's army, preserve the towns yet disposed to the Lacedæmonian interest, and prosecute war against Struthas. This command was committed to Diphridas; who, though unsupported by any force from Peloponnesus, yet by his activity in business, civil and military, with assistance from the pleasantness of his manners, restored in a considerable degree the Lacedæmonian affairs in Asia. In several towns the Lacedæmonian interest was revived or confirmed, and a fortunate incident gave means for raising an efficient military force: Tigranes, with his wife, the daughter of Struthas, was made prisoner; and a large sum being obtained by their ransom, Diphridas used it to raise a body of mercenaries, which he found means also to support.

In the following year the Lacedæmonian administration, earnest to recover Rhodes, ordered Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, to pass with his squadron from the Corinthian gulf to Asia, and take the command-in-chief. Thus re-enforced, the Asiatic fleet consisted of twenty-seven ships, with which Teleutias was proceeding from the station at Cnidus to Rhodes when he fell in with an Athenian squadron of ten, and took all. Xenophon remarks an inconsistency in the measures of both parties on this occasion.

²¹ This and the preceding are Dodwell's dates, made out from circumstances in Xenophon's narrative. [Mr. Clinton also assigns the capture of the ten Athenian vessels by Teleutias to B. C. 390.]

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 22.

B. C. 390.²¹
Ol. 37. $\frac{2}{3}$.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 23.

CHAP.
XXV.

The Athenians, in actual alliance with Persia, or, at least, with the western satraps, had sent that squadron to assist Evagoras king of Cyprus against Persia; and the Lacedæmonians, at actual war with Persia, intercepted that squadron going to fight against their enemies. But what seems principally to deserve notice is the evidence afforded of the weakness and distraction of the Persian councils, in consequence of which that vast empire submitted to insults, on all sides, from the little Grecian republics. These, if they sought its alliance, sought it through insults and injuries; and, in the actual enjoyment of great advantages from its alliance obtained, still they did not refrain from insults and injuries.

The usual activity of the Athenians was excited by the loss of their ships, and by the apprehension that the Lacedæmonians might recover the dominion of the sea. A fleet of forty triremes was committed to the orders of Thrasybulus. That able and experienced officer, pressing his way to Rhodes, found Teleutias there. The Rhodian refugees held a post in the island, which he had fortified for them. With some assistance from him they had ventured a battle, but were defeated, and the democratical party commanded the country. Thrasybulus therefore, finding them thus able to support themselves, and having tried in vain to bring Teleutias to action, proceeded to the Hellespont. Hostilities had arisen between Amadocus, or Medocus,²² paramount sovereign of the Odrysian Thracians, and Seuthes, the prince restored, through the assistance of the Cyrean Greeks, to the command of the country bordering on the

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 25.

²² In the Hellenics we find the name written Amadocus, in the Anabasis always Medocus, which is the orthography that Diodorus has followed, l. 4. c. 95.

Propontis. He effected a reconciliation between them, and, by forming an alliance with both for the Athenian commonwealth, he added considerably to the importance of the Athenian patronage for the Grecian towns on the Thracian coast. He proceeded then to Byzantium, and restored the collection of the toll, formerly imposed by the Athenians, of a tenth of the value of the cargo of all vessels passing the Bosphorus.²³ Seemingly this should not have been a measure very agreeable to the Byzantines, who might naturally enough think themselves best entitled to such a tax collected there; but, among the Greeks, when party-views interfered, the general interest of the commonwealth was little considered. Thrasybulus abolished the oligarchal government, established in Byzantium by the Lacedæmonians, and restored democracy. With the democratical party therefore, thus become the ruling party, the Athenian name was highly popular; and in the first moments of joy anything was borne from their benefactors. If indeed from the accounts given even by Xenophon, the friend

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 27.

²³ Ἀπέδοτο τὴν δεκάτην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων.—Decumam, e Ponto navigantibus impositam, publicanis vendit.—Decimas eorum quæ e Ponto veherentur, ἀπέδοτο, locavit, scilicet, publicanis. Hesychius: ἀπέδοτο, ἐκδέδωκε. Ἐκδιδόναι autem, apud Herodotum, idem quod μισθῶσαι. Though I have not on all occasions perfect faith in Hesychius, for explanations relating to the age of Xenophon, yet I believe these may be nearly right. I should however have been glad of more explanation on the subject from Xenophon himself. He indeed mentions the thing again in other words, rather confirming these interpretations, presently after:—ἡ δεκάτη τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πεπραμένη εἴη ἐν Βυζαντίῳ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. s. 31.—venditam ab Atheniensibus esse rerum e Ponto vectarum decumam. [There is another gloss of ἀπέδοτο in Hesychius: ἀπέδοτο ἀπεπωλήσατο: on which Alberti remarks: ἀπημπολήσατο scripsisse puto Hesychium. Ἀπεμπολήσατο correxerat Kuster.]

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XXV.

and admirer of Lacedæmon, a general judgment is to be formed of the conduct of some of the Lacedæmonian governors upon some occasions, it was not wonderful that popularity should attach in the moment to any change.²⁴ Thrasybulus had similar success at Chalcedon. The other Grecian towns, on the Asiatic shore, were already in the interest of Athens as the ally of Persia, or of the satrap in whose province they lay, excepting only Abydus, where at the time nothing invited his endeavours.

His next attention therefore was given to the large and rich island of Lesbos; large among the islands of the Ægean, but scanty to form a state sufficing for its own protection. The Lesbians nevertheless had no notion of coalescing under one government. Four, five, or six towns affected each its separate sovereignty. Mitylene, the most populous and powerful, was attached to the Athenian interest; all the others to the Lacedæmonian; and in Methymne, the next in power to Mitylene, a Lacedæmonian harmost resided. But refugees from all were unceasingly watching opportunities for restoring themselves. On these circumstances Thrasybulus founded the project of bringing the whole island into the interest, and, in effect, under the dominion of Athens. He was well received in Mitylene; and, by holding out the hope that all Lesbos might be reduced under their dominion, he engaged the Mitylenæans to march with him against Methymne. The refugees from the other towns were induced to join him by

²⁴ Plutarch mentions it as a popular saying in Greece, (Age-sil. v. 2. p. 1107.) that the Lacedæmonians collectively (*δημοσίῳ*) were the better men, but the Athenians individually (*ιδίῳ*). It was with individuals in command that the colonies had mostly to do.

the hope, otherwise desperate, of restoration to their country. The Lacedæmonian governor, venturing an action with him, was defeated and killed. Some of the towns then surrendered, and the plunder of the lands of the rest served for present pay to the victorious army.

SECT.
VI.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 30.

The dominion, or the influence, which Athens formerly held over that large part of the Greek nation which was settled in the islands, on the Asiatic coast, and on the Hellespontine shores as far as the Euxine, was now in great proportion recovered. Abydus, yet held by Dercyllidas, and the few Ionian towns that Diphridas had been able to preserve to the Lacedæmonian interest, were the principal exceptions. After these important services it remained still for Thrasybulus to accomplish what was the particular object of his instructions in leading the armament from Athens. Having therefore passed the winter in Lesbos,²⁵ he was anxious in spring to get to Rhodes as early as possible, but to get there prepared in the most effectual manner to meet such a commander as Teleutias. Money, which the treasury of his republic could not supply, must be obtained to support his armament. On that curious subject, the collection of tax or tribute from those numerous self-governed towns, over which the patronage of Athens extended or the fear of its arms operated, though

B. C. 389.
Ol. 97. $\frac{3}{4}$.

²⁵ We find Xenophon still deficient in marking dates ; but the laborious ingenuity of Dodwell has again here, I think, been successful. Contrary to Diodorus, he has assigned the departure of Thrasybulus from Athens to about midsummer of the year B. C. 390. ; his departure from Lesbos, in which he agrees with Diodorus, to spring B. C. 389. [The death of Thrasybulus, Mr. Clinton observes, 'happened in the archonship of Demostratus, and perhaps in the beginning of B. C. 389.' *Fasti Hellen.* p. 98.]

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XXV.

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 100.

mention of it frequently occurs, we do not find among ancient writers the desirable explanation. Thrasybulus, after obtaining money from many other towns, proceeded to Aspendus on the river Eurymedon, the scene of the celebrated double victory of Cimon over the Persians. The Aspendians had already paid a contribution, when some irregularities committed by the troops so exasperated them that they attacked the Athenian naval camp by night, and Thrasybulus was killed in his tent.

Such was the end of a man of no common merit, tried on various occasions; in seditions among fellow-citizens, in commands against common enemies, and proved, in them all, for honesty and true patriotism, at least after Aristides and Cimon, the most unequivocal character among the numerous superior men that Athens had to that time produced. But, in Athens, no character could escape the licentious calumny of those who made accusation a trade; and, among the remaining orations of Lysias, we find Thrasybulus involved in a charge of peculation. Certainly the mode used by the Athenians, extorting revenue with an armed force, gave the tax-gathering generals great opportunity for sinister practices: but then it opened unbounded opportunity for calumnious imputation, difficult for the clearest probity to refute; because, to prove honesty, a negative must be proved. Xenophon appears to have had no partiality for Thrasybulus: in party indeed they were rather opposite; but in relating his death he speaks his panegyric: ‘Such,’ he says, ‘was the end of Thrasybulus, a man of the highest estimation;’²⁶ a concise, yet perhaps

²⁶ So I think the import of the Greek phrase may most fairly be given in our language,—*μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι*—which the Latin translator has rendered perhaps as nearly as the

a completer eulogy than, in all his remaining works, we find bestowed upon any other political character, excepting only his particular friend and patron Ag-silaus.

SECT.
VI.

To the loss of this great man was added that of Conon; of whose fate after his imprisonment by Tiribazus we have nothing certain; but it seems most probable that he escaped from confinement, reached the island of Cyprus, where he had large property, and died there.²⁷

Isocr.
Paneg.
p. 270. t. 1.
Lys. pro
bon. Ari-
stophanis,
p. 155. vel
638.

Latin language would admit,—*maximâ virtute viri*. Cornelius Nepos's eulogy of Thrasybulus seems the same expression amplified in translation: 'Si per se virtus sine fortunâ ponderanda sit, dubito an hunc (Thrasybulum) primum omnium ponam, Illi sine dubio neminem præfero; fide, constantiâ, magnitudine animi, in patriam amore.'

²⁷ The biographer Nepos says that, according to some reports, Conon was carried into the king's presence, and was put to death, or died, in Upper Asia; but that, according to the historian Dinon, in his opinion the best authority for Persian affairs, he escaped from confinement. It is somewhat remarkable that none of the extant contemporary writers mention the death of so illustrious a man. Xenophon relates his imprisonment, and there leaves him. A licentious Latin translation seems to have led some to quote Isocrates as asserting that he was put to death by the Persians—*Κόνωνα μὲν—ἐπὶ θάνατον συλλαβεῖν ἐτόλμησαν*—(Paneg. p. 268. t. 1.) which, apparently for the sake of a rounder period than an exact version would readily have allowed, is rendered by Auger, *Cononem comprehensum interficere ausi sunt*. The meaning appears to me to be no more than that they seized him with the purpose of putting him to death; and as the completion of the purpose is not expressed, it seems implied that it did not follow. From Lysias we learn that the large property of Conon in Cyprus was disposed of, after his death, in conformity to a written will which he left, (Lys. pro bon. Aristoph. p. 155. vel 638.) and it seems in some degree implied, in the same passage, that he died there. The omission of all mention of his death, after noticing his imprisonment, seems to mark that Xenophon knew nothing of his having been put to death by the Persians.

CHAP.
XXV.

As no others perhaps could have raised Athens from ruin to that degree of strength and splendor which she had already recovered, so none possessed the means of Thrasybulus and Conon, whether by abilities and experience, or by interest and influence among Grecian states and foreign powers, to promote still her progress to empire. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless were alarmed at what had been already done, and especially at the recovery of the command of the Bosporus, and of the toll collected there. Dercyllidas, who had remained in his government of Abydus without a force sufficient for effectual operation against Thrasybulus, was, perhaps, while the affairs of Greece required the presence of Agesilaus, the fittest man that Sparta could furnish for the Asiatic command. But the interest of Anaxibius prevailed with the ephors. He sailed with only three triremes and no troops, but he was furnished with levy money for a thousand men.

To supply the lost abilities of Thrasybulus and Conon, Iphicrates now stood foremost among the Athenian officers. It is an important, though, for the modern reader, an over concise passage of Xenophon, in which he mentions that Iphicrates, while commanding in Peloponnesus, put to death some Corinthians for their zeal for the connexion with Argos; a violence of which the united republics took no farther notice than to dismiss him and his troops, with the pretence of having no farther need of them.

Nevertheless the appointment of a new commander from Lacedæmon, to act in the Hellespont with an increased force, induced the Athenians to send Iphicrates thither with eight triremes and twelve hundred targeteers. Desultory expeditions, for the collection of booty, for some time employed both generals. A

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 31.

s. 32.

s. 33.

s. 34.

proposal to revolt at length coming to Anaxibius from a party in Antandrus, he led thither the greater part of his force, consisting of Abydenes, mercenaries, and those Lacedæmonian governors, with their followers, who had taken refuge in Abydus, with Dercyllidas. Iphicrates, informed of this movement, crossed the Hellespont in the night, landed on the Asiatic shore, and, directing his march toward Cremaste, on the highlands of Ida, where, says Xenophon, were the gold mines of the Antandrians, he took a station commodious for intercepting the Lacedæmonians on their return. His squadron hastened back to Sestus, and, at daybreak, according to orders given, moved up the Hellespont toward the Propontis. It was seen from the Asiatic shore holding that course, and the feint completely deceived Anaxibius; who, in the persuasion that Iphicrates was gone on some expedition to the northward, marched in full security. He no sooner saw the Athenian infantry, so well was the ambushade planned, than he saw his own defeat inevitable. With the ready and firm conciseness of a Spartan, addressing his people, he said, ‘It will be proper for me to die here: hasten you to save yourselves before the enemy is upon you.’ Taking then his shield from his shield-bearer, and being joined by twelve of the expelled Lacedæmonian governors, they fought on the spot till all were killed. This testimony to the remaining vigor of the institutions of Lycurgus is the more remarkable as Xenophon, in doing justice to the bravery of Anaxibius, appears to have been very far from having had either personal regard for him, or esteem for his character.²³ The rest of the army flying was pur-

Xen. Hel.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 37.

s. 33.

²³ Dercyllidas appears to have been much the friend of Xenophon, who seems to have thought him ill used by the appoint-

CHAP. XXV. sued, with considerable slaughter, to the very walls of Abydus.

SECTION VII.

Freebooting war of the Æginetans against Attica: siege of Ægina. Lacedæmonian public revenue. Connexion of Athens with Cyprus. Teleutias commander on the Grecian coast: Antalcidas commander in Asia, and again ambassador from Lacedæmon to the satrap of Lydia. Able conduct of Antalcidas, in military command and in negotiation. Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Persia, and peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian government, in the king of Persia's name, commonly called the peace of Antalcidas.

B. C. 387.*
Ol. 97. $\frac{3}{4}$

While Athens was recovering empire beyond the Ægean, she was suffering at home those evils of predatory war to which, in the scantiness of their territories, the most powerful of the Grecian republics were always liable. Hitherto commercial intercourse between Athens and Ægina, though Ægina was of the Lacedæmonian alliance, had not been interrupted; the Lacedæmonians themselves, in the desire of finding opportunity to divide the formidable confederacy that opposed them, having been cautious of carrying hostility directly against Attica. But since a naval war was begun, in which the Athenians of course took

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 1.
s. 1.

ment of Anaxibius to supersede him. By Anaxibius himself, when he had before the command in the Hellespont, Xenophon had been, as we have seen, according to his own account, very ill treated. It may deserve observation that he mentions the impiety of Anaxibius, shown in his contempt of augury, as among the causes of his catastrophe.

[*Mr. Mitford states below that Chabrias, as he proceeded to Cyprus, to aid Evagoras, landed at Ægina to repress the annoyance suffered from that island. According to Mr. Clinton, Chabrias was dispatched with succours to Evagoras B. C. 388. Fasti Hellen. p. 100.]

the lead, such caution was laid aside; the Æginetans were encouraged to infest the Attic trade and pillage the coast, and Ægina became again 'the eyesore of Piræus.'

SECT.
VII.

Distressed by this annoyance, the Athenians sent Pamphilus with ten triremes and a body of heavy-armed to besiege Ægina. Teleutias happened to be in the neighbourhood, collecting tribute among the islands. For notwithstanding their professions of total disinterestedness during the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians had now avowedly, and indeed not without necessity, abandoned that system, and followed the example of Athens in raising a public revenue. After the Peloponnesian war, according to Diodorus, they collected yearly a thousand talents, perhaps near two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, which he seems to have considered as a great exaction. On the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet the Athenian squadron retired, but the siege of Ægina by land was continued. The season of the annual change of commanders occurring soon after, Hierax, the successor of Teleutias in the command-in-chief, led the greater part of the fleet to Rhodes, leaving only twelve triremes under Gorgopas; who, with that small force, so blockaded the Athenian troops that they suffered and risked more than the Æginetans whom they were besieging. An exertion of the Athenian government relieved them by reconveying them to Attica. But, immediately as the Æginetans were thus set at liberty, depredation was renewed on the Attic shores with increased sedulity and vigor. A squadron of thirteen triremes was therefore appointed, under the command of Eunomus, to guard the coast. By a surprise in the night, ably conducted, Gorgopas took four, and compelled the rest to seek shelter in the harbour of Piræus.

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 2.

Diod. 1. 14.
p. 400.

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 3.

s. 5.

s. 3. 9.

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XXV.

We cannot refuse admiration to the activity and spirit of enterprise of the Athenian government, which, amid these distresses at home, could direct its attention to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and, while Attica was so pressed, could resolve to send succours to a distant ally, a meritorious ally indeed, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus. We find lofty eulogy on the mutual friendship, the magnanimous friendship, of the Athenian people and Evagoras, uninterrupted in various fortune, and in a length of years, among ancient and modern writers, but the contemporary writer is not among them. Declamation rather than reason seems to have been thought fittest to give credit to such mutual sentiments, though the connexion certainly subsisted between a single despot and a despotic multitude. But political connexions have commonly their real source in mutual wants; and we are not wholly without information of those which produced, and maintained, the friendship between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis.²⁹ Athens had a population which the scanty produce of its own barren and narrow territory with cultivation long wholly interrupted by hostile armies, and, of late years, committed almost entirely to slaves, could not feed. Its nearest resource was Eubœa; its greatest the shores of the Euxine. But, in wars so frequent and almost continual among the Greeks,

²⁹ Valuable information no doubt may be gathered from that oration of Isocrates entitled *The Encomium of Evagoras*, which is said to have been written for the funeral of the Salaminian prince. It is however not by taking ingenious panegyric in the lump, but by sifting it, by comparing it with information remaining from other, especially contemporary, writers, by observing its connexion with the course of events, and its consistency with known facts, and with the temper of mankind and of the age, that the truly valuable is to be discovered and ascertained.

the hazard for heavy trading-ships, in threading the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, and then winding their way among the islands of the *Ægean*, was so great that supplies from that plentiful country would be precarious, and other resources highly desirable. From Cyprus the navigation to Athens might be open when that from the Euxine was precluded; and a contemporary orator informs us of one occasion, when Athens, pressed by dearth and apprehension of famine, looked principally to Cyprus for relief. Probably the service of the Athenian people which procured Evagoras the honor of being admitted to the freedom of the city, consisted in supplying them with corn in the last years of the Peloponnesian war. Such a benefit would be likely to make impression on the many, to win their favor and engage their attachment, even to a tyrant; while their leaders, more particularly connected with him, would know how to esteem the connexion which enabled them to minister to the wants of the many, their tools and masters. On the other hand, for Salamis Athens was a valuable market; and to Evagoras, pressed by the control of Persia, at the discretion of its satraps, sometimes threatening his safety, always checking his ambition, every alliance, founded on mutual interest, and especially that of a maritime power like Athens, would be highly valuable.

SECT.
VII.

Andoc. de
reditu.
Ch. 22. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Induced by such considerations, with perhaps others less indicated by ancient writers, the Athenian government resolved that a considerable force should pass to Cyprus; and the advantageous choice was made of Chabrias, one of the first military characters of his active age, for the command. But that Attica might be safe while a large part of its force was on distant service, the armament was directed first to

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 10—13.

CHAP.
XXV.

the repression of the annoyance suffered from Ægina. Chabrias landed on that island; an action ensued; Gorgopas was killed, and such slaughter was made of his troops and seamen that, for some time, the Attic coast and navigation, in the contemporary historian's expression, were unmolested as in peace.

The Lacedæmonian revenue, notwithstanding the tribute collected, was evidently scanty for the expense of a naval war; a deficiency to which, apparently in a great degree, must be attributed the narrow and desultory exertion by land. After the blow in Ægina the surviving crews refused to obey the orders of Eteonicus, who succeeded Gorgopas in the command, because he had no pay for them. The resource of the Lacedæmonian government was in the personal character of Teleutias. Not raised to fame by any achievement of extraordinary splendor, Teleutias had the merit of attaching, in a singular degree, the affection and esteem of those who served under him. On his arrival to take the command from Eteonicus joy pervaded the armament. Assembling the soldiers and seamen, 'I bring no pay with me,' he said, 'but, God willing, and you assisting, I will endeavour that you shall not want. You know that, when I commanded before, my door was always open to any who desired to speak with me, and so it shall be now. When you have plenty you shall find me well supplied; but when you see me bearing cold and heat and watching, you must expect in these also to have your share. You have, I know, deserved the reputation of brave men. It will be your business now to increase that reputation. We must labor together, that we may enjoy together; and what is more gratifying than to procure our subsistence by our arms, without flattering any man,

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 13.

s. 3. 4.

‘Greek or barbarian, for pay? Plenty at the enemy’s expense is at the same time wealth and glory.’ He was answered with a universal shout, ‘Command, and we will obey!’

SECT.
VII.

Teleutias resolved immediately to use this ready zeal. He ordered all aboard in the evening, with one day’s provision; and crossing the gulf, to within a mile of the harbour of Piræus, waited for daybreak. With his small squadron, only twelve triremes, he then pushed into the port. A force more than sufficient to overwhelm him was there, but not a ship in a state for action. The surprise was as complete as he had foreseen or could wish. The triremes which fell readily within his reach he rendered unserviceable; many laden merchant-ships he towed away, and some of his crews, leaping ashore, surrounded some sea-faring and mercantile men, and forced them aboard, prisoners. Alarm spread rapidly among the inhabitants: those within doors ran out to inquire what the disturbance was; those without, as where defence (not the business merely of a garrison) was the near interest of all, hastened in for their arms; while some ran to the city to communicate the intelligence; and shortly all Athens, horse and foot, came down, in the apprehension that the port was already in the enemy’s possession.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 1.
s. 16. 17.
& 18.

Meanwhile Teleutias, sending away his prizes under convoy of four triremes for Ægina, with the rest of his squadron coasted Attica southward. Numerous fishing vessels, with some passage-boats from the islands, concluding that a squadron from Piræus must be Athenian, fell into his hands without attempting flight. At Sunium he captured several trading ships, some laden with corn, some with other merchandize. Directing then his course to Ægina, and

s. 19.

s. 20.

s. 21.

CHAP.
XXV.

there selling his prizes, he gave his crews a month's pay in advance, and quickly his complements, which he had found deficient, were filled with volunteers; and he had a squadron as zealous in the service and orderly as it had lately been backward and mutinous.

But when a naval force, without which their own territory must always be insecure, could not be maintained and brought into action without the singular ability and popularity, and perhaps too the good fortune, of a Teleutias; when, after great victories by land, they had scarcely advanced a step against their enemies, even in Europe; and, in Asia and the islands, the extensive command which devolved to them by the extinction of the empire of Athens was nearly passed away, the Lacedæmonians became aware that their resources were unequal to break a league of half Greece against them, assisted with money from Persia: they found that a war to pull down the once widely dreaded power of Athens, and a war to maintain their own power, now become little less invidious, were very differently considered by those whose support was necessary to them; and that, after recalling their able and successful commander from Asia, not only their authority among the Grecian states of their alliance, but even the safety of their own territory, was precarious.

Under this pressure, looking around for means of relief, there were circumstances affording hope that negotiation with Persia might be attempted with advantage, and the resolution was taken to make the trial. Tiribazus, who had shown a disposition so friendly to them, was returned to the chief command in Asia Minor; and the hostile Pharnabazus, honored with the gift of the king's daughter in marriage, was gone from his satrapy to the capital. At the same

time, in consequence of successful negotiation at Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. s. 25. Syracuse and among the Italian states, a powerful re-enforcement to the fleet was expected; which might enable Lacedæmon to treat upon more equal terms than if excluded from the seas, and sinking under her enemies' arms. Antalcidas, who had successfully conducted the former negotiation with Tiribazus, was the person who stood forward for the s. 6. & 22. B. C. 388. Ol. 98. 1. management of the business, or whom the administration, and apparently the public voice, called for. Besides his interest in Lacedæmon, which appears to have been powerful, not only the favor he had acquired with Tiribazus, but his connexion of hospitality with Ariobarzanes, who governed the Hellespontine satrapy in the absence of Pharnabazus, strongly recommended him; and he was appointed both commander-in-chief in Asia, and ambassador to the Persian government.

Arriving at Ephesus in autumn, Antalcidas sent B. C. 388. Ol. 98. 1. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. s. 6. & 22. the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes, under his vice-admiral Nicolochus, to oppose Iphicrates in the Hellespont. He went himself immediately to wait upon Tiribazus, whom he found not only disposed to Lacedæmon and to himself in the same friendly manner as before, but furnished with authority from his court to engage in even offensive alliance, for the purpose of compelling the confederated republics to accede to terms of peace which had been settled in the Persian cabinet.³⁰ Returning then to

³⁰ - - - - - *ζυμμαχεῖν βασιλέα, εἰ μὴ ἐθέλοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ζύμμαχοι χρῆσθαι τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἣ αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν.* Upon a comparison of this passage with that where Tiribazus was last before mentioned, the meaning of the historian appears, I think, clearly that given in the text: but the incomplete connexion and deficient explanation in many parts of the Grecian annals show that the work never had the author's finishing hand.

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 7. & 22.

Ephesus, the satrap accompanied him.³¹ There intelligence came to them that Iphicrates, having collected all the scattered naval force of the Athenians in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont, to the number of thirty-two triremes, blockaded Nicolochus in the harbour of Abydus; and it was to be feared that the squadron, daily expected from Syracuse and Italy to assist the Lacedæmonians, would be intercepted. Upon this Antalcidas hastened by land to Abydus. By a stratagem he took eight triremes, proceeding from the Thracian coast to re-enforce Iphicrates. He was soon after joined by twenty from Sicily and Italy. Collecting then the naval force of all the Ionian towns, over which the influence of Tiribazus extended, and, through the friendship of Ariobarzanes, receiving some even from the Æolian, which would rather have gone to re-enforce the enemy, had Pharnabazus remained in the satrapy, he was at the head of a fleet of above eighty triremes. The Athenians were utterly unable to contend with this force: the Lacedæmonians commanded the seas; and the Athenian authority, trade, and revenue in the Hellespontine countries ceased.

s. 26.

Antalcidas, possessing means thus for conquest, persevered nevertheless in his purpose of making peace; and the temper of the principal belligerent republics, which had felt severely the pressure of war, at this time favored his purpose. The Athenians, seeing the command of the sea decidedly gone

³¹ Ὁ δὲ Ἀντακίδας κατέβη μὲν μετὰ Τιριβάζου. The historian has omitted to mention whether Antalcidas went to wait upon Tiribazus. The Latin translator seems to have understood it to be in Upper Asia; but I rather think the word κατέβη means no more than that Tiribazus *came down* to the coast with Antalcidas, probably from Sardis.

from them, and the great king, who had been theirs, become the enemy's ally, fearing a second siege of Athens itself, and in the mean time unable to protect their territory against the ravage even of Æginetan privateers, were earnest for peace. Even the Lacedæmonians, employed, in some towns, in guarding against the danger of foreign assault, in others in the more irksome service of obviating sedition and preventing revolt; a whole mora stationed in Lechæum and another in Orchomenus, while Corinth was a constant and most harassing object of contest; tired of continual calls to these and similar duties, were little allured by the prospect of conquest beyond the Ægean. Still more the Argives, distressed by repeated ravage of their rich territory, more exposed than any others of the confederacy to a repetition of the evil, and without a fleet to revenge, or transmarine possessions whence to supply themselves, had more than others occasion for peace. The Bœotians only remained, less solicitous to put an end to a war from which latterly they had less suffered, but which they could not support alone.

The proposal however for peace was not made in a manner the most creditable to Lacedæmon, or likely to be very gratifying to the Greek nation. It came from Tiribazus in the form of a requisition for a congress of ministers from all the belligerent republics which might be disposed to accede to terms of peace to be offered by the king. Nevertheless all sent their ministers. The congress being opened, Tiribazus produced a rescript from the king, showed

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 27.

B. C. 386.³²
Ol. 98. 2.
Spring.
[B. C. 387.
Cl.]

³² Polybius (l. 1. p. 7.) and Strabo (l. 6. p. 287.) say, that the peace of Antalcidas was made in the 19th year after the battle of Ægospotami; and this has been the canon to which Dodwell has accommodated his dates. [* Mr. Clinton considers the treaty

Xen. Hel.
1 5. c. 1.
s. 28.

the royal signet, and then read thus: ‘ Artaxerxes
‘ the king holds it just, That all cities on the conti-
‘ nent of Asia belong to his dominion, together with
‘ the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus; and that all
‘ other Grecian cities, little and great, be independent,
‘ except that the islands of Lemnus, Imbrus, and
‘ Scirus remain, as of old, under the dominion of
‘ Athens. If any refuse these terms, against such
‘ I will join in war with those who accept them, and
‘ give my assistance by land and by sea, with ships
‘ and with money.’³³

However strange this dictatorial address from a Persian governor to the Greek nation may appear to those whose ideas of the Grecian spirit of independency have been drawn from declaimers under the Roman empire, yet, from contemporary writers, it does not seem that the general mind was greatly shocked by it. Evidently however the Greeks had no reason to fear, and did not fear, the Persian military power. Persia was incomparably weaker than in the reign of Xerxes, and Greece united would have been stronger. Perhaps indeed there never existed, at any period, a nation so superior in military force to the rest of the world, as that assemblage of little military commonwealths at this time was, could they have been firmly united. But though incapable of

to have been concluded about autumn. Dodwell’s inconsistency respecting the date of the battle of Ægospotami is pointed out in the Appendix to the *Fasti Hellenici*, p. 270. His erroneous date of the peace of Antalcidas is examined *ibid.* pp. 276, 277.]

³³ The change from the third to the first person here copied from the Greek has probably been preserved from the Persian.

Clazomenæ was separated by so very narrow a strait that it was generally considered as a city of the Ionic main: it has been specified here apparently to obviate cavilling.

steady union, they had felt severely the inconveniences of discord, and of that unfailing source of discord, the separate independency of every city. Nothing but the fear of greater, and indeed of the greatest evils, could have produced the submissive attachment of the smaller republics to Athens or Lacedæmon; while even those commanding cities found perpetual uneasiness from an authority which they could neither quietly hold nor safely abdicate. When the military power of Persia then ceased to be feared; when, on the contrary, the Grecian military were sought by the Persian satraps, and employment in the Persian service became familiar to Grecian troops; when friendly intercourse and the pledge of hospitality became common between Greeks of rank and the Persian great; but especially after the high favor with which Cyrus had distinguished the Greeks, and when the event of his expedition had so clearly shown that the Persian king was to be feared only on account of his wealth, which enabled Greeks to subdue Greeks, but no longer enabled Persia, without Grecian assistance, to be formidable to Greece, the Persian king might be considered as no unnatural mediator in the destructive quarrels of the Greeks among themselves. Accustomed to the authority of men nearer their own level, officers of the Lacedæmonian or Athenian governments, they little felt the indignity of submission to the mandate of the great potentate of Asia.

Thus prepared then, all the belligerent republics, upon being applied to by their respective ministers at the congress, immediately acceded to the terms proposed. Even the Thebans did not, as far as appears, profess to make any difficulty. Their great object was, not the freedom of Greece, but the esta-

Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 1.
s. 29.

CHAP.
XXV.

blishment of their own power over all the Bœotian towns. They required therefore that the oath of the Theban ministers should be taken as the complete representatives of Bœotia. A remarkable controversy ensued. Agesilaus, says the historian his friend, declared he would not accept their oath, unless made in exact conformity to the king's rescript, which required the independency of every Grecian city, little and great. The Theban ministers said that 'no such requisition had been received at Thebes.' 'Go then,' said Agesilaus, 'and ask. But at the same time tell your employers that, unless they comply, Thebes will be excluded from the benefit of the peace.' The ministers went accordingly: but Agesilaus, in his animosity against the Thebans, would immediately employ coercive measures, and his influence decided the ephors. Orders were issued for the army to assemble, Lacedæmonians and allies, at Tegea; and the king himself, after a propitious border-passing sacrifice, hastened thither. Before he was ready to march however the Theban ministers returned, with a declaration of the acquiescence of their commonwealth. Thebes accordingly was admitted to the general terms of peace, and the Bœotian towns were restored to independency.

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 1.
s. 30.

s. 31.

The Corinthians and Argives, after having separately sworn to the peace,³⁴ were still for preserving the union of the two republics; but this could not be done, so powerful still was the adverse party in Corinth, without keeping a body of Argive troops there. Agesilaus threatened immediate hostility against both Corinth and Argos if these were not withdrawn. A reluctant obedience was paid to his

³⁴ This is not directly said, but seems clearly enough implied in the concise expression of Xenophon.

requisition thus enforced. Upon the departure of the Argives all those Corinthians who, since the Argive connexion, had been living in banishment, returned to their country; those who had been most active in promoting that connexion, together with the more notorious of those who had been concerned in the massacre which preceded it, aware that Corinth was no longer a place of safety for them, emigrated; and Corinth and Argos became as formerly, distinct republics. Thus peace was established throughout Greece; armies were dismissed, fleets laid up; and friendly and commercial intercourse became open, among all the republics of the nation; at least as far as the political circumstances of the country would allow; numerous citizens of every republic remaining in exile, and faction yet within all.

Agesilaus, it is evident, approved the treaty of Antalcidas; and, in one of the most studied of the political tracts of Isocrates, in which he has most urgently contended for the general freedom of Greece, we find it not only approved, as a proper measure at the time, but recommended as a model for following occasions. ‘Nothing,’ he says, ‘can be juster, nothing more advantageous for Athens.’³⁵ On another occasion indeed, when stimulation against Lacedæmon was among his objects, he has taken the abandoning of the Asian Greeks to subjection under

Isocr. de
Pace,
p. 172. t. 2.
ed. Auger.

Isocr.
Panathen.
p. 496. t. 2.

³⁵ Plutarch, in his life of Agesilaus (p. 1111.) says that Antalcidas was the political enemy of Agesilaus; but the contrary appears sufficiently evident from Xenophon; and, were confirmation wanting, we have it, from Plutarch himself; for, according even to his account, Agesilaus justified the treaty in argument, and supported it by deed; p. 1112. ed. H. Steph. In his life of Artaxerxes Plutarch is very futile on the subject of this treaty.

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Persia as ground for vehement invective. And indeed throughout Greece, wherever there was a disposition adverse to Lacedæmon, or the purpose of exciting such, this appears to have been a favorite topic for reproach. Hence perhaps Xenophon, in his general history treating of the peace of Antalcidas as if concurring in sentiment with his patron Agesilaus, has, in his panegyric of that prince, wholly avoided the subject. The surrender of the patronage of the Asiatic Grecian states was indeed a surrender of the proudest and fairest claim of glory that Lacedæmon perhaps ever acquired. Yet it seems not justly to be imputed as a peculiar crime or dishonor to Antalcidas. A similar or rather a more disgraceful dereliction of the cause of those states occurred on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. They had been found under the protection (so half Greece would have termed it, but at worst under the dominion) of a Grecian people; they were left to the mercy of barbarians, in subjection to the Persian empire. But on the present occasion the Lacedæmonians had to allege that not they, but their enemies, had betrayed the common cause of the nation, by producing the necessity for recalling Agesilaus from those glorious exertions which had rescued the Asian Greeks from foreign dominion, and given them independency.³⁶

³⁶ One cannot but smile at the grave assertion of Diodorus, that the abandoning of the Asian Greeks was what hurt the Athenians and Thebans on this occasion. Diod. l. 14. c. 111. The Asian like the European Greeks were divided between the aristocratical party and the democratical. Perhaps both would be as free and happy under Persian as under Lacedæmonian supremacy. The aristocratical would have been sure to suffer under Theban or Athenian.

A deep policy has, by some writers, without any apparent foundation, been attributed to the Persian court in this transaction. Considering the interest of Lacedæmon as distinct from the common interest of Greece, Antalcidas certainly served his country very ably. Simple and concise as the terms of the peace are, not only they appear directly calculated to promote the interest of Lacedæmon, but (except as far as dominion in Asia may have been an object of ambition) they answered the principal purposes of Lacedæmon completely. To break the growing power of Thebes by emancipating the Bœotian towns and to divide Corinth from Argos, had been the great objects of the war, and were the immediate effects of the peace; for the more ready and quiet production of which Athens was bribed with permission, contrary to the general spirit of the treaty, to retain the dominion of its three islands. Accordingly it is observed by Xenophon that the Lacedæmonians established their credit and influence in Greece much more completely, and put their commonwealth altogether in a much more splendid situation, by the peace which had its name from Antalcidas, than by that which had concluded the Peloponnesian war; and it is remarkable that he attributes the advantage to their having presided in the business (modern language will scarcely render his expression more exactly) under a commission from the Persian king.³⁷ So much, however, if we may trust Plutarch for the anecdote, was Agesilaus persuaded that the

Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 1.
s. 33.

Plut. Agesil.
t. 2. p. 1112.

³⁷ - - - - οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· προσάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης, κ. τ. λ.


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interest of Lacedæmon was well considered in the treaty, that, when somebody, reviling the peace of Antalcidas, said that Lacedæmon was gone over to the Persian interest, ‘Rather,’ he answered, ‘Persia ‘to the Lacedæmonian;’ and so, in truth, it seems to have been.

END OF VOL. IV.

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